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THE VEDĀNTA-SŪTRAS

WITH THE

ŚRĪ-BHĀSHYA

OF

RĀMĀNUJĀCHĀRYA.

Translated into English

BY

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THIS VOLUME

IS DEDICATED TO

The Right Honourable Professor F. Max Muller,

by the

TRANSLATORS

in grateful recognition of his valuable services rendered

to the cause of Sanskrit Literature.

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PREFACE.

THIS is the first of the three volumes in which it is proposed to bring out an English translation of Râmânujāchārya's *Sri-Bhāshya*, his well-known commentary on the *Vedānta-Sūtras* of Bādarāyana. The *Vedānta* of India has now fully established its title to occupy a prominent place among the various systems of philosophy known to the world; and one aspect of it commonly called the *Adwaita-Vedānta* has long been familiar to European scholars, and has even met with fair recognition at their hands. Rāmānujāchārya's *Sri Bhāshya*, is an exposition of the *Viśishṭādwaita* aspect thereof, and it well deserves to be quite as widely known and appreciated as the *Adwaita-Vedānta* of Sankarāchârya. The *Viśishtādwaitins* represent a school of *Vedāntic* thought, of which Sankarāchārya himself has taken cognisance in his writings, and there is evidence to shew that it must have come down in the form of an unbroken tradition from very ancient times. The Bhāgavatas and Pāncharātras, who have obviously played a very important part in the history of Hindu religion, are in all probability the original system-makers of this school, which appears to be as old as the *Upanishads* themselves. The *Upanishads* and the *Bagavadgitā* teach both *jñāna* and *bhakti*; that is, they teach that both *wisdom* and *worship* are capable of forming the means for the attainment of salvation. All along in our history some seekers after truth and salvation may be seen to have relied more upon *wisdom* than upon *worship*, while others have relied

more upon *worship* than upon *wisdom*. This division in religious thought is truly representative of two dissimilar innate tendencies in human nature, and the Bhāgavatas belong to the latter class. How far the *Viśishtādwaita* school interprets the *Upanishads* and the *Bagavadgītā* aright is thus a question to which each earnest student of the *Vedānta* has to find his own answer. The discussion of the various *Vedāntic* problems dealt with in this volume is so full and so well expressive of the fundamental conclusions embodied in the *Śrī-Bhāshya* that it gives the volume a characteristic completeness, in spite of its being only a part of the whole work. It is therefore expected that students of Indian philosophy and Hindu religion will find this volume to be interesting and instructive.

For the purposes of this translation we have consulted three editions of the *Śrī-Bhāshya*—the Madras edition printed in Telugu characters, the Benares edition in Devanāgari characters, and the incomplete Calcutta edition, also in Devanāgari characters and published by the Asiatic Society, We have found the Madras edition the most accurate among these, and have accordingly followed it in our translation. The style of the *Śrī-Bhāshya* is severely argumentative and controversial, and it is also technical and terse. We have, however, tried our best to make the translation smooth and intelligible without any way sacrificing its faithfulness to the original. The additions and alterations needed to make the English rendering full and accurate are all enclosed within curved brackets ; and the references to the various quotations and authorities cited in the work are generally given within square brackets, a few of these references being also given in foot-notes. Foot-notes have been sparingly given, and only in places where it was thought they were absolutely necessary for the elucidation

and proper understanding of the text of the translation. With the object of enabling the readers to make out easily the nature and the relations between the various parts of the closely reasoned arguments to be found in this volume, we have given in the beginning an analytical outline of the contents of the volume. A table showing our system of transliteration and a list containing the abbreviations used by us are given at the end of the volume. The word *ātman* is used in Sanskrit to denote the *Brahman* as well as the *jiva*; hence it has been translated as *Self* where it denotes the former and as *self* where it denotes the latter; and the pronouns *who* and *which* have been more or less indiscriminately used in relation to both of them. The word *karman* has been uniformly used in the form of *karma*, and its plural is given as *karmas*, as these forms seem to have become fairly current in English. The printing work has had to be done somewhat hurriedly, and a few errors have unavoidably crept in. The more serious ones among them are pointed out and corrected in a list of errata appended hereto. We do not know how far our English rendering of the *Sri-Bhāshya* is all that it should be, but we have spared no pains to make it as good as we can. We are well aware that it is capable of much improvement; and yet it may not perhaps be too much to hope that our attempt to present faithfully in English the thoughts of one of India's great teachers and religious reformers will be productive of some good in the way of helping on the world's appreciation of India's philosophic integrity and religious earnestness.

NOVEMBER, 1899. } M. R.
MADRAS. } M. V. B.

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CHAPTER I.

PART I.

AN ANALYTICAL OUTLINE OF THE CONTENTS OF VOLUME I.

In the Introduction to his *Vedāntadīpa* Rāmānuja summarises the teachings of the *Vedānta* to the following effect :—Of the three ultimate entities known to philosophy, the intelligent individual soul is essentially different from non-intelligent matter ; and God, who forms the Supreme Soul of the universe, is absolutely different from the individual soul. The essential differences thus existing between matter, soul and God are intrinsic and natural. God, who is the same as the Supreme *Brahman*, is the cause of the universe ; and the universe, which is made up of matter and soul, is the effect produced by Him. Matter and soul form the body of God ; and this body is capable of existing in a subtle as well as in a gross condition. God with his subtle body constitutes the universe in its causal condition ; and with His gross body He forms the created universe itself. The individual soul enters into matter and thereby makes it live ; and similarly God enters into matter and soul and gives them their powers and their peculiar characters. The universe without God is exactly analogous to matter without soul ; and in the world as we know it, all things are what they are, because God has penetrated into them and rules and guides them all from within, so much so that all things are representative of Him and all words denote Him in the main.

The first part of the first chapter of the *Vedānta-Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa deals, says Rāmānuja, with the question of what constitutes the cause of the world ; and

this volume contains his commentary on the aphorisms making up that first part. They are intended to demonstrate that the *Prakṛiti* (non-ego) and the *Purusha* (ego) of the *Sāṅkhyas* do not constitute the cause of the world, but that the cause thereof is the omniscient and omnipotent God Himself who is wholly pure and abundantly full of all auspicious qualities. Those aphorisms are as follow:—

1. Then therefore the enquiry into the *Brahman*.

2. (The *Brahman* is that) from whom (proceed) the creation, &c., of this (universe).

3. (That the *Brahman* is the cause of the creation, &c., of the universe, follows altogether from the scripture), because the scripture forms the source (of the knowledge relating to Him).

4. That (viz. the fact that the scripture forms altogether the source of the knowledge relating to the *Brahman*) results, however, from (His constituting) the true purport (of the scripture).

5. Because the activity imported by the root *îksh* (*to see i. e. to think*) is predicated (in relation to what constitutes the cause of the world), that which is not revealed solely by the scripture (viz. the *pradhâna*) is not (the *Sat* or the Existence which is referred to in the scriptural passage relating to the cause of the world).

6. If it be said that it (viz. the import of the root *îksh, to see*) is (here) figurative, (it is maintained that) it cannot be so; because there is the word *Âtman* (or Self mentioned in the context).

7. Because (also) it is taught (in the context) that he who is firmly devoted to That (viz. the *Sat*) obtains final release.

8. Because also it is not declared (in the context) that it (viz. what is denoted by the word *Sat* or *Existence*)

deserves to be discarded.

9. Because (also) there would then be the contradiction of the proposition (enunciated in the context).

10. Because (also) there is (mentioned in the context) the withdrawal (of the individual self) into its own cause (*i. e.* into the *Sat*).

11. Because there has to be a similarity of import (between the passage under reference and the other passages relating to the cause of the creation, &c., of the world).

12. Because also it is revealed (in the very *Upanishad* in which the passage under discussion occurs, and in other *Upanishads*, that the Supreme Self is the cause of the universe).

13. That which is denoted by the word *Ānandamaya* (is the *Brahman*); because there is, (in the context), the repetition (of various grades of bliss which culminate in the *Ānandamaya* or the Highest Bliss).

14. It may be said that owing to there being the affix (*mayaṭ*) significant of modification (the *Ānandamaya*) is not (the *Brahman*); but it is not (right to say) so; because that (affix *mayaṭ*) signifies abundance.

15. Because also He (the *Ānandamaya*) is declared (in the context) to be the cause of that (which forms the bliss of the individual souls).

16. (Because) also that same Being, who is denoted by the words of the *mantra* (in the context), is declared (there to be the *Ānandamaya*).

17. He who is other (than the *Brahman*) is not (that Being who is denoted by the words of the *mantra*), because (in such a case) there would be inappropriateness.

18. Because also there is (in the context) the declaration of difference (between the individual self and the *Brahman*).

19. Because also His will (is in itself the cause of creation), the *pradhāna* is not needed (by Him in the act of creation just as it is needed by the individual self).

20. (Because) also it (viz. the scripture) declares (that) his (*i. e.* the individual self's) acquisition of that (bliss takes place when he is) in (association with) this (*Ānandamaya*).

21. He (*i. e.* the Person) who is within (the Sun and the eye is the *Brahman*), because His attributes are declared (in the context).

22. And He is different (from the Sun and other individual selves), because also there is the declaration of difference (between the *Brahman* on the one hand, and the Sun and other individual selves on the other).

23. That which is denoted by the word *Ākāśa* (is the *Brahman*), because His peculiar characteristics (are mentioned in the context in relation to what is denoted by that word).

24. For that same reason (which has been given in the case of the *Ākāśa*), He who is denoted by the word *Prāṇa* (also in the context is the *Brahman*).

25. That which is denoted by the word *Jyotis* (is the *Brahman*), because there is the mention of (His) feet (in a connected context).

26. If it be said that, on account of the metre (known as the *gāyatri*) being mentioned (in the context, the Light or *Jyotis* described above is) not (the *Brahman*), it is not (right to say) so; because the teaching (here) relates to the concentration of the mind (on the *Brahman*) conceived as that same (*gāyatri*): indeed the scripture declares it accordingly.

27. Because also it is appropriate only thus to declare that (intelligent) beings and other objects form the

feet (of the *Gāyatri*).

28. If it be said that, on account of there being a difference between the (two) teachings (given in the context, what is denoted by the word *Jyotis* or Light) is not (the *Brahman*), it cannot be (right to say) so; because even in both those (teachings) there is nothing that is contradictory (of each other).

29. That which is denoted by *Prāṇa* (*Indra* and other such words is the *Brahman*), because it is so understood in the sequel.

30. If it be said that, on account of the speaker (Indra) declaring himself (to be the object of worship, what is denoted by the words *Indra* and *Prāṇa* is) not (the *Brahman*, it is replied that it cannot be so); because there is here (in this context) the mention of a multitude of attributes belonging to the Inner Self.

31. And the teaching (in the context) is, as in the case of Vāmadeva, in accordance with the view found in the scripture.

32. If it be said that, on account of the characteristics of the individual self and of the principal vital air (being mentioned in the context) there is no (reference to the *Brahman* here at all, it is replied that) it cannot be (right to say) so; because the worship (of the *Brahman*) has a threefold nature; because (elsewhere) this (threefold nature of His worship) is taken for granted; and because here (*i. e.* in the present context also) that (same kind of worship) may be appropriately referred to.

In accordance with the general fashion of Indian writers, Rāmānuja begins his *Śrī-Bhāshya* with a stanza in praise of God, wherein he lays particular stress on man's duty of love and devotion to God, preferring this love and devotion even to the wisdom of the understand-

ing. Then in another stanza he speaks of the traditionally ancient character of the teachings contained in the *Vedānta-Sūtras*, and gratefully recognises the value of the services rendered by early teachers in preserving and handing on those teachings, in accordance with which he himself undertakes to interpret the *Vedānta-Sūtras*. (Vide page 1). After declaring that his own explanation of the *Sūtras* is in accordance with the interpretation given by 'ancient teachers', such as Bodhāyana, Dramiḍa, Ṭaṅka, &c., he commences the discussion of the meaning of the first aphorism—"Then therefore the enquiry into the *Brahman*." The words of the *Sūtra* are taken into consideration one after another, and their meaning and grammar are both clearly explained (pp. 2 to 4). He then gives what is called the *Vākyārtha* of the *Sūtra*, this *Vākyārtha* being the full meaning that is conveyed by the aphoristic sentence as a whole. In keeping with the division of the revealed scripture of the Hindus into the *Karmakāṇḍa* and the *Jñānakāṇḍa*, there are two systems of philosophic enquiry known as the *Karma-mīmāmsā* and the *Brahma-mīmāmsā*. The former of these is what may be called a philosophy of sacrificial rites, and the latter is a philosophy that deals with the metaphysical foundations of the universe. The historical relation between the *Karmakāṇḍa* or the Old Testament of the *Vedas* and the *Jñānakāṇḍa* or the New Testament thereof is one of antecedence and sequence. And here this first aphorism is interpreted to mean that, immediately after acquiring the knowledge of the philosophy of *Vedic* sacrificial rites, the study of the philosophy of the *Brahman* has to be begun, for the reason that ritualistic works yield only small and unenduring results while the 'knowledge' of the *Brahman* gives rise to immortality and eternal free-

dom. Bodhāyana is quoted in support of this interpretation, and on his authority the two *Mīmāmsās* are declared to form parts of one science (page 5). Since every Indian *Ārya* is enjoined to learn the *Karmakāṇḍa* as well as the *Jñānakāṇḍa* of the *Vedas*, it may be argued that the study of the *Karma-mīmāmsā* is quite superfluous. In answer to this view it is pointed out that, in that injunction, learning the *Vedas* means nothing more than merely learning them by heart, and that such learning is efficacious in making them serve better whatever purpose they are intended to serve, and also in giving rise to a *prima facie* impression that ritualistic works yield insignificant and impermanent results while there is a mention made in the *Upanishads* of the attainment of everlasting immortality (pp. 6 to 8). Then *Vedāntic* texts are quoted to show the destructibility of the results of mere ritualistic works and the indestructible character of the results arising from the knowledge of the *Brahman*, and it is concluded that the study of the *Karma-mīmāmsā* must precede the study of the *Brahma-mīmāmsā* (pp. 8 to 10).

Having thus stated his view of what meaning the word *then* conveys in this first aphorism, Rāmānuja states the objections against his view with the object of meeting them so as to justify his own interpretation. A statement of objections that is given with an intention to meet them is called a *Pūrvapaksha*; and the objection against Rāmānuja's interpretation of the word *then* here is known as the *Laghu-pūrvapaksha* or the 'small objection', in as much as there is a 'great objection' coming later on as against his interpretation of the word *therefore*. In this 'small objection' the opinions of Śaṅkara and Bhāskara are shown to contradict each other, and Śaṅkara's opinion regarding the meaning of the word *then* is summarised thus :—

The cause of the bondage (of the soul) is merely the perception of distinctions, which is based on unreality and has its origin in the *avidyā* (or ignorance) that veils the true nature of the *Brahman*; this bondage itself is unreal; solely by reason of its unreality it is destroyed to the very roots by means of knowledge; the knowledge that (so) destroys (the bondage) is derived out of (scriptural) passages such as "That thou art" &c.; works are of no use in causing the origination of such knowledge in its own true nature, or in producing the effect of this knowledge that is so derived out of such passages, but the use of works consists only in (producing) the desire to know (the *Brahman*); and the use of works is to be found in causing the increase of *sattva* or the quality of goodness—an increase resulting from the destruction of *rajas* and *tamas* or the qualities of passion and darkness respectively, which form the roots of sin; and therefore, having in view only this use of works, it is declared in the scripture—"Brāhmaṇas desire to know, &c." Hence, on account of the uselessness of the knowledge of works, the aforesaid fourfold means alone has to be stated to be the necessary antecedent of the enquiry into the *Brahman* (pp. 10 to 15.).

Then follows what is called the *Laghu-siddhānta* or the 'small conclusion'—that is—the answer to the 'small objection'. In this answer it is pointed out that it is not the mere knowledge of what the scripture says that tends to the removal of ignorance and the attainment of immortality, but that devotion, meditation and worship alone can produce such a result. It is here shown how a purely intellectual realisation of the truth cannot eradicate the innate tendencies towards error, and how the word *knowledge* is frequently enough used in the scriptures to mean

the same things as *devotion*, *meditation* or *worship*. Ṭaṅka is quoted in support of this view and in support of the contention that the innate tendency towards error can be cured only by work and worship. It is further shown that the fourfold mental and moral equipment, which, according to Śaṅkara, ought to precede the study of the *Vedānta*, can be acquired only with the help of devotion, meditation and worship, and that ritualistic elements such as the *Udgītha*, &c., are also referred to in the *Vedānta* for the reason that they are helpful to meditation and to the acquisition of the needed mental and moral equipment mentioned above (pp. 15 to 27.).

The meaning conveyed by the word *therefore* is then fully taken into consideration, and the *Mahā-pūrvapaksha* or the 'great objection' against the view of Rāmānuja, as given by the followers of Śaṅkara, is fairly fully stated (pp. 27 to 53.). The main question dealt with in this *Pūrvapaksha* naturally bears upon what it is that forms the cause for leading us to enquire into the *Brahman*, and why it is that the enquiry into the *Brahman* has to be begun and conducted; and the opinion of the *Adwaitin* on this question is given to the effect that the study of the *Vedānta* has to be undertaken to remove the *avidyā* or ignorance that is at the root of the world's manifestation of variety, so as to attain the knowledge of the oneness of the self with the *Brahman*, who is, by nature, eternal, pure, self-luminous and free (p. 53.). The various points mentioned in this 'great objection' are the following:—The unqualified absolute *Brahman* alone is real; all other things are only assumed to exist in Him, and are therefore unreal (pp. 27-30.). Unreality is that which, being grounded upon what is perceived, is liable to be stultified by means of the knowledge of things as they are; and the world of

phenomena is based upon ignorance or *avidyā*, and is hence such an unreality (pp. 30-32.). Knowledge destroys this ignorance which forms the foundation of our world-perception; and the knowledge which so destroys ignorance and the consequent bondage of unreality is the knowledge that the self or the *ātman* of the individual is one with the absolute *Brahman* (pp. 32-33.). Scriptural authority is all along aptly quoted in support of every one of these points. It is then shewn how, when there is conflict between scripture and perception, the former is of stronger authority and is capable of stultifying the latter (pp. 33-35.). There being scriptural passages which deal with the one absolute *Brahman* and those which deal with the phenomenal world of variety and distinctions, it is shown how the former passages are of stronger authority than the latter, and how it is even possible for some portions of the scripture to stultify other portions thereof (pp. 35-37.). Then the meaning of the definitive scriptural sentence—'The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity'—is discussed from the *Adwaitic* stand-point, and it is shown how that sentence defines the absolute attributeless *Brahman* as He is essentially in Himself (pp. 37-42.). So far it is a discussion of the meaning of scriptural passages. After this the *Adwaitic* position is argued out on independent lines. At first it is brought out that perception apprehends only pure and unqualified existence, and that the distinction between things neither belongs to their essential nature nor constitutes any attribute of existence in itself (pp. 42-44.). It is then pointed out that all external objects are invariably apprehended as compounded of existence and experience, that in all perceptive cognitions existence alone unvaryingly persists, while the differentiating peculiarities of things are seen to vary from thing to thing, and that therefore pure

unqualified existence alone is real, and that, in as much as this compounded experience too persists like existence in all perceptive cognitions, experience also constitutes the reality and has to be the same as existence itself (pp. 44-46.). And the experience which thus constitutes the reality is thereafter declared to be so self-evident as to be the cause of its own knowability as well as of the realisation that it is knowable (pp. 46-48.). Then it is shown that this experience or what is otherwise called consciousness is, on account of its self-evident nature, eternal, unoriginated, immodifiable and undifferentiated, and that it is the same entity as the *ātman* or the self (pp. 49-51.). Finally the question of personality is taken up for consideration, and it is argued that the *ātman* or the self is not the same as the knower in as much as the idea of knowership in relation to the self is the result of the limitation imposed upon the intelligent principle of consciousness by the material principle of egoity known as *ahaṅkāra*, and in as much as again self-experience is possible even when there is no notion of egoity, as during dreamless sleep, swoon, &c. It is further argued that the internal self is a mere witness, and as such must be different from the knower which is the same as the ego or the thing 'I'; and it is then shown that this limitation of personality cannot be an attribute of the self which is pure and undifferentiated intelligence, and that in the beatific state of final release the self is free from the limitation of personality, even as it is found to be so free in the condition of dreamless sleep. The one intelligent and undifferentiated principle of consciousness being thus shown to be the only reality, it is arrived at that the reason for undertaking the study of the *Vedānta* is to understand the nature of this reality, otherwise known as the *Brahman*, and to realise that everything

which is in any manner whatsoever different from it is wholly unreal (pp. 51 to 53.) The *Mahā-pūrvapaksha* or the 'great objection' is here brought to an end.

Then begins the *Mahā-siddhānta* or the 'great conclusion' of Rāmānuja and his school regarding the meaning of the word *therefore* in the first aphorism. The meaning conveyed by this word is thus expressed (p. 242.) in Rāmānuja's own words :—"Mere ritualistic works yield only small and transitory results. On the other hand, such works as constitute the worship of the Highest Person, and are performed without attachment to results yield an infinite and ever-enduring result in the form of that experience of the real nature of the *Brahman* which is caused by the origination of the knowledge which is the same as steady meditation or worship. Both these cannot become known without a knowledge of the true nature of works. Without such knowledge there can be no rejection of mere ritualistic works as they ordinarily are, and no subsequent adoption of them in the form pointed out above. Therefore, for this very reason, the enquiry into the *Brahman* has necessarily to be conducted." This conclusion is arrived at only after meeting fully all the points raised against it in the 'great objection'. And they are met one by one in the following order. To start with it is shown that one's own experience, logical inference, revelation, and definite as well as indefinite perception, and all the other accepted criteria of truth prove only such things as are qualified by attributes, and that there is really no means of proving the thing which is absolute and unqualified. In this connection the nature of what is called definite and also of what is called indefinite perception is distinctly explained, and the view which maintains that there is both difference and non-difference between a

thing and its qualifying attribute is shown to be wrong (pp. 53-60.). Next the position that perception must apprehend pure unqualified existence, in as much as it cannot have differentiation for its object and in as much as it is difficult to define differentiation, is taken into consideration and criticised; and it is argued in reply that perception does apprehend distinctions, that distinctions so apprehended establish the difference, not only between one qualified thing and another, but also between the distinguishing attributes themselves, and that therefore the apprehension of particularity has necessarily to be admitted in connection with every state of consciousness. It is further shown that the senses, which naturally cannot perceive pure unqualified existence, perceive only the configurations of the attributes of things, and that it is these configurations that constitute the logical genera and at the same time denote whatever forms the distinction between things (pp. 60-64.). Then it is pointed out how it is erroneous to hold that jars and other such specific objects are unreal, the reason for their unreality being that they do not persist before consciousness in all perceptions, and how again it is not possible for experience or consciousness to be the same as the one unqualified and absolute existence (pp. 64-65.).

Afterwards the self-luminous character of experience is properly explained, and it is shown how experience does not cease to be experience when it becomes capable of being itself experienced (pp. 65-67.). The contention that experience or consciousness has the character of an unoriginated entity is then contradicted. It is argued that the absence of what is called the antecedent non-existence of experience does not prove its unoriginated character, because there is no rule which binds experience

to deal only with such objects as are existent at the same time with itself; and accordingly memory, logical inference, revelation and *yogic* perception are shown to relate to things which belong to a different time from that of their own existence or duration (pp. 67-69.). The reasoning involved in the supposition, that the antecedent non-existence of consciousness is not at all made out by perception, is then pointed out to be untenable; and it is shown that perceptual consciousness is conditioned by time, and that none of our cognising states of consciousness can be eternal or objectless (pp. 69-71.). Even during sleep, trance, and conditions of intoxication, consciousness cannot be absolute and altogether objectless, as there is no recollection whatsoever of our having at any time had any experience of such consciousness. In all its states consciousness is associated with the idea of the ego, is definite and relates to particular objects; and hence it cannot be unoriginated and eternal (pp. 71-72.). And then the immodifiable character of consciousness is contended against, and it is shown that it cannot be undifferentiated (pp. 72-74.). The position that consciousness can have no qualifying attributes is next disproved (pp. 74-75.). Afterwards the question whether consciousness is the same as the self is taken up for consideration and criticism, and it is explained that consciousness cannot indeed be the same as the conscious subject, and that this conscious subject is permanent while the attribute of consciousness belonging to that subject is liable to be originated and destroyed; and then it is demonstrated that the idea of an unfounded and objectless consciousness being the same as the self is contradicted by cognition, and that in consequence pure experience or absolute consciousness alone cannot be the highest reality (pp. 75-77.).

After this the discussion of the problem of the soul's personality is commenced from the stand-point of Rāmānuja, and it is at first pointed out that what constitutes the subjective self or the soul of the individual is nothing other than the ego which is here called *the thing 'I'*; similarly *the thing 'thou'* or the objective world forms the content of the notion of the non-ego; such being the case, how can the knower and the known be identical? (pp. 77-79.). If the thing 'I' is the self, then, like the self, it must be intelligent and have at the same time intelligence to constitute its essence; and it is explained and illustrated how the thing 'I' may be both *intelligence* and *intelligent* at the same time. Then scriptural and other authorities are quoted to shew that the self-luminous self is always the knower, but that it is never mere luminousness (pp. 79-81.). Consciousness is like luminosity, and must necessarily belong to a luminous self; this self is the intelligent thing 'I', and the luminosity or intelligibility of consciousness itself is due to its association with the self which is undoubtedly the knowing ego (pp. 81-83.). Having thus shown that intelligence forms the essence as well as an attribute of the thing 'I', the view of the *Adwaitin*—that the idea of knowership is falsely superimposed upon the undifferentiated and intelligent principle of consciousness by ignorance or *avidyā*—is next contended against. It is first shown that the knowership of the ego cannot be due to illusion, for the reason that the thing 'I' and its knowership are both separately and simultaneously cognised, unlike the mother-of-pearl and the silver superimposed thereon. It is next shewn that this knowership of the ego cannot be said to be due to the common error of mistaking the body for the self (pp. 83-84.). Nor does this knowership belong to the material principle

of egoity known as *ahaṅkāra*, in as much as subjectivity can in no way belong to objective matter. The knowership of the self does not contradict its immodifiable nature, and need not therefore be supposed to be due to modifiable matter in any form (pp. 84-87.). *Ahaṅkāra* or the material principle of egoity cannot be supposed to have acquired the attribute of knowership either as a result of the reflection of the self's intelligence thereon, or as a result of its contact with the knowing self (pp. 87-88.). Moreover, this supposed illusion of knowership cannot be due to the material principle of egoity being the revealer of immaterial consciousness, in as much as the relation of the revealer and the revealed between any two things is mutually exchangeable and cannot exist when there is any incompatibility in nature between them. Nor is it appropriate to hold that *ahaṅkāra* reveals consciousness at the same time that consciousness reveals *ahaṅkāra*; because it is not possible to understand what this revelation of the self through *ahaṅkāra* may mean, in as much as the self is not within the province of the senses and nothing can therefore serve as the means of bringing it into relation with them (pp. 88-90.). Nor again can the idea of the ego be due to the material principle of egoity, on the score that this principle and this idea derived therefrom are useful in removing whatever obstruction there is for our knowing the self. Indeed in no sense can there be a revelation of immaterial consciousness by means of the material principle of egoity (pp. 91-92.). Then it is argued that the nature of revealers is not to reveal the revealable thing as though it were within themselves, and it is finally concluded that the subjective self itself forms the thing 'I' which is in no way other than the knower (pp. 93-94.). The idea of the ego which is

thus intrinsically associated with the self does not get dissociated from it even in deep sleep; because at the time of waking, the self shines forth in one and the same continuous form of the thing 'I', even when we feel that, while asleep, we knew nothing at all, and that we did not know even ourselves (pp. 94-96.). The position that the self is a mere witness is explained not to mean that it is a witness only of ignorance; for, to be a witness is certainly the same as to be a direct knower, and even in sleep and other such states the self is luminous and shines forth as the ego (pp. 96-97.). In the final state of beatific release also the self continues to persist as the thing 'I'; scripture also declares that it does so persist, and God Himself is revealed to us as a distinct Person (pp. 97-100.). The material principle known as *ahaṅkāra* is indeed included among the things that go to make up our bodies; and it is called by that name because it forms the cause of the imposition of the idea of the ego upon the body. This false idea of the ego is subject to stultification, while the ego-hood of the self is real and incapable of being stultified. Therefore the thing 'I', which is the knower, is alone the self (pp. 100-101.).

The next point taken up for consideration is the position of the *Pūrvapakshin* that, when there is conflict between scripture and perception, the former is of stronger authority as a criterion of truth, for the reason that the latter is grounded upon error. It is here shown that it is not possible to make out definitely what that misguiding cause is which makes perception false and erroneous; it is shown that whatever makes perception erroneous must necessarily tend to make the scripture also erroneous, and that the scripture which is thus based upon error cannot certainly stultify perception. It cannot be proved that, unlike perception, the scripture is incapable of being misled by any cause of error

such as *avidyā* for instance; and the phenomenal knowledge derived from the scripture is in no way different from the phenomenal knowledge obtained through perception. Nor can it be maintained that the teaching of perception is stultified by the teaching which is given in the scripture, while this latter teaching is not so stultified by the former, and that in consequence the scripture is not false and erroneous; for, error is error even when it continues unstultified (pp. 101-105.). There are certain analogies generally given to shew that the scripture, which, being based upon *avidyā* or ignorance, is unreal, may form the means for the attainment of the highest reality known as the *Brahman*; and these analogies are all one after another pointed out to be not at all suited to the case under consideration, in as much as it is seen that in every one of them a real result is derived from a real cause. When auspicious and inauspicious dreams give rise to good and bad results in life, the dreams are indeed as really existent as the results they give rise to. When magic, medicinal herbs, incantations, &c., give rise to illusions which cause fear, love and other emotions, the illusions are as real as the emotions themselves. Death may result from a suspicion of snake-bite and of poisoning; here the suspicion is as real as the death. The reflected image of a thing is as real as the thing itself. Dreams are real even in the absence of the reality of the objects corresponding to them, in as much as what is required to make anything the object and the basis of any cognition is merely the manifestation of that thing to consciousness in some manner or other (pp. 105-107.). Even in the case of the apprehension of the sounds of letters by means of the corresponding written signs, there is no cognition of the real by means of the unreal. When things are cognised by means

of sketches and pictures, there is at the basis of the cognition a real similarity between the things and their representations. The apprehension of the real and absolute *Brahman* by means of the unreal and phenomenal teachings of the scripture cannot also be proved on the analogy of the apprehension of the absolute undifferentiated sound known as *Sphota* with the help of its numerous phonetic differentiations or *nādas*. Although the unreality of the scripture is not such as may be due to its absolute non-existence, it is difficult to arrive at the knowledge of the noumenal reality by means of the phenomenal teachings of the scripture. Nothing that is unreal can ever give rise to the knowledge of that which is real (pp. 107-110.).

After this the proper meaning of various passages in the *Upanishads* is taken into consideration, and it is shewn that their *Adwaitic* interpretation is not accurate and allowable. The passages first taken into consideration are—"Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning", from the *Chhāndogya-Upanishad*,—"And that is the higher knowledge by which that Indestructible Being is known", from the *Muṇḍaka-Upanishad*,—and "The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity", from the *Taittirīya-Upanishad*; and it is proved that these do not relate to the absolute and unqualified *Brahman*, and that the grammatical equation to be found in the last passage is intended to establish that one and the same thing, namely, the *Brahman* is characterised by more than one attribute (pp. 110-112.). Does the statement that the *Brahman* is one only without a second mean that the *Brahman* is not associated with a second thing even in the form of a quality? It is shewn that it does not mean such a thing, and that the scriptural passages which speak of the *Brah-*

man as unqualified only declare that He is free from the qualities appertaining to material nature. There are also many passages which speak of the *Brahman* as qualified, and these declare that He is intrinsically possessed of all the auspicious and divine qualities. And His possessing the divine qualities is not contradicted by the non-possession of the qualities that appertain to material nature (pp. 112-116.). The *Ānanda-valli* of the *Taittirīya-Upanishad* teaches the *Brahman* to be possessed of qualities, and in doing so agrees with passages in the *Chhāndogya-Upanishad*; and the *Kena-Upanishad* (II. 3.) does not declare that the *Brahman* forms no object of knowledge, in as much as this *Upanishad* has to agree in meaning with the *Taittirīya-Upanishad* and the *Muṇḍaka-Upanishad* wherein it is declared that the *Brahman* has to be known and is capable of being known (pp. 116-119.). The passage in the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka-Upanishad*—"Thou shalt not see the seer of the sight, nor think the thinker of the thought"—is next shown not to negative the seer and the knower as distinct from sight and knowledge; and then the statement that the *Brahman* is bliss is interpreted to mean that the *Brahman* is indeed the Blissful Being (pp. 119-121.). Finally it is pointed out that the *Upanishadic* passages which negative distinctions do not contradict those other passages which postulate distinctions, in as much as the world which is full of distinctions has the *Brahman* for its Self and has in consequence an organic oneness of nature; and it is shewn that the author of the *Vedānta-Sūtras* is also of this same opinion (pp. 121-124.).

The question, whether the *Smṛitis* and the *Purāṇas* teach the attributeless *Brahman* to be pure intelligence and the only reality, is next examined in detail; and at

the very commencement passages are quoted from the *Bhagavadgītā* and the *Vishṇu-Purāṇa* to show that the Highest *Brahman* is full of all auspicious qualities and free from all evil, and that the world which is the manifestation of His glory is as real as He is Himself real (pp. 124-129.). Then the passages relied upon by the *Adwaitins* to prove their peculiar monistic position are all interpreted in full accordance with their respective contexts and in obedience to all the accepted rules of interpretation, and it is concluded that in all the *śāstraic* works there is no establishment of that thing which is devoid of attributes, no establishment of illusoriness in regard to the totality of perceivable objects, and no negation of the natural differences between the individual soul and non-intelligent matter and the Lord (pp. 129-156.). Incidentally it is pointed out how necessary it is to amplify and support the meanings of *Vedic* and *Vedāntic* passages by means of the *Itihāsas* and the *Purāṇas*, and how among these latter the *Vishṇu-Purāṇa* is highly authoritative (pp. 134-135.). The statement found in the *Vishṇu-Purāṇa* (II. 14. 31.), to the effect that 'dualists see things wrongly,' is shewn to negative only that 'dualism' which postulates a difference in kind between one individual soul and another, but not that other 'dualism' which believes in the natural distinction between the ultimate entities known as God, soul, and matter (pp. 142-144.). In accordance with this view a few more *Purāṇic* passages are explained; and the conclusion is arrived at that, in the same way in which there is no essential identity between the body and the individual self, there is also no essential identity between one individual self and another, and that similarly there is no essential identity between the individual selves and the Supreme Self. That there is no substantial unity between

the individual selves and the Supreme Self is further confirmed by references to *Upanishadic* passages and to aphorisms in the *Vedānta-Sūtras* (pp. 144-148.) At last the question of what the *śāstras* say regarding the nature of the individual self in the beatific condition of final freedom from all association with matter is discussed clearly, and it is established that in that condition the released individual self does not become identical in essence with the Supreme Self, but that it only acquires most of the auspicious and divine qualities of the Supreme Self; and it is shewn that the *Brahman* whom the individual self is said to attain in the state of *moksha* is not mere attributeless intelligence, that, on the contrary, He is full of goodness, power, and glory, and that the individual self becomes one with Him then for the reason that he attains the highest degree of equality with Him and is free from the bondage of *karma* (pp. 148-156.).

Now begins the criticism of that theory of the *Adwaitins* according to which a beginninglessly old 'ignorance' known as *avidyā* or *māyā* is held to be at the root of our perception of the differentiated phenomenal world, and according to which also such an *avidyā* has necessarily to be admitted on the authority of the scripture and has to be understood to be a certain something which is neither a positive entity nor a negative non-entity. Seven difficulties are pointed out to be in the way of this theory being true. The first of these is called *Āśrayānupapatti* and deals with the difficulty of finding something for this 'ignorance' to reside in. In as much as the self-hood of the individual self is itself projected by *avidyā*, it is argued that this *avidyā* cannot reside in the individual self and thus give rise to the illusion for which it is held to be responsible. And in as much as the *Brahman* has the essential

nature of self-luminous intelligence, it is shewn that on no supposition can the *Brahman* be the seat of 'ignorance.' This supposed *avidyā* therefore can have no abode to reside in (pp. 156-161.). The next difficulty in the way of the theory of *māyā* is that this supposed 'ignorance' cannot, as maintained by its upholders, conceal the *Brahman* whose essential nature consists entirely of luminosity; for, the concealment of such a luminosity must mean nothing other than the destruction of the essential nature of the *Brahman* Himself. This difficulty is known as *Tirodhānānupapatti* (page 161.). The third difficulty is called *Swarūpānupapatti* and deals with the essential nature of this *avidyā*. As long as it is a thing at all, it must either have the nature of a reality or the nature of an unreality. But it is not admitted to be a reality; and it cannot be an unreality, for, as long as a *real* misguiding error, different from the *Brahman* Himself, is not admitted, so long it is not possible to explain this theory of illusion (pp. 161-162.). The fourth difficulty in the way of this theory of illusion is called the *Anirvachaniyatwānupapatti*, and points out how it is not possible for the illusion-producing *avidyā* to be incapable of definition either as an entity or as a non-entity. All cognitions relate to entities or non-entities; and if it be held that the object of a cognition has neither the positive characteristics of an entity nor the negative characteristics of a non-entity, then all things may become the objects of all cognitions (pp. 162-163.)

Naturally the next question that is here discussed is—whether there is any means by which this curious *avidyā* is brought within the range of our cognition; and it is shewn that there is no means of proof by which such an *avidyā* can be arrived at and established. This difficulty

in the way of the theory of *māyā* is spoken of as *Pramāṇānupapatti*; and its discussion is started with the plausible supposition that the 'ignorance' known as *avidyā* is capable of being directly experienced and has thus the nature of such a positive entity as cannot be contradicted by the witnessing principle of intelligence, and that it is therefore quite consistent with reason to realise that this *avidyā* is definitively associated with the thing 'I'. And it is further shewn here supposititiously that it is possible to establish by logical inference also that there is an 'ignorance' or *avidyā* which does not mean a mere negation of knowledge but is itself a positive entity of some sort (pp. 163-167.). These suppositions are then replied to one after another. It is first shewn that, so far as the relation to the intelligent internal self is concerned, there can be no difference between the ignorance that is a mere non-existence of knowledge and the other supposed 'ignorance' which has the nature of a positive entity (pp. 167-168.). It is then argued that in the cognition—'I am ignorant; I do not know myself, nor do I know another'—what is experienced is only that ignorance which is the antecedent non-existence of knowledge (pp. 168-169.). It is next shown that the *Brahman* can have no experience of any kind of *avidyā*, and that, if it be a positive entity, there can be no removal of it by means of any knowledge (pp. 169-171.). The *Brahman* cannot be a witness of 'ignorance'; because it is impossible for Him, whose essential nature is absolute self-experience, to acquire the character of a witness without the concealment of His own true nature. And the *Brahman*, who is without parts and without attributes, and who is pure luminosity itself, cannot at all be concealed (pp. 171-172.). This supposed concealment of the *Brahman* by means of ignorance cannot

even be an indistinct manifestation of His altogether luminous and self-evident nature. In as much as it is possible for us to have an illusion without a really existing basis for it to be imposed upon, and without a positive misguiding cause for that illusion to be produced, the world-illusion does not necessarily prove a positive 'ignorance' (pp. 172-174.). Accordingly the *avidyā* of the *Adwaitins* cannot be proved by perception. It cannot be proved by logical inference either; because the syllogism that is intended to prove this positive 'ignorance' is also seen to prove the other unacceptable ignorance, and because also the illustrative example found in the body oj the syllogism is defective. Moreover, there are faultless counter-syllogistic statements which go to shew that every one of the *Adwaitin's* predications about his *avidyā* is wrong and untenable. The predication, that this positive *avidyā* is capable of being removed by knowledge, cannot be maintained on the analogy of fear and other such positive emotions disappearing as soon as it is known that they are due to a false cause; because the positive emotion here is not destroyed by a subsequent stultifying knowledge, but disappears of itself on account of its own transitoriness. Therefore the logical process of inference also cannot establish that 'ignorance' which has the nature of a positive entity (pp. 174-179.). The hypothesis of *māyā* is next taken into consideration in relation with the five theories of perception known to Indian philosophy. Things become manifest to consciousness through perception, and their manifestation may either correspond completely to the reality or it may not. Thus all the five theories of perception get reduced into two—that according to which perception presents to consciousness the thing as it is, and that again according to which perception presents to

consciousness the thing as it is not. Of these two theories the former which is realistic is shewn to be true on the authority of tradition and scriptural teaching, and illusion and its stultification are accounted for by means of the belief that every thing in the universe has the characteristics of every other thing therein (pp. 179-186.). Scriptural and traditional authority is quoted to prove that even dream-perceptions are realistic. Then a number of exceptions apparently contradicting this realistic theory of perception—such exceptions as the yellow appearance of white things to the jaundiced eye, the circle of fire produced by the rotation of a fire-brand, &c.,—are all explained so as to show that all perceptions are undoubtedly realistic (pp. 186-191.). The objects corresponding to all perceptions are real; only some perceptions are experienced by certain particular persons only and last only for a short length of time, while others are experienced by all generally and have a longer duration. These latter stultify the former, as stultification is commonly understood; and a true theory of perception does not at all stand in need of a positive *avidyā* (pp. 191-192.). It is next shewn that the scriptural authorities relied upon by the *Adwaitins* to prove that there is an *avidyā*, which cannot be described either as an entity or as a non-entity, are all to be explained otherwise, and do not therefore tend to establish in any way such an *avidyā* (pp. 192-197.). The *Itihāsas* and the *Purāṇas* are also shewn to give no support to the theory of *māyā*, in as much as all such passages in them as seem to lend any support to this theory have, when properly considered, to be interpreted otherwise (pp. 197-210.).

The sixth difficulty in the way of this theory of the world being an illusion produced by *māyā* is then fully

discussed, and it goes by the name of *Nivartakānupapatti*. This difficulty is in relation to the idea that the cessation of *avidyā* or 'ignorance' takes place solely by means of the knowledge which has the attributeless *Brahman* for its object; and it is at first pointed out here that there are many scriptural passages, which do not teach the *Brahman* to be attributeless and unqualified, but teach on the contrary that He is possessed of attributes and qualities. Then it is shewn that the grammatical equations found in the sentence—'That thou art'—and in other similar sentences do not denote the oneness of any attributeless thing, in as much as every grammatical equation has to denote a thing which, while being only one, is capable of existing in two forms. It cannot be established that the grammatical equation in 'That thou art' is intended to give rise to the stultification of any illusion due to *avidyā*; it simply shows the *Brahman* to be capable of existing in two different modes or forms. On this supposition alone can all the scriptural passages be harmoniously interpreted (pp. 210-214.). The universe is the body of which the *Brahman* is the Soul, and *Vedāntic* passages clearly declare that all things have acquired the character of being things and of being expressible by means of words, only by reason of their having been entered into by the individual selves which are, in their turn, entered into by the *Brahman* as forming their Self. Thus the totality of all the intelligent and the non-intelligent beings becomes the same as the *Brahman* on account of the relation of the body and the soul existing between them (pp. 214-217). A grammatical equation can denote neither an absolute identity nor an absolute and discrete dissimilarity between the things mentioned therein. Hence those who maintain that there is only one attributeless thing in the

whole universe, those who maintain that there is both difference and non-difference at the same time between the *Brahman* and the individual souls, and also those who maintain that there is absolute difference between the individual souls and the *Brahman* will all find that such teachings regarding the sameness of the *Brahman* with the individual soul as are found in the *Vedānta* are all aimless and meaningless (pp. 217-219.). However, to those who maintain that the whole world forms the body of the *Brahman* all those *Vedāntic* teachings, which declare that the *Brahman* Himself constitutes the whole world, are sure to appear as appropriate explanations of the truth. Grammatical equations can and do point out the attributive character of material adjuncts; and the equation that a man is an individual self cannot have a merely figurative significance, in as much as the human body has to form in this case a mode of the individual self. And the word which denotes a mode of the individual self denotes the individual self also. Accordingly the words god, man, &c., include the individual self in their import. The individual selves form the body of the Highest Self, and hence possess the character of being His modes. Thus all the words which denote individual selves include the Highest Self also in their import. Consequently all things may be grammatically equated with the *Brahman* (pp. 219-224.). This position is then more fully explained and supported. All non-intelligent things constitute the objects of enjoyment, the intelligent things are the enjoyers thereof, and the *Brahman* is their Supreme Ruler; therefore they are distinct from one another in nature, as may be made out from various passages in the *Upanishads* and the *Bhagavad-Gītā* (pp. 224-227.). Both the intelligent and the non-

intelligent things form the body of the *Brahman* and have no separate existence from Him; they are in consequence subject to His control. Since in this way the intelligent and the non-intelligent things are seen to be the modes of the Highest Person, it is easy enough to understand how the scriptures teach that He Himself exists in the form of the world in its condition of cause as well as in its condition of effect. Although the non-intelligent thing, the intelligent thing, and the *Brahman* are distinct from one another in nature, the world must accordingly have the *Brahman* for its material cause; and the *Brahman* who thus enters into the production of an effect retains, nevertheless, His own immodifiable nature quite unaffected, in as much as there is and need be no transformation of His nature in the process of producing the effect. Such being the case, the statement that He is attributeless means that He is free from all evil qualities, and the statement that He possesses the nature of intelligence means that He is self-luminous and can be described only as intelligence in essence. The manifoldness of things which is negatived in the *Vedānta* is only such manifoldness as is due to the non-realisation of that oneness of the universe which results from the fact of the *Brahman* forming the Soul thereof. Only when interpreted thus can all the apparently conflicting scriptural passages be seen to agree with one another; and the theory of *māyā* which imposes ignorance on the *Brahman* is therefore unfounded; and similarly the theory which subjects the *Brahman* to limiting conditions is also unfounded. The Highest Person is the one embodied Being, and matter and soul constitute His embodiment. Thus He is Himself all the three real entities—God, soul and matter. Consequently the knowledge which has an attributeless *Brahman* for its object is impossible and cannot

be the complete knowledge of truth; and obviously such an impossible knowledge of the oneness of the attributeless *Brahman* cannot be the remover of the *avidyā* postulated by the *Adwaitins* (pp. 227-238.).

The last difficulty pointed out by Rāmānuja in the way of this theory of *māyā* is called *Nivṛittyanupapatti*; and it points that the 'ignorance' postulated by the *Adwaitins* has to be irremovable. The individual soul's bondage of 'ignorance' is determined by *karma* and is a concrete reality. It cannot therefore be removed by any abstract knowledge. Divine worship and divine grace can alone cause the freedom of the soul, and to know God is to seek salvation. According to the *Adwaitins* the differentiations of the knower, the knowledge, and the known thing are all unreal; and even that knowledge which is capable of removing *avidyā* has to be unreal and has to stand in need of another real removing knowledge. Nor indeed can that 'knowledge' which forms the essential nature of the *Brahman* constitute the knowledge, the birth of which means the destruction of *avidyā*. Moreover the knower of this knowledge cannot be the unreal and superimposed individual self; nor can that knower be the *Brahman*, unless such knowership belongs to Him by nature and is not unreal. No knower will ever destroy himself as knower by means of the knowledge he knows, and the knowership of the *Brahman* cannot itself be equivalent to *avidyā*. For all these reasons the removal of the *Adwaitin's* hypothetical 'ignorance' is quite impossible (pp. 238-241.).

Thus the *Mahā-siddhānta* is brought to a close; and it is concluded that, as mere ritualistic works yield only small and transitory results, the enquiry into the *Brahman* has necessarily to be conducted so that we may know how

we are to worship Him and thereby attain Him and Immortality (pp. 241-242.).

Then comes forward another objector, the *Mimāmsaka*, who says that the enquiry into the *Brahman* need not be conducted at all, in as much as such an enquiry cannot produce the result which is expected of it. His objection is called the *Adhikaraṇa-pūrvapaksha*, and is largely based upon linguistic thought and reasoning. He says that the true signification of a word is always to denote an action, and the import of the *Vedas* consists in the actions they prescribe. The *Vedānta* cannot be authoritative like them and cannot teach the *Brahman*, for the reason that the meaning of the word *Brahman* is independently established otherwise than as an inference from actions. The physical expression of the emotions caused by listening to spoken sentences cannot enable us to determine the meanings of words, in as much as many things may give rise to similar emotions. Neither the etymology of a word, nor its relation to other words in a sentence can enable us to ascertain its meaning independently of all action; because both these methods of interpreting words are obviously dependent upon action. Moreover, mere verbal statements cannot produce any kind of practical conviction and activity, and volition alone is the cause of all voluntary activity. Therefore that which induces voluntary activity has to be the thing that is expressed by words, and thus it is but proper that action forms the thing which is to be learnt from the *Vedas*. The *Brahman* is neither an action nor anything that is definitely related to an action; and the knowledge of such a *Brahman* cannot give rise to any infinite and eternal result in the shape of immortality. On the other

hand, ritualistic works themselves are declared in the *Vedas* to be capable of yielding eternal and indestructible meritorious results. Therefore the enquiry into the *Brahman* need not at all be undertaken (pp. 242-246).

The answer to this objection is called *Adhikaraṇa-siddhānta*, and it leads us to the conclusion that the enquiry into the *Brahman* has necessarily to be conducted. The linguistic argument of the *Pūrvapakshin* is here met by pointing out distinctly that the relation between words and their meanings is not primarily made out by means of any inference from the actions to which the utterance of words generally does give rise. Certain things have somehow acquired certain names, and the relation between such things and their names is dependent upon usage and is of itself naturally established without the help of any inference. The use of language is taught to children by their elders; and which words denote which things is distinctly and frequently enough pointed out to the young learners; thus they learn to associate the words with the things. The meaning of words is primarily made out only in this fashion; it may in some rare cases be made out also with the help of gestures. Therefore the rule that the meaning of words is only to denote actions is not binding (pp. 246-247). Even if the *Vedas* denote only actions, all such actions are seen to relate to the worship of the *Brahman* so that thereby He may be attained; and hence the knowledge of the true nature of the *Brahman* and His attributes is helpful to actions, and the *Vedānta* which deals with the *Brahman* has to be studied accordingly (pp. 248-249). Even in sentences like—'Bring the ox', the significance of words is not to be inferred from 'action'; for, this 'action' has to be aimed at by the volition of the speaker, and all activity proceeds from the

dependence of the accomplishment of desire upon effort. Volitional desire has to be expressed by means of language before it is worked out into 'action'; and this 'action' itself cannot be the thing desired, and it is not also capable of being defined as that which is accomplished by volition and which is also the principal object of volition (pp. 249-252.). Even when we take *Vedic* commandments into consideration we find that the action denoted by the verb in them is not the object that is to be accomplished by obeying them; nor is this object the *Apūrva* that is produced by performing the action denoted by the verb of command. It must be some desirable and pleasing object like *Swarga* or it must be the avoidance of pain. A commandment is no pleasure in itself, and is not anywhere described as such in the *Vedas*; and the mandatory passages found in the *Vedas* relate only to such actions as are indicated by the verbs that give the command. Therefore commandments are not obeyed and worked out merely for themselves. Sacrifices and other such works, enjoined by the scripture and denoted by the verbal roots in the scriptural commandments, have all the character of constituting the worship of the Highest Person who is the internal ruler of all gods; and the result aimed at by those works flows to us altogether from that Highest Person Himself (pp. 252-255.). The knowledge of the meaning and nature of *Swarga* is necessary on the part of him who performs the *Jyotishṭoma* sacrifice, in as much as *Swarga* is the object to be attained and the sacrifice is the means therefor. Similarly the *Vedāntic Brahman* is the highest object to be attained by man, and *Vedic* 'works' are only the means to attain Him. The statement that the *C̲h̲āturmāsya* sacrifice yields indestructible

results is not to be understood literally, as there are many explicit statements in the scripture to the effect that the results derived from the performance of ritualistic works as works are unimportant and unenduring. Accordingly it is concluded that, although the meaning and nature of *Brahman* are self-established and underived from any 'action', the study of the *Vedānta* which teaches such a *Brahman* has necessarily to be commenced and conducted (pp. 255-256.).

The discussion of the one aphorism making up the *Jijñāsādhikaraṇa* is thus brought to a close.

Like the first, the second aphorism also makes up a whole *Adhikaraṇa*, the object of which is to point out what that *Brahman* really is who is stated to be the object of all *Vedāntic* study and investigation. The aphorism itself runs thus:—"The *Brahman* is that from whom proceed the creation, &c., of this universe." After explaining the grammar and the meaning of the words in the aphorism, the question whether it gives any admissible definition of the *Brahman* is taken up for consideration; and the position of the *Pūrvapakshin* that it does not give any such definition is first stated. This aphorism is based on a passage in the *Taittirīyopanishad* (III. 1. 1.) wherein the *Brahman* is declared to be the creator, the preserver, and the destroyer of the world; and the question is whether these characteristics of creation, &c., are competent to define Him. The characteristics of universal creation, preservation and destruction cannot define the *Brahman*; because *Brahman* may be a common noun, and because also these attributes being more than one may thus denote more than one *Brahman* as in the instance—"The ox is that which is broken-horned, hornless and fully horned,'

Nor can the attributes of creation, &c., give rise to any accidental characterisation of the *Brahman*, in as much as all accidental characterisations denote only such things as have already been definitively characterised in some form or other, and in as much as it is not possible to establish that there is any definitive characterisation of the *Brahman* quite independently of the passage referred to in the aphorism. Therefore it is not possible to know the *Brahman* by means of any definition (pp. 257-259.).

To these objections it is replied that the characteristics of universal creation, &c., mentioned in this aphorism are well suited to give us an accidental characterisation of the *Brahman*, and suited also to give a definition of the *Brahman*. It is not right to say that the *Brahman* is not at all known to us otherwise than through the characteristics of universal creation, &c.; etymology itself teaches us that He is a Being who is characterised by Supreme Greatness and Growth and in the *Upanishadic* passage under reference He is spoken of as a well known Being. His greatness is really due to the fact of His being both the instrumental and the material cause of the universe, and the *Brahman* who is known to be all this may well be denoted by the characteristics of universal creation, &c. (pp. 259-261.). These characteristics of universal creation, &c., are also capable of defining the *Brahman*, in as much as they need not denote more than one *Brahman*. In the definition of the ox given above, all the three defining attributes are seen to conflict with each other; and thus they tend to denote more than one ox. In the given definition of the *Brahman* there is no such contradiction between the attributes, for the reason that the world's creation, preservation, and destruction take place at different times. The attributes of universal creation,

&c., define the *Brahman* to be the only cause of the universe, and the scriptural passage—"The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity"—denotes His essential nature to be different from that of all other things; and indeed there is no fallacy of reciprocal dependence between these two ways of knowing the *Brahman*. Thus the attributes of universal creation, &c., do define the *Brahman*, and He is quite capable of being understood by means of a definition (pp. 261-263.). Consequently the *Brahman* cannot be a mere attributeless Being; etymology gives Him the characteristics of Greatness and Growth, this aphorism defines Him as the Cause of the Universe, and other aphorisms endow Him with the power of 'seeing', &c. These aphorisms and the scriptural passages on which they are based do not constitute any authority for holding the opinion that the *Brahman* is an altogether attributeless Being. Logic deals with the similarities in the distribution of attributes among entities, and cannot of course prove an attributeless thing. Finally, it is not possible to interpret this aphorism to mean that the *Brahman* is the cause of the illusion of phenomena; because this illusion has to be based upon *avidyā*, and the *Brahman* cannot be identical with it, but has to be a witness thereof. To be such a witness implies that He has the character of homogeneous luminosity, whereby He ceases to be attributeless; and to deprive Him of this characteristic attribute of luminosity is to convert Him into nothingness (pp. 263-264.).

The third *Adhikaraṇa* also contains only one aphorism which runs thus:—"That the *Brahman* is the cause of the creation, &c., of the universe, follows altogether from the scripture; because the scripture forms the source of the

knowledge relating to Him." The aim of this aphorism is to shew that the *Brahman*, as defined in the previous aphorism, can be made out only by means of the *Vedānta*, and that there is no other means of knowing Him. The meaning of the aphorism is as usual explained and then the question it relates to is taken up for discussion. Against the above-mentioned view of the *Vedāntin* that the scripture alone forms the source of all our knowledge relating to the *Brahman*, the *Mīmāmsakas*, the *Naiyyāyikas*, and the *Vaiśeshikas* are the prominent orthodox objectors; and the position of the *Mīmāmsaka* is given at first, after stating, however, the general objection that the *Brahman* is capable of being made out by other means of proof than the scripture, and that the scripture has in consequence no special meaning or authority in this matter. The *Mīmāmsaka* agrees with the *Vedāntin* so far as the revelational authority of the scripture is concerned, but holds that the scripture is an inviolable authority in relation to ritualistic 'works' also. Therefore he naturally contends that the *Brahman* cannot be proved either by perception, or by inference. External perception, internal perception, and *yogic* perception are all shown to be incapable of proving the *Brahman*; and it is next pointed out that neither deduction nor induction can establish the *Brahman* (pp. 265-267.). Here the *Naiyyāyika* comes forward and says that the world is seen to be made up of component parts, and is thus a produced effect. Whatever is a produced effect necessarily implies a competent producing agent, and such an agent is the *Brahman*. Moreover, the world that is produced out of non-intelligent matter cannot but be subject to the control of a single intelligent being, who has to be the *Brahman* in this case. Accordingly He is capable of being proved by logic (page 267.). At this point the *Mīmāmsaka*

joins issue with the *Naiyyāyika* and points out that certain material bodies are not produced by those who control or enjoy them, that certain other material bodies, when their parts are seen to be organically put together, do not stand in need of any intelligent agent to control their working, and that there is no reason shown why in the case of the world the controlling intelligent being has to be only one, and has also to be other than the individual selves whose existence is admitted on both sides. Then the argument that every produced effect implies a competent agent to produce it, and that the world is such a produced effect is criticised; and in the course of the criticism it is distinctly shewn that this kind of design argument necessarily makes the world appear too much like a man-made thing and makes the *Brahman* Himself become too much like a human being, while there is really no impossibility in the way of the individual selves themselves satisfying the demands of this argument. Here a warning is given that from this it should not be understood that the *Mīmāmsaka* is of opinion that logic is of no use whatsoever in acquiring a true knowledge of the *Brahman*. His opinion is that logic is useful in understanding the *śāstras* aright, and that apart from the *śāstras* there is really no means by which God can be proved (pp. 267-271.). And now the *Vaiśeshika* intervenes as against the *Mīmāmsaka* to shew that God is capable of being proved solely by means of the process of logical inference. The material world is made up of constituent parts; it is inert and gross, and is nevertheless set in motion and has a definite form; therefore it cannot but be a produced effect. To infer a producing agent from the fact of there being a produced effect is never unjustifiable—not even when we do not know the producibility of the effect and the productive competency

of the agent. Both these are rightly inferred from the nature of the effect itself. Thus we arrive at God. The distribution of pleasure and pain to individuals in accordance with the merit and demerit of their *karmas* cannot take place of itself. Hence a Person who is capable of awarding skilfully the fruits of *karmas* in accordance with the various *karmas* themselves is also to be necessarily postulated. It is not right to hold that the individual selves themselves are the producing agents of the world and the distributors of the fruits of *karmas*, as their power and knowledge are seen to be inadequate to serve such a purpose, and as the inferred cause must in every way be competent to produce the observed effect. Nor is it right to maintain that this design argument proves the inferred creator of the world to be too human and to be thus devoid of the qualities of omniscience and the lordship of all things. Non-omniscience and non-lordship do not affect the producibility of things; and if they are not found in association with the producing Creator, surely there is nothing wrong in it. This design argument does not fail even on account of the fact that God has no material body in the way in which human agents have bodies. The will of God which is based on His mind is alone the active agent in creation; and His mind is eternal and unassociated with matter. Accordingly God can be conclusively proved by logic. However, it cannot be proved that He is both the instrumental and the material cause of the world, in as much as that which forms the material cause is seen to be extremely different from that which forms the instrumental cause (pp. 271-277.).

This position of the *Vaiśeshika* is then taken up for final disposal, and it is shewn that his design argument is defective in many ways. The world and its various parts

are, no doubt, produced effects; but there is really nothing in the logic given above to prove that they were created by one agent at one particular time. All the things in the world do not possess the character of being a single produced effect, and a single agent cannot be proved to be their Creator. On the score that individual souls cannot be the creators of our wonderful world, and on the score that it is inappropriate to assume many individual souls to have been agents in the act of creation, it is not right to argue that there must be only one Creator of the world. Through the highly increased influence of their *adṛishṭa*, individual souls can and do produce certain particular created effects. The conceptions of the simultaneous origination of all things and the simultaneous destruction of all things do not deserve to occupy the position of proved truth; and a single person who is capable of creating all things at once is nowhere known to exist, and cannot be logically inferred, unless logical inference can make the improbable probable and the impossible possible. And scripture also contradicts the idea that all produced things have only one producing agent. God is not subject to *karma*, and is not actuated by the 'qualities' of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*; He can therefore neither desire creation nor produce creation. Further, He is without a material body and is devoid of all perceivable activity; and an agent who produces through mere desire is unperceived and is hence uninferrible. Consequently, the *Brahman* who is the Highest Person can be proved only by the *śāstras*; and it is not opposed to reason, as shall be shewn later on, that He is the material cause as well as the instrumental cause of the whole universe, although there are portions in it which cannot be proved to be made up of constituent parts. Thus

the scriptural passage on which this aphorism is based is amply authoritative and abundantly full of import, in as much as the *Brahman* cannot, by any other means of proof, be cognised as the creator, the preserver, and the destroyer of the world (pp. 277-284.).

The fourth *Adhikaraṇa* also is, like the previous three, made up of only one aphorism; and it runs thus :—" That, viz. the fact that the scripture forms altogether the source of the knowledge relating to the *Brahman*, results, however, from His constituting the true purport of the scripture." Now, although the *Brahman* cannot be cognised by any means of proof other than the *śāstras*, is He after all really established by the *śāstras* ? This is the question which is discussed under this aphorism. After interpreting the words of the aphorism, some passages from certain *Upanishads* are quoted to shew that to teach the *Brahman* is the only aim of the *śāstras*; and then it is formally stated that, although He does not import any activity or cessation from activity, He alone constitutes the true purport of the *Vedānta*. Here the *Mīmāmsaka* comes forward with his objection that all sentences have their finality in some utility or other, either as relating to voluntary activity or cessation from activity, or as relating to knowledge ; that no sentence is thus capable of importing things, the ideas corresponding to which are already naturally established ; and that consequently the *Vedānta* cannot establish the *Brahman*, the idea corresponding to whom is already naturally established (pp. 284-287.).

This objection is answered by the *Nishprapañchīkaraṇa-niyoga-vādin* who holds that the *Upanishads* give us the commandment to non-phenomenalise the *Brahman*, and that therefore they relate to action and have their

finality in utility. Even if the *Brahman* is self-evident, there is nothing wrong in His being made the object of an 'action' so that He may be realised in the non-phenomenal form (pp. 287-288). The *Mīmāmsaka* contends against this view also, and says that all those, who maintain like him that the syntactical meaning of sentences is a commandment, must also be prepared to distinctly point out like him, in every case under consideration, the commandment, the attribute of the person to whom the commandment is directed, the special object of the commandment, the manner of carrying out the commandment, the details of procedure to be adopted in carrying it out, and the person who is to carry it out. It is fully possible to do this in connection with *Vedic* commandments all of which enjoin the performance of ritualistic works. There is, for instance, the commandment bearing upon the *Jyotishṭoma* sacrifice; this commandment is to be found in the *Yajurveda*; the attribute of the person to whom the commandment is directed is the desire to attain *Swarga*; the special object of the commandment is the *Jyotishṭoma* sacrifice; the *yajamāna* or the sacrificer is the performer thereof; and the manner of performing it and the details of procedure to be adopted in so performing it are all distinctly laid down in authoritative works relating thereto. But in the case of the supposed *Vedāntic* commandment enjoining the non-phenomenalisation of the *Brahman*, it is not possible to specify any attribute as that which has necessarily to belong to the person to whom the commandment is directed; nor is it possible to know in this case what the special object of the commandment is, in as much as this special and immediate object of the commandment has to be different from the final aim thereof, in the way in which the *Jyotishṭoma* sacrifice is different from *Swarga*. Further,

this supposed *Vedāntic* commandment cannot but be useless and absurd ; and the details of procedure to be adopted in carrying it out are indeed nowhere to be found in the *śāstras*. Therefore the *Vedānta* gives no commandment enjoining the non-phenomenalisation of the *Brahman* (pp. 288-293.).

Then the *Dhyāna-niyoga-vādin* comes forward with his objection against the contention of the *Mīmāmsaka*, and declares that the *Vedānta* is authoritative in teaching us the true nature of the *Brahman* by means of the injunction bearing upon His meditation. The *Dhyāna-niyoga-vādin* is he who, while agreeing with the *Mīmāmsaka* in holding that the scripture cannot be of any authority in relation to anything the idea corresponding to which is already naturally established, maintains at the same time that the *Vedānta* is nevertheless authoritative in relation to the *Brahman*, in as much as it gives a commandment enjoining the meditation of which He forms the object. This commandment enjoining meditation implies the thing to be meditated upon, and that thing is no other than the *Brahman*, whose real nature also is described in the *Vedānta*. The *Brahman* alone is real while all else that is different from Him is unreal. Accordingly, when there is contradiction between distinction and non-distinction, the latter alone is the reality ; and the final beatific release of the soul is the same as its becoming identified with the *Brahman*. The achievement of this identification is not possible without the help of that meditation which entirely relates to Him (pp. 293-295.).

Here the *Adwaitin* begins to oppose the *Dhyāna-niyoga-vādin*, and says that the freedom of the soul from the bondage of *avidyā* can and does result merely from the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of scriptural sentences,

and that the final beatific release of the soul must be such as cannot be accomplished under an injunction, in as much as any possible fresh accomplishment of it will certainly imply that it is non-eternal. Final release or *moksha* is the same as the unembodied condition of the soul, and this unembodied condition is its essential nature and is hence eternal and uncreatable. To accomplish anything anew must mean either its origination, or attainment, or modification, or refinement; and it is not possible to predicate any of these things in regard to *moksha*. The knowledge of the syntactical meaning of sentences does not therefore produce *moksha*, but only removes the obstructions which are in its way. Final release follows immediately after the knowledge of the *Brahman* is acquired, and does not stand in need of anything that has to be produced by obeying a commandment given in the *śāstras*. The *śāstras* declare all phenomenal distinctions to be unreal and to be manufactured by *avidyā*, and the commandment enjoining meditation is useful only in helping us to understand well the syntactical meaning of scriptural sentences. Immediately after the knowledge of truth is acquired, the bondage of unreality must necessarily give way; and to be released from this bondage, one need not wait even till the falling off of the body. It has thus to be made out that *moksha* is not a thing that can be accomplished by obeying the commandment relating to meditation, and that the *Brahman* is not hence implied in that commandment; indeed He is independently taught and known (pp. 295-301.).

This contention of the *Adwaitin* is next met by the *Dhyāna-niyoga-vādin*. He says that the phenomenal bondage of the soul is a concrete reality and is actually perceived to be such. Mere abstract knowledge of any kind is wholly incompetent to remove this bondage; and

the knowledge derived from the scripture is no exception in this matter and cannot destroy the sensory perception of differentiated phenomena. Moreover, meditation cannot be the means of knowing the syntactical meaning of scriptural sentences, in as much as the *Brahman* has to be known before He can be meditated upon; nor can it produce the knowledge which relates to the oneness of the self with the non-phenomenal *Brahman*, because it has itself to pre-suppose many phenomenal entities. If it were possible to destroy the bondage of *avidyā* merely by the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of scriptural sentences, the commandment enjoining meditation would become purposeless. The bondage of phenomenal unreality cannot, however, be so destroyed; and it follows as a matter of course that *Jīvanmukti*, or the soul's release from such a bondage even while it is in the embodied condition, is altogether impossible. The idea of *Jīvanmukti* is illogical, and is opposed to scripture; it is discarded by a great teacher like Āpastamba. Accordingly, bondage comes to an end only after death and by means of that injunction which relates to meditation and which produces the direct knowledge of the *Brahman*. What is accomplished under this injunction relating to meditation is not final release itself, but it is the removal of the obstructions to final release; therefore this injunction cannot give a non-eternal character to *moksha*. Obeying this injunction purifies the mind; the mind so purified realises the *Brahman* directly; and there is nothing in the scripture to shew that He cannot be made an object of meditation. Therefore the bondage of phenomenal unreality comes to an end only by obeying the commandment which enjoins meditation and the final result of which is the direct realisation of the *Brahman* (pp. 302-309.).

At this point the *Dhyāna-niyoga-vādin* anticipates the objection of the *Bhedābhedavādins*, according to whom there is no contradiction between distinction and non-distinction, and the *Brahman* is thus the seat of both distinction and non-distinction at the same time. Every object that we perceive is suggestive of similarity as well as of diversity. When a thing is realised as the cause of another thing, there is the realisation of similarity or non-distinction between them; for instance, when clay is made out to be the cause of a pot, we see that there is non-distinction between the clay and the pot. Similarly, when a thing is realised as representative of a genus, there is the realisation of non-distinction between that thing and the other things belonging to that genus. On the other hand, when a thing is realised independently in its condition as an effect or in its condition as a particular individual, there is the realisation of distinction between it and other things. Thus it is nothing uncommon to realise the same thing as the seat of both distinction and non-distinction at the same time. In every process of recognition also there is the realisation of both distinction and non-distinction in relation to one and the same thing (pp. 309-311.). It cannot be maintained, however, that the commonly current superimposition of the idea of the self on the body indicates that there is both distinction and non-distinction between the body and the self; because it is the unstultified idea alone which everywhere proves things. The idea of the serpent falsely perceived in a rope is soon stultified, and cannot prove any non-distinction as really existing between the serpent and the rope. Similarly the idea of the self arrived at in relation to the body is stultified, and cannot prove any non-distinction between the self and the body. Accordingly, the individual self is not absolutely distinct from the

Brahman; it is both distinct and non-distinct from Him; and there is ample scriptural authority to prove this (pp. 311-314.). In the state of final beatific release the individual self has to be absolutely identical with the *Brahman*; and non-distinction alone is thus natural, while the distinction of the individual selves from the *Brahman* as well as from each other is due to limiting conditions. The *karma* of the individual self gives rise to these limiting conditions, and they in their turn give rise to *karma*. The stream is thus kept up; and according as the *Brahman* is or is not subject to these limiting conditions, He is realised to be distinct or non-distinct from the individual self. The spatial ether is, for example, distinct or non-distinct from the ether in a pot according as it is or is not limited by the walls of the containing pot (pp. 314-317.).

The position of the *Bhedābhedavādin* so stated is then attacked by the *Dhyāna-niyoga-vādin*. The idea of non-contradiction between distinction and non-distinction is shown to be illogical and untenable, and it is pointed out that in every perception it is realised that a particular thing is of a particular nature. Here the characterising thing is the genus and the characterised thing is the particular individual. The individual self is not, however, realised as belonging to the genus *Brahman*, and cannot therefore be both distinct and non-distinct from the *Brahman*. Non-distinction is based upon the *śāstras*; and distinction is due to *avidyā*, which being unreal, is incapable of tainting the *Brahman*. It is inconceivable how the supposed limiting conditions really do limit the *Brahman* who is only one and indivisible and homogeneous. The individual self cannot be a bit of the *Brahman* cut off from Him by limiting conditions; it cannot be such a part of the *Brahman* as is not cut off from Him and

is still associated with limiting conditions; nor can it be the *Brahman* Himself in essence, though subject to limiting conditions; nor finally can it be the limiting condition itself. Thus non-distinction between the *Brahman* and the individual self is alone the reality, and the *Vedānta* is authoritative in relation to the essential nature of the *Brahman*, in as much as the knowledge thereof is needed as a complement to the injunction relating to meditation (pp. 317-323.).

Now the *Mīmāmsaka* comes forward to meet finally the *Dhyāna-niyoga-vādin* and maintains that, although the knowledge of the essential nature of the *Brahman* is needed as a complement to the injunction bearing upon meditation, there is indeed nothing to show that *Vedāntic* passages import anything that is really existent. In connection with the commandment enjoining the realisation of the *Brahman* as a *Name*, we find that the completion of meditation is possible even when its object is a mere mental concept corresponding to which there may or may not be any external entity. The *Vedānta* is devoid of utility in the form of inducing activity or cessation from activity; and even when it is granted that it induces the activity of meditation, it is incapable of establishing the reality of the *Brahman*, in as much as an object of meditation need not always be real, and in as much as the idea corresponding to the word *Brahman* is already naturally established and known (pp. 323-325.).

And at last the *Vedāntin* comes forward and proves his case as against the *Mīmāmsaka*, and points out that the *Vedānta* which teaches that *Brahman*, who is the highest object of attainment for all, cannot be said not to have its finality only in utility. Such scriptural passages as relate to activity and cessation from activity may, on

the other hand, be said not to have their finality in utility; because they give rise merely to that kind of knowledge which can be utilised only so long as there are desirable objects to attain. But *Vedāntic* passages enable us to know that individual souls acquire unlimited and unsurpassed bliss at the time of *moksha*, and enable us also to know that they continue for ever in the enjoyment of such bliss. Therefore there is really no end to the utility of the knowledge produced by the *Vedānta*. To know this invitingly attractive and worthy nature of the highest object of human pursuit is to be impelled to seek it so as to find it; and herein is the utility of the *Vedānta*. This utility cannot indeed be well based merely on such an abstract conception of the *Brahman* as has no reality to correspond to it. If it be shewn that the *Upanishads* do not teach the real existence of the *Brahman*, then, although they may give rise to the conceptual knowledge of the *Brahman*, they can have no finality in utility. Therefore the *Brahman* is really existent, and the chief end of the *Vedānta* is to teach us to know Him (pp. 325-328.).

The fifth *Adhikaraṇa* consists of eight aphorisms, commencing with the fifth and ending with the twelfth. The object of this *Adhikaraṇa* is to establish that what is declared to be the cause of universal creation, &c., in the *Vedānta* is not *Prakṛiti* or primordial matter with all the potentialities assigned to it by the *Sāṅkhyas*; but that it is that omniscient and omnipotent Being who has been denoted by the name of *Brahman*. The cause of the world is spoken of as *Sat* in the *Chhāndogya-Upanishad*, and the word *Sat* means *Existence*. Does this word *Existence* denote the *Pradhāna* or *Prakṛiti* of the *Sāṅkhyas*, or does it denote the *Brahman*? The doubt arises that

it may denote the *Pradhāna*, in as much as, whatever thing and whatever general nature thereof exist in the condition of a cause, that same thing and that same nature thereof have to exist also in the condition of an effect, and in as much as the world which is a produced effect and is hence made up of the qualities of *sattva, rajas* and *tamas* cannot therefore have the non-material 'quality-less' *Brahman* for its cause. If the undifferentiated *Pradhāna* is not taken to be the cause of the world, it is impossible to understand how, by knowing a certain single thing, all things become known, as it is declared in the scripture ; and it is impossible also to understand why the statement relating to the cause of the world is, as given in the *Chhāndogya-Upanishad*, in the form of a proposition and an illustration. In reply to such a supposition it is pointed out in the first of the eight aphorisms of this *Adhikaraṇa* that the *Existence* spoken of as the cause of the world cannot be the *Pradhāna*, because the activity of seeing and thinking is predicated in relation to it. There is no doubt that the cause has necessarily to be in natural conformity with the effect ; and the Highest Person who owns all the intelligent and the non-intelligent things in their subtle state as His body is certainly in natural conformity with all produced effects, as taught in the *Upanishads* and as maintained by the *Sūtrakāra* himself. The passage dealing with the cause of the world in the *Chhāndogya-Upanishad* is not really in the form of a syllogism, as the middle term is altogether wanting ; and hence it surely cannot be that that passage mentions the logically inferrible *Pradhāna* to be the cause of the world (pp. 329-334.). The second aphorism in the *Adhikaraṇa* is intended to show that the activity of 'seeing' predicated in relation to the *Sat* which forms the cause of the world

is not to be interpreted figuratively, in as much as that *Sat* is spoken of as the *Ātman*. The teaching in the *Chhāndogya-Upanishad* (VI. 8. 7.) has in view the world which is made up of intelligent and non-intelligent things, and points out that the *Sat* is the *Ātman* or the Self thereof; and surely the non-intelligent *Pradhāna* cannot be the intelligent *Ātman*. The omniscient *Brahman* alone can be the world's *Ātman*, and can also see and think (pp. 334-336.). The third aphorism of the *Adhikaraṇa* gives another reason why the *Sat* that is mentioned to be the cause of the world cannot be the material *Pradhāna*, and that reason is that it is taught in the context that he who is firmly devoted to that *Sat* obtains final release as a result of his devotion. What one worships here on earth determines what one attains finally; and to attain the *Pradhāna* is not to obtain *moksha*, but it is to get into the bondage of *samsāra*. Indeed the *Vedānta* is not so unkind as to impel us to get into this bondage (pp. 336-337.). The fourth aphorism here assigns another reason why the causal *Sat* cannot be the *Pradhāna*; and that reason is that Śvetaketu, who was desirous of attaining *moksha*, is taught in the context that he is the same as the *Sat*, which certainly cannot mean that he was mere matter; for, if he were the same as the *Pradhāna*, he could obtain no *moksha*, and the idea of his being the same as the *Sat* would deserve to be discarded. But it is not taught that it is to be so discarded (page 337.). The next aphorism gives the fifth reason why the causal *Sat* is not the *Pradhāna*; and in it it is pointed out that, if the *Sat* were the *Pradhāna*, there would then be the contradiction of the proposition enunciated in the context to the effect that, by knowing a certain single thing, all things become known. This arises out of the fact that

non-intelligent matter cannot give rise to the intelligent individual souls, and cannot be their cause; and hence, by knowing it, all things cannot become known (page 338.). The next aphorism is based on a passage in the *Chhândogya-Upanishad* (VI. 8. 1.), in which it is declared that a sleeping person is in union with the *Sat*, and that while asleep he withdraws into his own cause and is also absorbed into his own cause. Here the *Sat* is the cause into which its effect, namely, the individual self withdraws; and the non-intelligent *Pradhâna* does not deserve to be the cause of the individual self. Until final release takes place the individual self is associated with names and forms; in *moksha* and at the time of deep sleep he is embraced by the *Brahman* and gives up names and forms. It is thus that he withdraws into his own cause, and the *Sat* has therefore to be the *Brahman* (pp. 339-341.). The next aphorism maintains that the cause of the world cannot be the *Pradhâna*, because the *Sat* which is mentioned here as the cause must have the same meaning as whatever is elsewhere in the scripture declared to be the world's cause. In a number of scriptural passages the Lord of All is taught to be the cause of the world, and this causal *Sat* cannot therefore be other than the Lord (pp. 341-342.). The last aphorism of the *Adhikaraṇa* says that more than all it is actually revealed in the *Chhândogya* and other *Upanishads* that the Supreme Self is the cause of the universe, and that the causal *Sat* cannot at all mean in consequence any thing other than that Supreme Self, who is the Highest Person and is also the *Brahman* that has to be enquired into in the *Vedânta*. In conclusion it is pointed out at the end of this *Adhikaraṇa* that the import of it as a whole is against the position of the *Adwaitins*, according to which

the *Brahman* is a mere attributeless intelligence and luminosity. Here the *Brahman* is declared to be associated with the *real* attribute of 'seeing', and His character as a witness cannot therefore be *unreal*. The 'seeing' and thinking *Brahman* must be an intelligent being, and to be an intelligent being is to possess the quality of intelligence. To be devoid of this attribute of intelligence is to be the same as the non-intelligent *Pradhāna*, which surely the *Brahman* is not. In the same way in which the *Brahman* cannot be attributeless, He cannot also be mere luminosity or intelligence. Indeed luminosity or intelligence is that which makes itself and other things fit to be realised by a cognising mind; and a thing which is devoid of all attributes cannot possess this capacity. To grant that the *Brahman* has such a capacity is the same as to admit that He is none other than the all-powerful, all-knowing, and all-good God; and an attributeless entity cannot but be a mere nothing that is totally unrealisable (pp. 342-346.).

The sixth *Adhikaraṇa* is the *Ānandamayādhikaraṇa*, and contains also eight aphorisms from the thirteenth to the twentieth. The object of the last *Adhikaraṇa*, known as the *Īkshatyadhikaraṇa*, is to prove that the *Brahman* declared to be the cause of the world is not the same as the *Pradhāna* of the *Sāṅkhyas;* and the *Ānandamayādhikaraṇa* shews that that *Brahman* is different from the individual self also. This *Adhikaraṇa* is based on the *Ānandavalli* of the *Taittirīya-Upanishad*, and the first aphorism here runs thus:—"That which is denoted by the word *Ānandamaya* is the *Brahman*; because there is, in the context, the repetition of various grades of bliss which culminate in the *Ānandamaya* or the Highest Bliss." Here the doubt arises whether this *Ānandamaya* is the Highest Self

who is different from the individual self commonly known as the *jīva*, or whether the *Ānandamaya* is the *jīva* himself. It can be made out from the context in the *Taittirīya-Upanishad* that the *Ānandamaya* denotes the *Brahman* who is the cause of the world; and whether this *Brahman* is different from the *jīva* or not has therefore to be determined by making out what the *Ānandamaya* means. According to the *Sāṅkhyas* the association of the individual self with matter is the cause of all creation, and individual selves may accumulate the merit of *karma* to such an extent as even to become presiding deities at the commencement of what is called a creating *kalpa* or cycle. Hence they are the *Pūrvapakshins* here, and hold that the *Ānandamaya* is the individual self. They say that since the *Ānandamaya* is declared in the *Taittirīya-Upanishad* to be associated with an embodiment, it cannot be anything other than the individual self. Again, the fact that what is declared to be the cause of the world is, in scriptural passages, grammatically equated with the individual self, is evidence to them that the individual self itself is the cause of the world. The individual self can 'see' and think; and its final object of attainment is freedom from association with matter, in as much as such freedom from the bondage of matter and ignorance constitutes its essential nature and its bliss. With the object of pointing out this essential nature of the individual self, the *Taittirīya-Upanishad* says that the *Ānandamaya* is different from the body (*annamaya*), different from the life inside it (*prāṇamaya*), different from the mind within (*manomaya*), and different even from the understanding therein (*vijñānamaya*). The *Ānandamaya* is thus the innermost entity in the body, and is the same as the individual self (pp. 346-350.). Here the *Adwaitin* steps in with his interpretation of the

Ānandamaya. According to him the *Ānandamaya* is not different from the *Brahman* who is the seat of joy, pleasure, satisfaction and bliss, all of which are described to be His constituent parts. The *Brahman* is of such a nature as distinguishes Him from all other things, He is the innermost essence of all and is called the *Ātman.* The idea intended to be conveyed by the *Adwaitin* is that the individual self is not essentially different from the *Brahman* who is altogether one only without a second, and that this secondless Being is the *Ānandamaya.* The *Adwaitin* then meets a possible objection to the effect that the *Ānandamaya* may not be the *Brahman,* but may be something else; and he distinctly shews that the *Ānandamaya* must not only mean the *Brahman,* but also must indicate that the *Brahman* is extremely different from pain, even as He is different from all things other than Himself. The differentiation of the individual selves from the *Brahman* and from each other is due to *avidyā;* otherwise there is no difference between the essential nature of the individual self and that of the *Brahman.* Viewed in relation to its essential nature the individual self deserves to be called the *Ānandamaya* quite as much as the *Brahman* does; and it is appropriate in the context to interpret the *Ānandamaya* as that individual self which is not in essence different from the *Brahman* (pp. 350-353.).

Thus both the *Sāṅkhyas* and the *Adwaitins* maintain, in their own respective ways, that the *Ānandamaya* is nothing other than the individual self. At this point it is shewn that the aphorism quoted above indicates clearly that the *Ānandamaya* must mean the *Brahman,* who is distinctly other than the individual self. The reason assigned for this is that, in the *Taittirīya-Upanishad,* there is a graded repetition of several kinds of bliss,

in an order in which each succeeding bliss is a hundred fold of the bliss preceding it, so as to reach that bliss which forms the summit of an unsurpassable condition. This last bliss is not possible to the individual self, and denotes therefore the *Brahman* who alone can be its abode. Accordingly this *Upanishad* declares the *Ānandamaya* to be different from the *vijñānamaya*, which latter has necessarily to mean the same as the individual self. The word *vijñānamaya* cannot mean mere intellect or understanding; for, if it be so interpreted, the affix *mayaṭ* that is found in it would be meaningless; it really means the knower or the individual self. It is true that in the passage—"The *vijñāna* performs the sacrifice"—the word *vijñāna* stands for *vijñānamaya*; but it has to be borne in mind that words which denote the essential attributes of things are often used so as to denote those things themselves; besides, there are grammatical rules according to which the word *vijñāna* has to mean an intelligent agent but not mere intelligence. The *vijñāna* that performs the sacrifice is indeed an agent, which the mere intellect or understanding can never be; and this same *vijñāna* is also said to own a body as its home. The Mādhyandinas and the Kāṇvas have two separate recensions of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka-Upanishad*. In the recension of the latter there is a particular passage (III. 7. 22.) in which the word *vijñāna* occurs; and in the corresponding passage in the recension of the former it is found that the word *ātman* is used instead of the word *vijñāna*. This decides that the *vijñāna* which is used in the place of the *vijñānamaya* can be nothing other than the individual self, and the word *vijñānamaya* itself very appropriately denotes the individual self. Therefore the *Ānandamaya*, which is positively declared to be different from the *vijñānamaya*, cannot denote the individual

self, but must denote the *Brahman* who is other than the individual self (pp. 354-358.).

Then this other position of the *Pūrvapakshins*—that, because the Being, who is declared to be the cause world, is, in a number of scriptural passages, seen to be grammatically equated with the individual self, the *Ānandamaya* has to be the same as the individual self—is taken up for consideration and criticism. The individual self is, no doubt, an intelligent being; but that being cannot have the power of creating, preserving, and destroying the world in accordance with his own will. The scripture and the *Sūtrakāra* are both agreed on this point, and the individual self is essentially different from the *Brahman*. The grammatical equation between the *Brahman* and the individual self cannot denote that both of them are essentially the same; it is indeed impossible for the all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-good *Brahman* to be essentially the same as the ignorant, weak, and impure individual self. Nor can it be maintained reasonably that a grammatical equation is appropriate only when either of the two equated things in it is taken to be false; for, in the case of the *Brahman* and the individual self equated with each other, it is not easy to decide to which of them such a falsity belongs. Of course the *Brahman* is not unreal. The individual self may be so, on the supposition that the *Brahman* appears falsely as the individual self owing to the superimposition of *avidyā*; but this would make the *Brahman* contradict Himself. This supposition cannot be forced on us to make the grammatical equations in the scripture significant; for, what is inappropriate and opposed to reason should not be assumed even for the purpose of making the scripture appropriate. This supposed association of the *Brahman* with evil cannot at all be a reality; and if it be held that His

attributeless character frees Him from such an association, it frees Him also from His association with all that is good and auspicious, and indeed makes all things unreal so that there remains nothing that is to be known through knowing the *Brahman*. The proposition that, by knowing a certain single thing, all things become known, does not surely denote that all things are unreal. Again, it cannot be held that the unreality of all things is due to the fact of their being modifications of the one real thing which is attributeless intelligence. The attributelessness of the *Brahman* is itself contradicted by the scripture ; and in the equation—'That thou art'—neither the *That* nor the *thou* can denote an attributeless thing, unless indeed both these words are interpreted figuratively (pp. 358-366.). This difficulty of having to interpret both the words in a grammatical equation figuratively cannot be got over by maintaining that the purpose of a grammatical equation is not at all to denote any attributes, but is merely to denote the oneness of the thing referred to therein ; because the function of a grammatical equation is to predicate in relation to a thing, either affirmatively or negatively, by means of certain words that that same thing, which has already a particular form denoted by some words, is also possessed of a certain other form. Only when one of the two attributes mentioned in a grammatical equation contradicts the other, is it right to interpret figuratively either of the two words denoting those attributes, in as much as the grammatical equation has to denote only one thing as characterised by two consistent attributes. Nor again can it be maintained that the words of a grammatical equation cannot import oneness in relation to the things they denote, on the ground that the thing correlated to any one attribute is distinct from the thing which is correlated to any other attri-

bute. This would be so, provided only that the mere correlation of a thing to two attributes is opposed to the oneness of that thing. Such is not always the case ; when the two attributes are contradictory, then they can not meet in one and the same thing. Many consistent attributes may and do meet in one and the same thing ; thus it is that grammatical equations become significant, and thus again it is that the perdurability of all perceived external objects can be maintained (pp. 366-371.). That the words in a grammatical equation have all the power of denoting a single thing, which is characterised by many attributes, is further shewn to be borne out by Jaimini in his *Mīmāmsā* aphorisms ; and the *Vedic* commandment—"With the red, tawney-eyed heifer, one year old, let him purchase the *soma* plant"—is discussed fully from the stand-point of Jaimini. The conclusion here arrived at and illustrated is that, in any particular sentence forming a grammatical equation, a thing, which is characterised by one attribute or two attributes or many attributes, is denoted by certain particular words used in agreement either with the *kāraka* case-affixes or with the nominative case-affix ; that it is made out by means of the grammatical equation that the thing so characterised by all the attributes is only one ; and that this one thing is associated with the action denoted by the verb forming the predicate of the sentence. Two minor objections against this conclusion are then disposed of, namely, that, in a grammatical equation in which a substance is mentioned, a word denoting a quality merely denotes that quality but not a thing as qualified by that quality,—and that, as the purchase of the *soma* plant is completely concluded with the exchange of the one year old heifer, its redness has no necessary relation to this transaction of purchase (pp. 371-377.).

In accordance with the conclusion so arrived at regarding the import of a grammatical equation, the scriptural sentence—'That thou art'—is interpreted so as to shew how, by means of the word 'thou' also, it is the Highest Self alone that is denoted as forming the internal ruler of all individual selves. This interpretation is supported by means of the teaching given in the scripture regarding the differentiation of names and forms. The *Brahman* wishing to become manifold created the world. All the individual souls in the world entered, each according to its *karma*, into such material embodiments as were most suited to them. Then the *Brahman* Himself entered into these souls so as to become their internal ruler. Thus it is that all things have become things, and that all significant words denote the Highest Self as associated with non-intelligent matter and the intelligent individual self (pp. 377-379.). Scriptural authority is then sufficiently quoted to prove that the whole world accordingly forms the body of the *Brahman*, and that He Himself constitutes the Self thereof; and it is thence arrived at that all things form modes of the Highest Self, and that words denoting non-intelligent material things as well as words denoting intelligent individual selves finally import the Highest Self Himself. Therefore in the sentence—'That thou art'—the grammatical equation of the word 'That' with the word 'thou', which also thus denotes the Highest Self, has certainly a primary and natural significance; and there is no need at all to adopt here any figurative interpretation of any kind whatever. As long as the material embodiment of a thing may happen to be one of its modes, it is not right to hold that it is only words denoting generic and other qualities that can be grammatically equated with words denoting substances. In the case of

a thing which can exist as the mode of another thing, the existence, persistence, and realisation of that thing are invariably associated with this other thing. Accordingly, the words which usually denote such things as are such modes denote also the things which are characterised by those modes. The material characteristics of the body do not taint the embodied individual soul; similarly the weaknesses and deficiencies of individual souls do not affect the *Brahman* who is their Soul. In the grammatical equation—'That thou art'—the word 'That' denotes, therefore, the Highest Self as the all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-good cause of the world; and the word 'thou' also denotes that same Supreme Self as having for His body an embodied individual self. This interpretation of this grammatical equation is quite absolutely faultless; and it denotes at the same time that the individual self which is a mode and hence an attribute of the Highest Self is for that very reason different from the Highest Self. The word *Ānandamaya* has to denote this Highest Self; therefore it can neither denote the independent individual self of the *Sāṅkhyas*, nor that other individual self of the *Adwaitins* which is in essence identical with the Supreme Self (pp. 379-383).

The contention of the *Pūrvapakshins*—that the grammatical equation of the word denoting the *Brahman* with words denoting individual selves is calculated to prove the *Ānandamaya* to be the same as the individual self—is thus finally disposed of; and their other contention—that, since the *Ānandamaya* is declared in the scripture to be associated with an embodiment, it cannot be anything other than the individual self—is then taken up for disposal. It is no doubt true that the *Ānandamaya* is declared to be the *embodied self* of the *vijñānamaya*; but

it is also declared that, in the series consisting of the *annamaya*, the *prāṇamaya*, the *manomaya*, the *vijñānamaya* and the *Ānandamaya*, the embodied self of that which succeeds is the same as the embodied self of that which precedes; and the *Brahman* who is the cause of the world is spoken of in this *Taittirīya-Upanishad* itself as the Self of the whole series of created beings. Moreover it is distinctly stated in the *Subāla-Upanishad* that all the constituent principles of the universe form the body of the Highest Self. Therefore it is this Highest Self Himself who forms the embodied Self of the *annamaya*, the *prāṇamaya*, the *manomaya* and the *vijñānamaya*; and the *Ānandamaya* is Himself the embodied Self of Himself. Thus the Supreme Self also has an embodiment; He alone is the unconditioned and ever blissful Embodied Self. This is the reason why the *śāstra* which deals with the *Brahman* is known to worthy persons by the name of the 'Science of the Embodied Being.' Consequently the *Ānandamaya* is the Highest Self, and is undoubtedly distinct from the individual self (pp. 383-386.).

In the next aphorism another objection against the above interpretation of the *Ānandamaya* is answered. In the word *Ānandamaya* there is the affix known as *mayaṭ*. According to Sanskrit grammar this affix generally signifies modification, although it may occasionally denote abundance as well. In the context the affix *mayaṭ* is uniformly used so as to signify modification. Therefore the word *Ānandamaya* cannot be interpreted to mean any thing that is immodifiable. Even if it be granted that the *mayaṭ* here denotes abundance, there is the difficulty that an abundance of bliss implies at least a modicum of misery. Therefore it is the modifiable individual self who is subject to misery that is denoted by the word *Ānandamaya*.

Such is the position of the *Pūrvapakshin*, and it is counteracted by this aphorism which says that the *mayaṭ* here signifies only abundance. In the graded repetition of the various kinds of bliss, the highest unsurpassable bliss happens to be that which is attributed to the *Ānandamaya*; and the *Ānandamaya* must therefore mean the immodifiable and ever blissful *Brahman*. In the context the affix *mayaṭ* cannot be uniformly interpreted to mean modification, in as much as the word *prāṇamaya* has to be interpreted to mean the same thing as the word *prāṇa* means, or to mean that which has the activity of the *prāṇa* in abundance. It is as common to use the affix *mayaṭ* in the sense of abundance as it is to use it in the sense of modification. An abundance of bliss does not necessarily imply a modicum of misery; on the other hand it only implies the negation of the smallness of bliss. The scripture says distinctly that the *Brahman* is wholly free from sin and from misery. The unsurpassably large amount of bliss belonging to the *Brahman* implies also the smallness of the bliss belonging to others; and it is not right to hold that the individual self is a modification of bliss, in as much as the knowledge and the bliss of the individual self are only in a state of contraction when in the condition of *samsāra*. Therefore also the *Ānandamaya* is different from the individual self and is the same as the Supreme Self. (pp. 386-390.).

The next aphorism says that the *Ānandamaya* is not the individual self, in as much as He is declared to be the cause of bliss to all individual selves. The source of bliss cannot be the same as he who receives bliss therefrom (pp. 390-391.). The fourth aphorism in the *Adhikaraṇa* says that that same *Brahman*, who is denoted by the words of the *mantra* which begins with—'The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity,'—is spoken of as the *Ānandamaya*,

and that therefore the *Ānandamaya* cannot be the individual self. The *Brahman* is the object to be attained by the individual self who is the worshipper, and the object of worship cannot be the same as the worshipper (pp. 391-392.). The next aphorism gives another reason why the *Ānandamaya* cannot be the individual self; and that is—that there is inappropriateness in supposing that the *Ānandamaya* is any thing other than the Supreme Self. It may be maintained by a *Pūrvapakshin* that, although it is true that a worshipper's object of attainment is necessarily different from the worshipper himself, here the *Brahman*, denoted by the words of the *mantra* referred to above, is not a different thing from the individual self. The *mantra* is intended to teach that the *Brahman* and the individual self are both one and the same, and that both of them have the same essential nature of attributeless and undifferentiated intelligence. Therefore the *Ānandamaya* denotes only this essential nature of the individual self. The inappropriateness in maintaining a position like this is—that unconditioned omniscience will have to be attributed to the individual self, which has no omniscience at all in its bound condition of *samsāra*. Even the released individual self cannot have such unconditioned omniscience as can 'see' and think in many ways, so as to create the world thereby, and make the *Brahman* manifold. Accordingly the *Ānandamaya* has to denote the *Brahman*, who is the Supreme Self and is other than the individual self. That speech and mind cannot grasp the *Brahman* does not mean that He is really attributeless, in spite of the scripture attributing to Him innumerable auspicious qualities; it only means that speech and mind cannot prove Him. It is said that the unsurpassable Bliss of the *Brahman* may be known, and that to know it is to cease to have any fear

from anywhere. Thus the *Brahman* described in the *mantra* has characteristics which are other than those that constitute the essential nature of the individual self; and the *Ānandamaya* cannot again for this reason be the same as the individual self (pp. 392-396.). The next aphorism says that the *Ānandamaya* is different from the individual self, for the reason that the *Taittirīya-Upanishad* itself declares that the individual self is different from the *Brahman*. (pp. 396-397.). There is again another reason given in the next aphorism to shew why the *Ānandamaya* cannot be the individual self. The *Brahman* merely wills, and there arises creation; and He does not stand in need of any association with non-intelligent matter in the course of His willing such a creation. But no individual self that is capable of engaging in creation can ever do so without being in association with matter (page 397.). The last reason why the *Ānandamaya* cannot be the individual self is given in the last aphorism of the *adhikaraṇa*. Since the bliss of the individual self is the result of that self's association with the *Ānandamaya*, the bliss-giver cannot be the same as the bliss-receiver. That the *Brahman* is the supreme home of bliss and that He is Bliss Himself, so that without Him none can have any bliss of any kind, is amply borne out by scriptural authority. The *jīva*, or the individual self, is not taught to be such an entity; and therefore the conclusion of the *Adhikaraṇa* is that the *Brahman*, who has been made out to be a different entity from the *pradhāna* or non-intelligent matter, is also a different entity from the *jīva* or individual self (pp. 398-399.).

The seventh *adhikaraṇa* is called *Antaradhikaraṇa*,

and consists only of two aphorisms. This and the following four *adhikaraṇas*, belonging to the first part of the first chapter of the *Vedānta-Sūtras*, are intended to establish that the *Brahman* is different from certain particular non-intelligent entities, as also from the Sun, Prajāpati, Indra and other such individual selves, who have attained godhood and are in possession of peculiarly valuable merit due to their respective *karmas*. The first aphorism of the *Antaradhikaraṇa* says that the Person, who is declared in the scripture to be within the Sun and within the eye, is the *Brahman* Himself, in as much as such attributes as belong only to the *Brahman* are seen to be applied to that Person. The *Sāṅkhyas* are again the *Pūrvapakshins* here, and point out that this person is declared to be, like an individual self, associated with a body; and they contend that individual selves themselves may, through the accumulated merit of their *karmas*, acquire omniscience, omnipotence, and all the other sovereignties which are attributed to the *Brahman*, and that there need be nothing called the Supreme Self as distinct from the individual self. According to them it is only a highly meritorious individual self that is the person within the Sun and within the eye (pp. 400-402.). In answer to the *Sāṅkhyas* it is first pointed out that "This same above-mentioned Person is risen above all sins," and that to be so free from sin is to be free from all subjection to the influence of *karma*. No individual self is, by nature, free from the influence of *karma*; and the *Brahman's* freedom from the influence of *karma* is indeed the basis of all the auspicious qualities and sovereignties that are attributed to Him as being natural to Him. To possess these things thus, it is altogether impossible for any individual self. Therefore the Person within the eye and within the Sun cannot be an individual self. That this

Person is declared to be associated with a body does not prove that He must, in consequence, be only an individual self; because it is possible for Him who wills the truth to will His own association with a body. Indeed there is incompatibility between His essential nature, which is free from the influence of *karma*, and His association with a material body, which is always controlled by *karma*; but then His body need not at all be material. That, with the object of favouring His worshippers, He often assumes suitable divine forms, that nevertheless He is free from the qualities belonging essentially to material *Prakṛiti*, and that the body which is at any time assumed by Him is immaterial and divine, are all capable of being well established by means of the scriptures. Consequently, He who abides within the brilliant orb of the Sun and within the eye is the Highest Self Himself, who is different from the Sun and other individual selves (pp. 403-408.). Then the other aphorism in the *adhikaraṇa* draws attention to the fact that the scriptures themselves have declared this Highest Self to be different from the sun-god and other such individual selves; and in proof of this, passages are quoted from the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka-Upanishad* and from the *Subāla-Upanishad*; and finally the *adhikaraṇa* is brought to an end with the conclusion that the Supreme Self is altogether different from all the individual selves from the four-faced Brahmā downwards (pp. 408-409.).

The *Ākāśādhikaraṇa* contains only one aphorism which says that what is denoted by the word *Ākāśa* in the *Chhāndogya-Upanishad* (I. 9. 1.) is the *Brahman*, in as much as His peculiar characteristics are, in the context, mentioned in relation to what is denoted by that word. *Sat*, *Ātman*, and such other words have already been shewn to

denote the *Brahman*, who is the cause of the world and the home of all auspicious qualities and divine sovereignties. Here, it is pointed out that the word *Ākāśa* is also used, in the passage referred to above, to denote that same *Brahman*. The *Pūrvapakshin* here contends that the word *ākāśa* must be interpreted to mean nothing other than the material element of *ākāśa* or ether. No one has any right to interpret a word so as to make it have a meaning which is other than its usual significance; and, when it is said in the scriptures that all beings are born out of the *ākāśa*, what is meant to be taught is that the whole world has been evolved out of the material element known as ether. The qualities of 'seeing', thinking, and willing are attributed to the cause of the world only figuratively. The word *sat* also means the material element known as *ākāśa*, and the word *ātman* also may legitimately be interpreted to mean the same thing. That *ākāśa* is sometimes pointed out to be a produced effect, does not go against its being the cause of the world; because it is capable of existing both in the unevolved and the evolved conditions. This view agrees also with other statements in the scripture regarding the *ākāśa*; therefore the *Brahman* is not other than the well known element of *ākāśa* (pp. 409-413.). Against this contention it is argued that the *Upanishadic* passage on which this aphorism is based assigns to *Ākāśa* such attributes as cannot appropriately belong to the element ether. This element cannot be the cause of all things, in as much as the intelligent individual self cannot be born out of non-intelligent matter; it cannot be greater than all things, because to be greater than all things is to be unconditioned; nor can it be the best refuge, as long as it is merely that non-intelligent thing which deserves to be discarded and the attainment of which forms no desirable aim of life. It is

not right to say that the word *ākāśa* cannot be interpreted to mean anything other than the well known material element ether; for, in the context, that word is used so as to denote a thing that has been already described. The thing so described is the *Brahman*; and in as much as He possesses the power of illuminating things, He is very appropriately called *Ākāśa*. The forced adoption of an interpretation that is against the context is in no way reasonable. It is true that the word *ātman* is occasionally used so as to denote a non-intelligent thing, but the general rule is that it has to denote an intelligent entity; and the scripture ascribes to what forms the cause of the world such attributes as belong only to an intelligent being. It is thus a settled conclusion that the omniscient, omnipotent and omnipenetrative *Brahman* alone is denoted by the word *Ākāśa* in the context referred to above (pp. 413-417.).

The *Prāṇādhikaraṇa* is a short one containing only one aphorism, which says that the word *Prāṇa* also is used in the *Chhāndogya-Upanishad* to denote the *Brahman*. Here *prāṇa* cannot mean merely *life* or *vital air*, in as much as it is used to denote a thing that has been otherwise described, and in as much as it is characterised to be an entity into which the world enters and out of which the world comes. Seeing that most things are dependent upon *life*, we cannot interpret this causal *Prāṇa* to mean *life*. Stocks and stones and the essence of the intelligent individual self are all pervaded by the *Brahman*, and are thus dependent upon the *Brahman*; but there is no *life* or physical vitality in them. Therefore the word *Prāṇa* also denotes, like the word *Ākāśa*, that all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-good *Brahman* who

alone can be the cause of the universe and be its final home of refuge (pp. 417-418.).

There are four aphorisms in the *Jyotir-adhikaraṇa*, and they are intended to show that the word *Jyotis* and the word *Gāyatri* are both used in the *Chhāndogya-Upanishad* to denote the *Brahman* who is the cause of the world. It may be held that the word *Jyotis* means the oridinary light that counteracts darkness, in as much as no particular characteristics specially belonging to the Highest Self are mentioned here as being in association with the thing denoted by that word. This *Jyotis* is also mentioned to be the same as the digestive heat of the stomach, and even ordinary light is quite capable of being characterised by great splendour. The ordinary well known light itself is therefore the *Brahman* which forms the resplendent cause of the world. Against this view the first aphorism in this *adhikaraṇa* says that *Jyotis* or 'Light' here denotes the Highest Person Himself, as there is the mention of His feet in a connected context. It is said—"All beings make up His one foot; His three immortal feet are in the Highest Heaven." This means that all created beings indicate only a quarter of His power and greatness and glory, while the remaining three fourths are not made manifest in our visible universe at all. They are in the Highest Heaven, and this 'Light' is said to shine beyond that Highest Heaven. When it is taught that this Highest Person conceived as 'Light' has to be meditated upon as forming the digestive heat of the stomach, it does not prove that *Jyotis* cannot denote the *Brahman*. In the *Bhagavad-gītā* the Lord has actually compared Himself to this digestive heat (pp. 419-421.). The mention of the feet here is also in relation to the *Gâyatri*, which again is declared in the *Chhāndogya-Upanishad*

to be the *Brahman* and to form the cause of all things. The second aphorism of this *Adhikaraṇa* says that this word *Gāyatrī* does not mean the *Vedic* metre known by that name, but denotes the *Brahman* Himself. It is taught that one of the ways of meditating on Him is to conceive Him as the *Gāyatrī* metre, which has four feet even as He has His four feet. To use words which ordinarily denote metres in some other special sense is not uncommon, and the word *virāj* is so used in this same *Chhandogya-Upanishad*. Therefore *Gāyatrī* also means the Supreme Self who is the cause of the world (pp. 421-423.). The next aphorism gives another reason why the word *Gāyatrī* has here to be understood to mean the Highest Person Himself. As in the case of the Highest Person, so in the case of the *Gāyatrī* also, it is pointed out that it has four feet and that all beings make up only one of these four feet. Therefore again the word *Gāyatrī* must denote the *Brahman* Himself (pp. 423-424.). The *Jyotis* or 'Light' mentioned above is said to shine *beyond* the Highest Heaven, and the three immortal feet of the Highest Person are taught to be *in* the Highest Heaven. In the former statement the Highest Heaven indicates a boundary, while in the latter it indicates a position of location. The last aphorism of this *adhikaraṇa* says that, nevertheless, there is no incompatibility here to vitiate the conclusion that *Jyotis* really means the Highest Person. That Highest Person in the Highest Heaven, who is possessed of unsurpassable splendour, is Himself the Light which is resplendent beyond the Highest Heaven. There is scriptural authority for this way of harmonising the above two statements. Consequently it is quite faultless to say that it is that Supreme Person Himself who is denoted by the word *Jyotis* or 'Light' (pp. 424-425.).

The eleventh *Adhikaraṇa* is known as the *Indraprāṇādhikaraṇa*, and consists of four aphorisms. This *adhikaraṇa* is mainly based on passages to be found in the *Kaushītaki-Brāhmaṇa-Upanishad*. In one of them Pratardana, the son of Divodāsa, is said to have gone to the abode of Indra and there to have been told by him to choose a boon. On Pratardana saying that on his behalf Indra himself may choose such a boon as is most beneficial to man, Indra is declared to have said—"Indeed I am the *Prāṇa* and the Omniscient Self. Worship and meditate on me as life, as immortality." Here Indra is seen to designate himself as *Prāṇa* and to affirm that he is himself a worthy object of worship and meditation. Here the doubt naturally arises whether this Indra who calls himself *Prāṇa* is merely the individual self known as the god Indra, or whether he is the Supreme Self who is other than any individual self. The first aphorism of the *Adhikaraṇa* maintains that the words *Indra* and *Prāṇa* denote the Supreme Self, in as much as on that supposition alone the sequel becomes appropriate, wherein it is said that this *Prāṇa* is the Omniscient Self who is blissful, undecaying and immortal. (pp. 425-427.). The context of the passage quoted above makes it quite clear that it is the god Indra who is the speaker therein, and as if for recognition and identification he also calls himself here as the slayer of Tvāshtra; and when he says that he himself is a worthy object of worship and meditation, it cannot be that the word *Indra* denotes any thing other than the god of that name. The second aphorism here gives the reply to this objection, and says that it cannot be so, because there is in the context the mention of a multitude of attributes belonging to the Inner Self. The *Kaushītaki-Brāhmaṇa-Upanishad* says that *Prāṇa* is the support of the whole universe that is made up of intelligent

and non-intelligent things. This quality of being the support of all things can be appropriately attributed only to the Highest Self who is the Internal Ruler of all things. To be the worthy object of such worship as leads to final release and immortality, to be the impeller of all activities, to be the support of all, to be the Lord of all, and to be blissful, undecaying and immortal, are all attributes belonging to the Inner Self; and they are ascribed to Indra and *Prāṇa*. Therefore the words *Indra* and *Prāṇa* denote the Supreme Self Himself here (pp. 427-430.). How can Indra presume that he is the possessor of all these attributes of the Inner Self? The third aphorism here gives the answer to this question. That Indra looked upon himself as the Highest Self is in accordance with the teaching given in the *śāstras*, and in accordance with what Vāmadeva is said to have done when he realised and saw the *Brahman*. After realising that the Highest person is the Internal Ruler of all things, and that the universe is His body, Prahlāda is also said to have declared that he was all things himself and that all things existed in him (pp. 430-432.). The characteristics of the individual self and of the principal vital air are mentioned clearly in the context wherein the words *Indra* and *Prāṇa* occur. Therefore these words cannot denote the *Brahman*, who is different from the intelligent individual selves and from non-intelligent matter, and who is also the cause of the world. The last aphorism of this *adhikaraṇa* gives, however, the reply to this supposition, by pointing out that it is allowable to worship and meditate on the *Brahman* in three ways, that those three ways of worship and meditation are assumed to be proper in the context here, and that one of those three ways is actually adopted therein. The *Brahman* may be worshipped in His essential unembodied

nature, or He may be worshipped as an embodied being; and in this latter case He may be conceived and meditated upon either as an individual self or as a material object. Wherever particular individual selves and particular material objects are found so described in the scripture as to be in association with the peculiarly characteristic attributes of the Supreme Self, or wherever the words denoting those individual selves and material objects are seen to be grammatically equated with words denoting the Supreme Self, —in all such cases what is intended to be taught is the worship and meditation of the *Brahman* as forming the Inner Self of all those intelligent and non-intelligent entities. Accordingly the words *Indra* and *Prāṇa* also denote the Supreme Self (pp. 432-435.).

Thus ends the commentary on the first part of the first chapter of the *Vedānta-Sūtras*. The first *Adhikaraṇa* establishes the need for the study of the *Vedānta* and points out the purpose of such a study. The second gives a definition of the *Brahman*. The third points out that this definition has altogether to be based on the scripture. The fourth says that the scripture accordingly forms the only source from which a knowledge of the *Brahman* is to be derived, in as much as the *Brahman* is the one thing which it throughout aims at teaching. These four *Adhikaraṇas* contain only one aphorism each, and together they denote the need and the main object of *Vedāntic* studies. The fifth *Adhikaraṇa* establishes that the *Brahman*, who has been defined to be the cause of the creation, preservation and destruction of the whole universe, is other than the purely material *Pradhāna* of the *Sāṅkhyas*. Thus the *Vedānta* does not believe in what may be called the omnipotence of matter, and there are eight aphorisms given to shew that matter cannot be the creator of the world. Then

the eight aphorisms of the sixth *Adhikaraṇa* demonstrate that, according to the teaching given in the *Upanishads*, the cause of the creation, preservation and destruction of the world is not only not matter, but it is not also any one of the individual souls existing in the universe. The *Brahman* who is the Highest Person is the Creator ; and He is distinct from matter and distinct from soul. Then the remaining five *Adhikaraṇas* shew that it is only this *Brahman* who is mentioned as the Person within the Sun and the eye, and who is denoted in various contexts in the *Upanishads* by the words *Ākāśa*, *Prāṇa*, *Jyotis*, *Gāyatrī* and *Indra-and-Prāṇa*. Accordingly it is proved that the *Prakṛiti* and the *Purusha* of the *Sāṅkhyas* do not constitute the cause of the world, but that the cause thereof is the omniscient and omnipotent God Himself who is wholly pure and abundantly full of all auspicious qualities.

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ŚRĪ-BHĀSHYA.

CHAPTER. I.

PART I.

May my understanding assume the form of loving devotion to that Highest *Brahman* who is the Home of Lakshmī,[1] and to whom the creation, preservation, destruction, &c., of all the worlds is (mere) play, whose main resolve consists in the protection of hosts of multiform subordinate beings, and who is specially seen to shine forth in what constitutes the head[2] of the *Vedas*.

May the fair-minded god-like ones of the earth drink in daily the speech-nectar of the son of Parāśara—(the nectar) which has been churned out of the heart of the milky ocean of the *Upanishads*, and quickens such souls as have lost hold of their life in God through the excessive flaming forth of the fire of *samsāra*[3] —(may they drink in that nectar) which has been carefully preserved by ancient teachers and has (hitherto) been held at a distance (from us all) on account of the mutual conflict of many schools of thought, and which is now brought within the reach (of all) by means of (our) appropriate words.

1. Lakshmī is the name of the goddess of fortune, mercy and beauty. She is otherwise known as *Śrī*, and is regarded in Hindu Mythology as the wife of Vishṇu or Nārāyaṇa. In the *Taitt. Ār.* in the passage "*Hrīscha te Lakshmīscha patnyau*," both *Lakshmī*, and *Hrī* or modesty personified, are spoken of as the wives of Vishṇu.

2. The *Upanishads* are looked upon as forming the head of the *Vedas*, and are also known as the *Vedānta*.

3. *Samsāra* means the circuit of mundane existence consisting of frequent births and frequent deaths and all their consequences.

Ancient teachers (such as Dramiḍāchārya and others) abridged that extensive commentary on the *Brahma-Sūtras*[4] which was composed by the venerable Bodhāyana.[5] In accordance with their opinion, the words of the *sūtras* (*i. e.* aphorisms) are (here) explained.

ADHIKARAṆA. I.

Jijñāsādhikaraṇa.

Sūtra* I. *Athāto Brahmajijñāsā.

Then therefore the enquiry into the *Brahman.*

Here the word **then** is used in the sense of *coming immediately after*; the word **therefore** is used in the sense that that (enquiry) which has been concluded (viz. the enquiry into the *Karma-kāṇḍa*[6]) is the reason (for undertaking the present enquiry). With him who has (first) studied and learnt the *Vedas* with all their limbs[7] and head, and who, through realizing that the mere knowledge of (ritualistic) works gives small and transitory results, has the desire for final release born in him—(with him), the desire for that knowledge of the *Brahman*, which is productive of infinite and eternal results, is, indeed, of subsequent origin.

Brahmaṇo jijñāsā=***Brahmajijñāsā.*** *Brahmaṇas*, the

4. *Brahma-Sūtras* is another name for the *Vedānta-Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa.

5. Accordingly, Bodhāyana is called the *Vṛittikāra* or the author of the *Vṛitti*.

6. The *Karma-kāṇḍa* is that section of *Vedic* scriptures which includes the *Mantras*, the *Brāhmaṇas* and such portions of the *Āraṇyakas* as deal with rituals and their performance.

7. In the same way in which the *Upanishads* are looked upon as the head of the *Vedas*, the science of *Śikshā* or phonetics, which deals with the proper pronunciation and euphony of words, grammar, metrics, *Nirukta* which deals with the etymology and proper meaning of *Vedic* words, astronomy, and *Kalpa* or the code of liturgy, form the six limbs of the *Vedas*.

genitive of the word *Brahman*, has (here) the objective significance, in accordance with the special rule—"The genitive followed by a word having a *kṛit*[8] affix is used to denote the agent or the object." [*Pāṇini.* II. 3. 65.]. Even if the genitive is taken as expressing relation in general[9], the objective significance (of the genitive) is well established (here), because the desire to know requires an object. Yet again, because what is made out by the direct denotative power (of the genitive in accordance with *Pāṇini.* II. 3. 65.) is more acceptable than what is obtained by a process of inference (in accordance with *Pāṇini.* II. 3. 50., where the genitive is declared to be capable of expressing relation in general)—the genitive (here) has to be understood in the objective significance. It should not be supposed that because there is the rule—"The genitive prescribed specially for particular words is not to be compounded"—[*Pāṇini.* II. 2. 10. *Vārtika.*], this genitive in the objective significance, (being one such), is prohibited from being compounded (with other words); for, there is the rule of counter-exception (to this), *viz.* "The genitive, with a *kṛit* following, is to be compounded." [*Pāṇini.* II. 2. 9. *Vārtika.*]

By the word **Brahman** is denoted the Highest Person who is, by nature, devoid of all evil, and is possessed of hosts of auspicious qualities, which are innumerable and unsurpassed in excellence. For, everywhere (*i. e.* in all contexts) the word *Brahman* is seen to derive its meaning from the

8. See *Pāṇini* III. 1. 93. *Kṛidatiṅ.* Whenever a rule affecting a root obtains scope for its operation, then the affix which is applied to that root in accordance with that rule, and is other than verbal personal affixes such as *mi, si, ti,* is called a *Kṛit.* Generally, a *Kṛit* is an affix used to form nouns from roots. And a word ending with a *Kṛit* affix (*Kṛidanta*) is also called a *Kṛit.* The word *Jijñāsā* is a verbal noun and is taken to be a *Kṛit* here.

9. See *Pāṇini.* II. 3. 50.

association of *bṛihattva, i. e.* greatness, (with the thing denoted by it); and whatever greatness is, by nature as well as by qualities, unsurpassed in excellence, that is its primary and natural meaning[10]. And He (who possesses such greatness) is alone the Lord of All. Hence the word *Brahman* is primarily used to signify Him alone. In cases where, on account of the association of a small modicum of that quality, other things than He are meant (by the word *Brahman*), it must be used in a secondary sense; because it is improper to postulate a variety of meanings (for it), as (it is improper) in the case also of the word *Bhagavat*[11]. For the sake of attaining immortality, He alone has to be desired and to be known by (all) those who are afflicted with the three miseries[12]. Hence, the Lord of All is indeed the **Brahman** who forms the object of (our present) enquiry.

Jijñāsā is (literally) the desire to know. As (every) desire has for its basis the thing to be desired, here, that

10. In Indian literature it is held that the power of words to denote meanings is of three kinds, *viz.* denotative, figurative and purportive. The purportive signification of words is by some maintained to be different from the suggestive signification, and accordingly the power of words is also said to be fourfold. See *Kāvyaprakāśa*, chapters, II. & III.

11. The word *Bhagavat* means the Divine Lord. It is, however, used frequently enough as a term of respect in association with the names of great and holy men, such as Vyāsa, Bodhāyana, &c. It is held that in all such cases the applicability of the word as a term of respect is due to the fact of such men possessing more or less the godly qualities of the Divine Lord.

12. The 'three miseries' are the three kinds of miseries known as the *Ādhyātmika i. e.* those which are due to one's self, the *Ādhidaivika*, those that arise out of deities or are of supernatural origin, and the *Ādhibhautika*, those that arise out of natural causes and beings. For example, fever and other such diseases, anger, desire, and other such passions form the misery known as the *Ādhyātmika*. Thunder, storm, lightning, &c., produce the *Ādhidaivika* misery. The *Ādhibhautika* misery results from ghosts, devils, &c.

very knowledge (of the *Brahman*), which is the thing desired, is enjoined.

What is said is this:—As the (ritualistic) works learnt from the earlier part of the *Mīmāmsā* are capable of producing only small and transitory results, and as the knowledge of the *Brahman*, conclusively dealt with in the latter part (thereof), is capable of producing infinite and indestructible results,—for this reason alone, immediately after the antecedent knowledge of works, the *Brahman* has to be desired and known. Says the *Vṛittikāra* (Bodhāyana) therefore:—"The desire to know the *Brahman* comes immediately after the acquisition of the knowledge of (ritualistic) works is completed." Moreover, he says, in the following manner, that between the *Karma-mīmāmsā* and the *Brahma-mīmāmsā* there is a *śāstraic* (*i. e.* scientific) unity (whereby the antecedence of the *Karma-mīmāmsā* is implied):—"This *Mīmāmsā* of the Embodied (*i. e.* of the *Brahman*) is composed so as to be one with that of Jaimini (*i. e.* the *Karma-mīmāmsā*) which consists of sixteen specific chapters; and so there is the establishment of *śāstraic* unity between them." Hence the difference between the *Pūrva-mīmāmsā* and the *Uttara-mīmāmsā* is due to the difference in the subject-matter taken up to be propounded, like the difference between the first six and the second six chapters (of the *Pūrva-mīmāmsā*), as also like the difference between one chapter and another (of either of the *Mīmāmsās*). The *Mīmāmsā-śāstra* (as a whole), beginning with—"Then therefore the enquiry into *dharma* [13], (*i. e.* duty)"—[*Pūr. Mīm.* I. 1. 1.]; and ending with—"There is non-return, according to scripture;

13. *Dharma* or duty is defined in the *Pūrva-mīmāmsā* to be "that thing which has the characteristics of a commandment."

Chodanālakshaṇortho dharmaḥ.
[Jaimini's *Pūrva-mīmāmsā*. I. 1. 2.].

there is non-return, according to scripture"—[*Ved. Sūt.* IV. 4. 22.], has a certain order of sequence (in the treatment of its subject) in accordance with the peculiarity of the topics dealt with (therein).

Accordingly, by the statement—"The *Veda* (*Swādhyāya*) has to be learnt"—[*Taitt. Ār.* II. 15.], the mental reception, by means of oral recitation, of the collection of syllables known as the *Veda*, which is denoted by the word *Swādhyāya*, is enjoined in the very beginning. And if it be asked, "Of what nature is that learning through oral recitation and how is it to be gone through?"—we reply as follows:—The requirements (for learning the *Vedas*) are enjoined by means of this passage, *viz.* "A Brāhmaṇa of eight years of age should be initiated (as a *Vedic* student) and be taught (to repeat the *Vedas*)—"[*Śat. Br.* ?]; as also by means of the teaching about special preparatory and purificatory ceremonies and restrictions (as to time, place, food, &c.)—such as are laid down in this passage among others, viz. "Having, according to scriptural injunctions, made preparations to begin (to learn the *Vedas*) either (on the full moon day) in the month of *Śrāvaṇa* (*i. e.* July-August) or (on the full moon day) in the month of *Praushṭhapada* (*i. e.* August-September), and having become fitted (therefor), a Brāhmaṇa should learn the *Vedas* for four months and a half." [*Manu.* IV. 95.]. Thus it is understood that learning the *Vedas* turns out to be the mental reception of a collection of syllables, and consists in their recitation by the teacher followed by the after-recitation (of the pupil), who is in the habit of observing special preparatory and purificatory ceremonies and restrictions, and who has been initiated by a teacher born of noble lineage, accustomed to pious observances, possessed of spiritual qualities, and also having a thorough know-

ledge of the *Vedas*. Learning the *Vedas* is, moreover, a *samskāra* (*i. e.* a refinement or an exaltation of excellence) in relation to the *Vedas*, since it is seen that *Swādhyāya* forms the object (of such a *samskāra*) in the passage—"The *Veda* has to be learnt." [*Taitt. Ār.* II. 15.]. *Samskāra* (*i. e.* refinement or exaltation of excellence), it is well known, is the means of qualifying (a thing) for the fulfilment of other objects (than those for which it is suited without that *samskāra*). And it is proper for the *Vedas* to be worthy of *samskāra* (*i. e.* of getting their excellence exalted), because (when so qualified) they enable us to know (the nature of) duty, wealth, desire and final release, which form the fourfold objects of human pursuit; and (they enable us to know also) the means of accomplishing them. And again (they are worthy of such *samskāra*), because, in the way of a mere silent repetition (of prayers), &c., they form, even as they are verbally, the means of accomplishing those (objects of human pursuit). Thus the injunction as to learning the *Vedas* finally comes to mean a mere mental reception of a collection of syllables, after (reciting) certain *mantras*[14] and (obeying) certain regulations.

Because the *Vedas*, as learnt by oral recitation, are, of their own nature, seen to give us knowledge of purposeful (*i. e.* fruit-giving) things, the person who has learnt the *Vedas* perceives, in the first instance, those purposeful (fruit-giving) things which are disclosed to him by the *Vedas* so learnt; and then betakes himself, of his own accord, to the 'hearing' (*i. e.* the study) of the *Mîmāmsā* which is of

14. A *Mantra* is interpreted to mean a sacred formula and its thought which protect the thinker thereof from all danger. It is, properly, a hymn or prayer addressed to a deity, and is supposed to possess mystic and supernatural powers.

the nature of an enquiry into *Vedic* texts, having for its result the determination of the special character and mode of those (purposeful and fruit-giving) things. There (*i. e.* in the *Vedas*), after the true nature of the injunctions regarding works has been ascertained, he observes the insignificant and impermanent character of the result of works. And then because, from the passages of the *Upanishads* which are a part of the *Vedas* learnt by oral recitation, a *prima facie* mental impression about an infinite and permanent result in the form of immortality arises, he therefore becomes qualified for the study of the *Mīmāmsā* of the Embodied—(the *Mīmāmsā*) which is such an enquiry into *Vedāntic* texts as results in the determination of the nature of that (immortality).

Accordingly, *Vedāntic* texts declare the destructibility of the results of mere works and the indestructible character of the results arising from the knowledge of the *Brahman*:—"Just as the world obtained by works perishes here, so also, there, the world obtained by merit perishes." [*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 6.]. "To him that (world obtained by works) indeed comes to an end." [*Bṛih. Up.* III. 8. 10.]. "It is not reached by the non-eternal (works)." [*Kaṭh. Up.* II. 10.]. "Frail, indeed, are these floats in the form of sacrifices." [*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 2. 7.]. "Having examined the worlds obtained by works, let a *Brāhmaṇa* acquire freedom from all desires. The changeless is not (gained) by the changeable; to know that, let him approach, with fuel in hand, a preceptor who is learned in the *Vedas* and has a sure footing in the *Brahman*. To him (*i. e.* to such a pupil) who, with restrained senses and fully tranquilled mind, has thus appoached him (*i. e.* the perceptor), that wise man (the *Guru*) should speak of that knowledge of the *Brahman* by which the ever-existent and indestructible

Person (*Purusha*) is known." [*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 2. 12 & 13.]. *Should speak of* has (here) the same meaning as *should teach*. "He who knows the *Brahman* attains the Highest." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.]. "He comes not to death again who sees that One." [?]. "He who sees (that One) does not see Death." [*Chhând. Up.* VII. 26. 2.]. "He (who knows the *Brahman*) becomes free." [*Chhând. Up.* VII. 25. 2.]. "He who knows Him thus becomes immortal here. There is no other path for the attainment of final release." [*Taitt. Âr.* III. 12.7.]. "Knowing the individual self and the Impeller (*i. e.* the *Brahman*) to be separate, and being therefore blessed by Him, he attains immortality". [*Śvet. Up.* I. 6.]. To the same effect there are also other texts.

It may, however, be said that *Swarga* (the celestial world of enjoyment) and other such results of works, the destructibility of *Swarga* and of such other things, and immortality as the result of the worship of the *Brahman*—are (all) undoubtedly made out merely by learning the *Vedas* with their limbs; and that (therefore) he, who (having so learnt the *Vedas*) is desirous of obtaining final release, may at once betake himself to the enquiry into the *Brahman* immediately afterwards. What then is the reason for the (alleged) necessity of the (previous) enquiry into (ritualistic) duty (*dharma*)? If so asked—we reply—"Let him not enter on the study of the *Mîmâmsâ* of the Embodied also, since, by merely learning the *Vedas* with their limbs, all things become known." It may be again said, however,—"True, there certainly arises a *prima facie* notion (of all those things mentioned above); still, as a sentence is capable of definitely importing a true meaning only when it is supported by logic, this notion, even though it at first sight appears of itself, does not transcend doubt

and wrong apprehension. Hence to determine that (true meaning), an enquiry into *Vedāntic* passages has to be undertaken." If so, (we rejoin)—"You please see to it that the enquiry into (ritualistic) duty also has to be undertaken for that very same reason."

But it may be said again (by the *Pūrvapakshin*,[15] or the objector) as follows:—Whatever the enquiry into the *Brahman* invariably desiderates, that very thing should be stated to be the antecedent subject of enquiry (here). The enquiry into the *Brahman* does not desiderate the enquiry into (ritulistic) duty (*dharma*), because in the case of him who has learnt the *Vedānta*, although he may have (previously) obtained no knowledge of (ritualistic) works, the enquiry into the meaning of *Vedāntic* passages is quite possible and appropriate. In this same (*Vedānta*) are discussed those *upāsanas* or forms of worship which are based upon the *Udgītha* (*i.e.* the sacred syllable *Om*), &c., and are in themselves a part of (ritualistic) works. If it be held that one who has not obtained the knowledge of works is incapable of performing them (*i.e.* of going through those forms of worship), then, whoever thinks so is ignorant of the import of the Science of the Embodied. In this science, it is aimed to propound the knowledge of the oneness of the *Ātman* (*i.e.* of the Self), for the purpose of destroying that false knowledge, which is the source of all (kinds of) misery to him, who is sunk in the ocean of the sorrows which arise out of the *samsāra* (or the circuit of mundane existence), that is made up of birth, old age, death, &c., and have for their cause the perception of the various distinctions which are due to the beginningless *avidyā*, (or ignorance).

15. This objector is the *Adwaitin* who is of opinion that the *Karma-kāṇḍa* need not be studied as the necessary preliminary to the study of the *Jñāna-kāṇḍa* or the *Vedānta.*

How, then, is the knowledge of works, which depends upon distinctions, of any use to such a person? On the contrary it is positively unfavourable (to him). Moreover, the discussion of the *Udgîtha*, &c., really forms a part of (the study of) works; and yet as it (*viz.* that discussion) is closely allied to what constitutes knowledge, it is also (incidentally) conducted here (in the *Vedânta*). Indeed, it (*i. e.* the conduct of that discussion here) is not due to any direct relationship (of antecedence and sequence). Hence, whatever is desiderated by what forms the principal subject of this science—that very thing has to be mentioned as its antecedent. (The *Bhâskariyas* may, however, here interpose and say)—"True; but the knowledge of works alone is what is desiderated by it, because it is declared that final release (or *moksha*) results from knowledge that is added to works. He (the *Sûtra-kâra*) also says: 'There is need of all (works), because there are scriptural statements enjoining sacrifices, &c.; just as (the harness is needed) in the case of the horse.' [*Ved. Sût.* III. 4. 26.]. Moreover, when the desiderated works are not (themselves) made out, it is not possible to know the distinction, as to with which (of them) there is to be the cumulative association (of knowledge), and as to with which it is not to be. Hence that (*viz. karma*) alone is the antecedent (subject of enquiry)." This view (we mention) is not proper, because the cessation of ignorance (or of *avidyâ*) is due solely to the knowledge of the *Brahman*, who is pure intelligence and hostile to all characterising attributes. In reality, final release is merely the cessation of ignorance. How can works which are subject to endless distinctions arising from the peculiarities due to the various conditions and stages of life, (arising) from the objects which these have in view and from the means of accomplishing them, as also from the manner of

accomplishing them—(how can such works) become the means for the destruction of ignorance, which (destruction) is, by nature, nothing other than the cessation of the perception of all distinctions? Scriptural texts also say that works are an obstruction to final release, inasmuch as their results are of a transitory nature; and (they further say) that knowledge alone forms the means of final release. "To him that (world obtained by works) indeed comes to an end." [*Bṛih. Up.* III. 8. 10.]. "Just as the world obtained by works perishes here, so also, there, the world obtained by merit perishes." [*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 6.]. "He who knows the *Brahman* attains the Highest." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.]. "He who knows the *Brahman* becomes the *Brahman* indeed." [*Muṇḍ. Up.* III. 2. 9.]. "After knowing Him alone, one transcends death." [*Śvet. Up.* III. 8.]. To the same effect there are also other texts.

Besides, it has been observed that *vidyā* (or the knowledge of the *Brahman*) is dependent upon *karma*, such as sacrifice, &c. Now, it (*viz. karma*) is (by nature) hostile to what forms the principal subject (of the *Brahma-mīmāṁsā*); from this fact, as well as from a careful consideration of the words of the scriptural passages (enjoining *karma*), it follows that, through previously purifying the internal organ (or the mind), it (*viz. karma*) is useful in producing the desire to know (the *Brahman*), but not in producing the fruit (in the form of *moksha* resulting from the knowledge of the *Brahman*); and it is therefore that the word *vividishanti* (which means *they desire to know*) is mentioned in the scriptural passage (under reference, *viz. Tametam Vedānuvachanena Brāhmaṇā vividishanti yajñena dānena tapasānāśakena.*) [*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 22.]. The scripture itself declares in the following manner that after the desire to know (the *Brahman*) has come into existence, tranquillity, &c., consti-

tute the inborn means for the evolution of knowledge :—"Tranquilled in mind, with the senses restrained, having given up desires, resigned and patient, and absorbed in abstract meditation, let a man see the Self in the self." [*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 23.]. Therefore, after the desire to know (the *Brahman*) is thus born in one, whose sins have been destroyed by means of works done in hundreds of previous births without attachment to any particular result, (one's) *avidyâ* (or ignorance) is removed by means of the knowledge derived from such passages as the following among others :—"Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning, one only without a second." [*Chhând. Up.* VI. 2. 1.] : "The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.] : "He is without parts, He is without actions and tranquil." [*Śvet. Up.* VI. 19.]: "This *âtman* (the self) is the *Brahman*." [*Bṛih. Up.* II. 5. 19. & IV. 4. 5.][16]: "That thou art." [*Chhând. Up.* VI. 8. 7.].

'Hearing' (*śravaṇa*), 'reflection' (*manana*) and 'steady meditation' (*nididhyâsana*) are useful for the purpose of knowing the meaning of (scriptural) sentences. 'Hearing' is to receive ideas which are supported by logic—from a preceptor who has perceived the truth that *Vedântic* passages declare the knowledge of the oneness of the Self. 'Reflection' is rationally to fix in one's self that, in a certain particular way alone, the idea thus taught by the teacher is true. 'Steady meditation' is the incessant contemplation of this very idea for the purpose of destroying that beginningless innate impression (*vâsanâ*) of distinctions which is hostile to this (knowledge of the oneness of the Self). The knowledge of the syntactical meaning of scriptural sentences

16. Vide also *Mâṇḍ. Up.* 1. 2.

removes the ignorance (or *avidyā*) of him whose innate impression of distinctions has been removed by 'hearing', &c.; and so whatever is desiderated by that 'hearing' which is of this nature, should be stated to be the necessary antecedent (of the enquiry into the *Brahman*). And that (which is so desiderated) is this fourfold means, namely, (1) the discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal things, (2) tranquillity of the mind, restraint of the senses, and an abundance of other[17] (similar) means, (3) the renunciation of the enjoyment of the fruits (of actions) here and hereafter, (4) and the desire for final release; because without this (fourfold means) it is impossible for the desire to know (the *Brahman*) to come into existence. From the very nature of the subject itself, this alone is made out to be the necessary antecedent (here).

What has been said is this: That the cause of the bondage (of the soul) is merely the perception of distinctions, which is based on unreality and has its origin in the *avidyā* (or ignorance) that veils the true nature of the *Brahman*; that the bondage itself is unreal; that solely by reason of its unreality it is destroyed to the very roots only by means of knowledge; that the knowledge that (so) destroys (the bondage) is derived out of (scriptural) passages such as "That thou art" [*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 7.], &c.; that works are of no use in causing the origination of such knowledge in its own true nature, or in producing the effect of this knowledge that is so derived out of such passages, but that the use of works consists only in (producing) the desire to know (the *Brahman*); and that it (*viz.* the use of works) is to be found in causing the

17. These other similar means are: *uparati*, or cessation from all desires, *titikshā* or resignation and patience, *samādhāna* or equanimity, and *śraddhā* or faith.

increase of *sattva* (*i. e.* the quality of goodness)—(an increase) resulting from the destruction of *rajas* and *tamas* (or the qualities of passion and darkness respectively) which form the roots of sin; and that, therefore, having in view (only) this use (of works), it is declared (in the scripture)—"Brâhmaṇas desire to know &c." [*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 22.]. Hence, on account of the uselessness of the knowledge of works, the aforesaid fourfold means alone has to be stated to be the necessary antecedent (of the enquiry into the *Brahman*).

Regarding this (view) it is said (in reply) as follows:—The statement that the cessation of ignorance in itself constitutes final release, and that it results solely from the knowledge of the *Brahman* is admitted (by us). It has (however) to be discriminated, of what form that knowledge is which it is desired to enjoin, by means of *Vedântic* passages, for the purpose of removing ignorance—whether what is to be learnt from a scriptural sentence is merely the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of that sentence, or whether it is knowledge which is based thereon and is the same as worship. It is surely not the knowledge arising out of (the syntax of) sentences, because such (knowledge) results logically from the sentence itself, even without an injunction (enjoining that knowledge), and because also the removal of ignorance does not result from just so much alone. Moreover, it should not be urged—that, when the innate impression (*vâsanâ*) of distinctions remains unremoved, the *Vedântic* sentence does not give rise to that knowledge which is destructive of ignorance;—that even if it (*viz.* such knowledge) come into existence (thus), it is nothing wrong if, all at once, the perception of distinctions does not cease for all, as in the analogous case of the persistence of the perception of two moons even when the

(real) oneness of the moon is known;—and that even though it (*i. e.* the innate impression of distinctions) has not ceased to be, since its roots have (already) been cut, it is powerless to bind (the self): because it is impossible for knowledge not to come into existence when the necessary materials for it are available; and because even where there is the wrong innate impression, it is seen that the knowledge which stultifies (such impressions) results from the teaching of trustworthy preceptors, and from the bases of logical inference, &c. It is not possible for you to say that even when there is the knowledge of the meaning of *Vedāntic* passages, the perception of distinctions continues to be, owing to the existence of a small vestige of the beginningless innate impression (of distinctions); because this innate impression, itself forming the means for the production of the perception of distinctions, is of the nature of an unreality, and is (therefore) removed at once by the genesis of true knowledge. If, even after the origination of knowledge, there be no removal of that (innate impression) which is unreal, then there can be nothing else to remove it; and therefore there will never be the removal of this innate impression (*vāsanā*). To say, that the perception of distinctions which results from such innate impressions has its roots cut and still continues to exist, is childish talk. In the case of the perception of two moons (when there is only one in reality) and in the case of other such things, even though the stultifier (of such a perception) is near at hand, the persistence of the false perception is not contradictory to reason; because the really existing darkness and such other misguiding things, forming the cause of (such) false perception, are not (thereby) destroyed, owing to the fact that they are not injuriously affected by (true) knowledge. But the effects in the form of fear, &c., (due

to such a false perception of a serpent in a real rope, &c.,) disappear, when they are put an end to by powerful means of true knowledge (such as the verbal testimony of a trustworthy person, and so on). Moreover, the genesis of knowledge can never take place in those who hold that that genesis of knowledge results from the removal of the innate impression of distinctions. The innate impression of distinctions is beyond measure (in strength), by reason of its accumulation from beginningless time; but the mental conception which is hostile to it (*i. e.* to the innate impression of distinctions) is weak; therefore the removal of that (innate impression of distinctions or *vâsanâ*) is not possible by means of this (hostile mental conception or *bhâvanâ*). Hence that 'knowledge' alone which is different from the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of sentences, and is imported by words such as *dhyâna* (meditation), *upâsana* (worship), &c., is what it is desired to enjoin by means of *Vedântic* passages.

To that same effect are the (following) scriptural texts:—"Having discovered (Him), let him practise knowledge." [*Vijñâya prajñâṁ kurvîta.—Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 21.]. "Having discovered (Him), let him know." [*Anuvidya vijânâti.—Chhând. Up.* VIII. 12. 6.]. "Meditate on the Self as the Om." [*Om iti eva âtmânam dhyâyatha.—Muṇḍ. Up.* II. 2. 6.]. "Having perceived That, one is freed from the jaws of death." [*Nichâyya tan mṛityumukhât pramuchyate.—Kaṭh. Up.* III. 15.]. "Let him worship the self alone as the object to be attained." [*Âtmânam eva lokam upâsîta.—Bṛih. Up.* I. 4. 15.]. "Verily, my dear one, the Self has to be seen, has to be heard, has to be reflected upon, has to be steadily meditated upon." [*Âtmâ vâ are śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyâsitavyaḥ.—Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 5.]. "He has to be sought after, He has to be

specially desired and known." [*Sonveshṭavyassavijijñāsitavyaḥ.—Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 7. 1.]. To this same effect there are also other similar scriptural passages. These (passages) have to import the same meaning as *nididhyāsitavyaḥ*, &c.[18]; accordingly, on account of the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of (scriptural) sentences being helpful to *dhyāna* (or meditation), the passages *Vijñāya prajñām kurvīta*, *Anuvidya vijānāti* and others, (first) re-affirm (the need for) that (knowledge) by means of (the words) *anuvidya* and *vijñāya*, and then they enjoin *dhyāna* by means of *prajñām kurvīta* and *vijānāti*. *Śrotavyaḥ* also gives a restatement (of the need for knowing the syntactical meaning of sentences)—because the need for *śravaṇa* (or 'hearing') arises of itself from the fact that a person, who has learnt the *Vedas* with a view to attain desirable objects, sees that the *Vedas* are capable of affording instruction in regard to such desirable objects, and then betakes himself, of his own accord, to the 'hearing' of the *Vedas* for definitely ascertaining what those objects are. *Mantavyaḥ* also means (such) a restatement, because *manana* (or reflection) serves the purpose of fixing in the mind what has (already) been 'heard.' Therefore, it is *dhyāna* (or meditation) alone that is enjoined (here). Says (the *Sūtrakāra*) also—" Frequent repetition (is to be practised), as it is so taught." [*Ved. Sūt.* IV. 1. 1.]. Therefore, this *vedana* (or knowledge), which it is desired to enjoin as a means of obtaining final release, has to be understood in the

18. The meanings of the Sanskrit words used in the context here are as follows:—*nididhyāsitavyaḥ*=has to be steadily meditated upon; *anuvidya*=having discovered (Him); *vijñāya*=having understood (Him); *vijānāti*=let him know; *prajñām kurvīta*=let him practise knowledge; *śrotavyaḥ*=has to be 'heard'; *mantavyaḥ*=has to be reflected upon.

sense of *upâsana* (or worship). For knowledge (*vidi*) and worship (*upâsti*) are seen to be used, the one for the other, in the beginning and the conclusion of *Vedântic* passages such as the following :—"Let him worship (*upâsita*) the mind as the *Brahman*. [*Chhând. Up.* III. 18. 1.];.......He, who knows (*veda*) thus, shines and warms up through fame, greatness and spiritual glory." [*Chhând. Up.* III. 18. 6.]. "As, indeed, he is not all this, he does not know (*veda*). .....Let him worship (*upâsîta*) Him as the self itself." [*Brih. Up.* I. 4. 7.]. And—"He who is the knower of that *Brahman* (*yastad veda*), and that (*Brahman*) whom he knows (*yat sa veda*)—both these have been explained to you by me. [*Chhând. Up.* IV. 1. 4.];......Reverend sir, that deity which you worship (*upâsse*), commend that deity unto me." [*Chhând. Up.* IV. 2. 2.].

Further, *dhyâna* (or meditation) is of the form of a succession of memories (or remembrances), which is unbroken like a stream of oil. For, firm memory is declared to be a means of final release in this passage, *viz.* "The memory becomes firm ; when such memory is obtained, there is the loosening of all knots." [*Chhând. Up.* VII. 26. 2.]. And such memory is of the same form as direct perception, because it (*viz.* the above passage) has to agree in meaning with—"When He who is the highest and lowest is seen, the knot of the heart is broken, doubts are all shattered, and his actions (or *karma*) perish." [*Muṇḍ. Up.* II. 2. 8.]. This being the case, it is decided by means of this passage—*viz.* "The Self, my dear one, has to be seen, &c," [*Brih. Up.* II. 4. 5.]—that steady meditation (*nididhyâsana*) has the same character as direct perception. Moreover, memory has the character of direct perception, because it is (simply) an intensification (of the process) of mental conception.

All this has been well explained by the *Vākyakāra*.[19] He says:—"*Vedana* (or knowledge) is *upāsana* (or worship), since it is so mentioned in the scriptures as to refer to that." It has thereby been explained that the *vedana* (or knowledge) which is enjoined in all the *Upanishads*, as the means of attaining final release, is (the same as) *upāsana* (or worship). After stating the position of an opponent to the effect that religious contemplation has to be gone through only once, for, by so doing, the intention of the scripture is fully carried out, as in the case of *prayāja*[20] and other such sacrificial offerings, it is finally determined by him (*i. e.* the *Vākyakāra*), in the passage—"From the word *upāsana*, it is conclusively established (that *vedana* or knowledge means *upāsana* or worship)"—that *vedana* frequently repeated is the means of final release. In the passage—"*Upāsana* (or worship) is the same as firm memory, as it is seen so to be, and as it is so declared in the scriptures"—it is explained by him that that very same *vedana* (or knowledge), which is of the form of *upāsana* (or worship), has the character of firm memory. Such memory is declared to be the same as seeing; and (for it) to possess the nature of seeing is the same as to have the character of direct perception. Scripture thus specifies the memory which has been proved to possess the character of direct perception, and to be the means of final release: "This Self is not reached either by reflection (*pravachana* which means *manana*), or by steady meditation (*medhā* or

19. The *Vākyakāra* who is frequently quoted by Rāmānuja in his *Śrī-Bhāshya* & *Vedārtha-saṅgraha* is known as Taṅka.

20. *Prayājas* are the fore-offerings, as opposed to *Anuyājas* or the after-offerings. These *prayāja* offerings and others like them cannot be offered more than once in any one particular sacrifice. *Vide Pūr. Mīm.* XI. 1. 29 to 37.

nididhyasana), or by largely 'hearing' the scriptures. Whomsoever He chooses, by him alone is He reached. To him, this Self reveals His own form." [*Mund. Up.* III. 2. 3.]. By means of this passage it is (first) stated that mere 'hearing,' reflection and steady meditation form no means for the attainment of the Self, and then it is declared that whomsoever this Self chooses, by him alone is He reached. For, it is indeed the dearest one that becomes worthy to be chosen. To whomsoever He is unsurpassingly dear, he alone is the dearest to Him. It is stated by the Lord Himself, in the following manner, that the Lord Himself, of His own accord, so acts as to cause His dearest one to attain Himself:—"To those who are desirous of an eternal union with Me, and, accordingly, worship Me, I give with love that faculty of understanding by which they come unto Me." [*B. G.* X. 10.]; He has also said—"Indeed, I am inexpressibly dear to him who has knowledge of Me, and he is dear to Me." [*B. G.* VII. 17.]. Hence what is said is this:—He alone, to whom this memory of the form of direct perception is of itself inexpressibly dear, by reason of the inexpressible dearness of the object of that memory—(he alone) is fit to be chosen by the Highest Self; and so, by him alone is the Highest Self attainable.

Firm memory of this same character is denoted by the word *bhakti* (devotion)—because the word *bhakti* is synonymous with *upasana* (worship). For this very reason, it is declared by the *Srutis*[21] and the *Smritis* as follows: "Knowing Him alone, one transcends death." [*Svet. Up.*

21. The *Srutis* and the *Smritis* together form the scripture of the Hindus. *Sruti* means *Vedic* revelation; and *Smriti* ordinarily means the metrical law-books. But here, in this work, *Smriti* is so used as to signify all except the *Vedic* portion of Hindu Scripture, and the *Bhagavad-Gita* also is referred to under the name of a *Smriti*.

III. 8.]. "He who thus knows Him becomes immortal here. There is no other path for the attainment of final release." [*Taitt. Â*. III. 12. 7.].[22] "It is not possible to see Me, with the help of the *Vedas*, through the practice of religious austerity, through the giving of gifts, or through sacrifices, in the same manner in which you have seen Me (now). O Arjuna, destroyer of foes, it is possible really to know, to see, and to enter into Me, such as I am now, exclusively by means of *bhakti*." [*B. G.* XI. 53 & 54]. "That Highest Person, O son of Prithâ, is attainable exclusively by *bhakti*." [*B. G.* VIII. 22]. &c., &c.

It will be demonstrated later on in connection with (the *sûtra* which says)—"There is need of all (works), because there are scriptural statements enjoining sacrifices &c.; just as (there is the need of the harness) in the case of the horse"—[*Ved. Sût.* III. 4. 26.]—that works such as sacrifices, &c., form the means of attaining the firm memory of the aforesaid character. No doubt, the sacrifices, &c., referred to in the scriptural passage—"(Brâhmaṇas) desire to know &c"—[*Bṛh. Up.* IV. 4. 22.]—are of use in originating (in us) the desire to know (the *Brahman*). But yet, since such *vedana* (knowledge)—as is of the form of meditation, and is practised every day, and acquires increased excellence through repeated practice, and is continued up to the time of departure from this life—is of itself the means of attaining the *Brahman*; for the production of that (*vedana*), all the works appertaining to the *âśramas* (or the various stages of life) have to be gone through as long as life lasts. He (the *Sûtra-kâra*) also says (the same thing) in the following and other aphorisms :—"(Meditation has all along in the meanwhile to be gone through) up to the time of death, for it is so declared in the scripture"—[*Ved. Sût.* IV. 1. 12.] : "But

22. Vide also *Vâj. Samh.* XXX. 15. and *Taitt. Âr.* III. 13. 1.

the *Agnihotra*, &c., (have to be performed) solely for producing that (*viz. vidyâ* or knowledge), because it is so stated in the scripture "—[*Ved. Sut.* IV. 1. 16.]: and "(Works have also to be performed) because of their helpfulness (in the production of knowledge)." [*Ved. Sût.* III. 4. 33.].

The *Vâkyakâra* also says in the following manner that firm memory is the outcome of discrimination and other such qualities:—"That (viz. firm memory) results wholly from (*viveka*) discrimination, (*vimoka*) freedom, (*abhyâsa*) practice, (*kriyâ*) work, (*kalyâṇa*) auspiciousness, (*anavasâda*) absence of weakness, and (*anuddharsha*) absence of excessive merriment; because it is only so possible, and because also there is scriptural authority to that effect." He also explains the true nature of discrimination, &c., thus: "Discrimination means (here) the purification of the body by means of the food which is not impure, either because of its own nature, or because of its source, or because of any (other) special cause." The scriptural authority for this is—"When the food is pure, the mind (*i. e.* the internal organ) becomes pure, when the mind is pure, there is firm memory." [*Chhând. Up.* VII. 26. 2.]. "Freedom is the absence of clinging to desires." The scriptural authority for this is—"Tranquilled in mind, let him worship (the *Brahman*)." [*Chhând. Up.* III. 14. 1.]. "Practice means the worshipping of (God) the Home of Goodness again and again." The scriptural authority quoted by the *Bhâshyakâra* (*i. e.* the commentator Dramidâchârya) in support of this is here taken from the *Smṛiti*—"Always with the mind fixed on His form, &c." [*B. G.* VIII. 6.]. "Work means the performance of the five great sacrifices, &c., according to one's abilities." The scriptural authority for this is—"He who performs works in the right manner is the best of those who know the *Brahman*." [*Muṇḍ.*

Up. III. 1. 4.] : also—"Brāhmaṇas desire to know Him by reciting the *Vedas*, by sacrifices, by giving gifts, by religious austerities associated with fasting." [*Brih. Up.* IV. 4. 22.]. "Auspiciousness consists in truth, uprightness, mercy, liberality, harmlessness, and in not coveting another's property." The scriptural authority for this is—"He is to be reached through truth." [*Mund. Up.* III. 1. 5.], and "To them alone comes this fruition of the *Brahman* which is devoid of evil." [*Pr. Up.* I. 16.]. "Weakness is the lustrelessness of the mind, due to the melancholy which is born out of the untowardness of time and place, and the recollection of sorrowful things, &c. Its opposite is the absence of weakness." The scriptural authority for this is—"This Self is not to be attained by one who is devoid of strength." [*Mund. Up.* III. 2. 4.]. "Excessive merriment is the gladness derived from the opposites of those (qualities which give rise to *avasāda* i. e. weakness); and the opposite of that (gladness) is the absence of excessive merriment." That is to say, excessive joy also is obstructive (to the production of the knowledge of the *Brahman*). The scriptural authority for this is—"Tranquilled in mind, with the senses restrained, &c."—[*Brih. Up.* IV. 4. 23.]. What is said is this—that to him, who is thus given to observe scriptural regulations, the genesis of knowledge comes altogether through the performance of works enjoined in connection with the (various) *āśramas* (or stages of life). To the same effect is another scriptural passage:—"*Vidyām chāvidyām cha yas tad vedobhayam saha | avidyayā mṛityum tirtvā vidyayāmṛitam aśnute.*" [*Is. Up.* 11.] Here what is denoted by the word *avidyā* is the work which is enjoined in connection with the castes and the *āśramas*; *avidyayā* means, by means of work; *mṛityum* denotes the effects of the past work which is obstructive to the genesis of knowledge;

tîrtvâ means, having destroyed ; *vidyayâ* means, by means of the knowledge (of the *Brahman*) ; *amṛitam* denotes the *Brahman*; and (*aśnute*) means, he attains. [=He who knows both *vidyâ* (knowledge) and *avidyâ* (work) together, first destroys by means of (present) *avidyâ* (or work,) the effects of the past work (or *karma*) which is obstructive to the genesis of knowledge, and then attains the *Brahman*]. The *avidyâ* which is said to be the means of destroying the effects of past *karma* is other than *vidyâ*, and is the same as the work (*karma*) which is enjoined by the scriptures. To that effect is this passage :—" Having the knowledge of the *Brahman* as the object in view, he also relied upon (the scriptural) knowledge (of works) and performed numerous sacrifices, in order that he might destroy the effects of past *karma* by means of (present) *avidyâ* (or work)." [*V.P.* VI. 6. 12.]. Work which is obstructive to knowledge is of the form of merit and demerit. Both these are denoted by the word *pâpa* (sin), as they produce undesirable results, in consequence of their obstructiveness to the origination of the knowledge of the *Brahman*. Its (viz. sin's) obstructiveness to (such) knowledge is by way of the increase of *rajas* and *tamas* (passion and darkness), which act as obstructions to pure unmixed *sattva* (goodness) that forms the means of producing (that same) knowledge. That *pâpa* (or sin) is obstructive to the origination of knowledge, is understood from the scriptural passage—" He of Himself induces him, whom He wishes to lead downwards, to do work which is not good." [*Kaush. Up.* III. 9.] It is declared by the Lord Himself in the following and other passages that *rajas* and *tamas* veil true knowledge and that *sattva* is the means of (acquiring) true knowledge :— " Knowledge results from *sattva*." [*B. G.* XIV. 17]. And therefore, to give rise to the genesis of knowledge, sinful

work (*karma*) has to be destroyed. Its destruction results from duty (*dharma*) performed without attachment to results. To that effect is this scriptural statement[23]—"By means of duty (*dharma*) he gets rid of *pāpa* (or sin)." [*M. Nār.* 22. 1.]. Thus that knowledge which is the means of attaining the *Brahman* desiderates all the works enjoined in connection with the various *āśramas* (or stages of life). Hence, as the knowledge of the true nature of the works so desiderated, and also the knowledge of the small and impermanent character of the results of mere works, are (both) conclusively dealt with in the *Karma-mīmāmsā*—that (*Mīmāmsā*) alone has to be mentioned as the necessary antecedent of the enquiry into the *Brahman*.

Moreover, the discrimination of the eternal and the non-eternal things, &c., do not come into existence without the 'hearing' of the (whole of the) *Mīmāmsā*; because, without coming to a decision regarding the particulars bearing on the fruits (of works), on the means (of performing them), on the *modus operandi*, and on the persons qualified (to perform them), it is difficult to understand the true nature of works, their results, the permanence or impermanence thereof, and the eternity of the self, and such other things. That these also (*viz.* the discrimination of the eternal and the non-eternal things, &c.,) form the means (for acquiring the knowledge of the *Brahman*), is understood from their prescribed auxiliary use; and their prescribed auxiliary use is learnt from scriptural passages, from the bases of logical inference, &c. This (use of works) has to be made out from the third chapter (of the *Pūrvamīmāmsā*.)

The worship of the *Udgītha*, &c., although it (merely) serves the purpose of adding to works, really stands in

23. The reference given above is according to Jacob's *Concordance to the Upanishads.*

need of the knowledge of the *Brahman*, because it (*viz.* that worship) has to assume the form of the contemplation of the *Brahman*, and so has to be discussed here (*i. e.* in the *Brahma-mîmâmsâ*) alone. And those works also (*viz.* the worship and meditation of the *Udgîtha*, &c.), performed without attachment to results, produce the knowledge of the *Brahman*; and because they thus come to resemble that (knowledge) in character, they are very appropriately dealt with here alone. And it is agreed on all hands that they (*viz.* the meditation of the *Udgîtha* and other such meditations) depend upon the knowledge of the true nature of (ritualistic) works.

What they (the *Pûrvapakshins*[24] or the objectors) further say is as follows:—

The *Brahman* alone, who is pure intelligence and hostile to all characterising attributes, is real; all other things than Him, such as the varied distinctions of the knower and the known and the knowledge arising therefrom, &c., are merely assumed to exist in Him and are unreal: because, by means of the following and other *śâstraic* passages which are devoted to the teaching of the true nature of the principal subject (of the *Brahma-mîmâmsâ*), it is declared that the *Brahman* alone who is pure intelligence and devoid of attributes is real, and that all else is unreal:—"Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning, one only without a second." [*Chhând. Up.* VI. 2. 1.]; "And that is the higher knowledge (*vidyâ*) by which that Indestructible Being is known—that (Being) which is invisible, which cannot be seized, which has no family (or which has no name), which has no colour, no eyes, no ears: That which has no hands and no feet, and

24. These *Pûrvapakshins* or objectors are the *Adwaitins* known also as the *Mâyâ-vâdins*.

That which the wise see as the source of all beings, is the eternal, the omnipresent, the all-pervading, the extremely subtle, and the imperishable One." [*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 1. 6.]; "The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.]; "He is without parts, without actions, tranquil, and without fault, without taint." [*Śvet. Up.* VI. 19.]; "He who is of opinion (that that *Brahman*) is unknown—to him (He) is known; he who is of opinion (that that *Brahman*) is known to him—he does not know (Him): (because) to those who know well, (He) is unknown; to those who do not know well, (He) is known." [*Ken. Up.* II. 3.]; "Thou shalt not see the seer of the sight nor think the thinker of the thought." [*Bṛih. Up.* III. 4. 2.]; "The *Brahman* is bliss." [*Taitt. Up.* III. 6. 1.]; "That which is all this is this Self." [*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 5. 7.]; "There is nothing here that is many and varied. He who sees this world, as though it were varied, obtains death (*mṛityu*) from death." [*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 19. & *Kaṭh. Up.* IV. 10.]; "But where there is duality, as it were, there one sees another; but where to one all this becomes the Self, there who shall see whom by what, and who shall know which by what?" [*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 14. & IV. 5. 15.]; "Modification (*i. e. vikāra*) is (mere) name having its origin in speech; that it is all clay is alone the reality." [*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 1. 4.]; "For whenever he perceives in Him even the smallest distinction, then, indeed, there is fear for him." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 7. 1.]; "Not even on account of the peculiarity of situation can the twofold characteristics (*viz.* positive and negative) belong to the Highest, for everywhere (That is taught to be without distinctions)." [*Ved. Sūt.* III. 2. 11.]; "But it (*i. e.* the world of dreams) is altogether a mere illusion, on account of its being of an unmanifest nature."

Ved. Sût. III. 2. 3.]; "That in which differences have vanished, which is pure existence, which is beyond the sphere of speech, which is self-knowing—That is the Intelligence, called *Brahman* by name." [*V. P.* VI. 7. 53.]; "(I bow) to Him alone who in reality is of the nature of Intelligence and is absolutely pure (*i. e.* devoid of all attributes), and who, nevertheless, exists, in consequence of (our) illusive vision, in the form of material objects." [*V. P.* I. 2. 6.]; "O Lord of the universe! Thou alone art the only reality, and there is none other." [*V. P.* I. 4. 38.]; "This which appears embodied belongs to Thee who art of the nature of Intelligence; and those who are not *Yogins* (*i. e.* those who are ignorant) look upon it, on account of (their) illusive perception, as though it formed the world. All this world is of the nature of Intelligence. Ignorant men look upon it as though it were made up of material things, and are tossed to and fro in a flood of illusions. Highest Lord! Those who know what is knowledge, and whose minds are pure, look upon the whole world as being made up of Intelligence and as consisting of Yourself." [*V. P.* I. 4. 39 to 41.]; "Although He is to be found in one's own body and in that of all others, Intelligence, which is one and simple, indeed, constitutes His reality. Dualists see things wrongly." [*V. P.* II. 14. 31.]; "O, thou the best of kings, if there were any other like me or any other unlike me, then alone would it be proper to say that such an one is me and such an one is not me." [*V. P.* II. 13. 90.]; "It is, in consequence of the difference due to the holes in a flute, that the distinctions named *shadja*[25], &c., (corresponding to the pitch of the sound)

25. *Shadja* is the name of the first note of the gamut and corresponds to the symbol *do* in *do, re, mi, fa, sol, la, si,* which are given in Indian music thus: *sa, ri, ga, ma, pa, da, ni.* The seven notes of the scale have the following names in Sanskrit: *shadja, rishabha, gāndhāra, madhyama, panchama, daivata, nishādha.*

result to the air, which pervades all without distinction; just so is it the case with the Highest Self." [*V. P.* II. 14. 32.]; "He is myself, and He is yourself, and all this is the same as the Self. Give up the illusion of distinctions. Thus taught by him, that great king saw the Highest Reality and gave up distinctions." [*V. P.* II. 16. 23 & 24.]; "When the knowledge, which gives rise to distinctions, has undergone complete destruction, (then) who will create the unreal difference between the self and the *Brahman?*" [*V. P.* VI. 7. 96.]; "O Gudākeśa[26], in the form of the individual self, I exist within the heart of all beings." [*B. G.* X. 20.]; "O Bhārata, know Me also as the knower of the body (*i. e.* as the individual self) in all bodies." [*B. G.* XIII. 2.]; "There does not exist any being, moveable or immoveable, which is without Me." [*B. G.* X. 39.].

Unreality is that, which, being grounded upon what is perceived, is liable to be stultified by means of the knowledge of things as they actually are; as, for instance, it can be made out in the case of the (falsely perceived) serpent, &c., having for their foundation a (real) rope, &c. The assumption of the existence of that (serpent) there (*i. e.* in the rope) is due to something wrong that misguides us. Similarly, owing to a certain something that misguides us, all this world which is made up of the distinctions of gods, animals, men, immoveable things, &c., is assumed to exist in the Highest *Brahman* whose essence is pure Intelligence; and it (viz. the world) is liable to be injuriously affected by the knowledge of the true nature of the *Brahman* as He is, and has therefore the character of unreality. And that something which so misguides us is the beginningless ignorance (*avidyā*)

26. *Gudākeśa* is one of the names of Arjuna. Vide also *B. G.* I. 24., II. 9. & XI. 7. Literally it means one who has conquered sleep, or one who has a profusion of hair.

which is the cause of the varied and wonderful superimpositions that veil the true nature (of the *Brahman*), and is (itself) unfit to be described either as existence or as non-existence. From the following and other passages it is evident that the *Brahman* Himself, who is devoid of attributes and is pure Intelligence, has His true nature veiled by the beginningless ignorance which is unfit to be described either as existence or as non-existence, and He thereby perceives the manifoldness existing within Himself :—"For they (*i. e.* the creatures) are drawn away (from the *Brahman*) by means of ignorance (*anṛita=avidyā.*)." [*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 3. 2.]; "Those who are (dependent on themselves) have ignorance ; their desires remain unfulfilled." [*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 3. 1.]; "Then there was neither existence nor non-existence, there was darkness (*tamas=avidyā*); at first, Intelligence was veiled by darkness." [*R. V.* X. 129. 1 & 3.];[27] "Know then that *Prakṛiti* (Nature) is *māyā*, and the great Lord, the *Māyin* (*i. e.* the possessor of the *māyā*)." [*Śvet. Up.* IV. 10.]; "Indra (*i. e.* the Highest Lord) is known to assume many forms through the power of illusions (*māyā*)." [*Bṛih. Up.* II. 5. 19.]; "My *māyā* is difficult to transcend." [*B. G.* VII. 14.]; "When the individual soul, that has been asleep under the influence of the beginningless *māyā*, wakes up, (then he knows the Unborn One)." [*Māṇḍ. Up.* II. 21.].

To the same effect are the following passages :—"Because the Lord is of the nature of Intelligence, therefore He has the All for His form. But He is no material thing. Know then that the distinctions of mountain, ocean, land, &c., are indeed born out of Him and are the outcome of the display of illusion in Intelligence. But when, after all the effects of works are destroyed, there remains Intelligence

27. Vide also *Taitt. Br.* II. 8. 9.

alone in Its own true form, pure and devoid of evil, then indeed cease to exist those fruits of the tree of illusion (*saṅkalpa* = *avidyā*) which form the distinctions of things in things." [*V. P.* II. 12. 39. & 40.]; "Therefore, at no time and in no place, can there be any group of things other than Intelligence, O thou, twice-born one. The One Intelligence is apprehended in many ways, by those whose minds are variously constituted on account of the variety of their own actions. The Intelligence which is pure, devoid of evil, devoid of sorrow and is free from contact with all greed, &c., is one and always one, is the Highest and the Highest Lord; He is Vāsudeva, other than whom there is nothing. Thus have I told you of what is real existence, and how Intelligence is real and all else unreal; and I have told you also that this, which is phenomenally realised well for practical purposes, is indeed that on which the world is dependent". [*V. P.* II. 12. 43 to 45.]

The following and other scriptural passages speak of the destruction of ignorance (*avidyā*), by means of the knowledge of the oneness of the self with the *Brahman*, who is devoid of characterising attributes and is pure Intelligence:—"He comes not to Death (*mṛityu*) who sees that One". [?]; "He who sees that One does not see Death". [*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 26. 2.]; "For, indeed, when he obtains fearless support in that which is invisible, incorporeal, undefinable, homeless, then he obtains fearlessness." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 7. 1.]; "When He who is the highest and lowest is beheld, then the knot of the heart is broken, doubts are all shattered, and his *karmas* perish." [*Muṇḍ. Up.* II. 2. 8.]; "He who knows the *Brahman* becomes the *Brahman* indeed." [*Muṇḍ. Up.* III. 2. 9.]: "He who thus knows Him transcends death (*mṛityu* = *avidyā*); there is no other path for the attainment of final

release."—[*Śvet. Up.* III. 8.]; &c. Here *avidyā* (ignorance) is denoted, by the word *mṛityu*, as in this speech of Sanatsujāta:—"I say that false perception is death (*mṛityu*), and I also say that right perception is always immortality." [*M. Bh.* V. 41. 4.].

"The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge (or Intelligence), Infinity"—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.], "The *Brahman* is Knowledge, Bliss"—[*Bṛih. Up.* III. 9. 28.], these and other such probative passages (in the *Vedānta*) conclusively establish the essential nature of the *Brahman* to be free from attributes; and the knowledge, that this (*Brahman*) is identical with the (individual) self, results logically from the following and other scriptural passages:—"And he who worships another deity, thinking that that (deity) is one, and he another, he does not know." [*Bṛih. Up.* I. 4. 10.]; "He (the self) is not all this....Let him worship Him as the self itself." [*Bṛih. Up.* I. 4. 7.]; "That thou art." [*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 7.]; "Reverend deity, I am you, reverend deity, thou art me." [?]; "Therefore whatever I am, that is that (deity), and whatever that (deity) is, that am I." [*Ait. Ār.* II. 2. 4. 6.]. (The *Sūtra-kāra*) also says the very same thing thus:—"But they (*viz.* the Jābālas) worship (the Lord) as the self, and they (*viz.* the scriptural texts) make us comprehend (it as such)." [*Ved. Sūt.* IV. 1. 3.] Similarly, the *Vākyakāra* also says—"The Lord is to be comprehended as nothing other than the self, since everything is assumed to exist in Him." Thus by means of this knowledge of the oneness of the self and the *Brahman*, the destruction of the bondage of unreality and of its cause comes on quite appropriately.

However, it may be asked—how is that cessation of all distinctions, which is contrary to perception, accomplish-

ed by the knowledge that is derived out of the scripture? —or, how, (for instance), by means of the knowledge 'This is a rope, not a serpent', is the destruction of the serpent-perception effected—(the destruction) that has to contradict what is actually perceived? Here (*i. e.*, in the instance of the serpent falsely perceived in the rope) there is contradiction between two perceptions; there, however, (the contradiction lies) between perception (on the one hand) and the scripture based upon perceptions (on the other). Under these circumstances, when there is contradiction between two equally strong things, how can there be between them the relation of the stultified and the stultifier? If it be said in reply that it (*viz.* the relation of the stultified and the stultifier) results from the fact of the former (*i. e.* the thing stultified) being produced by a misguiding cause, and the latter (*i. e.* the stultifier) not being so (produced),—then, this same (contention) is equally applicable to the case of scripture and perception also. What is said is this:—The cause of the relation of the stultified and the stultifier is neither similarity, nor dependence, nor independence (in respect of any two things); because it is not possible to stultify (for instance), the direct perceptual knowledge, (of the singleness of the flame in a lamp) by means of the inference [28] regarding the (constantly) changing character of flames. In this case, the oneness of the flame is undoubtedly made out

28. The body of the syllogism in regard to this inference is given as follows:—*Madhyakshaṇaparamparāvartinī jwālā pratikshaṇam utpattivināśavatī, vartyavayavavināśitwayogāt, prathamacharamakshaṇajwālāvat.* That is to say:—The flame burning during the successive moments intermediate (between the moment of its birth and the moment of its extinction) is born and extinguished from moment to moment, because it also shares the destructibility of the lit portion of the wick, in the same way in which the flame is seen to do so during the first moment of its birth and the last moment of its extinction.

by means of direct perception. Such being the case, when there is contradiction between two means of knowledge, then, that one happens to be the stultified, the logical result of which it is possible to realise otherwise, while that other happens to be the stultifier, (the logical result of) which cannot be otherwise established, and is, moreover, singular and undoubted. That this is the relation of the stultified and the stultifier is established in all cases. Therefore, it is but proper that the cessation of that bondage, which is of the form of varied superimpositions resulting from direct perception, &c., which allow room for possible errors, does take place by means of the knowledge of the oneness of the self with the *Brahman*, who is unmixed Intelligence, destitute of attributes, eternal, pure, free, intelligent, and self-luminous—(the knowledge) that results from the scripture which, being in accordance with the tradition that is beginningless, endless and unbroken, does not admit of the smallest error, and is (as a means of knowledge) singular and undoubted (in value). But in regard to direct perception, which apprehends the world of distinctions resulting from varied superimpositions, the defect (or misguiding cause) known as *avidyâ* (or ignorance), which mainly consists of the beginninglessly old innate impression of distinctions, is admissible and has its scope.

However, stultification may possibly result to those scriptures (or *śâstras)* also, which are free from all defects on account of their being in accord with the beginningless, endless, and unbroken tradition; because they deal with distinctions in such passages as—"Let him who is desirous of *Swarga* (or the celestial world of enjoyments) perform the *Jyotishtoma* sacrifice." [29] Yes; and the *śâstra*

29. *Vide Taitt. Samh.* VII. 4. 1 to 12. and *Pûr. Mîm.* IV. 4. 39 to 41.

that deals with final release is of singular and undoubted authority; therefore, it (*viz.* the *śāstra* dealing with distinctions) is certainly stultified thereby, in the same way in which the *śāstraic* injunction [30] (imposing a penance) for an earlier disconnection (between the officiating priests connected together in a chain in the performance of the *Prātassavana* sacrifice) is stultified (by the injunction relating to the later disconnection), when an earlier and a later disconnection do take place. In *Vedāntic* passages also this same rule holds good in respect of those injunctions which relate to the worship of the qualified *Brahman*, because the Supreme *Brahman* is devoid of attributes (and has, therefore, to be realised after the qualified *Brahman* is known).

But it may be asked, how there can be the stultification of the following and other *śāstraic* statements which are intended to teach the essential nature of the *Brahman*:—"He who understands all and who knows all"—[*Muṇḍ. Up.* I.

30. In the sacrifice known as the *Prātassavana*, five *Ṛitwiks* (or officiating priests) move one behind the other, taking hold of each other's girdle. The *Prastotṛi* takes hold of the *Adhwaryu* from behind, the *Pratihartṛi* takes hold of the *Prastotṛi* similarly, the *Udgātṛi* takes hold of the *Pratihartṛi* similarly, the *Brahmā* priest takes hold of the *Udgātṛi* in the same manner, and the *Yajamāna* takes hold of the *Brahmā* priest. While so moving, if the *Udgātṛi* disconnect himself from the *Prastotṛi*, then the expiation prescribed therefor is, that the sacrifice so interrupted has to be completed, without, however, distributing the *dakshinā* (or the money intended for distribution among the priests), and then the whole thing is to be performed over again. If the *Pratihartṛi* disconnect himself from the *Prastotṛi*, then the expiation prescribed therefor is, that all the property of the sacrificer should be distributed then and there. If both the *Udgātṛi* and the *Prastotṛi* disconnect themselves from the chain of priests, one after another, in the same sacrificial act, then the expiation prescribed in the case of him who disconnects himself later on has alone to be gone through, but not the expiation prescribed in the case of the earlier disconnection. Vide *Pūr. Mīm.* VI. 5. 49 to 55.

I. 9. and II. 2. 7.]; "His supreme power is revealed, indeed, as varied, natural, and as consisting of knowledge, strength, and action."—[*Śvet. Up.* VI. 8.]; "He who desires the truth and He who wills the truth"—[*Chhând. Up.* VIII. 1. 5.]; &c. If so asked, we answer that it (*viz.* such stultification) results from the power of the passages relating to the non-qualified (*Brahman*). What is said is this:—The following and other similar passages, viz. "That which is neither gross, nor atomic, nor short, nor long"—[*Bṛih. Up.* III. 8. 8.], "The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.], "That which is without attributes, without taint"—[*A. M. Nâr.* 7.],[31] declare that the *Brahman* is Intelligence, eternally unchangeable, and devoid of all attributes: while others (declare that He is) qualified. There being (thus) a conflict between (these) two kinds of passages, it is nothing wrong if, according to that very rule which is applicable to the disconnection (in the chain of priests), the passages relating to the non-qualified (*Brahman*) are found to be more powerful, for the reason that these (latter) desiderate the (predication of) qualities, and have, therefore, to come into operation after (the passages which relate to the qualified *Brahman*).

But if it be said that in the passage—"The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity"—knowledge, &c., are declared to be the attributes of the *Brahman*, it is replied that it is not so; because there has to be oneness in the meaning (of these words) due to the fact of their being grammatically equated. If it be (again) said that even in describing that which is characterised by many attributes, oneness in the meaning (of the words used to describe it) is not opposed to reason, then, (it has to be said that)

31. See also *Adh. Up.* 68.

whoever is (so) ignorant of the denotative power of words is (foolish like sheep which, being fit for sacrifices, are) beloved of the gods. Oneness in meaning implies that all the words (in a grammatical equation) denote the same thing. Whenever a thing that is characterised by attributes is described (in words), then, the difference in meaning between those (various characterising) words, in accordance with the difference in the characterising attributes (they denote), is unavoidable; and therefore (such) oneness in meaning does not result (here). If, however, it does result even as against this, then all the words cannot but have a synonimity in meaning, in as much as they have (all) to denote one and the same characterless thing. But listen attentively how there can be no (such) synonimity even when they import one and the same thing. It is settled that (in a grammatical equation) there is oneness of import, and hence it is that the one particular thing (mentioned therein) has the power of being denoted by the opposite of what is contradictory to the meaning of the several words (used in that equation). It follows, therefore, that all the words (in a grammatical equation) have (their own) meanings, and have oneness of import, and are not synonymous. What is said is this:—The *Brahman*, who has to be understood as He really is, is of a nature which is the opposite of all things other (than Himself). All things, which are (thus) by nature opposed to Him, are, in the result, negatived by these three words (*viz. existence*, *knowledge*, and *infinity*). Of these, the word *existence* refers to the *Brahman* as being other than that thing, which, on account of its being subject to modifications, is unreal; the word *knowledge* refers (to the same *Brahman*) as being other than that thing, which is, by nature, non-intelligent, and the luminosity of which is dependent upon other things;

and the word *infinity* refers (also to Him) as being other than that which is limited by time, by space, and by its own definite character as a thing. Moreover, this logical exclusion (of all that is not a thing from what *is* that thing) forms no positive or negative characterising attribute thereof, but means the *Brahman* Himself who is not any thing other (than Himself). Just as, in the case of whiteness or any other such thing, the logical exclusion of it, from blackness or any other such thing, gives the true nature of that particular thing itself (*viz.* whiteness or any other such thing), but forms no new characterising property (of that whiteness or any other such thing); so also, these three words, by indicating that the one particular thing (mentioned in the given grammatical equation) is opposed by nature to all things different from itself, are abundantly full of meaning, have one and the same import, and(yet) are not synonymous. Therefore, it has been demonstrated that the *Brahman*, which is one only, is self-luminous and is free from all characterising attributes.

It is only when the meaning of this sentence is thus propounded, that there will be agreement in sense between it and the following passage among others:—"Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning, one only, without a second." [*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 1.]. The passages—"Whence indeed all these beings are born—"[*Taitt. Up.* III. 1. 1.]; "Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 1.]; "Indeed the Self, this one only, was in the beginning."—[*Ait. Up.* I. 1.]—these and other similar passages define the *Brahman* as the cause of the world; and His essential nature is here described to the effect that "The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity." Under these circumstances, in ac-

cordance with the rule[32] which enforces faith (in the truthfulness of all that is said about any one thing) in all the recensions of the *Vedas*, it is the *Brahman* Himself, who is without a second and excludes (from Himself) (all) similars and dissimilars, that is to be made out in all the passages which characterise Him to be the cause (of the world). That essential nature, which is (here) intended to be propounded, and belongs to the *Brahman*, who is without a second and is pointed out to be the cause of the world, has (therefore) to be explained so as not to contradict this (aforesaid characterisation). The scriptural text relating to His being without a second does not admit the existence of any second thing even in the form of a quality. Otherwise, there will be a contradiction also of the statement which says—(He is) "untainted" and "devoid of attributes," &c. Therefore, this passage which defines (the *Brahman*) denotes only That which is indivisible and homogeneous.

It may however be said that there is an indicative[33] (or figurative) sense in the use of the words 'Existence,' 'Knowledge,' &c., since, by losing their own proper mean-

32. This rule termed the *Sarvaśākhāpratyayanyāya* may be explained as follows:—The rituals known as the new-moon and full-moon sacrifices are mentioned in several recensions of the *Vedas* such as *Kāṭhaka*, *Kāṇva*, *Mādhyandina*, *Taittirīya*, &c. Each of these recensions mentions only a few of the characteristics of those sacrifices, and those that are mentioned in any one of them are not all mentioned in the others. Nevertheless, all the characteristics mentioned in all the recensions have to be put together in performing those sacrifices in accordance with any recension, because the essential nature of those sacrifices has to be the same throughout. Consequently, the new-moon and full-moon sacrifices are not different in the different recensions of the *Vedas*. Similarly, all the statements made about any one particular thing in all the recensions of the *Vedas* have to be taken together as really characterising that particular thing in each recension. Vide *Pūr. Mīm.* II. 4. 8 to 32.

33. Vide *supra* p. 4. note 10.

ings, they express the nature of that thing which excludes the opposite of what they denote. This is nothing wrong, because the purportive power (of words) is stronger than their denotative power. It is surely agreed on all hands that the purpose of a grammatical equation is to be found solely in (its) oneness (of import.) Again, it may be said that all the words (in a sentence) are not commonly seen to be used in a figurative sense. What of it? Such use is not seen in the case of even a single word, when, (in adopting the purely denotative sense of the words), there is no contradiction of the purport of the sentence. After it has been determined that such and such is the main purport of a group of words, which are used together (in a sentence), then, for the purpose of removing any contradiction (which the purely denotative sense of the words may give rise to) in relation to that (purport), (to adopt) the figurative interpretation in relation to two, or three, or all (the words), is in no way wrong, just as (it is not wrong to do so) in relation to any one (word). This is so admitted by (all) those who take their stand on the *śâstras*. Those[34] who maintain that the syntactical meaning of sentences is to be finally found in action, acknowledge that all the words that are found in the sentences of ordinary language possess the figurative significance; because (according to them) the mandatory and other verbal forms such as the *liṅ &c.*, [35] are primarily used so as to signify the production of the (new unperceivable principle) *apûrva*[36]. The

34. These are the *Prâbhâkaras*—a school of *Mîmâmsakas* who hold the position that words have a meaning only in so far as they express actions or are associated with actions in one way or another.

35. *Liṅ* is the verbal form of the potential mood, and it is also used in the sense of the imperative mood.

36. This *apûrva* is otherwise called *adrishta* by the followers of Jaimini. It is said to be a new and invisible something, representing either an imperceptible afterstate of a work performed in obedience to a commandment, or the state immediately antecedent to the production of the result of that work. In either case, this new principle is of itself held to be enough to produce the good or the bad results of works.

action signified by verbs is (only) figuratively made known by means of (their) mandatory and other forms. And those other words, which (being different from verbs) denote their own meanings which are dependent upon action, have also their primary sense undoubtedly in producing the unperceivable principle *apūrva*; and hence to declare that they are (also) significant of action like verbs is (to make them) altogether figurative. Therefore, there is nothing wrong in (adopting) the figurative interpretation of even all the words (in a sentence), if it is to serve the purpose of counteracting the contradiction of the purport of sentences.

Therefore the *Vedānta* is undoubtedly expressive of all these conclusions, and is, in consequence, unquestionably authoritative.

Moreover, it has been stated (above) that, in the event of there being a conflict (of the *śāstras*) with perception, &c., the *śāstras* are more powerful. It is only when there is any (such) conflict, that the higher authoritativeness (of the *śāstras*) has to be asserted. But there is no (such) conflict noticeable at all, because perception (also) apprehends the *Brahman* who is devoid of attributes and is pure existence. It may be asked, how it can be said that perception apprehends pure existence, seeing that it has for its objects a variety of things, as when (it is perceived) that a jar exists, that a cloth exists, and so on. If (in perception) there be no apprehension of distinctions, then all perceptions will relate to only one object, and will, accordingly, be the cause of only one realisation, as in the case of the knowledge which results from a continuous stream (of similar perceptions). (This is, no doubt,) true; and it shall be examined here accordingly. How are existence and its differentiation made out when it is realised that a jar exists? Both these realisations cannot indeed have perception for their

basis; because they result from knowledge born at different times, and because also perceptual knowledge lasts only for a moment. Therefore, it has to be ascertained whether that which forms the object of perception is the (essential) nature of things or (their apparent) differentiation. Since the apprehension of differentiation very naturally pre-supposes the apprehension of the essential nature of things, and also (pre-supposes) the remembrance of the correlatives of that (differentiation), for this very reason it has necessarily to be admitted that sense-perception has the essential nature of things for its object; and so, differentiation is not apprehended by means of sense-perception. Therefore, the realisation of distinctions is altogether based upon error.

Again, that something which is known as differentiation is not capable of being defined by those who know the science of logic. Indeed, differentiation does not constitute the essential nature of things. Otherwise, when the essential nature of a thing is perceived, then, in the same way in which there results the realisation of that essential nature, there will have to result (also) the realisation of the distinctions differentiating it from all other things. The realisation that one thing is different (from another) desiderates the remembrance of correlatives; therefore, it should not be urged that, even when the essential nature of things is apprehended, there happens to be no realisation of distinctions, for want of the remembrance, at that very time, of the correlatives of that (differentiation); for, surely, it is not allowable, on the part of him who holds that differentiation is not at all distinct from the essential nature of things, to posit that (before realising differentiation) it is necessary to know the connected correlatives; because, (according to him) the essential nature of things and its differentiation have both the character of not being different from that

essential nature. And if there is no need to know any correlatives in the case of the realisation of the essential nature of things, so also must it be in the case of the realisation of differentiation. And the statement that a jar is different (from other things), must then be, like the statement that the hand is the hand, an identical proposition (affirming the admitted identity between the jar and its differentiation from other things).

Nor is (differentiation) a qualifying attribute. If it have the character of a qualifying attribute, then it has necessarily to be accepted that it (*viz.*, this qualifying attribute) is distinct from that essential nature of things (which is qualified by it). Otherwise, it (*viz.* differentiation) will certainly be the same as the essential nature of things. If it be granted that there is a distinction (between the essential nature of things and its differentiating attributes), then in regard to this differentiation (which has been hypothetically taken to be a qualifying attribute), its own character as a differentiation forms its qualifying attribute, and in regard to this also, (it being again different from the essential nature of things, its own character as a differentiation forms its qualifying attribute, and so on); thus (arises) a *regressus in infinitum*. Moreover, (if it be held that differentiation is a qualifying attribute), then, there will also be the logical fallacy of reciprocal dependence; for, there will then result the apprehension of (individual) differentiation when there is the apprehension of things as characterised by (their) generic and other (such) qualities, and there will (similarly) arise the apprehension of things as characterised by (their) generic and other (such) qualities when there is (merely) the apprehension of (individual) differentiation. Therefore, differentiation being difficult of definition, perception brings to light pure existence alone.

Again, from the instances such as a jar exists, a cloth exists, a jar is experienced, and a cloth is experienced, —it is seen that all external objects are invariably apprehended as compounded of existence and experience. Now, in all cognitions, existence alone is seen to persist always, and so it alone is the reality ; and the differentiating attributes (which are specific of jars, cloths, &c.,) are all unreal, on account of their having to be (one after another) excluded, as, for example, the (falsely perceived) serpent in a (real) rope (is excluded). That is to say, the rope is the (real) entity and forms the persistent basis (of all the false perceptions) ; and the (falsely perceived) snake, crack in the earth, stream of water, &c., are all unreal, in as much as they are all liable to be excluded one after another.

To this it may be objected thus:—In the case of the (falsely perceived) snake, &c., in a (real) rope, the snake, &c., are of an unreal nature, because (the perception in regard to them) is stultified by knowing the actual reality of their basis, such as the rope, &c., through making out that it (viz. the thing perceived) is a rope but no snake ; but not because those (perceptions) are one after another excluded. And the reality of the rope, &c., is not due to their persistence all along, but is due to their remaining unstultified (even by the knowledge of what forms their basic reality). But, in the present instance, how can there be unreality in regard to jars, &c., the perceptions whereof are not (so) stultified ?

This objection is thus answered :—The logical exclusion—well, it has to be ascertained of what nature that (exclusion) is. Is it, (for example, of the nature of) the non-existence of cloth, &c., in the cognition that a jar exists ? If so, it must be concluded that the stultification of (the cognition of) cloth, &c., results from this (cognition)

that a jar exists. Hence logical exclusion is such a negation of (the cognition of) objects as is based upon (such a) stultification. And this kind of (exclusion) establishes the unreality of those objects which are (so) excluded. Pure existence alone, being unstultified, persists all along, like the rope (for example, in the falsely perceived instances of the snake, the crack in the earth, &c., referred to above). Therefore, all that is other than pure existence is unreal. And the syllogistic statement (here) is as follows:— Existence is real, because it continues to persist all along, like the rope, &c., in the instances of the rope-serpent, &c., (above referred to). Jars, &c., are unreal, because they are (all one after another) excluded, like the (falsely perceived) snake, &c., that have for their basis the (real) rope, &c. Such being the case, it is only experience, which continues to persist all along, that constitutes reality, and it (*viz.* experience) is existence itself.

It may, however, be said again that pure existence, being the object of experience, is different from it. It is not so, because (all such) differentiation has already been set aside, as not forming the content of perception, and as being difficult of definition. And for this same reason, the idea that existence forms the object of experience can not be in agreement with any authoritative position in logic. Therefore existence is the same as experience. And this (experience) is self-evident, (simply) because it has the nature of an experience. If it have any other proof (than itself), then, there will be room to characterise it as no experience, in the same way in which jars and such other things (are not experience). Further, it is not possible to posit the necessity of one experience for (making out) another experience, because it (viz. experience) is capable of becoming evident merely by its own existence. Indeed, experience, while it exists, is not

found to be incapable of becoming evident like jars, &c., (which are incapable of becoming evident simply because they exist). Otherwise, (*i. e.* if experience be found to be incapable of becoming evident simply through its existence), it will have to be acknowledged that it has its knowability dependent upon something other than itself.

Then perhaps you hold as follows:—Even in the case of an experience that has (actually) come into existence, it is merely the object (of that experience) that is brought to light, as (for instance) when a jar is experienced; because no one, who knows that a certain particular thing is a jar, also experiences at that very same time experience-in-itself, which forms no object (of experience) and is not of the nature of what may be (externally) pointed to by the word '*this*'. Therefore, in the same way in which contact with the eye and other similar senses is the cause of the production of the knowability of jars and other external objects, an (external) entity alone forms the cause of the production of that same knowability in relation to experience. Immediately afterwards, (that is, after perceiving an object) experience is inferred from the logical basis of distinct knowability which is momentarily associated with that object. If that be so, it may be said that experience, which is intelligence, acquires the nature of non-intelligence. What, then, is the nature of this intelligence known to be? Surely, it cannot be the invariable association of knowability with its own existence, because (such knowability) is found to exist (also) in association with pleasures, &c. Indeed, pleasures, &c., while they exist, are never unfelt. Therefore, experience-in-itself is not experienced by itself, on account of the impossibility of such a thing (taking place), in the same way in which (it is impossible) for the finger-tip, which feels all other things by

touch, to perceive itself by touching itself.

(To all this, it is thus replied):—That knowability which, like colour, &c., forms a property of objects, and is other than experience, is not (at all) known to exist; moreover, it is not proper to assume (the existence of) a property called *knowability*, when it is possible to realise all things by means of that experience alone which is admitted by both (sides); for these reasons all this (above contention) is simply the foolish display of the intelligence of him who has not himself understood the peculiar nature of experience. Consequently, experience is not made out by means of inference, and is not also made evident by any other means of knowledge. But, on the contrary, experience, which proves all things, proves itself, and the syllogistic statement here is as follows:—Experience is that in respect of which its own characteristic property and the realisation thereof are (both) independent of any thing else; because it (*viz.* experience) forms, through its association (with another thing), the means of having that property and that realisation in connnection with that other thing; whatever is, by its own association (with another thing), the means of giving rise to a characterising property and its realisation in that other thing,—that is seen to be independent of all other things in the matter of that (property) and that (realisation) in reference to itself. For instance, there is the case of colour, &c., in relation to visibility, &c. Colour, &c., while producing by means of their own association, visibility, &c., in the earth and such other things, are not themselves dependent upon the association of colour, &c., for the production of visibility, &c., in relation to themselves. Therefore, experience is itself the cause of its own knowability as well as of the realisatoin that it is knowable.

This same experience which is self-luminous is also eternal, because antecedent[37] non-existence and other non-existences are absent (in relation to it.) And such absence (of non-existence) certainly results from the self-evident nature (of experience.) Indeed, it is not possible to make out the 'antecedent non-existence' of self-evident experience, either by itself, or by other means. Experience—if it have to cause the knowledge of its own 'non-existence'—does not, as a matter of fact, cause such knowledge, while it is itself existent. While it is existent, simply because there will (otherwise) be contradiction, its 'non-existence' cannot exist. And so, how can it cause the knowledge of its own 'non-existence'? Similarly, even when not existent, it (viz. experience) does not cause the knowledge (of its 'non-existence'). How can experience, being itself non-existent, become the means of proving its own 'non-existence'? Nor is it possible to know it (viz. 'non-existence') by other means, because experience is not the object of anything other than itself. The means of proof, that can prove the 'antecedent non-existence' of this (viz. ex-

37. Non-existence (or *abhâva*) is of four kinds *viz. prâgabhâva*, *pradhwamsâbhâva*, *anyonyâbhâva*, and *atyantâbhâva*. *Prâgabhâva* or antecedent non-existence exists antecedently to the production of an effect such as a pot; that is, the pot is non-existent before it is produced. Thus, this non-existence is incapable of having a beginning but capable of having an end. *Pradhwamsâbhâva* is the non-existence consequent on the destruction of a thing such as a pot; that is, the pot is non-existent after it is destroyed. So this particular non-existence is capable of having an origin but is incapable of having an end. For example, when a pot or any other such thing is destroyed, this particular non-existence comes into being and thereafter persists for ever. *Anyonyâbhâva* or mutual non-existence means that in any one thing there is the non-existence of another, as when it is said that a pot is not a cloth. This coincides with what is generally known as 'difference.' *Atyantâbhâva* or absolute non-existence is that kind of non-existence which negates the existence of a thing at all times. For instance, the horns of a hare are non-existent at all times.

perience), has to prove such 'non-existence' after making out objectively what experience really is. It is not possible to know its 'non-existence' by other means, because it is self-evident, and is not therefore capable of being perceived definitely as an external object, so as to say '*This it is*'. Hence, it cannot be said that experience is originated, as there is the absence of 'antecedent non-existence' in relation to it. Therefore, it has also none of those other modifications [38] of the produced thing, which are invariably associated with origination. This un-originated experience does not admit of any manifoldness (or variation) within itself, because, in relation to it, there is the realisation of what is contradictory to the predication (of such manifoldness *i. e.* the realisation of non-origination). Indeed, that which is not originated has never been seen to be manifold (or varied in character). Moreover, distinction and such other things, are (themselves) capable of being experienced (*i. e.* of becoming the objects of experience), and cannot, therefore, be the qualifying attributes of experience, in the same way in which colour and such other things are not (such attributes). Therefore, as experience is of the nature of experience alone, nothing else that is capable of being experienced can be its qualifying attribute. For whatever reason consciousness is devoid of all distinctions, for that same reason, it has not, for its basis, a knowing subject called the *ātman* (or the self), which is different from its own essential nature (as consciousness). Therefore, and also because it has an intelligent nature, that very thing (viz. consciousness),

38. These modifications are stated to be six in number and are given as follows :—"*Shaḍ bhāvavikārā bhavantīti Vārshyāyaṇiḥ jāyate asti vipariṇamate varddhate apakshīyate vinaśyatīti.*" *Nir.* I. 1. 3. They are : Origination, existence, modification, increase, decrease and destruction. Vide also *V. P.* I. 2. 11.

which possesses the character of being self-luminous, itself constitutes the *âtman* (or the self). Non-intelligence also, which is invariably concomitant with what is not the self, and is logically excluded from consciousness, indeed, negatives (the view) that consciousness (itself) does not constitute the *âtman*.

It may, however, be said that the (self's) character of being the knower is established by the cognition 'I know'. It is not so; it results from illusion, in the same way in which the characteristics of silver are (illusorily perceived) in a bit of the mother-of-pearl. Because experience does not possess the property of being the subject of any predication, of which it is itself the object; therefore, this character of being the knower is (simply) super-imposed (upon consciousness), in the same way in which, when one says 'I am a man,' the love of self, due to the feeling that a thing is one's own, is (superimposed) upon the altogether external lump (of matter) that is characterised by the generic and other properties of the thing called man. To be the knower is, in fact, to be the same as the subject of the predication of knowing. And it (viz. this knower-ship) is subject to modification, is non-intelligent and is seated in the knot of the evolved principle of egoity known as the *ahankâra*.[39] How can this become

39. *Ahankâra* forms the third of the twenty-four material principles that go to make up the objective world according to the *Sânkhyas*. The *Purusha* or the soul is the twenty-fifth principle, differing from all the material principles on account of its intelligent character. The notion of egoity is here held to be due to the association of this intelligent principle with matter or *Prakriti*. Primordial *Prakriti* is held to give rise to the *Mahat* or the 'Great Principle' which is also known as *Buddhi*, perhaps for the reason that the cognisablity of the external world by the *Purusha* is due to it. Out of this *Mahat* is evolved the principle known as *Ahankâra*, which is a kind of 'mind-stuff' responsible for our sense of egoity and for the production of the senses and the mind. &c.

possible in relation to the immodifiable witnessing principle, the *ātman*, which is entirely made up of pure intelligence? The quality of being the subject of a predication and other such qualities do not form the attributes of the self, simply because they are, like colour and such other things, realisable by means of direct perception. It is seen that there is self-experience, even when there is no notion of egoity, as during dreamless sleep, swoon, &c.; therefore, the self does not fall within the sphere of the notion of egoity. If the property of being the subject of a predication as well as the property of being the object of the notion of egoity be (both) admitted of the self, then, as in the case of the body, (which possesses both these properties), it is difficult to avoid, (in relation to the self), the resulting attribution of non-intelligence, externality, and non-self-hood, &c. It is, indeed, well-known among those, who follow the well-established criteria of truth, that the self, which is the enjoyer of *Swarga* and other similar fruits of the actions of the body, is different from the body, which falls within the sphere of the notion of egoity, and is generally well known to be the subject of predications. And, similarly, it has to be understood that the internal self, the witness, is altogether different from the knower, which is the thing 'I'. Thus the principle of egoity, which, though non-intelligent, reveals the self to be the same as the immodifiable experience, does reveal it as constituting its own basis. The nature of revealers is to reveal the revealed, as though they (*i. e.* the revealed things) were within themselves (*i. e.* the revealers). Indeed, a mirror, a sheet of water, a mass of matter, &c., (respectively) reveal a face, the orb of the moon, and the outline of a cow, &c., as though these were (actually) within them. The illusion 'I know'; is due to this same fact. Do not ask how experience, which is

self-luminous, can be revealed by the non-intelligent principle of egoity, which is itself revealed by that (experience); surely, it is seen that the palm of the hand, which is revealed by a beam of the sun's rays, itself reveals them (at the same time). Indeed, the rays of the sun passing through the holes of a window are frequently seen to become more brilliant by means of (their contact with) the palm of the hand, which is (itself) revealed by them. In the cognition 'I know', for whatever reason, this knower, which is the thing 'I', forms no real attribute of the self, which is pure intelligence; for that same reason, it (viz. the thing 'I') does not find its way into the states of dreamless sleep and final release. Indeed, here (in these states), by reason of the cessation of the super-imposition of the thing 'I', the self shines forth altogether in the form of pure and natural experience. It is only in consequence of this fact that one who has risen from deep sleep observes sometimes—'I did not know even myself'. Thus, consciousness alone, which, in reality, is destitute of all distinctions and alternations, which is destitute of attributes and is pure intelligence, which is homogeneous and eternally unchangeable, manifests itself, through illusion, as wonderfully and variedly manifold in the forms of the knower, the known, and knowledge. Therefore (the study of) the whole of the *Vedânta* has to be undertaken to remove the ignorance, which is at the root of this (manifestation), so as to attain the knowledge of the oneness of the self with the *Brahman* who is, by nature, eternal, pure, self-luminous and free.

This opinion of persons who are devoid of those special qualities which make one worthy of the choice of the Highest Person who is taught in the *Upanishads*—of those

(persons) whose understanding is, in its entirety, tainted with the innate impression of beginninglessly ancient sins, and who are ignorant of the essential nature of words and sentences and their correct meanings, and (are ignorant) also of such sound logical processes as enable (us) to proceed rightly (in our reasonings), and as are (at the same time) based upon perception and all other (well known) criteria of truth,—(this opinion of such persons) is founded upon that kind of unsubstantial and variedly fallacious reasoning which is not applicable to any other similar case as an alternative; and it therefore deserves to be disregarded by all those who are conversant with that knowledge of truth, which is based upon perception and all other such criteria of truth as are supported by logic.

And this comes out in the following manner:—

Those, who maintain the view [40] that there is a thing which is devoid of attributes, cannot say what criterion there is to prove that thing which is so devoid of attributes; because, all the criteria of truth (that form the means of logical proof) deal (only) with such objects as possess attributes. And the convention that obtains in their own school, that it (viz. the thing devoid of attributes) is established by one's own experience, is counteracted by the fact of such experience having, (nevertheless), the qualification of being witnessed by the *ātman* (or the self); because, all experience relates to objects which are qualified by some attribute or other, as, for instance, in the specific cognition 'I saw *this*'. If it have to be demonstrated, by some specious reasoning or other, that an experience, while it is being experienced, is without attributes, although it is (in fact) pos-

40. Vide *supra* pp. 27 et seq.

sessed of attributes,—it can be so demonstrated only with the help of such natural qualifying attributes as are peculiar to that (experience) itself, and are different from its own existence. Therefore, even thus, it continues to be qualified by means of its own qualifying attributes, which form the basis of such demonstration, which are different from its own existence, and are also peculiar to itself. Under these circumstances, it is only some attributes that are denied in relation to a thing which is (already) qualified by other attributes; therefore, the thing which is devoid of attributes can in no way be proved.

To consciousness, indeed, belongs the quality of illuminating external objects as well as the quality of self-luminousness, because perception becomes possible to the knower (only) in the way of bringing external objects to the light (of consciousness). We will, in our own turn, explain, with great clearness of judgment, that, (even) during dreams, conditions of intoxication, and swoons, experience is altogether qualified. There are, undoubtedly, many attributes, in regard to experience, such as eternity, &c., which are also admitted by you (our opponent). And it is not possible to declare that these also constitute the thing-in-itself (which is pure and simple); for, even if they are taken to constitute the (attributeless) thing-in-itself, we find that there are conflicting views in regard to its various modes, and every one tries to establish his own position by means of such of its modes as are approved of by him. Therefore, it has to be stated that that thing is certainly qualified by such attributes as accord with the accepted criteria of truth.

Verbal testimony (*i. e.* revelation) also possesses the power of denoting only such objects as are qualified by attributes, because it is extant in the form of words and sentences

A word is, in fact, the result of the combination of roots and terminations. There is difference between the meaning of the root and that of the termination, and it is therefore unavoidable that words denote only such things as are qualified (by attributes). And the difference between words binds us to a difference in (their) meaning. A sentence, which is a collection of words, gives expression to the peculiar relations existing between the meanings of the several words (therein), and is hence incapable of denoting any object which is devoid of attributes. Verbal testimony is, therefore, no authoritative means of proving the thing which is devoid of attributes.

Perception, which is differentiated into the divisions of the *indefinite* and the *definite*, has not the power of being the means to prove the thing which is without attributes. Definite perception has for its object only that which is qualified, because it relates wholely to objects that are characterised by many things such as (their) generic and other properties. Indefinite perception also certainly relates to qualified objects, because all those things which are experienced in it (viz. in indefinite perception) are found to be synthetically put together in definite perception. Indefinite perception is, indeed, known to be the perception of that which is devoid of some particular attribute or other, but not (the perception) of that which is devoid of all attributes; because the perception of such a thing is not seen to occur at any time, and because also it is impossible. Surely, all cognition is produced in association with some defining attribute or other, so as to denote that a particular thing is of a particular nature. The perception of anything is impossible apart from the configuration of its characterising attributes, (in the same way in which it is not possible to perceive, for

instance, an ox) apart from the triangular face, the dewlap, and such other things (as go to make up its configuration). Hence, indefinite perception is the first outline-perception in relation to things which are of the same kind; and it is said that the second and the following outline-perceptions are definite (perceptions). Here, in the first outline-perception, the generic properties of the ox and of such other objects (of perception) can not be made out to possess (in relation to them) the property of continued persistence. The possibility of making out such continued persistence is to be found only in connection with the second and the following outline-perceptions. The generic properties of the ox and of other similar objects of perception constitute the configuration of the thing which is apprehended in the first outline-perception; that these (generic properties) possess the character of continued persistence, is conclusively made out in the second and following outline-perceptions; and so the second and following outline-perceptions are characterised as being definite. The first outline-perception is characterised as being indefinite, because the continued persistence of such generic properties of the ox and of other similar objects of perception, as constitute the configuration due, (for instance), to things like the dewlap &c., is not apprehended in that first outline-perception, but not because there is (in it) no apprehension of the generic and other properties which together go to make up a (perceptive) configuration. Even in the first outline-perception, it is only such a configuration, that constitutes the thing which is apprehended, so as to be able to say that it is of a particular form; for, the generic and other properties, which constitute such a configuration, have no characteristics other than those apprehended by the senses, and, further, the configurated cannot, as a matter of

fact, be apprehended apart from the configuration. Therefore, just as the configurated and the configuration are always apprehended (together in perception), so also, in the second and following outline-perceptions, the generic properties, such as those of the ox and of other objects, are always made out to possess the character of continued persistence (in relation to those objects). Consequently, they (*i. e.* the second and following outline-perceptions) undoubtedly possess the character of being definite. Thus, perception can never have for its object the thing which is devoid of attributes.

For these same reasons, the theory which maintains (the thing perceived) to be distinct and non-distinct (at one and the same time) has also been throughout set at naught. In the cognition, 'This thing is of this nature' *(Idam ittham)*, how is it possible to get any idea regarding the identity of the concepts denoted by the words *idam* (which means *this thing*) and *ittham* (which means *of this nature*)? Of these two, the concept denoted by the word *ittham* refers, (for example), to the configuration characterised by the dewlap and such other things relating to the ox; and the object possessing these characteristics is denoted by the word *idam*. Thus the identity of these two concepts is contradicted by perception itself. Accordingly, the thing, which is perceived, is, even in the very beginning, perceived, as if it is altogether excluded (and is thus different) from all other things. And this exclusion is due to the fact that a perception, which makes out a particular thing (such as an ox or any other object) to be of a particular nature, is invariably associated with a particular configuration (of attributes), such as that which is made up of the generic properties, &c., of the ox or of any other object. In all cases wherein the relation of the qualifier and the qualified is

perceived, it is quite clear, by means of that perception itself, that they are quite distinct from each other. It being so, a stick, an ear-ring and other such objects, possessing distinct configurations of their own and existing in themselves, may occasionally happen, however, to be here and there the characterising adjuncts of some other object (than themselves). But the generic properties of the ox and of other such objects become cognisable things only by reason of their making up the configurations of (those) objects, and hence they form the attributes of substances. In both these cases (viz. in the case of the separable adjuncts, such as sticks, ear-rings &c., and in that of the inseparable attributes, such as the generic properties of the ox and of other similar objects), the relation of the qualifier and the qualified is one and the same. And it is for this very reason (*i. e.* because both separable and inseparable adjuncts possess alike the power of qualifying things), that there results also the perception of the difference between them (*i. e.* between the qualifier and the qualified). There is however, this much of peculiarity. Sticks and other separable adjuncts are capable of being perceived as existing separately; whereas the generic properties of the ox, &c., are systematically incapable of it (*i. e.* of being perceived as existing separately from the thing they qualify). Hence, the statement, that the differentiation of things is contradicted by perception, can be made only by ignoring the true character of perception. Indeed, it is agreed on all hands that the true character of perception is to denote that a particular thing is of a particular nature. All this has been clearly enunciated by the *Sûtrakâra* in the aphorism—"It cannot be true, because it is impossible (for contradictory attributes to exist at the same time) in one and the same thing." [*Ved. Sût.* II. 2. 31.].

And, in as much as perception has thus qualified things for its objects, inference also, relating as it does to such objects as are qualified by the relations observed in perception, &c, has to deal only with qualified things.

Even where there is difference of opinion as to the number of the various means of knowledge, all the means of knowledge, accepted by all, deal with this same (qualified) thing. Therefore, by no means of knowledge can there be the establishment of the thing which is devoid of attributes. Whoever, while he is himself relying upon the natural qualifying attributes of a thing, declares that that very thing is devoid of attributes,—he does not know the contradiction in terms to be found in his own speech, as when one enunciates the barrenness of one's own mother.

It has been stated above[41] that, because perception apprehends pure existence, it cannot have differentiation for its object; and that differentiation is difficult to define, because it does not admit of any one of the several alternative views (in regard to its own nature). This (opinion) also has been driven away (as untrue), on the ground that perception has for its object only such things as are characterised by generic and other properties, and (also on the ground) that generic and other properties, by reason of desiderating their correlatives, form the means of realising the distinctions between themselves and the (distinctions between the) things (qualified by them). What has been admitted by you, (our opponents),—in the case of consciousness and in the case of colour and other such qualities,—to the effect that they, being the cause of particular realisations in regard to other objects (than themselves), are also

41. Vide *supra* pp. 42 & 43.

the cause of such realisations in regard to themselves,—that certainly holds good in the case of differentiation also. Therefore, there is neither the fallacy of *regressus in infinitum* nor the fallacy of reciprocal dependence.[42] Even if perceptual knowledge last only for one moment, yet, during that very moment, the generic properties which, (for example), belong to the ox and other such objects, which are the same as the distinctions between those things and constitute their configurations,—they are (all) apprehended; therefore, there is nothing else here (*i. e.* in perception) that remains to be apprehended in any other moment. Moreover, if perception apprehend pure unqualified existence, then there would result the contradiction of such (definite) cognitions as are realised in the instances, 'A jar exists' and 'A cloth exists.' If differentiation, which is a thing other than pure existence, and consists of generic properties and such other attributes as go to make up the configurations of things, be not apprehended by perception, why does one who is in quest of a horse turn away at the sight of a buffalo? If pure existence alone be the object of all cognitions, why are not all the words which are associated with the objects of all those cognitions remembered in each one of those cognitions? Further, if the two states of consciousness, relating to a horse and to an elephant (respectively), have the same thing for their object, then (the apprehension of) whichever of them is perceived later on would merely be the apprehending of the already apprehended, and so there would be the absence of any difference (between them); therefore, there would be nothing (here) to distinguish it (*i. e.* the latter state of perceptive consciousness) from memory. If, in every state of consciousness, the apprehension of particularity is ad-

42. Vide *supra* p. 44.

mitted, then surely it will have to be admitted that perception has qualified things for its object. If all states of consciousness have the same thing for their object, there will then be the apprehension of all things by means of only one state of consciousness, and, in consequence, there will have to be the non-existence of persons affected with blindness, deafness, &c.

Moreover, pure unqualified existence is not surely apprehended by the eye, because it apprehends colour, things possessing colour, and all such things as are characterised by inherent association with anything that has colour. Nor (is pure existence apprehended) by the sense of touch, because it has for its object things possessing tangibility. The sense of hearing and the other senses also have not pure existence for their object, but have for their object the characterising attributes of sound, taste, and smell. Therefore, here (*i. e.* in this world) there is nothing to be found which can apprehend existence-in-itself. If, solely by means of perception, there be the apprehension of pure existence which is devoid of attributes, then, the scripture, which also relates to it, will have to deal with a result already arrived at by some other means of knowledge, and will therefore acquire the character of what gives expression to a mere tautological repetition. And, for the same reason, there would also result cognisability in regard to the *Brahman* which is pure existence. You have yourself admitted that in such a case (*i. e.* when the *Brahman* becomes cognisable) non-intelligence, destructibility, &c., (would result to it also). Therefore, perception certainly has for its object only such things as are qualified by differentiation which is constituted by the configurations of things and has for its basis their generic and other properties.

There is nothing other than this perceptive configuration which is seen to be capable of giving rise to the impression that several things are of only one form; and it is possible to realise the generic properties, such as those of an ox and of other objects, merely by means of that (configuration) alone. And again, even when it is held that the generic properties of things are distinct from their (corresponding) configurations, the perception of configuration has unavoidably to be admitted. Therefore, this (perceptive) configuration alone constitutes the genus (in logic). Configuration is well known to be that which constitutes a thing's own peculiarity, and so it has to be (severally) synthesised by perception in accordance with the thing that is perceived. Because the realisation that one thing is different from another results solely by means of the apprehension of their (respective) generic qualities, and because no other thing than generic properties is observed (when such differentiation is perceived), and because also they (viz. the generic properties) are admitted as well by him who maintains that (differentiation) is distinct (from generic properties),—therefore (*i. e.* for all these reasons), generic properties such as those of an ox and of other objects, alone constitute differentiation.

It may, however, be said that, if generic and other properties alone constitute differentiation, then, as soon as they are apprehended, there will be the realisation of differentiation also, in the same way in which they are themselves realised. True, differentiation too is so realised, through the realisation of the generic properties, (for instance), of the ox and of other such objects. Indeed, the generic properties, such as those of an ox, &c., are different from all things other than themselves, because, as soon as the generic properties such as those of an ox, &c., are apprehended, there results the removal of all other

impressions of similarity as well as (the removal) of their realisation. Surely, the negation of non-differentiation results wholly from the apprehension of distinctions. However, in the realisation 'This is different from that,' the declaration made in regard to these mutually exclusive correlatives (viz. 'this' and 'that') desiderates (each of) those (correlatives); it is, therefore, said that the realisation that one thing is different from another is dependent upon correlatives.

The statement made above [43] to the effect that jars and other such specific objects are unreal, because they do not persist before consciousness in all perceptions,—this is an erroneous assumption on the part of one who has not rightly considered the relation of the stultified and the stultifier, and the peculiar nature of the properties of logical exclusion and continued persistence (in regard to perceptions). In fact, the relation of the stultified and the stultifier arises only when there is a contradiction between two cognitions; and then (*i. e.* when it arises), there is certainly the exclusion of that which is stultified. Now, in regard to (perceptions which relate to) jars, cloths, &c., there is no (mutual) contradiction at all (between them); because they are different from one another in point of time and place. If, when the existence of a thing (is perceived) in relation to any particular place and any particular time, its non-existence (also be perceived) in relation to the same place and the same time, then there is contradiction. And in such a case, that which is the stronger (of the two) becomes the stultifier, and there arises the negation of the stultified. If a thing, which is experienced as existing in relation to a certain time and a

43. Vide *supra* p. 45.

certain place, is perceived to be non-existent in relation to a different time and a different place, (then) there is no contradiction; and so, how can there be the relation of the stultified and the stultifier in such a case? Or, how can it be said, that, what has been (already once) negatived in one instance, is (again) to be negatived in another instance? On the other hand, in the case of the rope-snake and other (illusorily perceived) things, there is the perception of their non-existence in that very place and that very time (wherein they are also perceived to exist); therefore, there arise contradiction, stultification and logical exclusion. The logical exclusion of a thing, (which is perceived in relation to a particular place and a particular time), from a different place and a different time, is not thus seen to be invariably concomitant with unreality; and therefore, merely to possess the quality of being logically excluded, (so as not to persist before consciousness in perception), does not constitute the cause of unreality. The statement that existence (alone) is real, because it is persistent (before consciousness), is in itself evident, and does not stand in need of any means (such as perception) to prove it. Therefore, pure existence alone is not the thing (which is apprehended in perception).

There is the relation of subject and object between experience and any particular entity (which is experienced); thus the difference (between them) is established by perception, and is incapable of being stultified; therefore this (contention) also has been set at naught, namely, that experience itself is existence.

It has been further[44] stated that experience possesses the quality of self-luminousness. This is true in the case

44. Vide *supra* p. 46.

of the self, which is the knower, only at the time it brings external objects to the light of consciousness. But there is no rule to the effect that it is so at all times in the case of all (persons); because the experience of others forms (to us) the object of such inferential knowledge as is based upon the acceptance and rejection (of things in accordance with their own likes and dislikes); and also because it is seen that one's own past experience becomes even an object of knowledge, as when (one says) 'I had known'. If, in this way, it is not possible to say that experience is self-evident, it is also wrong to declare that, if experienced, it loses the character of an experience; because the character of being no experience at all would thereby result to one's own past experiences and the experiences of others, on the score that they are themselves experienced. And if it be not granted that the experiences of others can be made out (by us) by means of the process of inference, there would then result the non-apprehension of the relation between words and their meanings, in consequence of which there would arise the cessation of the use of all words. Further, it is only after making out by means of inference that the teacher is possessed of knowledge, that an approach to him is made (by the pupil); and this too would thereby become impossible. It can not be that (experience) ceases to possess the character of an experience, merely because it becomes the object of another experience. The character of an experience, indeed, consists in the fact that, while it lasts, it is luminous (*i. e.* intelligible) solely by means of its own existence, to that which constitutes its basis, (*i. e.* to the self); or, it consists in the fact of its being the means of proving (the existence of) its objects solely by means of its own existence. Although these two (characterisations of experience) are

capable of being realised in an experience other than one's own, they do not (thereby) fall away, seeing that they are (at the same time) established by means of one's own experience; and so this character of an experience does not disappear (in relation to any experience, even though it becomes the object of another experience). And jars, &c., certainly do not possess the character of an experience, (simply) because they are devoid of this (above-mentioned) nature (of an experience), but not because they are capable of being experienced. Similarly, when an experience is incapable of being experienced, then it is difficult to avoid the result that it is not at all an experience; because the flowers imagined to grow in the sky and other such imaginary objects, which are not capable of being experienced, constitute no experience (at all). If it be said that the sky-flower and other (such purely imaginary) things are not experience, because they are non-existent, but not because they cannot be experienced, then let it be held that, in the case of jars and other similar things also, it is the fact of their not being opposed to 'non-intelligence' which binds them to the condition of their being no experience, but not the fact of their incapability to be experienced. Should it be said that, when an experience is capable of being experienced, then, like jars and other objects, it would acquire the character of not being opposed to 'non-intelligence,' then, surely, as in the case of the sky-flower and other (imaginary) objects,there would certainly result to it (*i. e.* to experience), even when it is not capable of being experienced, the quality of not being opposed to 'non-intelligence'. Hence it is ridiculous to say that, if it (viz. experience) is capable of being experienced, then it has not the character of an experience.

Again, the view in which origination is denied to con-

sciousness which is self-evident, on the score of the absence of its antecedent non-existence[45] and other non-existences, —this view is very much like the presentation of a stick (for purposes of guidance) to one who is blind by another who is born blind. It is not possible to speak of the absence of (such) antecedent non-existence, on the ground that there is nothing which can apprehend it; because it (viz. that antecedent non-existence) is apprehended by experience itself. If it be asked, how experience, at the same time that it exists, can give us the contradictory knowledge of its non-existence, it is replied that there is no rule which binds experience to deal only with such objects as are existent at the same time with itself; for then there would result, to past and future occurrences, the quality of being no objects (of experience at all). But if you say that the antecedent non-existence and other non-existences (in relation to an experience), while they are being made out, are, as a rule, found to exist simultaneously with that (experience), it is asked in return—"Did you perceive this state of things in any case?" Then (*i. e.* if it be possible so to perceive them), surely on account of that very perception, antecedent non-existence and other non-existences are proved to exist (in relation to experience). Thus there can be no denial of such antecedent non-existence (in relation to experience). However, who is there but is insane that will say that a thing's antecedent non-existence is existent simultaneously with that (thing) itself?

Indeed, this is the natural condition of the perception which is born of the senses—that it has the power of apprehending the thing which is existent simultaneously with

45. Vide *supra* p. 49.

itself, but such is not also (the condition) of all kinds of knowledge and of all means of true knowledge; because in the case of memory, inference, revelation, *yogic*[46] perception, and the like, it is observed that there is the apprehension of the thing, the existence of which belongs to a time different (from that of their own existence). Hence also, no instrument of knowledge is ever dissociated from what is to be discerned by it. The relation of an instrument of knowledge, to the thing that is to be discerned by it, does not consist in the absence of the dissociation of that (instrument of knowledge) from the thing which exists at the same time with itself; but, on the other hand, (such relation) consists in the negation of the unreality of that particular form of any particular thing which is discerned in association with any particular time, place, and other such (determining) conditions. Thus the position that memory does not deal with external objects, because even when the external object (to which it refers) has disappeared, memory is seen to continue,—this is also set at naught.

It may, however, be said:—The antecedent non-existence of consciousness is not at all made out by perception, because such (non-existence) does not exist. Nor is such (non-existence) made out by the other means of proof, because (in relation to it) the basis of logical inference and the other limbs of syllogistic reasoning are absent.

46. This is the perception which peculiarly belongs to the *Yogin*, who, by withdrawing the mind into itself and concentrating it on its own conceptions, has succeeded in actualising those conceptions in the form of direct perceptions. The realisation that results in *Yoga* is said to correspond to the conception in the mind of him who practises it. *Yâdṛiśî bhâvanâ yatra siddhirbhavati tâdṛiśî.* There is, however, an opinion which maintains that *Yogic* perception is a separate means of knowledge, and gives rise to realisations which are not possible otherwise.

Indeed, there is to be found here no such basis of inference as is invariably associated with the antecedent non-existence of consciousness. Revelation also is not at all seen to deal with it (*i. e.* with such antecedent non-existence). Hence, the antecedent non-existence (of consciousness) cannot be proved, because there is really no means of proving it. To this, it is replied thus :—If, abandoning the peculiar support of the self-evident nature (of consciousness), you rely upon the absence of the means to prove that (non-existence), then it would be well for you to stop the discussion, bearing in mind that that (same non-existence) is established by the negative proof of non-cognition relating to a necessarily associated thing.

Moreover, perceptual knowledge, which during the time that it exists, proves (the existence of) its objects, such as jars &c., is not seen to give rise to the knowledge of their existence at all times. Therefore, the existence of jars and such other objects during periods antecedent and subsequent (to their perception), is not made out (by means of perception). Such non-cognition is seen to be due to perceptual consciousness being conditioned by time. If perceptual consciousness, which has jars, &c., for its objects, is itself made out to be unconditioned by time, then, the objects of (that) consciousness, such as jars, &c., would also appear to be unconditioned by time, and so would be eternal. If (this) consciousness which is self-evident be eternal, it should of itself appear to be so eternal. But it is not so made out. Similarly, if the inferential and the other cognising states of consciousness are made out to be unconditioned by time, then they would make their objects also appear unconditioned by time ; and so all such objects would become eternal ; for every object has a nature which corresponds to the state of consciousness (that represents

it). Again, there is no objectless consciousness, in as much as such a thing is unknown. Indeed, the self-luminous nature of consciousness has been demonstrated solely by means of the fact that perception brings external objects to the light of consciousness. If consciousness have not the power of bringing external objects to light, there would result to it the absence of self-luminousness; in consequence of this (absence of self-luminousness), and also in consequence of the fact that experience is incapable of being experienced by any other experience, consciousness itself would become a mere nothing.

Further, it should not be stated that during sleep,[47] conditions of intoxication, swoons, &c., totally objectless, absolute consciousness alone shines forth; because such a statement would be invalidated by the negative proof of non-cognition relating to a necessarily associated thing. If during these states also, experience is experienced, then, at the time of waking, there will have to be its recollection. But there is no such thing. It may, however, be said that it is not commonly seen that an object which has been experienced, is, as a rule, remembered; and therefore, how can the absence of recollection prove the non-existence of the (corresponding) experience? It is stated (in reply to this) that, provided there are no such powerful causes as the dissolution of the body, &c., which remove all innate mental impressions, then uniform non-remembrance establishes only the non-existence of experience. Surely, the non-existence of experience is not proved solely through the uniform absence of any remembrance thereof; because it is possible for one who has just risen from sleep to realise by means of introspective observation alone that all the

47. Vide *supra* pp. 52 & 53.

while he did not know anything. Moreover, it is not possible to say that, even when experience exists, the uniform non-remembrance thereof is due either to want of association with objects or to the destruction of the principle of egoity; because, the non-experience of some one thing (such as a jar) and the non-existence of another thing (such as a cloth) do not constitute the causes of the non-remembrance of some other experienced object (such as a wall).

It will be explained presently that, in those states also (namely, sleep, intoxication, swoon, &c), the idea of the ego continues to persist. It has, indeed, been stated already that, during sleep and other similar states, it is possible to have such experience as is definite and relates to particular objects. What has been so stated is really true. Indeed, that (experience) is self-experience. And it will be established further on that that (self-experience) is definite and relates to particular objects. But, here, only such consciousness as is altogether objectless, and is without a basis, is denied. If mere consciousness alone is said to be self-experience, (we say) it is not so, because it will be explained hereafter that it (viz. consciousness) is dependent upon (some thing else as) its basis. Hence it cannot be said that, because experience, while it exists, does not establish its antecedent non-existence, (such) antecedent non-existence is disproved. In explaining the possiblity of experience being experienced, its incapability to be proved otherwise (than by itself) has also been negatived. Therefore, the non-origination of consciousness merely on the ground that there is no proof of antecedent non-existence and other non-existences in relation to it—that is not supported by logic.

What has been stated[48] already to the effect that, on

48. Vide *supra* p. 50.

account of there being no origination of consciousness, other modifications are also negatived in relation to it,—that also is unreasonable; because such reasoning is too wide and inconclusive, holding good in the case of antecedent non-existence also. In fact, although it has no origination, it is seen to be capable of destruction. If, (for the purpose of meeting this difficulty), this (proposition) is qualified by saying (that it holds true only) in the case of entities, then, indeed, (your) skilfulness in logical reasoning becomes quite manifest. Thus, for instance, the *avidyā* (or ignorance), which is accepted by you, is un-originated; and it is, nevertheless, the seat of a variety of modifications, and is also put an end to after the origination of true knowledge. If you say that all its modifications are unreal, then, is there, according to you, any modification which has the nature of reality, so that this qualification (thus limiting the scope of the proposition mentioned above) may become significant? But this (kind of modification that has the nature of reality) is surely not acknowledged by you.

Again, what has been already[49] stated to the effect that experience does not admit of any differentiation in regard to itself, on account of its being unborn,—that also is unfounded: because the self which is undoubtedly unborn is seen to be differentiated from the body, the organs of sense, and other such things; and also because it has necessarily to be accepted that the self is different from the admittedly beginningless *avidyā* (or ignorance). If you say that this differentiation is itself of the nature of unreality, (we ask), did you anywhere observe any differentiation which has the nature of reality and is the necessary concomitant of origination? Indeed, if ignorance be not in reality

49. Vide *supra* p. 50.

distinct from the self, then, as a matter of fact, ignorance itself may become the self. In maintaining the distinctions between such perceivable objects as are realised in unstultified perceptions, the distinction between the perceptions themselves is established; in the same way in which the distinction between the various kinds of the process of cutting (is established) by means of the distinction between the things cut (accordingly).

Moreover, the statements[50] already made to the effect that consciousness, which is altogether of the nature of consciousness, can have no qualifying attribute that is itself capable of being objectively perceived by consciousness,and that such (attributes) cannot qualify consciousness merely because they are objectively perceivable,—both these also are not absolutely conclusive, because, in relation to it (viz. consciousness), there are the attributes of eternity, self-luminousness, &c., which are well established by the authoritative criteria of knowledge, and are also admitted by yourselves (our opponents). Neither do these (attributes) constitute pure consciousness, because they are in their essential nature distinct (from consciousness). Indeed, consciousness is that which, solely by means of its own existence, makes intelligible to that which constitutes its own foundation, any external object whatsoever. Self-luminousness consists in being luminous, in consequence of a thing's own existence, to that which constitutes that thing's own foundation; luminosity (or intelligibility) is that (quality) which is common to all intelligent and non-intelligent things alike, and makes them fit to be practically realised; eternity is, indeed, existence through all time; unity is limitation by the number one; &c., &c. Even when these (qualifying attri-

50. Vide *supra* p. 50.

butes) constitute the negation of non-intelligence and other such things (as have to be excluded from consciousness), then, even as such, they form the qualifying attributes of consciousness; therefore, it is inevitable that this reasoning becomes too wide (and inconclusive) in as much as they, nevertheless, continue to be the attributes of consciousness. If, for the reason that consciousness is opposed to non-intelligence, and other such qualities, (merely) on account of their being different from its own essential nature, neither a negative nor a positive qualification can be admitted in relation to it, then, the (various) statements severally negating those (qualities) will have to import nothing at all.

Then, is consciousness provable (as existent) or not? If provable, it must be characterised as being possessed of attributes. If not, it becomes a mere nothing like the 'sky-flower' and other (imaginary) objects. If you say that the proof itself is consciousness, it has to be asked whose that (proof) is, and to what it refers. If it do not belong to any one, and be not in regard to some thing, then that (proof) is no proof. Indeed, proving, like son-ship, belongs to some one and is in relation to some thing (or person). If it be said that (the proving) belongs to the self, (we ask) who this self is. Was it not stated by you that it (viz. the self) is consciousness itself? Yes, it was so stated; only, it is a wrong statement. And this can be made out thus. How can that consciousness, which, by reason of its making a number of objects intelligible to a person, is related to those (objects) and to that (person), experience that it is itself the self? What is said is this:—Experience is that which, solely by means of its own existence, possesses the quality of making a thing fit to be realized in relation to what constitutes the basis of that (experience) itself; it has other names, such as

knowledge (*jñāna*), comprehension (*avagati*), consciousness (*samvid*), and the like ; it always relates to an object and is a particular attribute of the experiencing self : and again it is well known to all as possessing the qualification of being witnessed by the self, as when (one says), 'I know a jar,' 'I understand this thing,' 'I am conscious of a cloth,' &c. Indeed, it is on account of its possessing this aforesaid nature, that self-luminousness has been postulated in relation to it even by you. This (experience) which relates to an object and is a particular attribute of the subject (of the predication of knowing), cannot possess the quality of itself being the subject (of any predication), quite as much as (it cannot possess) the quality of being the object (thereof).

Accordingly, the permanent character of this subject (of the predication of knowing) is directly ascertained ; and origination, existence, and destruction, in relation to that attribute which belongs to this subject and is called consciousness, are also ascertained to be true, in the same way in which they are (so ascertained) in the case of pleasure, pain, &c. The permanent character of this subject (of the predication of knowing,) is indeed established by that kind of perception which leads to the recognition of identity, as (when one says), "This is that very thing which was formerly experienced by me." Origination and other such things are also established in regard to consciousness, by the cognitions 'I know,' 'I had known,' 'The knowledge which I, the knower, had, is now lost'; and where then is its oneness (with the self) ? If consciousness, which is thus destructible moment after moment, be admitted to be the self, then it becomes impossible indeed, to have the recognitive cognition—"I saw (again) on the next day that (same thing) which was seen on the previous day." Surely, there is no possibility of the recognitive cognition by one person of any thing experienced by

another person. Again, when experience is admitted to be the self, and eternity too is predicated of it, then also there will similarly arise the absence of the cognition leading to recognition. Indeed, the cognition which leads to recognition, as for instance (when one feels), 'I myself experienced this formerly also,'—that establishes the experiencing subject to continue unchanged in antecedent and subsequent intervals of time, but does not prove pure unconditioned experience. Surely, you also do not accept that experience is the same as the subject who experiences; experience is merely experience (to you). It has already been stated (by us) that that unfounded or objectless something which is called consciousness cannot exist, because there is absolutely no knowledge (of such a thing). Thus the view, that that same consciousness, which is indeed admitted by both of us, is the self itself, is contradicted by cognition; and all the specious arguments, which were intended to demonstrate that such pure experience alone is the highest reality, have also been thus completely refuted.

It may however be said again thus:—In the idea of the ego to be found in the cognition 'I know (this),' that which, (not being objective), is not denoted by the word 'this,' and which is homogeneous luminosity and is the thing denoted by *chit* (or intelligence),—that is the self; now, the idea of the ego, resulting from the cognition 'I know,' acquires, by reason of its being made luminous in that (intelligence) through the strength of that (intelligence), the characteristics of the thing 'thou' (or of the non-ego); and it is, therefore, other than pure intelligence, and means certainly the thing 'thou' (or the non-ego). It is not (right to say) so; simply because, (in such a case), that perceptual knowledge, in which, as when one says 'I know (a thing),' there is (between the knowing and the knower)

the relation of an attribute to the possessor thereof,—that would itself be (thereby) contradicted. Moreover,—" If the thing 'I' (or the ego) is not the self,there will be no subjectivity to the self. For, the subjective thing is distinguished from the objective thing by means of the idea of the ego. Indeed, he who is desirous of final release betakes to the 'hearing' &c., (of the scriptures), with the intention that he may himself become devoid of all misery, the enjoyer of infinite bliss,and free. If any one holds that final release consists in the destruction of the thing 'I' (or of one's own personality), then such an one will surely get away from even the merest scent of the discussion bearing upon the topic of final release. No one,who believes that,even after he ceases to exist,there is some kind of consciousness which is other than himself, will ever make any attempt to attain that (kind of consciousness as his goal after death) It is only by being associated with the self, that this (consciousness) has its own existence, has its own character as consciousness, and its other qualifications. When this association with the self is severed, consciousness itself ceases to exist; in the same way in which, in the absence of the cutter and the object to be cut, there can be no cutting or any other such process. Hence it is settled that the thing 'I,' which is also the knower, is the subjective self. The scripture also says—'My dear one, by means of what is one to know the knower?' [*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 5. 15.]. The *Smṛiti* also says—'Whoever knows this (body), him they call the *kshetrajña*.' [*B. G.* XIII. 2.]. The *Sūtra-kāra* also says the same thing opening it with the aphorisms—' The individual self is not (produced) as there are no scriptural statements to that effect '—[*Ved. Sūt.* II. 3. 18.], and ' For that very reason, (the individual self) is the knower.' [*Ved. Sūt.* II. 3. 19.]. Therefore it is decided that the self is not pure and unqualified conscious-

ness." Indeed, the thing 'I' is of itself established by the notion of the ego; the thing 'thou' is the content of the notion of the non-ego. It being so, to say that the knower, who is realised when one says 'I know,' is the non-ego, is, moreover, a contradiction in terms, very much like the statement—'My mother is barren.'

Again, this knower, the thing 'I,' has not its luminosity dependent upon anything else, because it possesses self-luminousness. Indeed, to be self-luminous is to possess the character of intelligence. Whatever, like the flame of a lamp, possesses the character of luminosity, that possesses its own light independently of anything else. For, surely, the flame of a lamp and such other self-luminous things, seeing that they are made to shine out by means of the power of their own light, can not possess non-luminousness, nor (can they possess) the character of having their luminosity dependent upon anything else. What then are they? The flame of a lamp has the nature of light, and certainly shines of itself, and also makes other objects shine by means of its own radiance.

What is said is this:—One and the same substance *tejas* (or the material element of light and heat) exists, for instance, in the form of luminosity as well as in the form of that which is luminous. Though luminosity forms an attribute of the thing which is luminous, nevertheless, it is the substance *tejas*, and nothing else. It is not a quality like whiteness, &c., because (unlike them) it can exist elsewhere also than in what constitutes its basis, and because also it is itself the possessor of colour. As it is of a different nature from whiteness and other such qualities, and possesses the quality of luminosity, it is undoubtedly the substance *tejas* and nothing else. If a thing brings to light its own nature as well as other things, it is thereby said to possess

luminosity. And the practical realisation of this (luminosity) as a quality necessarily results from its invariably having that (substance *tejas*) for its basis, and also from its forming a dependent constituent thereof. It is not that the component parts of its basis (*i. e.* of the substance *tejas*), becoming scattered and getting into motion, are spoken of as light; for, (under such a supposition), there would be the destruction of gems, of the sun, and of other such luminous bodies (through their mere shining). And in the case of the flame of a lamp also, there would at no time be the perception of an united whole. Indeed, it is not possible to say that lamp-flames, whose component parts have the nature of becoming scattered, do invariably get collected together into a whole only to the extent of four inches, rise up, and then spread about, at the same time and in the same form, horizontally and upwards and downwards. Hence, it is ascertained, that lamp-flames which possess luminosity are produced and destroyed every moment; because there is, (for their production), the ordered convergence of sufficient causes (such as wicks, oil, &c.,), and because also, on the destruction of those (causes), they (*i. e.* the flames) are themselves destroyed. That light acquires greater brilliance, greater warmth, &c., near its own source, is capable of being proved by direct perception, in the same way in which, heat &c., are (seen to be greater in intensity) near fire, &c. In this same manner, the self, which is wholly of the nature of intelligence, is (also) characterised by the attribute of intelligence.

Indeed, to possess the character of intelligence is to be self-luminous. To that effect are the following and other scriptural texts:—"Just as a solid lump of salt has neither inside, nor outside, and is altogether one whole mass of taste, so also, my dear one, he, this self, who has

neither inside nor outside, is altogether one whole mass of knowledge, and is altogether made up of intelligence." [*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 5. 13.]: "Here, this *purusha* becomes self-luminous." [*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 3. 9 & 14.]: "There is no disappearance of the knowledge of the knower." [*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 3. 30.]: "Then whoever feels 'I smell this',—that is the self." [*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 12. 4.]: "Who is the self? He is that person who is luminous in the proximity of the *prāṇas* and the heart, and wholly consists of knowledge." [*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 3. 7.]: "He is, indeed, the seer, the hearer, the taster, the smeller, the thinker, the knower, the doer, and is the person who is made up of intelligence." [*Pr. Up.* IV. 9.]: "By means of what, my dear one, is one to know the knower." [*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 5. 15.]: "This person (*i. e. purusha*) surely knows." [?]: "Whoever sees (that One) sees not death, nor disease, nor the state of sorrow." [*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 26. 2.]: "He is the Highest Person..; he (in His presence) does not mind this body which has had birth." [*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 12. 3.]: "In this same manner, all these sixteen *kalās*[51], which belong to the seer and are dependent on the *Purusha*, meet their end after attaining the *Purusha*." [*Pr. Up.* VI. 5.]: "Different from this which consists of mind is the inner self which consists of understanding." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 4. 1.]. And the *Sūtra-kāra* also says in the sequel—"For that very reason, (the self) is the knower." [*Ved. Sūt.* II. 3. 18.]. Therefore, this self, which is self-luminous, is indeed the knower always, it is not mere luminousness.

51. Vide *Pr. Up*, VI. 4. where these are enumerated as follows :— (1) The principal vital air *Prāṇa*, (2) Faith, *i. e.* belief in the reality of God (*Śraddhā*) (3) Ether, (4) Air, (5) Light, (6) Water, (7) Earth, (8) Mind, (9) The ten *Indriyas*, (10) Food, (11) Strength of body and of the senses, (12) Austerities and penance, *Tapas* (13) The sacred hymns or *Mantras* (14) Works (sacrificial and other) (15) *Swarga* and other such results of works (16) The names of *Swarga* &c.

Luminosity, as in the case of the luminosity of lamp-flames and other similar objects, must necessarily belong to something, simply because it possesses the character of luminosity. Therefore, consciousness in itself is not capable of becoming the self. Moreover, those that know the power and import of words say that the words *samvid* (consciousness), *anubhūti* (experience), *jñāna* (knowledge), &c., are words implying relation. It is not seen either in ordinary language or in the scripture that the verbs to know, &c., are at all used without an object or without a subject.

What has been stated[52] to the effect that consciousness itself is the self, because it possesses the quality of intelligence,—in regard to that (statement), this has to be asked, namely, what it is that is meant by intelligence. If it be replied that it is the possession of that luminosity which is due to the mere fact of a thing's own existence, then, in that case, such an explanation, being also applicable to the flame of a lamp, is too wide. If, as apart from consciousness, this quality of luminosity is not granted at all, there will then result the fallacies of inconclusiveness and contradiction.[53] Moreover, (the definition that intelligence means) the possession of that kind of existence which is invariably associated with luminosity (or intelligibility),—that has been already declared to be invalid, because it is too wide, being applicable also to the case of pleasures, &c. If it be said that pleasures and other such feelings, although in-

52. Vide *supra* pp. 50 & 51.

53. Inconclusiveness results, because, without knowing luminosity, as apart from consciousness, any definition of consciousness in which the idea of luminosity is involved, must necessarily prove meaningless and inconclusive. Contradiction results, because, not to admit luminosity as apart from consciousness, which is itself defined by means of the idea of luminosity, is the same as to admit that that luminosity is a peculiarly characteristic attribute of the consciousness which has been taken to be attributeless.

variably associated with luminosity, are like jars and other objects, made luminous (or intelligible) to a thing other than themselves, and are, in consequence, non-intelligent, and thereby constitute the non-self; (it is asked in return)—'Is intelligence, then, luminous to itself?' It also is always luminous to another thing, the knower, which is the ego in the cognition 'I know'; in the same way (in which happiness is luminous to a thing other than itself) in the cognition 'I am happy.' Hence, the intelligence which has the character of self-luminousness is not proved to exist in relation to consciousness. Therefore that intelligent thing 'I', which is proved to itself by the mere fact of its own existence,—that alone is the self (or the *ātman*).

The luminosity of consciousness also is dependent upon its association with that (self). Indeed, analogously to the case of pleasures and other such feelings, the intelligibility of consciousness to the self, which constitutes its own basis, and its un-intelligibility to other things (than the self), are (both) wholly due to that (association with the self.) Therefore, the self is not pure consciousness itself, but is undoubtedly the ego, the knower.

Again, what has been urged[54] to the effect that, because no illusion is possible without a basis (for it to be imposed upon), experience, which is, in truth, unfounded in any thing else and is objectless, constitutes the reality, but, nevertheless becomes manifest, through illusion, as the knower; just as the mother-of-pearl is made out, (through illusion), to possess the characteristics of silver;—this (view also) is incorrect. If it were correct, then, the experiencing subject, namely, the ego, would, in consequence of its being

54. Vide *supra* p. 51.

equivalent to experience (itself), appear in the form—'I am (myself) experience'; in the same way in which silver and other (illusorily perceived) things are made out to be nothing other than the lustrous substances which are placed in front of us. But, here, this same experience, which is itself separately cognised, qualifies some thing else, namely, the ego, just as a stick qualifies (or characterises) Devadatta (when he is holding it.) It is indeed thus that there arises the cognition,—'I experience.' Such being the case, how can the cognition 'I experience,' while showing the ego to be qualified by experience, be declared to relate entirely to this qualifying attribute, namely, experience, as if one may say that the cognition—'Devadatta is the possessor of a stick' relates merely to the stick?

What has been further stated[55] to the effect that the (self's) quality of being the knower is seen to come out only in relation to him who, thinking that he is stout and so on, mistakes the body for the self, and that this (knowership) is therefore unreal,—this (also) is incorrect; because there would then result unreality to experience also, which is maintained by you to be the self, in as much as (such experience also) is cognisable only by him who possesses that (mistaken notion of the body being the self.) If it be said that there is no unreality in relation to experience, in as much as it is not contradicted by that knowledge of truth which stultifies all other things (than truth), then, in that case, certainly (the self's) quality of being the knower is not also unreal, on account of the absence of that same stultification.

Then again it has been said thus:—It is not possible

55. Vide *supra* pp. 51 & 52.

to postulate, in the case of the self which does not admit of modifications, the quality of being the knower, which is the same as being the subject of the predication of knowing. Thus, this quality of being the knower, which is of the nature of a modification and is non-intelligent, rests in the knot of the material principle of egoity which is capable of modifications and is itself a modification of *prakṛiti* (*i. e.* nature). Hence, knowership does not belong to the self, but belongs to this material principle of egoity, which constitutes an internal organ. Indeed, the quality of being the subject of predications and other such qualities, are all attributes of perceivable objects, just as colour and other such qualities are. If the quality of being the subject of predications and the quality of being denoted by the idea of the ego are (both) admitted in relation to the self, then, as in the case of the body, so also, in the case of the self, there would result (to it) non-selfhood, objectivity, non-intelligence, &c. All this is not right; because, this material principle of egoity which constitutes an internal organ (of the body), is, like the body, possessed of non-selfhood, the character of being a modification of the *prakṛiti*, perceivability, objectivity, the character of being utilised by other things than itself, and other similar characteristics; and because also, the quality of being the knower has the peculiar character of belonging always to an intelligent thing. What is said is this:—Just as the body and other similar objects are, by means of their perceivability, objectivity, and other such characteristics, distinguished from whatever is characterised by the opposites of these (characteristics), viz. the quality of being the perceiver, subjectivity, and the like; so also, the principle of egoity which is of the nature of an internal organ, being made up of the same

substance (as the body), is distinguished by those very characteristics (of perceivability, &c.,) from that (which is characterised by the other attributes of being the perceiver, &c). Hence, the quality of being the knower does not, like the quality of being consciousness, belong to this principle of egoity, for the mere reason that, (if it did), there would thereby be the contradiction of its own nature. Just as the quality of being consciousness is not admissible in relation to the principle of egoity, which is the object of that (consciousness), so also the quality of being the knower can not be admitted in relation to what constitutes the object of (knowledge) itself.

Moreover, the quality of being the knower is not of the nature of a modification. The quality of being the knower is, indeed, the same as the quality of being the seat of the attribute of intelligence; and intelligence, being the natural attribute of this eternal thing (viz. the self), is (itself) eternal. And he (the *Sūtrakāra*) speaks of the eternity of the self in the following aphorism and in others,—"The self is not (a produced thing), as there are no scriptural statements to that effect." [*Ved. Sūt.* II. 3. 18.]. In the aphorism—"For that very reason, (the self) is the knower." [*Ved. Sūt.* II. 3. 19.],—by mentoning the (self to be) *knower* he declares that it is natural for the self to be the seat of intelligence. It has been stated that there is nothing wrong in the (self), which is itself of the nature of intelligence, being (at the same time) the seat of intelligence; just as (there is nothing wrong) in gems and other simlar objects, (although they are made up of the material element of heat and light), being themselves the seat of luminosity. We will establish farther on that intelligence, which of itself is unconditioned, is capable of contraction and expansion. Hence, in the state of the knower of the body (*i. e.* as the

embodied individual self), it exists, owing to its past actions (or *karmas*), in a contracted condition, (the contraction thereof) varying in degree in accordance with the nature of those particular actions; and that (state of contraction or expansion) is regulated by means of the senses. The statement about the rising and the setting (of intelligence) is made, having regard to this aforesaid passage of intelligence through the door-way of the senses. In the matter of this movement of the intelligence, there certainly results (to the self) the quality of being an agent; but that quality is not natural (to it), being due to its *karmas* (or past actions); and so the self has undoubtedly an immodifiable nature. Knowership, which is of this aforesaid nature, belongs only to the self, whose essential character is intelligence; and consequently, this knowership cannot possibly belong, at any time, to the non-intelligent principle of egoity (*i. e. ahaṅkāra*).

If, however, it be said that, in regard to this principle of egoity, whose essential nature is non-intelligence, there is the possibility of (its acquiring) the quality of knowership, on account of its proximity to intelligence and the consequent reflection (of qualities) therefrom,—it is asked in return—what is this reflection of intelligence? Does the reflection of the principle of egoity fall upon consciousness, or, does the reflection of consciousness fall upon the principle of egoity? It (viz. the reflection of the principle of egoity) does not fall upon consciousness, because knowership is not admissible in regard to consciousness. It (viz. the reflection of consciousness) does not fall upon the principle of egoity, because it is impossible for that (principle of egoity), which is admittedly non-intelligent, ever to possess the quality of knowership, and because also both (consciousness and the principle of egoity) are not capable

of being perceived by the organ of sight. And surely, no reflection is seen to take place in relation to invisible objects.

Then again, it may be urged that the quality of being the knower results from contact with intelligence, in the same way in which the heat in a lump of iron results from contact with fire. It cannot be so here, however; because knowership is not admitted to be an intrinsic quality of consciousness; for that same reason, this quality of knowership cannot, from contact with it, result to the principle of egoity, nor can it be apprehended (in relation to that principle). Since knowership cannot at all be predicated of the principle of egoity which is non-intelligent, there cannot, through contact with it, result to consciousness the quality of being the knower, nor can there arise (thus) the apprehension of that (quality of being the knower) in relation to consciousness.

What has been further stated[56] to the effect that both of them (viz. consciousness and the material principle of egoity), do not, in reality, possess the quality of knowership, but that this material principle of egoity is the revealer of experience, and consequently reveals that experience as though it were within itself, in the way in which mirrors and other such revealers do;—this (also) is not right; because, the self-luminous *ātman* cannot appropriately be held to be revealed by the non-intelligent principle of egoity. This has been declared thus:—"It does not stand to reason that the principle of egoity, whose nature consists in non-intelligent materiality, reveals the *ātman* which is self-luminous, in the same way in which (it does not stand to reason to hold that) a dead ember

56. Vide *supra* pp. 52 & 53.

(reveals) the sun." [*Â. S.*].[57] Indeed, all things have their cognisability dependent upon self-luminous experience. It being so, those, who know the self, ridicule the idea that the non-intelligent principle of egoity, the luminosity of which is dependent on that (experience), reveals that same experience, the luminosity of which is, (on the contrary), neither producible nor destructible, and itself forms the means by which all things are cognised. Moreover, since there is incompatibility between the nature of the material principle of egoity and (the nature) of experience, and since also there will result to experience, (when it happens to be a thing revealed by *ahaṅkâra*), the character of being no experience at all,—there cannot be the relation of the revealer and the revealed (between them). This has been stated thus:—"The relation of the revealer and the revealed (between any two things) is mutually exchangeable, and cannot exist when there is any incompatibility in nature (between them). If the self be capable of being revealed, it would, like a jar, (for instance), acquire, in consequence, the character of being no experience at all." [*Â. S.*]

Again, it is not very appropriate (to hold), in regard to consciousness, that it is revealed by the principle of egoity, which is itself revealed by consciousness, just as a beam of the sun's rays is revealed by the palm of the hand, which is itself revealed by that (very beam of rays); because, in this instance itself, there is really no revelation of the beam of the sun's rays by means of the palm of the hand. Surely, on account of their progress being obstructed by the palm of

57. This stanza occurs in the *Âtmasiddhi* of Yâmunâchârya, the leader of Śrî-Vaishṇavism in South India just before Râmânuja. Much of Râmânuja's reasonings in the *Jijñâsâdhikaraṇa* are based upon the writings of Yâmunâchârya, as it may be made out from a study of his *Siddhitraya*.

the hand, the rays become increased (through reflection and scattering) and are themselves very clearly perceived; thus the palm of the hand cannot possess the character of a revealer (of the sun's rays), in as much as it simply serves to increase them (thus).

Yet again, of what nature is that revelation which is effected by the principle of egoity in relation to this self (or the *ātman*), the essential nature of which is the same as that of consciousness? It is not, surely, origination, because it (viz. the *ātman*) is self-established, and it is in consequence impossible for it to be originated by any thing else. Nor does it (viz. such revelation) consist in making that (self) intelligible, because it (viz. the self which is the same as experience) is incapable of being experienced by any other experience. And for this same reason there can be nothing that is of use as a means for experiencing that (self). It (viz. this sort of instrumental utility of a thing) is indeed of two kinds. It consists either in serving as the means which brings the object of knowledge into relation with the perceiving senses; just as—in the matter of the apprehension of generic qualities, one's own face, and such other things—the individual, the mirror, and such other things (respectively) form the means of bringing (those generic qualities, that face, and those other things) into relation with the senses. Or, it (viz. such instrumental utility) consists in serving the purpose of removing the impurity found in one who is desirous of acquiring knowledge; just as tranquillity, self-restraint, and such other things are (in the way of removing the impurities of him who is desirous of true knowledge auxiliary) to the science which is the means of knowing the supreme reality. It is therefore declared accordingly:—"As it (viz. the ego) is not within the province of the senses, nothing can serve as the means

of bringing it into relation with them."[58]

Moreover, even if it be allowed that experience is capable of being experienced, it is not proper to say that the ego is useful as a means for experiencing that (experience). Indeed, it (viz. such instrumental utility thereof) may consist in the removal of any obstruction to the origination of the experience which is thus capable of being experienced; in the same way in which lamp-flames and other luminous things serve, in relation to the organ of sight, as instruments for the removal of the deep darkness which is an obstruction to the origination of the perception of colour and other qualities. But here (*i. e.* in the case of experience or consciousness) there is no such removable obstruction. Surely, in the consciousness which is the same as the *ātman*, there is not anything to be found which, while being an obstruction to the origination of the knowledge of that (*ātman*), is capable of being removed by the material principle of egoity. If it be said that there is (the obstruction offered by) ignorance (which has to be removed),—it is replied that it is not right to entertain such an opinion, for the reason that it is not admissible to hold that ignorance (or *avidyā*) can be removed by the material principle of egoity (or *ahaṅkāra*). Indeed, what removes ignorance is not anything other than knowledge. Moreover,

58. Only the first half of the *śloka* from the *Ātmasiddhi* is quoted above, but the other half also is pertinent to the context. And the whole *śloka*, when translated, runs thus:—"As it (viz. the ego) is not within the province of the senses, nothing can serve as the means of bringing it into relation with them. The ego is itself the knower and therefore this (knower) cannot be purified by that (ego) itself." It is, in accordance with this opinion of **Yāmunāchārya** so expressed, that **Rāmānuja** argues out the impossibility of anything proving a helpful instrument, in either of the two ways mentioned above, in the matter of the realisation of the *ātman*.

it is not possible for ignorance to have consciousness for its basis, because it would then have the same basis for itself as knowledge has, and because also its objects would then be the same as those of that (knowledge). Ignorance cannot exist in the witness who is pure unqualified consciousness, and is free from the condition of being the knower as well as that of being the object (of knowledge). Just as jars and other similar objects cannot form the seat of ignorance, because they are not, even in the least, the seat of knowledge, so also pure unqualified consciousness cannot be the seat of ignorance, for the reason that it too is not the seat of knowledge. Even if consciousness be taken to be the seat of ignorance, that same (consciousness), which is (also) taken to be the self, cannot form the object of knowledge; therefore the cessation of the ignorance which is found in it (viz. in this consciousness) cannot be brought about by means of knowledge. Knowledge, indeed, removes always the ignorance which relates to its own objects, as in the case of the rope and other things (where the false knowledge of the snake,&c., in relation to the rope, &c., is removed by the true knowledge of the rope as rope). Hence, the ignorance which has consciousness for its basis can never be destroyed by any thing whatsoever. It will be stated further on that the true nature of this ignorance, which is not capable of being described either as an entity or as a non-entity, is altogether difficult of definition. And because this ignorance, which is of the nature of the antecedent non-existence of knowledge, is not an obstruction to the origination of knowledge, it cannot, through causing its own destruction, serve as an instrument for producing that knowledge. Hence there can be no revelation of experience by the material principle of egoity in any manner whatsoever.

Moreover, the nature of revealers is not to reveal the revealable thing as though it were within themselves; because such (a revelation) is not seen in the case of lamp-flames and such other self-luminous things, and because also knowledge, the instrument of knowledge, and all that helps that (instrument of knowledge in the production of knowledge) are all of such a nature as is consistent with the realisation of things as they are. And this fact is proved by the rule which declares that self-evident things prove themselves. Again, mirrors and other things are not the revealers of faces and other objects, but (only) form the means to produce that cause of erroneousness which (for instance) consists in the bending back of the ocular aura (to one's own face.) And it being so, all false appearances arise from such a cause of error. But the revealers are (really) such things as are like the *âloka*[59] (or the ocular aura). Further, here, in the present instance, it is not possible for the material principle of egoity to impose any such error upon the self-luminous consciousness. The logical genus represents the typical form of the individuals (that go to make it up); and it is therefore that it appears to be contained in the individuals, but not because it is revealed by the individuals. Hence, to give rise to the apprehension of consciousness as abiding in the material principle of egoity, which forms an internal

59. *Âloka* which has been translated here as *Ocular Aura* is a kind of influence, which, proceeding from the eye and falling upon external objects, is supposed to make them visible. According to this theory of vision, the eye sees only such objects as are touched, as it were, by its own *âloka*; the perception of the images which are due to reflection is supposed to be caused by the mirror or any other reflecting surface bending back this *âloka*; and, accordingly, a man sees his own face in a mirror, because the *âloka* from his eyes goes to the mirror, is there bent back, and finally returns and falls on his own face.

organ, there is, indeed, nothing which can serve as a means, either in itself or through causing an error. Thus the quality of being the knower does not belong to the material principle of egoity, nor is there any impression to the effect that it does. Therefore, the subjective self is the thing 'I', which is of itself made out to be the knower; but is not pure unqualified consciousness.

It has also been stated already that, on the disappearance of the idea of the ego, consciousness cannot acquire the subjectivity (of the self). Although, (during deep sleep), the thing 'I' (or the ego) does not, owing to its being overpowered by the quality of darkness (or *tamas*), and owing also to the absence of the experience of external objects, distinctly and clearly manifest itself, still, because the self shines forth (as before) in one and the same continuous form of the 'I' at the time of waking, there is no disappearance of the idea of the ego even in deep sleep. It has to be stated that the experience which is accepted by you does also shine forth in that very same form. As a matter of fact, no one, who has risen from sleep, introspectively realises, as existing simultaneously with the condition of sleep, any experience which is of the following form, namely, "I who am (pure) consciousness which is free from the notion of the ego, and the nature of which is hostile to all other things, have (all this while) remained as a witness of ignorance." The introspective realisation of one who has risen from sleep is, indeed, to the effect—"I have slept happily." By means of this process of introspective realisation, it is made out that even at that time (*i. e.* during sleep) the self, which is the thing 'I', possesses the quality of being the enjoyer of happiness as well as the quality of being the knower. It should not be urged that the realisation is simply to the effect—"I so slept then as to feel

happy now"; because that realisation is not at all of such a form. Moreover, (it may be said that) a person who has risen from sleep realises by introspection the very thing which was experienced (by him) before, and then observes —'This was done by me'. 'This was experienced by me,' 'I said this'; and that, therefore, it is not right to think that the quality of being the enjoyer of happiness cannot be consistently applied to the ego, on account of the impermanent character of this ego which is the self. But if it be said (in reply) that he also realises by introspection —'All this while (during my sleep) I knew nothing at all,' (we ask)—'What (follows) then'? If it be said that 'nothing at all' means (here) the negation of all things, it is replied that it can not be so, for the reason that the thing 'I,' the knower, must continue to persist when one can say 'I knew,' (even though his knowledge relates to nothing). In fact, this negation here relates only to knowable objects. If the negation by means of the word 'nothing' here relates to the entire totality of things, then that experience also, which is admitted by you (to be existent during sleep), will have to be denied. Now (it is held that) the self, which is the knower, and constitutes the thing 'I' which is continuously existent even during sleep, is (first) introspectively realised as the 'I' (or the ego); and that that (ego) is then denied by means of the cognition—'I knew nothing at all.' Thus, this same introspective realisation—'I knew nothing at all.'—is made to prove the reality of that knowledge which is, however, denied to exist at that time of sleep), and (to prove) also the unreality of the thing 'I', which is the knower and is continuously existent; and let such a thing as this be proved only to the gods (who do not reply to arguments and criticism).

If it be said that when one observes—'I did not know

even myself (in sleep)', the continued existence of the thing 'I' also is not then apprehended, it is replied that you—the *pūrvapakshins*—do not know even the contradiction (thus arising) between your own experience and your own description (of it). Indeed, this experience and its description are to the effect—'I did not know myself.' If it be asked what it is that is negated in the word 'myself', it would be indeed a pertinent question put by you. It is thus answered. It is not the essential reality of the continued persistence of the thing 'I', which is the knower, that is denied (here). But (what is denied is) that the thing 'I' which is, at the time of waking, made out to have been continuously existent, is characterised by caste, and the various stages of life, &c. When it is said 'I did not know myself,' the real import (of that utterance) has to be distinctly ascertained. The import of that particular portion (of the sentence) which is denoted by 'myself' is the thing 'I' which is characterised by such peculiarities of caste &c., as are continuously applied to it in the condition of wakefulness. The import of that (other) portion (of the sentence) which is denoted by 'I' is the ego, which is well known to exist in the condition of self-absorption as altogether consisting of indistinct self-experience. The form of this experience is indeed to this effect, viz. 'I did not know even myself, as being asleep, and as possessing a particular nature.'

Moreover, your position[60] indeed is this, that, in deep sleep, the self exists as the witness of ignorance. To be a witness is certainly the same as to be a direct knower; and one who does not know cannot at all possess the character of a witness. In the scripture as well as in the

60. Vide *supra* p. 53.

world, it is the knower alone that is spoken of as the witness. Mere knowledge is not (the witness). The venerable Pāṇini also declares thus:—"The word *witness* is an appellative term and means the person who directly sees." [*Pāṇini.* V. 2. 91.]. The word *witness* is used always in the sense of one who knows. And this aforesaid witness, who is realised when one says 'I know,' is undoubtedly the thing 'I'; and it being so, how can the thing 'I' be not known to exist then (*i. e.* during deep sleep)? Therefore, it is a settled conclusion that the thing 'I', being luminous to itself, shines forth invariably as the 'I'; and so, even in sleep and other such states, the self is luminous and undoubtedly shines forth as the ego.

Again what has been stated[61] to the effect that in the state of final release the thing 'I' does not continue to persist—this (also) is not good. If it do not (so persist), then final release would, in other words, come to mean the enunciation of the destruction of the self. Moreover, the thing 'I' is no mere attribute, so that, even after its cessation, the essential entity may remain, as it does in the case of the removal of ignorance. On the contrary, the thing 'I' is itself the self; and intelligence is its attribute; because intelligence is, indeed, apprehended to be the attribute of the thing 'I' in the cognitions 'I know', and 'Knowledge has come to me.' Further, he who considers the self to be afflicted with the *ādhyātmika*[62] and other miseries, saying—'I am sorrowful,' and in whom the desire for final release is born to the effect (of making him feel)—'How may I become tranquilled and devoid of sorrow, setting aside the whole of misery, so that it may never occur again to me,'—such a man alone strives for the attainment of that (release). Should he, however, come to think—'I shall be no more, if I utilise

61. Vide *supra* p. 53. 62. Vide *supra* p. 4. n. 12.

the means (for the attainment of release),'—he would flee away from even the semblance of any discussion bearing upon the topic of final release; and then the whole science treating of final release would, (through want of scope), become unauthoritative, because there would be none at all having the needed qualification (for the attainment of final release). It may be said that that mere luminousness alone, which is indicated by the word 'I', remains in the state of final release; but then of what use is it? No one, whose actions are based upon right understanding, will ever make any attempt (to obtain final release) with the knowledge that even though his ego ceases to exist, something which is mere luminousness remains. Therefore the thing 'I' itself, which is made out to be the knower, is the subjective self. And this subjective self, even in the state of final release, shines indeed as the 'I', because it is luminous to itself. Whatever is luminous to itself, that always shines forth as the 'I'. Thus, for instance, the self, which is subject to the round of births and deaths, is admitted by both the contending parties to be possessed of such luminousness. Whatever does not shine forth as the 'I', that is not luminous to itself, like jars and other similar objects, for instance. This self in the state of final emancipation is luminous to itself. Therefore it (viz. the self) shines forth always as the 'I'. Ignorance, transmigration, &c., cannot be said to result to that (released self), in consequence of its thus shining forth as the 'I', because they (viz. ignorance, transmigration, &c.,) are opposed to the condition of final release, and because also, the notion of the 'I' is not the cause of ignorance and such other things. Ignorance, indeed, is either not to know a thing as it is, or to know it other than as it is, or to know it as contrary to what it is. The essential nature of the self consists, indeed,

in being the 'I'; and so the notion of the 'I', which is of the nature of the knowledge of the self itself, cannot cause ignorance; and how can it cause the condition of transmigration? On the contrary that (notion of the 'I'), being opposed to it (viz. ignorance), certainly destroys it. (The subjective self shines indeed as the 'I' even in the state of final release), also because the experience of that self is seen to have been altogether in the form of the 'I', in the case of Vāmadeva and others who had their ignorance destroyed in its entirety by means of the direct realisation of the *Brahman* as constituting the Self of all. It is, indeed, heard declared in the scripture to the following effect:—"After seeing this (*Brahman*), the sage Vāmadeva experienced—I have become Manu and the sun also." [*Bṛih. Up.* I. 4. 10.]; "I alone exist and will exist." [*Ath. Up.* I. 1.]. The Highest *Brahman*, who is not ignorant of any thing which is distinct (from Himself), and who is denoted altogether by the import of the word 'Sat' (*i. e.* existence), is also (seen to be) accustomed to the same usage (of personality) in the following scriptural passages:—"Indeed, I (will enter) these three deities." [*Chhând. Up.* VI. 3. 2.]; "May I become manifold and be born." [*Chhând. Up.* VI. 2. 3.]; "He thought—May I create the worlds." [*Ait. Up.* I. 1.]. Again that same (association of personality with the Highest *Brahman*) may be seen in the following and other passages also:—"Because I transcend the destructible and am also superior to the indestructible, therefore, I am known as the Highest Person, both in the world and in the scripture." [*B. G.* XV. 18.]; "I am the Self, O Gudākeśa."[63] [*B. G.* X. 20]; "It is not that I did never exist." [*B. G.* II. 12.]; "I am the source as well as the end of the whole world." [*B. G.* VII. 6.]. I am the

63. Vide *supra* p. 30. n. 26.

source of all; everything goes forth from Me." [*B. G.* X. 8.]; "I am their deliverer from the deadly ocean of the circuit of mundane existence." [*B. G.* XII. 7.]; "I am the seed-giving father." [*B. G.* XIV. 4.]; "I know the past things." [*B. G.* VII. 26.].

It may, however, be asked—"If the 'I' constitutes the self, then, how is it that the principle of egoity is declared by the Lord to be among the things that go to make up the material embodiment (or *kshetra* of the individual self) as in the following passage :—'The great elements, the principle of egoity, the *buddhi* or the principle known as *mahat*, the *prakṛiti*......(all these thrown together have been declared to make up this changeful material embodiment)'?" [*B. G.* XIII. 5.]. It is thus said (in reply to this):—In all declarations regarding (His) essential nature, the teaching is given (by Him only in the first person) as 'I', and the essential nature of the self is also apprehended in that very same form (viz. as the 'I' or the ego); therefore, the true nature of the subjective self is surely in the form of the 'I'. It is, indeed, declared by the Lord Himself that the principle of egoity, which is one of the various modifications of the *prakṛiti*, is included among the things that go to make up this material embodiment. And it is called the principle of egoity (or *ahaṅkāra*) because it forms the cause of the imposition of the idea of the ego upon the body, which is other than the self. And again the etymology of this word *ahaṅkāra* (which means the principle of egoity) is to be made out on the supposition that the affix termed *chvi*[64] has become applicable here on account of (our) assuming as really existing what does not so exist. Moreover, this same *ahaṅkāra*, which (often) forms

64. Vide *Pāṇini*. V. 4. 50. *Vārtika*.

the cause of disesteem in regard to men of position, and is otherwise named pride, is often declared in the scripture to be worthy of rejection. [65] Therefore such idea of egoity as is not stultified by any thing is directly within the province of the self itself. That other idea of egoity, which is within the province of the body, is certainly ignorance. To the same effect it has been declared by the reverend Parāśara (also):—"O thou, worthy son of thy family, listen also to the teaching regarding the true nature of ignorance as well. It is the imposition of the idea of the self on that which is no self." [*V. P.* VI. 7. 10.] If mere consciousness alone constitute the self, then, the body which is not the self, but which is, (nevertheless), mistaken for the self, would illusorily appear as mere consciousness, but not appear as the knower. Therefore, the thing 'I', which is the knower, is alone the self. It has been taught:—"Thus, the self which is the knower shines forth as the 'I', because it can be so established by direct perception, and because the aforesaid arguments and scriptural texts are applicable so to prove it, and because also ignorance cannot (really) be associated with it." [*Ā. S.*] To the same effect is this passage:—"The self is other than the body, the senses, the mind and vitality; and is self-evident. It is eternal, all-pervading, different in each body, and happy in itself." [*Ā. S.*] To be self-evident is to be self-luminous; to be all-pervading is to possess the power of getting into the inside of all inanimate things by reason of its own extreme subtlety.

It has been stated [66] that sense-perception, which embraces all distinctions, is grounded upon error and is, in consequence, liable to give rise to false knowledge; and that

65. Vide *B. G.* XVI. 18.

66. Vide *supra* pp. 33 to 35.

therefore it is apt to be stultified by scripture. Here, it has to be questioned what this error is, grounded whereon, perception becomes capable of giving rise to false knowledge. If it be replied that the beginninglessly old innate impression of distinctions itself is, indeed, the cause of error, then it is asked whether it has been already ascertained elsewhere that this innate impression of distinctions possesses, like 'darkness',[67] &c., the character of being the cause of (our) apprehending things as being other than what they really are. If it be said again that this is made out by that same (aforesaid) scriptural stultification (of perception), it is replied that it cannot be so, for the reason that the logical fallacy of reciprocal dependence would thereby result (in the following manner). When it is settled that scripture gives rise to the knowledge of that thing which is devoid of all attributes, then (alone) is it demonstrable that the innate impression of distinctions forms the misguiding cause of error (in relation to perception); and again, when the innate impression of distinctions is proved to be of the nature of a misguiding cause of erroneous perception, then (alone) is it demonstrable that scripture gives rise to the knowledge of that thing which is devoid of all attributes. Moreover, if, by being based upon the innate impression of distinctions, perception gives rise to such knowledge as is other than the reality, then scripture also, being similarly based thereon, would acquire the same character (of giving rise to false knowledge). It may be urged again that, although based upon error, the scripture forms the stultifier of perception, in as much as it is the means of that knowledge which is destructive of all the distinctions apprehended in perception, and is therefore of stronger

67. Vide *infra* p. 104. n. 69., where this *darkness* is explained to be the name also of an eye-disease.

authority as a criterion of truth; if so, it is replied that it can not be so, because, when it is known that it (viz. scripture) is based upon error, the idea that it is stronger as a criterion of truth can serve no purpose. For, when the fear caused by the false perception of the snake in a real rope is found to exist in a man, that fear is not seen to cease even after he is told—'This is no snake, do not be afraid'—by another who knows that he is labouring under an illusion. That scripture is based upon error can, however, be thought of only at the time of 'hearing' it; because reflection,[68] &c., consist in practically realising that knowledge of the oneness of the *Brahman* and the self, which is destructive of all the distinctions apprehended at the time of 'hearing.'

Again, by what means have you come to know what the scripture is and how it is incapable of being erroneous, while perception is capable of being erroneous? That self-evident experience (of yours) which is devoid of all attributes cannot, indeed, give rise to this knowledge, because it is wholly objectless and because also it can lend no special support to the scripture. Nor does sense-perception (give rise to this knowledge), because, being based upon error, it relates to what is other than the reality. The other means of proof (such as inference, &c.,) being themselves based upon that (perception), cannot also (give rise to that knowledge). Hence, on account of the unavailability of any means of proof to establish your own position, there can be no proof of the position accepted by you.

It may, however, be said that we also have to make use of (such) means of proof and (such) objects of knowledge as appertain to the phenomenal world. But what is this which you call phenomenal? If it be said that it is that which results from first impressions, and is then made

68. "Reflection &c." means reflection and steady meditation.

out to be (really) otherwise when examined by means of appropriate reasoning,—it is asked in reply, of what use that can be. Even though it be accepted as a means of proof, it cannot effect what a means of proof has to accomplish, because it is capable of being itself stultified by appropriate reasoning.

Again it may be said that, although both scripture and perception are based upon ignorance, the objects of perception are found to be stultified by the scripture, while the object of the scripture, namely, the *Brahman*, which is the only existence without a second, is not seen to be so stultified subsequently; and that, in consequence, the *Brahman* alone, which is pure experience and devoid of all attributes, is the highest reality. To say so is wrong, because whatever is based upon error, even though it continues unstultified, can be demonstrated to possess the character of unreality. What is said is this:—All those men, for instance, who are affected by *timira*[69], who do not know that they are themselves so affected by *timira*, who dwell in such mountain caves as are inaccessible to other men, and who are free

69. *Timira* commonly means darkness, and is here used to denote obviously a disease of the eye. In the *Sabdakalpadruma* of Rājā Rādhākānta Deva, it is said that this disease itself is called 'darkness,' because it darkens vision. According to Vābhata who is quoted here, this disease affects the fourth coat of the eye, obstructs vision in all directions, and finally causes blindness. In this disease, it is said, that single objects appear double or multiple, and that short objects appear long and *vice versa*, &c., &c. If the disease grows and invades the third coat of the eye, it comes to be known as *kācha*. In this disease the eye is always directed upwards, and the vision is hazy and often coloured; faces appear noseless, single objects appear multiplied, and straight objects appear crooked, &c., &c. When *kācha* grows, it leads to blindness. On pages 16 & 102, we have translated *timira* as *darkness*, so that it may mean either the ordinary darkness resulting from want of light, or the eye-disease known as *darkness*, because both these act as misguiding causes of false perception.

from all other causes of error in vision, such as the eye-disease *kācha*, &c., have without distinction, the perception of two moons (when there is only one in reality), as they are all equally subject to that misguiding cause (of false perception) which is known as *timira*; here, there is no apprehension of any stultifier (of such a perception), and (yet) it cannot for that reason be other than false; accordingly, the moon's duality, which forms the object of that (perception), is also undoubtedly false. Indeed, an error-producer is that which is the cause of false knowledge. In this same manner, the knowledge of the *Brahman*, although free from the notion of any thing that may stultify it, has to be undoubtedly false; and with it, its object, which is the *Brahman*, (has also to be false); because that (knowledge) is (held to be) based upon ignorance. And the forms of the syllogistic statement in this connection would be as follow:—(i). The *Brahman* which is (now) the subject of discussion (between us) is unreal, because it is the object of the knowledge which is produced in one who is possessed of ignorance; as, for example, the phenomenal world. (ii). The *Brahman* is false, because it is the object of knowledge (or experience); as, for example, the phenomenal world. (iii). The *Brahman* is unreal, because it is the object of that knowledge which is produced by false causes; as, for example, that same phenomenal world.

Moreover, it should not be urged that the unreal perception of elephants and other objects arising in dreams do form the cause of the attainment of real good and evil (in life); and that it is not opposed to reason to hold that, similarly, the scripture, which, being based upon ignorance, is unreal, forms the means for the attainment of the object which is known as *Brahman* and constitutes the highest reality: because the cognition arising in dreams is not at all

of an unreal nature. Indeed, here (in dreams), there is unreality only in relation to the objects (perceived therein), because stultification is seen only in relation to them, but not in relation to the perception itself. Surely there is not born in any one the belief that will make him feel—"That conscious state itself which was experienced by me during dreams is non-existent." As a matter of fact, the idea of stultification here is in the form—"The conscious state is existent, but the objects (thereof) are non-existent."

That knowledge which consists of illusions, and is caused by the incantations (*mantras*) and medicinal herbs, &c., of the enchanter, is quite real and forms also the cause of love and fear; because, in this case also, the knowledge (or the conscious state so produced) remains unstultified. That perception of the snake, &c., which is imposed upon the rope, &c., and is produced by means of the misguiding causes relating to the objects of perception and the perceiving senses, &c.,—that is also truly existent and forms the cause of fear and other emotions. The impression resulting from the proximity of the snake to one's self, to the effect that one has been bitten (by it), even when not so bitten,—this also is undoubtedly real. The idea giving rise to a (false) suspicion of poisoning is also certainly real, and forms the cause of death. The reflected appearance of the face, &c., in water, &c., is a really existing thing, and forms the means of ascertaining the particular characteristics found in the face which is a really existing thing. The reality of these various states of consciousness is conclusively established, in as much as they have an origin, and also form the causes of actions which are determined by motives. If it be asked, how, even in the absence of the elephant and other objects (perceived in dreams), the forms of cognition relating to them can be real, we reply that that

(question itself) is not right; because these forms of cognition merely require, as a rule, some object (whether it be real or unreal) to depend upon, and to relate to. For, what is required to make a thing the basis and the object of any cognition, is merely the manifestation of that thing (to consciousness); and there certainly does exist such a manifestation under the influence of the misguiding cause (which is productive of such manifestation). However, that (thing which is so made manifest to consciousness), is, when stultified, conclusively proved to be unreal. And it has been already declared that that cognition which continues unstultified relates certainly to the reality.

Further, in the case also of the apprehension of the sounds of letters by means of (the corresponding) written signs, there is no cognition of the real by means of the unreal, because the written sign itself is really existent. To this, it may be objected that the sign is taken to be of the same nature as the sound, and is thus the cause of the cognition of the sound here, but that its identity in nature with the sound is unreal. This is not so; because the unreal (or non-existent) nature of the identity (of the sign) with the sound cannot form the means (of producing such a cognition). Indeed, it is not seen, nor is it possible, that what does not exist, and is not cognisable, can form the means (of proving any thing). Again, it may be said that the imposition of the idea of the alphabetic sound on that (written sign) is the cause (of the apprehension of the sound with the help of the sign). If it be so held, then, there would not be here, (as you contend), the cognition of the real by means of the unreal, simply because that (superimposed) idea is (itself) real. Moreover, there would then result also the oneness of the means of proof with the object to be proved, because both of them possess the same

character of being the cognition of alphabetic sound. And again, if a written sign forms the means (for the cognition of an alphabetic sound), by reason of its supposititious and unreal identity in nature with that sound, then it is easy enough for any one sign to be so supposititiously and unreally identical in nature with all the alphabetic sounds; and thus there will have to result the cognition of all the alphabetic sounds by looking at any one written sign of a letter. Then again, it may be said that, just as there is the convention of using 'Devadatta' and other nominal words in relation to particular masses of matter, so also, there is the convention of associating a particular sound, which is perceivable by the ear, with a particular written sign, which is perceivable by the eye; and that, consequently, a particular written sign is the cause of the cognition of a particular alphabetic sound. Well then, there is, in that case, the cognition of the real by means of the real, because both the written sign and the (phonetic) convention are of a real nature. The cognition of the real wild ox by means of the written outline of the wild ox is founded upon similarity, and this similarity is itself real. Again, there is no cognition of the real by means of the unreal, even in the case where, by means of particular phonetic differentiations, the one undifferentiated sound (known as *sphota*)[70] is seen to become the means of apprehending a variety of meanings; because this one undifferentiated sound is revealed by numerous phonetic

70. This is what is known as the *Sphota* of the grammarians, according to whom, this *Sphota* which is eternal is 'the cause of the manifestation of all sounds,' and so they hold that all the things in the world which are expressed by sounds are traceable to that one eternal sound. The *Pūrva-mīmāmsā* also ascribes eternity to all *Vedic* sounds. Vide *Pūr. Mīm.* I. 1. 5 to 23. Vide also *Manu.* I. 21. & *Taitt. Br.* II. 2. 4. 2.

differentiations (or *nâdas*), and forms the cause of the origin of the knowledge of a variety of meanings, owing to the apprehension of its relation with various meanings, according as they are severally revealed by the various phonetic differentiations (thereof). It is not also proper to hold that sound possesses (at all) the undifferentiated character of unity; because *ga* and the other phonetic elements of language, which undoubtedly import meanings, do themselves constitute sound, in as much as they (alone) are perceived by the ear.

Therefore, by means of the scripture, which is false, it is difficult to arrive at that knowledge the object of which is the real *Brahman*.

An objection may, however, be raised against this conclusion to the following effect:—The scripture is not false, in the same way in which the flowers imagined to grow in the sky (are false); because it is made out to be a real entity (or *sat*) before the knowledge of non-duality (is born). Indeed, it is only after the knowledge of the truth is born, that the scripture acquires the character of being untrue. And then it is that the scripture can not form the means of knowing the *Brahman*, which is pure intelligence and is devoid of all distinctions. When it, however, does form such a means, then the scripture is really existent, for the reason that it is then made out to be so existent. To this objection, it is replied that it cannot be so; because, when the scripture does not really exist, to make out that it does exist is false. What (follows) then? Then (follows) this:—In consequence of the unreality of the knowledge produced by the unreal scripture, there will result unreality to the *Brahman* also which forms the object of that (knowledge); in the same way in which, owing to the falsity of the knowledge of fire inferred by means of aqueous

vapour wrongly perceived to be smoke, the fire also which forms the object of that (inferential knowledge) is unreal. Moreover, the absence of any subsequent stultification (of the scriptural knowledge of the *Brahman* after it is actually produced) is not also proved; because such stultification of that (scriptural knowledge) is really to be found in the statement (of some [71] Buddhists) that nothingness alone is the reality. If it be said that that (statement) is based upon illusion, it is replied that it has been already declared by you that this (scriptural knowledge) also is based upon illusion. Indeed the absence of any such stultification is to be found only in relation to that (statement that nothingness is alone the reality)! We have now done with the ridiculing of such ill-founded and fallacious reasoning.

What has been urged[72]–by the *Pūrvapakshins*—to the effect that *Vedānta* passages such as "Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning"—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 1.], and the like, are intended to establish that thing alone which is devoid of attributes and is of the uniform nature of intelligence,—this (view also) is incorrect; because in the way of proving the proposition [73] that, by knowing a certain One Thing, all things become known, it is declared that the Highest *Brahman*, which is denoted by the word *Sat* (or Existence), is the material cause of the world, is the efficient cause of the world, is omniscient, omnipotent, wills the truth, pervades all, supports all, controls all, and is characterised by innumerable other auspicious qualities; and that the whole world has that (*Brahman*) for its

71. These are the Mādhyamikas; and the statement quoted above is also mentioned in the *Sāṅkhya* aphorisms of Kapila, I. 44., for the purpose of refutation.

72. Vide *supra* p. 27.

73. Vide *Chhānd. Up.* VI. 1. 3. wherein this proposition is given.

Soul; and that, in consequence, the context (wherein the above scriptural passage occurs) proceeds to teach Śvetaketu that he is of the same nature as the *Brahman* thus described. Indeed, this subject is discussed (by us) at length in the *Vedârtha-saṅgraha* [74]. In this work also [*Ved. Sût.* II. 1. 15.], in the section treating of the origin of the world, this (subject) will be discussed well with great clearness. In this passage also, namely,—"And that is the higher (knowledge) by which that Indestructible Being (is known)"–[*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 1. 5], the evil qualities appertaining to matter (or *prakṛiti*) are first negatived (in relation to the *Brahman*), and then it is declared that the Highest *Brahman* possesses innumerable auspicious qualities such as eternity, omnipresence, subtlety, all-pervasiveness, indestructibility, the quality of being the source of all, omniscience, and so on. By means of this passage also, namely,—"The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity"—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.], that thing which is devoid of attributes is not arrived at, because the fact of their (*i.e.* of *Brahman*, Existence, Knowledge, and Infinity) being grammatically equated has to be understood to mean the denotation of some one thing which is characterised by more than one attribute. Indeed, (for words) to be grammatically equated is to import only one thing through a variety of significations. Regarding the use of these words so as to import only one thing, either by signifying those qualities which form the primary and natural meaning of the words, 'Existence,' 'Knowledge', &c., or by denoting the opposite of what is contrary to each of those particular qualities, a difference between their significations has necessarily to be accepted. Here, however,

74. Vide pp. 20 to 60, *Vedârtha-saṅgraha*, edited at Madras, in Telugu characters, by Messrs J. Tirumalâchârya and A. K. Vijayarâghavâchârya.

there is this much of peculiarity. In one case, the words have their primary and natural meaning; and in the other, they have a figurative significance. To be opposed to what is ignorance, &c., does not surely constitute the essential nature of the entity *Brahman*; for, (if it did), the true nature of (that) *Brahman* would be fully made out by means of only one word, and the use of the other words would, in consequence, be meaningless. Moreover, under such a circumstance, there will not be any grammatical equation between these words, for the (mere) reason that those words, all of which denote only one thing, cannot have a variety of significations. Furthermore, a variety of qualified conditions results to one and the same thing from a variety of qualifying attributes, and consequently the words (in a grammatical equation) acquire a variety of meanings; and this is not incompatible with their being grammatically equated, because an equation between words is, indeed, intended to establish that one and the same thing is characterised by more than one attribute. In fact, grammarians[75] declare that a grammatical equation (between words) means that words having a variety of significations are used so as to import only one thing.

It has been further urged—by the *Pūrvapakshins*—to the following effect:—In the passage, "One only without a second"—[Chhānd. Up. VI. 2. 1.], the word *advitīya* (which means *without a second*) does not admit of (the *Brahman*) being associated with a second thing even in the form of a quality. Hence, according to the rule[76] which enforces faith in all the recensions of the *Vedas*, it has to

75. Vide Kaiyyaṭa's commentary on Patanjali's *Mahā-Bhāshya*, *Vṛiddhyāhnika* and also the portion relating to *Pāṇini* I. 2. 42. The definition of a grammatical equation as given by Kaiyyaṭa under *Pāṇini* I. 2. 42., runs as follows:—*Bhinnapravṛittinimittayuktasya anekasya śabdasya ekasmin arthe vṛittis sāmānādhikaraṇyam.*

76. Vide *supra* p. 40. & n. 32.

be admitted that the passages which relate to (the *Brahman* as) the cause of the world, are all intended to establish that Thing which is without a second. The definition of that *Brahman*, which is characterised as the cause of the world, and is without a second, is given here to this effect :—"The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.]. Hence that *Brahman*, which it is intended to define, is certainly devoid of attributes. Otherwise, there would be the contradiction of all such statements as (declare the *Brahman* to be) 'without attributes', 'without taint', [*Adh. Up.* 68.], and so on.

To hold so is not appropriate, because the word *advitîya* is intended to establish the possession of wonderful powers by the *Brahman*, who is the material cause of the universe, by pointing out that there is no other who is the ruler thereof and is different from Himself. Similarly, the following among other passages, viz. "It thought, may I become manifold and be born; It created the element *tejas*."-[*Chhând. Up.* VI. 2. 3.], also makes known the possession of such wonderful powers (by the *Brahman*). If it be asked, how by the unqualified statement (that the *Brahman* is) *advitîya* (or without a second) the negation merely of any other cause (than the *Brahman*) is made out, (it is said thus in reply):—The *Brahman*, who is desirous of creating, is the material cause of the world, as declared in the passage—"Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning"—[*Chhând. Up.* VI. 2. 1.]. And in accordance with the very nature of the production of effects, some other cause (than the material one) is also then naturally thought of in the mind, and that, consequently, the word *advitîya* negatives only that (other cause). Indeed, if it be taken that all things (other than the essential *Brahman*) are negatived (by the use of that word *advitîya*), eternity

and other qualities which are accepted by you, and which you desire to establish (in regard to the *Brahman*), would also be thus negatived. In the present instance, the rule [77] which enforces faith in all the recensions of the *Vedas* produces results contrary to what you desire; because, omniscience and other qualities mentioned in all the recensions of the *Vedas* in relation to what forms the cause of the world, have, (in accordance with that rule) to be brought together here. Hence, it is understood, even from the nature of the passages relating to (the *Brahman* as) the cause of the world, that it is the qualified thing alone which is declared in the passage—"The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.]. Moreover, there does not thus arise any contradiction of the passages which describe the *Brahman* as being free from attributes, because these passages such as, "(He is) without attributes......without taint"—[*Adh. Up.* 68.], "(He is) without parts, without actions, tranquilled"—[*Śvet. Up.* VI. 19.], and others, deal with qualities which appertain to *prakṛiti* (*i. e.* nature), and which (therefore) deserve to be rejected (in any description of the *Brahman*).

Those scriptural texts also, which maintain that the essential nature of the *Brahman* is pure unqualified intelligence, declare that that *Brahman* has, (at the same time), the essential nature of intelligence. By this much (it is not meant) that pure unqualified intelligence which is devoid of attributes is alone the reality; because he who is the knower can alone possess the essential nature of intelligence. Indeed, it has been already stated that it is proper for him alone who is of the essential nature of intelligence, to be the seat of intelligence; analogously to the case of

77. Vide *supra* p. 40. n. 32.

gems, of the sun, of lampflames, &c., (which, being themselves of the nature of the luminous element *tejas*, are also the seat of luminosity). Indeed, all the scriptural texts declare (in relation to the *Brahman*) that He is undoubtedly the knower.

The following and other scriptural passages declare that auspicious qualities, like the quality of being the knower, are natural to the *Brahman* who is Himself of the essential nature of intelligence, and also that (the *Brahman*), is (at the same time), destitute of all such qualities as deserve to be rejected:—"He who understands all and who knows all"—[*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 1. 9.]; "It thought"—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 3.]; "This same deity thought"—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI 3. 2.]; "He thought—may I create the worlds"—[*Ait. Up.* I. 1.]; "The Eternal among the eternals, the Intelligent among the intelligent, who, though One, fulfils the desires of the many"—[*Kaṭh. Up.* V. 13. & *Śvet. Up.* VI. 13.]; "The two unborn, the intelligent and the non-intelligent, (are) the Lord and the non-lord"—[*Śvet. Up.* I. 9.]; "May we know that highest adorable God who is the ruler of the worlds, who is the greatest Lord being the highest of Lords, who is the highest Deity among deities, and who is the highest Protector among protectors. He has neither the body nor the senses and organs, and there is seen neither His equal nor His superior. His supreme power is revealed, indeed, as varied, natural, and as consisting of knowledge, strength, and action."—[*Śvet. Up.* VI. 7 & 8.]; "This Self is devoid of sin, is free from old age, free from death, free from sorrow, free from hunger, free from thirst, and desires the truth and wills the truth."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 5. & VIII. 7. 1 & 3.]. In the portion beginning with 'devoid of sin' and ending with 'free from thirst,' this (last) passage negatives (in

relation to the *Brahman*) all evil qualities; and then it mentions the auspicious qualities of the *Brahman* by means of the expressions "desires the truth," and "wills the truth"; and in itself it (thus) discriminates between the meaning of the passages which deal with the *Brahman* as unqualified and that of passages which deal with the *Brahman* as qualified. Therefore there is no contradiction between the passages which speak of the *Brahman* as qualified and again as unqualified, and it can not hence be suspected in the least that either (of those two sets of passages) depends upon and relates to unreality.

This scriptural passage (from the *Taittirīya-Upanishad*, viz. II. 8 & 9. *Anuvākas*) [78] begins by describing the auspi-

78. The *Anuvākas* here referred to run as follows:—"'Through fear of Him the wind blows; through that fear the sun rises; through fear of Him fire and Indra (perform their duties), and Death runs as the fifth.' Now, what follows is an enquiry into (the nature of) bliss:—Let there be a young man, noble and well versed in the *Vedas*, very quick and active, firm and strong, and let the whole of this earth full of wealth belong to him, that is the unit of human bliss, and likewise of the sage who has a sure footing in the *Vedas*, (and has the knowledge of the *Brahman*), and is free from desires. One hundred times that human bliss is the unit of the bliss of 'human' Gandharvas, and likewise of the sage who has a sure footing in the *Vedas* and is free from desires. One hundred times that bliss of 'human' Gandharvas is the unit of the bliss of 'divine' Gandharvas and likewise of the sage who has a sure footing in the *Vedas* and is free from desires. One hundred times that bliss of 'divine' Gandharvas is the unit of the bliss of the Pitṛis who have acquired long-enduring worlds, and (it is) likewise (the unit) of the sage who has a sure footing in the *Vedas* and is free from desires. One hundred times that bliss of the Pitṛis who have acquired long-enduring worlds is the unit of the bliss of the Devas born in the world known as *Ājāna*, and (it is) likewise (the unit of the bliss) of the sage who has a sure footing in the *Vedas* and is free from desires. One hundred times that bliss of the Devas born in the world known as *Ājāna* is the unit of the bliss of the gods known as *Karma-devas* who have become gods (Devas) through (the performance of sacrificial) acts, and (it is) likewise (the unit) of the sage who has a sure

cious qualities of the *Brahman*, saying "Through fear of Him, the wind blows"; then it speaks of the unsurpassable bliss of the *kshetrajña* (or the soul), in a regular order of increasing succession, saying—"That which is a hundred times, &c."; and then it declares with very great regard the infinitude of the auspicious qualities of the *Brahman*, saying—"Whoever knows the bliss of that *Brahman*, without being able to attain whom speech returns with the mind, &c."

The passage which makes known the result of the worship of the *Brahman*, viz. *Sośnute sarvān kāmān saha Brahmaṇā vipaschitā*—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.], speaks also of the infinitude of the qualities possessed by the Highest *Brahman* who is intelligent. (The prose order of this sentence runs thus)—*Vipaschitā Brahmaṇā saha sarvān kāmān samaśnute*. The word *kāma* is derived from the root *kam* to

footing in the *Vedas* and is free from desires. One hundred times that bliss of the gods known as *Karma-devas* is the unit of the bliss of the (original) Devas (to whom alone sacrifices are offered) and (it is) likewise (the unit) of the sage who has a sure footing in the *Vedas* and is free from desires. One hundred times that bliss of the (original) Devas is the unit of the bliss of Indra, and likewise of the sage who has a sure footing in the *Vedas* and is free from desires. One hundred times that bliss of Indra is the unit of the bliss of Bṛihaspati and likewise of the sage who has a sure footing in the *Vedas* and is free from desires. One hundred times that bliss of Bṛihaspati is the unit of the bliss of Prajāpati and likewise of the sage who has a sure footing in the *Vedas* and is free from desires. One hundred times that bliss of Prajāpati is the unit of the bliss of the *Brahman*, and likewise of the sage who has a sure footing in the *Vedas* and is free from desires. He who is in the *purusha* and He who is also in the sun, (both) are one and the same Being. He who knows this, after departing from this world, reaches the Self which consists of 'food,' reaches the Self which consists of vitality, reaches the Self which consists of mind, reaches the Self which consists of understanding, and reaches (finally) the Self which consists of bliss. Accordingly, the following *śloka* is given:—'Whoever knows the bliss of the *Brahman*, without being able to attain whom, speech returns with the mind, he need not fear anything.'"

covet and means that which is covetable, *i. e.* auspicious qualities. The meaning (of the passage accordingly) is that he (the successful worshipper) attains along with the (intelligent) *Brahman* all those (auspicious) qualities. The word 'with'[79] (is used) to bring out prominently the (possession of) qualities (by the *Brahman*), as it is brought out in connection with the *Dahara-vidyā*[80] viz. "What exists within that (small space inside the heart), that has to be sought after." [*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 1.]. That, between worship and its result, there is a similarity of nature, is proved conclusively by the scriptural passage which says.—"Of whatever nature a man's worship is in this world, of that same nature that man becomes after death." [*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 1.].

If it be said that by means of the passage—"He who is of opinion (that the *Brahman*) is unknown,—to him (the *Brahman*) is known.........to those who know well, (He) is unknown"—[*Ken. Up.* II. 3.], the *Brahman* is declared to form no object of knowledge, it is replied that in such a case there ought not to be any teaching to the effect that final release results from knowledge, as (it is found declared) in the following passages:—"He who knows the *Brahman* attains the Highest"-[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.], "He who knows the *Brahman* becomes the *Brahman* indeed"—[*Muṇḍ. Up.* III. 2. 9.]. The scriptural passage—"Whoever knows the *Brahman* as non-existent, he becomes non-existent indeed.

79. Vide *Pāṇini.* II. 3. 19.

80. *Dahara-vidyā* is that *vidyā* or form of worshipping the Supreme *Brahman*, which consists in meditating on Him as dwelling in the small etherial space within the heart. In connection with this *vidyā* or form of worship, the *Brahman* who has to be meditated upon is declared in the context to be the 'Self who is devoid of sin, is free from old age, free from death, free from sorrow, free from hunger, free from thirst, and desires the truth and wills the truth.' Vide also *M. Nār.* X. 7. & XI. 7.

Whoever knows the *Brahman* as existent, him, therefore, they know as existing"—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 6. 1.]—speaks of the destruction of the self and the continuance of the self as resulting (respectively) from the non-existence and the existence of that knowledge the object of which is the *Brahman*. Therefore all the scriptural texts enjoin only that knowledge which relates to the *Brahman*, for the purpose of attaining final release. And the knowledge (so enjoined) is of the nature of worship, and it has been already stated that the object of such worship is the *Brahman* who is possessed of attributes. In the passage—"Without being able to attain Him, speech returns with the mind"—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 9. 1.]—it is declared that the *Brahman* is infinite, is possessed of innumerable attributes, and is incapable of being measured by speech and mind as possessing any definite magnitude; and then it is said of those, who suppose that they have any definite knowledge of the *Brahman* to the effect that the *Brahman* is of such and such magnitude, that they do not know the *Brahman* well and have no correct opinion (of the *Brahman*), because the *Brahman* is immeasurable. Otherwise, in the passage—"He who is of opinion that (the *Brahman*) is unknown—to him (the *Brahman*) is known........to those who know well, (He) is unknown."—[*Ken. Up.* II. 3.], the statement about (the *Brahman*) being rightly made out and (the *Brahman*) being well known would meet with contradiction in that very same context.

It has been stated[81]—by the *Pûrvapakshins*—that the scriptural passage—"(Thou shalt) not (see) the seer of the sight, nor (think) the thinker of the thought." [*Bṛih. Up.* III. 4. 2.], negatives the seer and the knower as distinct

81. Vide *supra* p. 28.

from sight and knowledge. This (objection) is invalidated by understanding that what the passage teaches is as follows:– "Understand that it is only fallacious reasoning which arrives at the conclusion that the knower has the essential nature of ignorance, on the ground that his quality of sentiency is of an accidental character; and then, do not look upon, and do not think of, the self as such (in reality), but look upon the self, who is the seer and the knower, as being also surely of the nature of sight and knowledge." Or the meaning of the passage is this:—"Set aside the individual self who is the seer of sight and the knower of knowledge and then worship the Highest Self alone who is the Soul within all beings." Otherwise, there will be the contradiction of the following and other scriptural passages (relating to the *Brahman*) as the knower:—"My dear one, by what means has one to know the knower?" [*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 14.].

What has been urged[82]–by the *Pūrvapakshins*–to the effect that from the passage—"The *Brahman* is bliss." [*Taitt. Up.* III. 6. 1.], the essential nature of the *Brahman* is (made out to be) pure bliss,—that is met by saying that this passage declares the essential nature of the *Brahman*, who is the seat of knowledge, to be knowledge (itself). Indeed, that conscious state which is agreeable is said to be bliss. The meaning of the scriptural passage—"The *Brahman* is intelligence, bliss"—[*Bṛih. Up.* III. 9. 28.], is that that state of consciousness which is of the nature of bliss is alone the *Brahman*. Hence, also, results that uniform homogeneity of nature (in relation to the *Brahman*) which is advocated by you. It has been already stated that, in regard to this *Brahman*, the true nature of which

82. Vide *supra* p. 28.

is intelligence itself, the quality of being the knower also is undoubtedly established by hundreds of scriptural texts. In the same manner, by means of these distinct statements also—"That is the unit of the bliss of the *Brahman*"—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 8. 13.], and "Whoever knows the bliss of the *Brahman*, &c.,"—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 9. 1.], (it is established that) the *Brahman* is not mere bliss, but is the blissful One. To be the Knower is, indeed, to be the blissful One.

Again, it has been affirmed[83] that the negation of distinctions (in regard to the *Brahman*) is asserted in various ways in the following passages:—"But where there is duality, as it were,"—[*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 14. & IV. 5. 15.]; "There is nothing here that is many and varied. He who sees this world, as though it were manifold, obtains death from death."—[*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 19. & *Kaṭh. Up.* IV. 10.]; "But where to one all this becomes the Self, there who shall see whom by what?"—[*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 14. & IV. 5. 15.]. This (objection) is invalidated when it is made out that the whole universe, which is the effect of the *Brahman* and has that (*Brahman*) for its internal ruler, is one with (the *Brahman* Himself) in as much as it has that (*Brahman*) for its Self, and that the manifoldness contrary to that (oneness) is what is negatived in those (passages); but that other manifoldness of the *Brahman* which is grounded upon His volition to be born as many, in accordance with the scriptural passage—"May I become manifold and be born"—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 6. 1. & *Chhând. Up.* VI. 2. 3.], and which (manifoldness) is (again) well established by the scripture,—that is not negatived. If it be said that, by reason of the negation of manifoldness, all this (scriptural authority)

83. Vide *supra* p. 28.

relates to things which are unreal; then it is replied that it is not so; because, after predicating in relation to the *Brahman* such manifoldness as cannot be made out by perception and all the other means of proof, and as is difficult of realisation, to say that that same thing (viz. manifoldness) is negatived (in relation to the *Brahman*)—this is indeed matter for laughter.

It has been stated[34] that in accordance with the passage —"For, whenever he perceives in Him even the smallest distinction, then there is fear for him"—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 7. 1.], fear comes to him who sees manifoldness in the *Brahman*. This is wrong; because the continued meditation of the manifoldness of that (*Brahman*) is taught to be the means of tranquillity in the following passage:—"Let a man meditate, having been tranquilled by the knowledge—'All this indeed is the *Brahman*; all this is born in It, is absorbed into It, and lives in It.'" [*Chhând. Up.* III. 14. 1.]. Accordingly, here (in this passage), tranquillity is taught to result from the continued meditation of the fact that it (viz. the world) has that (*Brahman*) for its Self, in as much as the work of creation, preservation, and destruction proceed from Him in regard to the whole world. Therefore, the continued meditation of the fact that the world which is full of differentiations owing to the varieties of gods, animals, men, immoveable objects, and other things that are (all) really existent (therein), has the *Brahman* for its Self, forms the cause of tranquillity; and is hence the cause of the attainment of fearlessness; and so there can be no room to suppose that it (viz. such meditation) forms the cause of any fear. If so, it may be asked, why it is declared—"Then there is fear for him." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 7. 1.]. To this

34. Vide *supra* p. 28.

it is replied thus:—When that support in the *Brahman* which, in the passage—"For, indeed, when he obtains fearless support in that which is invisible, incorporeal, indefinable, homeless, then he obtains fearlessness."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 7. 1.], is declared to be the cause of fearlessness, is interrupted, then there results fear. To the same effect it is declared by the great sages in the following and other passages:—"If Vāsudeva is not meditated upon (at least) for the short interval of a *muhūrta*[85] or even for a mere moment, that is loss, that is great weakness, that is illusion, and that is unnatural activity."[86] The (word) *antara* (which is in the first passage quoted above) means breach of continuity in the meditation that has its support in the *Brahman*, and is indeed its interruption.[87]

It has been urged[88] that, in the aphorism beginning with—"Not even on account of the peculiarity of situation"—[*Ved. Sût.* III. 2. 11.], he (the *Sūtrakāra*) men-

85. A *Muhūrta* is one-thirtieth part of a day *i.e.* a period of 48 minutes, a day being equal to 24 hours. It is however used to denote any short space of time.

86. This passage, in all probability, occurs in more than one *Vaishṇava Purāṇa*, and is to be found in the following form in the *Garuḍa-Purāṇa*:—*Sā hāniḥ tat mahat chhidram sā cha andhajaḍamūkatā | yat muhūrtam kshaṇam vā api Vāsudevaḥ na chintyate||* [CCXXXIV. 23.]. "If Vāsudeva is not meditated upon (at least) for the short interval of a *muhūrta* or even for a mere moment, that is loss, that is great weakness, and that is blindness, dullness and dumbness."

87. The passage from the *Taittirīya-Upanishad* [II. 7. 1.], which, according to the *Advaitins*, negatives manifoldness in relation to the *Brahman* is interpreted by them thus:—"For whenever he perceives in Him even the smallest distinction, then, indeed, there is fear for him." Here the word *antara* is understood to mean *distinction*. But Rāmānuja takes this same word to mean *breach of continuity* or *interruption*, and interprets the passage thus:—"For whenever he causes the smallest interruption in the meditation that is based on Him, then indeed there is fear for him."

88. Vide *supra* p. 28.

tions the *Brahman* to be devoid of all attributes. This is not so; because there he speaks of the *Brahman* as being undoubtedly possessed of attributes. And it has been said that in the aphorism beginning with—"But it is a mere illusion"—[*Ved. Sût.* III. 2. 3.], the objects experienced in dreams also are declared to be mere illusions, because they are different from the things which are experienced in the wakeful state. But therein, he (the *Sûtrakâra*) says that they also, like the objects experienced in the wakeful state, possess the characteristics of reality.

What has been asserted [89] to the effect that, in the *Smritis* and the *Purāṇas* also, pure intelligence alone, which is devoid of attributes, is taught to be real while all else is unreal,—that (again) is incorrect.

"Whoever knows Me as the unborn, as the beginningless, as the great Lord of the world"—[*B. G.* X. 3.]. "All beings abide in Me and I do not abide in them. And the beings do not also abide in Me. See my sovereign glory and power. The protector of all beings, I do not abide in beings. My will is the producing cause of all beings." [*B. G.* IX. 4 & 5.]. "I am the source as well as the destruction of the whole world. O Dhanañjaya; there is nothing else higher than Me. All this (creation) is strung on Me like a number of gems on a thread." [*B. G.* VII. 6 & 7.]. "I stand supporting the whole world by a small part (of my power)." [*B. G.* X. 42.]. "The Highest Person is another; and He is called the Highest Self who, having entered the three worlds as the Imperishable Lord, supports (them). Because I transcend the destructible and am also superior to the indestructible, therefore am I celebrated in the world

89. Vide *supra* pp. 29 & 30.

and in the *Vedas* as the Highest Person." [*B. G.* XV. 17. & 18.]. "O sage! He (viz. the Lord) transcends the *prakriti*[90] (which forms the natural and material foundation) of all beings, (transcends) all its modifications,[91] all the blemishes (arising out) of its qualities.[92] He, who is the Self of all, has passed beyond all veils,[93] and by Him is pervaded all that is within the inside of the universe. He is of that nature which is characterised by all the auspicious qualities; He has, by a small part of His own powers, held up the whole creation; He assumes at His will any desirable and worthy form, and He has accomplished the good of the whole world. He is the one collection of splendour, strength, sovereignty, great powers of knowledge, excellent heroism, and other such qualities. He is high among the highest, and in Him, who is the Lord of the higher and the lower, are never found the afflictions and all other such undesirable things. He is the Lord in the individual form and also in the form of the totality; He has an unmanifest nature and also a manifest nature. He is the Lord of all, the Seer of all, the Knower of all. He possesses all powers, and is known as the highest Lord. That, by means of which that *Brahman* who is devoid of all evil, pure, high, devoid of all blemishes and is of one form, is either seen or attained—that

90. This is the *Avyakta* which is that state of primordial nature that immediately precedes the evolution of the various constituent elements of the universe.

91 These 'modifications' are the constituent principles of the universe such as the *Mahat* or the 'great principle', the *Ahaṅkāra* or the principle of egoity, the organs of perception, the organs of activity, the mind, the gross elements and the subtle elements.

92. These are: (1) *Sattva*, the quality of goodness; (2) *Rajas*, the quality of passion; (3) *Tamas*, the quality of darkness.

93. These 'veils' are: (1) *Karma* or ignorance, (2) *Vāsanā* or 'innate impressions.' &c.

is called knowledge and all else (is called) ignorance." [*V. P.* VI. 5. 82 to 87.]. "O Maitreya! The word *Bhagavat* (Divine Lord,) is used to denote the Highest *Brahman* who is pure and is well known as the possessor of great sovereignty, and is the cause of all causes. The syllable *bha* is associated with two meanings, viz. that He makes all materials ready (for creation), and that He is the upholder. Similarly, the meaning of the syllable *ga*, O sage, is, that He is the leader (*i. e.* the preserver), the destroyer, and the creator. *Bhaga* (which is made up of these two syllables) is an affirmation (in relation to Him) of the (following) six (qualities) in their entirety, namely, sovereignty, heroism, renown, glory, knowledge and dispassion. The meaning of the syllable *va* is to the effect that all beings abide in Him, who is the Self of all beings and is also the Self of all, and that He (abides) in all beings and is therefore imperishable. Knowledge, power, strength, sovereignty, heroism, splendour—all these are fully expressed by the word *Bhagavat*; only evil (undesirable) qualities and other such things are not. Such, O Maitreya, is this important word *Bhagavat*. (It is applied) to Vāsudeva who is the Highest *Brahman*, and is not applicable to others. Here, this word, denotes, by convention, a thing deserving of worship, and is not used in its secondary sense; elsewhere, indeed, it is used in its secondary sense." [*V. P.* VI. 5. 72 to 77.]. "Wherever, O king, all these powers[94] are established, there is another great Form of the Lord, which is different from His Universal Form. He, out of His own playfulness, causes that (Form

94. These are the three *śaktis* or powers, viz. the *Vishṇu-śakti* which is the power of Vishṇu and is the highest, the *Kshetrajña-śakti* or the power of the individual self, and the third power is that which is denoted by the word *avidyā* or *karma*. Vide *V. P.* VI. 7. 61 to 70.

of His) which is endowed with all powers, to become actively manifest under the names of gods, animals, and men. That (activity) is (intended) for the good of the worlds and is not produced by means of *karma* (*i. e.* the effect of works operating upon Him). The activity of that unknowable (*Brahman*) is all-pervading and is of an irresistible nature." [*V. P.* VI. 7. 70 to 72.]. "The highest abode called Vishṇu is, in this manner, stainless, eternal, all-pervading, undecaying and free from all evil." [*V. P.* I. 22. 53.]. "The Supreme Self is high among those that are high and is the highest; and is firmly established in the self (of all beings) and is devoid of the defining attributes of form, colour, &c. He is free from waste, destruction, modification, growth, and birth and is capable of being spoken of absolutely as that which always is. Because He abides everywhere and all things abide in Him, therefore He is called Vâsudeva by the learned. That *Brahman* is the highest, is eternal, unborn, indestructible, imperishable and is always of one nature, and is pure through the absence of evil. That alone is all this and is possessed of a manifest and an unmanifest nature. Moreover, It exists in the form of *Purusha* (or Person) as well as in the form of Time." [*V. P.* I. 2. 10 to 14.]. "The *prakṛiti* (*i. e.* nature) which has been spoken of by me as possessing a manifest and an unmanifest nature, and the *purusha* (*i. e.* the self), are, both of them, absorbed into the Highest Self. And the Highest Self is the support of all, and is the Highest Lord. He is celebrated under the name of Vishṇu in the *Vedas* and in the *Vedânta*." [*V. P.* VI. 4. 39 & 40.]. "That *Brahman* has two forms, viz. the embodied and the unembodied. These two possess (respectively) a destructible and an indestructible nature, and are found to exist in all beings. The indestructible is that Highest *Brahman*, the destructible is the

whole of this world. The whole of this world is the manifestation of the power of the Supreme *Brahman*, in that same way in which spreading light is (the manifestation) of the fire located in a particular spot." [*V. P.* I. 22. 55 to 57.]. "The power of Vishṇu is called the higher, that known as the *kshetrajñā*[95] (*i. e.* the individual self), is, similarly, the lower (power). Another named *avidyā* (ignorance) and *karma* is said to be the third power, by which, O king, the all-pervading power known as the *kshetrajñā* is completely enveloped. The power known as the *kshetrajñā* acquires, on account of its being covered by that (*avidyā* or *karma*), all the ever-recurring miseries belonging to the circuit of mundane existence, and exists in all beings in different degrees, O thou, protector of the earth." [*V. P.* VI. 7. 61 to 63.]. "O thou, the most intelligent one, the mutually interrelated *prakṛiti* and *purusha* (*i. e.* nature and soul) are encompassed by the power of Vishṇu which pervades all beings as their Self. That same power (of Vishṇu) is the cause of their separation and interrelation.........Just as, from a mass of water, the wind bears away hundreds of minute drops without itself being moistened (by them), so also is that same power of Vishṇu (related) to all that is of the nature of *prakṛiti* and *purusha*." [*V. P.* II. 7. 29 to 31.]. "O thou, the best of sages, all this world above-mentioned is undecaying, eternal and is subject to the alternations of expansion and contraction, birth and destruction." [*V. P.* I. 22. 60.].

By means of these and other such passages, the Highest *Brahman* is (first of all) declared to be, by nature, free from

95. The individual self goes under the name of *kshetrajña*, because, in that condition, it is the knower of the *kshetra* *i. e.* of the material body, with which it is associated.

even the smallest taint of all that is evil, and to possess that nature which is characterised by all the auspicious qualities, and to be engaged, out of free sportiveness, in the creation, preservation, destruction, inter-penetration, control, &c., of the world; and then all the intelligent and non-intelligent existences (in the universe), which exist in all conditions and are undoubtedly real, are stated to be of the same form as the *Brahman* owing to their constituting His body, because the words *śarîra* (embodiment), *rûpa* (form), *tanu* (body), *amśa* (part), *śakti* (power), *vibhûti* (glory), and the like, are used (in the above passages), and because also they are equated with 'That' (viz. the *Brahman*); and then the intelligent thing (viz. the self), which forms the glory of that (*Brahman*), is said to exist (freely) in its own essential nature, and also (to exist) in the form of the *kshetrajña* owing to its association with non-intelligent matter; and, (lastly), it is laid down that in the condition of the *kshetrajña* it (viz. the self) is veiled by the *avidyâ* (or ignorance) which is of the nature of meritorious and sinful actions, and that it has, in consequence, no unbroken remembrance of its own natural condition as intelligence, but continuously thinks (of itself) as existing in the form of things which possess a non-intelligent nature. Therefore, it is made out that the *Brahman* is possessed of attributes, and that the world which is the manifestation of His glory is undoubtedly real also.

In the passage—"That in which differences have vanished"—[*V.P.* VI. 7. 53.],[96] it is declared that the true

96. Vide *supra* p. 29, where the translation of this passage, in accordance with the interpretation of the *Adwaitins*, is given in full as follows:—"That in which differences have vanished, which is pure existence, which is beyond the sphere of speech, which is self-knowing—That is the Intelligence, called *Brahman* by name."

nature of the self, even when it is united with particular modifications of the *prakṛiti*, such as gods, men, &c., is inexpressible by words like god, &c., which denote distinctions in relation to it, because it is devoid of intrinsic distinctions; and that it is to be defined as wholly consisting of intelligence and existence; and that it is self-knowing, and is invisible (even) to the mind of one who has gone through the practice of *yoga* (*i. e.* mental concentration and meditation). Therefore, from this (passage) the negation of the world does not follow. If it be asked, how this is arrived at, we reply that it is thus:—In the context[97] (wherein this passage occurs), *yoga* is stated to be the only remedy to bring about the cessation of the circuit of mundane existence; then the constituent parts of the *yoga* are mentioned up to *pratyāhāra*;[98] and then with the intention of pointing out a good and worthy object for the purpose of accomplishing *dhāraṇā*[99] (or concentration), the two forms of the Highest *Brahman i. e.* Vishṇu, which are denoted by the word power—*śakti*—are declared to consist of the divisions of the embodied and the unembodied. Then again the division called the embodied, that is the *kshetrajña*, which is associated with non-intelligent matter and is encircled by that ignorance (or *avidyā*) which is known as *karma* and forms the third power (of Vishṇu), is affirmed to be bad and unworthy (for purposes of meditation) on account of its being connected with the three[100] (undesirable) conceptions: afterwards, the character of being a good and

97. Vide *V. P.* VI. 7.

98. *Pratyāhāra* means the withdrawal of the senses from external objects.

99. *Dhāraṇā* means steady concentration of the mind on a particular object.

100. These conceptions are:—(1) the conception that we become the *Brahman* Himself; (2) the conception that we merely do the work; (3) the conception that we become the *Brahman* and do the work.

worthy object (to help concentration) is denied (also) in relation to the second division called the unembodied, which is devoid of ignorance, is separate from non-intelligent matter, and is altogether of the form of intelligence, on account of its being an object worthy to be meditated upon only by accomplished *yogins*, and on account of its being incapable of proving a support to the mind of a beginner in *yoga*, and also on account of its being devoid of uncaused intrinsic purity: (lastly), the embodied (universal) form (of the *Brahman*) which is the seat of His three powers, viz. the higher power which is this (above mentioned) unembodied (form of the self), the (other) lower power which is the (self's) embodied form called the *kshetrajña*, and ignorance (or *avidyā*) which is of the nature of *karma* and is known as the third power and which forms the cause of leading the self, which is of the nature of the higher power, to assume the condition of the *kshetrajña*—(this embodied form of the *Brahman*) which is peculiar to the Divine Lord, and is ascertained by means of *Vedānta* passages like—"He is of sunlike lustre." [*Śvet. Up.* III. 8. & *B. G.* VIII. 9.]—[101] (this) is declared to be the good and worthy object (for the accomplishment of *dhāraṇā*). In this context, the passage —"That in which differences have vanished &c." [*V. P.* VI. 7. 53.], is intended to show that the self which has the pure unembodied nature is unfit to be a good and worthy object (for the accomplishment of *dhāraṇā*). Accordingly, it has been stated (in the same work, viz. *Vishṇu-Purāṇa*):— "O king! That (unembodied form of the Lord) is not fit to be meditated upon by one who begins the practice of *yoga*." [*V. P.* VI. 7. 55]. "The highest home which is the second (unembodied form) of Him who is called Vishṇu

101. Vide also *Taitt. Ār.* III. 12. 7.

is fit to be meditated upon by *yogins*............Wherever, O king, all these powers are established, there is another great Form of the Lord, which is different from His Universal Form". [*V. P.* VI. 7. 69 & 70.]. In the same manner, after stating that the (four-faced) Brahmā, Sanandana, and others who are beings inside the universe, are unfit to be good and worthy objects, (to help concentration) owing to their being covered by means of ignorance (or *avidyā*), the character of being (such a) good and worthy object is denied by the venerable Śaunaka in relation also to those bound souls in whom knowledge is originated only later on by means of *yoga*, and who have (thus) realised their true nature, for the reason that they are themselves devoid of uncaused intrinsic purity. It is stated (by Śaunka) in the following and other passages that the natural and peculiar form of Vishṇu, who is the Highest *Brahman*, can alone be (such a) good and worthy object (for the accomplishment of *dhāraṇā*) :—"Because all living things from Brahmā to a clump of grass, that are within the world, are within the grasp of the ever changing circuit of mundane existence caused by *karma*, therefore, they are not helpful in meditation to those that meditate. Indeed, they are all in ignorance (or *avidyā*) and are subject to the ever-recurring succession of births and deaths. Those also in whom knowledge of truth is born later on are not at all helpful in meditation. Their knowledge of truth is not natural to them, because it is derived from another source. Therefore that pure *Brahman* is, alone, by nature, full of (such) knowledge." [*V. Dh.*[102] CIV. 23 to 26]. Consequently in this passage (viz. *V. P.* VI. 7. 53. "That

102. This *Vishṇu-Dharma* forms a portion of the *Bhavishyat-Purāṇa* and is said to have been taught by Śaunaka.

in which differences have vanished", &c.,) the negation of distinctions is not brought out.

Also in the passage—"(I bow to Him alone) who in reality is of the nature of intelligence," &c., [*V. P.* I. 2. 6.],[103] unreality is not established in relation to the whole aggregate of those objects which are distinct from intelligence, because therein only this much is stated, viz. that the false apprehension of the self, which is of the nature of intelligence, in the form of gods, men, and such other objects, is a mere illusion. Indeed, if it be said that the false apprehension of the mother-of-pearl as silver is an illusion, it does not follow that all the collection of silver in the world becomes thereby unreal. There is the appearance of unity between the *Brahman* and the world due to the fact of their being grammatically equated (in the *śâstras*); and it may be urged that it is an illusion to apprehend, in consequence, the *Brahman* whose essential nature is Intelligence, in the form of things (other than Intelligence); and if it be held that when it is so urged, the whole collection of things in the world would acquire the character of falsity, (it is declared in reply that) that (opinion) is wrong; because, that Vishṇu who is the Highest *Brahman*, who is devoid of even the smallest taint of all such evil things as ignorance and the like, who is identified with all the auspicious qualities, and is the owner of great sovereignty, is taught in this *śâstra*, and it is thus impossible to have any illusory vision in relation to Him. Moreover, it will be presently established, that the declaration of unity (between the

103. This passage has been already translated from the stand-point of the *Adwaitins* and is to the following effect:—"(I bow) to Him alone who in reality is of the nature of Intelligence and is absolutely pure (*i. e.* devoid of all attributes), and who, nevertheless, exists in consequence of (our) illusive vision in the form of material objects." Vide *supra* p. 29.

Brahman and the world) resulting from the fact of their being equated, does not admit of stultification and is not opposed to reason. Therefore this passage also [viz. *V. P.* I. 2. 6.] does not stultify the natural reality of external objects.

Accordingly, from this scriptural passage, viz. "From whom all these beings are born, in whom, when born, they live, and whom they enter when they perish; do thou desire to know that well; that is the *Brahman*."—[*Taitt. Up.* III. 1. 1.], it may be concluded that the cause of the origin, &c., of the world is the *Brahman*, ; but then we learn from the *śāstraic* commandment,—"The *Veda* should be amplified and supported by the *Itihāsas* and the *Purāṇas*,[104] because the *Veda* is afraid of him who has little learning that he would do it wrong."—[*M.Bh.* I. 1. 264.], that amplification and confirmation are necessarily to be effected with the help of the *Itihāsas* and the *Purāṇas* in relation to what is taught (here in the above scriptural passage). To amplify and support is indeed to elucidate the meanings of the *Vedic* passages which are known to oneself by means of the sayings of those who know all the *Vedas* and their meanings, and who have, by the great power of their *yoga*, directly perceived the things constituting the truth of the *Vedas*. Amplification and confirmation, indeed, have necessarily to be effected (in connection with the import of *Vedic* passages), because it is difficult to understand the meanings of all the passages

104. An *Itihāsa* like the *Rāmāyaṇa* or the *Mahābhārata* is a work purporting to deal with ancient history. *Purāṇas* are works which treat of the five topics, viz. primordial creation or evolution of matter, primordial creation of form-possessing conscious and unconscious bodies, genealogy of the gods &c., periods of time known as the *Manwantaras*, and the history of the dynasties of kings.

found in all the recensions of the *Vedas* by knowing only a small part thereof, and it is in consequence impossible to attain certainty without that (amplification and confirmation). Here (*i. e.* in the context wherein the passage—"(I bow to Him alone) who in reality is of the nature of Intelligence"—occurs), Maitreya desires to get his own knowledge of the teachings of the *Vedas* amplified and supported at the hands of the reverend Parāśara, who was in possession of that knowledge of the reality of the Highest Divinity which he had obtained from Pulastya and Vasishṭha as a boon bestowed upon him, and questioned (Parāśara) thus:—"Again I wish to hear from you, O thou, the knower of religion and duty, how this world came into existence, and what will become of it again. O thou, glorious one, what does the world consist of? O thou, reverend one, whence (came) all this moveable and immoveable creation; how and where was it hidden, and into what will it be absorbed?" [*V.* P. I. 1. 4 & 5.]. By means of these and other passages, the particular nature of the *Brahman*, the characteristics of the different kinds of His glory, the nature of worshipping Him, the particular results (of such worship) are all here questioned about. In the question regarding the particular nature of the *Brahman*, the efficient and material causes (of the world) are enquired about in the query—"Whence (came) all this moveable and immoveable (creation)?"; (therefore), in the query—"What does it consist of"—it is asked of what nature that world is which is the object of creation, preservation, and destruction; and the reply to this is—"And the world is that (*Brahman*)." [*V.* P. I. 1. 31.]. This sameness (of the world with the *Brahman*) is due to the invariable association (of the world with the *Brahman*) on account of His constituting the Self (there-

of) as its internal ruler; but is not due to the oneness in substance between the subject and the predicate (in the proposition "And the world is that *Brahman*)"; because the equation (between the world and the *Brahman*) in the passage—"And the world is that (Brahman)"—forms the reply to the question "What does it (*i. e.* the world) consist of?" The affix *mayaṭ* in *yanmayam* (*i. e.* what does it consist of)[105] does not denote modification; otherwise, this separate question would (relate to what has already been asked and thus) be purposeless. Nor is it used in the sense of importing that very thing itself which is denoted by the word to which it is affixed, as in the case of the word *prāṇa-maya*,[106] because the reply—"And the world is that (*Brahman*)"—would be inappropriate (in such a case). Indeed, in such a case, the reply should have been "(And the world is) Vishṇu Himself."[107] Hence that (affix *mayaṭ*) imports only the abundance (of that thing which is denoted by the word to which it is attached). (Here) the affix *mayaṭ* is (used) in accordance with the rule which says—"The affix *mayaṭ* is (to be employed) wherever an abundance of a thing has to be expressed."

105. That part of the *śloka* which contains the affix *mayaṭ* is as follows:—*Yanmayam hi jagat brahman yataḥ cha etat charācharam.*

106. Here *i. e.* in the word *prāṇa-maya*, the affix *mayaṭ* gives to that word the power of importing that very thing which is denoted by the word *prāṇa* itself; cf. *Prāṇamayam ātmānam upasaṅkramya. Taitt. Up.* III. 10. 5.

107. The equation between the *Brahman* and the world, contained in the answer—"And the world is that *Brahman*"—posits two different entities, and it would become an identity if the affix *mayaṭ* were to have no significance. When it is possible to make the affix *mayaṭ* significant, that interpretation in which it loses all significance, as it would do if the above supposition were right, is not held to be correct according to the accepted rules of interpretation in *Vedāntic* literature.

[*Pāṇini.* V. 4. 21.]. Certainly, the whole world being the body of that (*Brahman*) is abundantly full of Him. Therefore it is settled that the equation in the statement—"And the world is that (*Brahman*)"—made in reply to the question —"What does it consist of?"—results from there being, between the world and the *Brahman*, the same relation as there is between the body and the soul. Otherwise, all these questions and answers would not be appropriate in the *śāstra* which is admitted to be devoted to the establishment of that thing which is devoid of all attributes; and the *śāstra* which is intended to be an explanation of that thing would also be thus inappropriate. Indeed, in such a case, to the one question of the form "What is the basis of the illusion of the world?"—there would be only one answer in this form, viz. "Pure intelligence that is devoid of all attributes." If the equation (contained in the statement—"And the world is that *Brahman*") denote the unity of substance between the world and the *Brahman*, then the fact of His being the sole seat of myriads of auspicious qualities such as the quality of willing the truth, &c., as well as the fact of His being the opposite of all that is evil, would be stultified, and the *Brahman* would also become the seat of all evil. It will be established later on that the fact of (the *Brahman* and the world) being equated denotes primarily the same relation (between them) as there is between the soul and the body. Hence, by means of the passages commencing with "(The Supreme Self) is high among those that are high and is the Highest", &c., [*V. P.* I. 2. 10.], (Parāśara) proceeds to explain *in extenso* the idea briefly conveyed in the stanza—"The world came into existence from the will of Vishṇu, and it is altogether existent therein. He is the cause of the preservation and destruction of this world, and the world is Himself." [*V. P.* I. 1. 31.];

and with that object in view, he first bows to the Divine Lord Vishṇu, who is in His own natural form and is the Highest *Brahman*, by repeating the stanza commencing with—"(I bow) to the Immutable........." [*V. P.* I. 2. 1.];[108] and then again he bows to the same (Vishṇu) who is existent in the form of the trinity made up of Brahmā (the creator), of His own incarnation (as Vishṇu), and of Śiva, and (is also existent in the form of) *prakṛiti* (or nature), Time, *kshetrajña* (or the individual self), the aggregate creation and the individual created beings. In that context, this stanza, which begins with—"(I bow to) Him (alone) who is in reality of the nature of intelligence," speaks of the nature of that Highest Self which is in the form of the individual entities known as *kshetrajñas*. Therefore, here (*i. e.* in this stanza), the thing which is destitute of attributes is not taught.

If the *śāstras* relate to the establishment of that illusion which is based upon the *Brahman*, whose nature is (pure and simple) intelligence devoid of attributes, then the objection—"How is it possible for the *Brahman* who is without qualities, who is unknowable, pure and devoid of evil by nature, to be the agent in the acts of creation, &c.,[109] (of the world)?"—[*V. P.* I. 3. 1.]—would be inappropriate here; and similarly its invalidation as given in the following passage, would also be (inappropriate)—"O thou, the best of ascetics, there are, in all things, powers which cannot be brought within the sphere of thinkable (or explicable) knowledge, and for that very same

108. The whole of this stanza is as follows :—"(I bow) to the Immutable Vishṇu who is eternally pure and forms the Highest Self, who has a uniformly homogeneous nature and is the 'conqueror' or, in other words, the possessor of all."

109. The *et cetera* here implies preservation and destruction in relation to the world.

reason, those acts of creation, &c., constitute the inherent (inexplicable) powers of the *Brahman*, as heat (constitutes the inherent power) of fire." [*V. P.* I. 3. 2 & 3]. Indeed, if that be the case (*i. e.* if the *śāstra* relate to the establishment of illusion as aforesaid), then the (above mentioned) objection (in regard to the *śāstra* declaring the thing that is devoid of attributes), and its refutation would (severally) run thus:—(i). How is it that the *Brahman* which is devoid of qualities becomes the agent in the acts of creation, &c ? (ii). The creation proceeding from the *Brahman* is not real, but is manufactured by illusion. But the objection really is to this effect—"The work of creation, &c., is seen in association with those who possess the qualities of *sattva*,[110] &c., who are imperfect, and are bound by *karma*; and so, how is it possible for Him who is devoid of the qualities of *sattva*, &c., who is perfect, who is not bound by *karma*, and who cannot have any association with *karma*,—(how is it possible for such a Person)—to be the agent in the acts of creation, &c? And the answer to this objection also is really to this effect—"The union of all powers in the *Brahman*, who is distinct from all perceivable things and is altogether of the aforesaid nature, is not incompatible with reason, in the same way in which the association of the power of heat, &c., with fire, &c., which are distinct from water, &c., (is not incompatible with reason).

The statement[111]—"Thou alone art the only reality, &c.," [*V. P.* I. 4. 38.], does not also speak of the unreality

110. These are: *Sattva*, goodness, *Rajas*, passion, and *Tamas*, darkness.

111. This is half of the stanza, *V. P.* I. 4. 38. And, its meaning according to the *Adwaitins* (vide p. 29. *supra*), has been already given as follows:—"O Lord of the universe! Thou alone art the only reality and there is none other."

of the whole (world), but (speaks only of) the unreality of that thing the existence of which is (held to be) independent of That (viz. the *Brahman*), the reason being that the whole (world) has that (same *Brahman*) for its Soul. He (*i.e.* Parāśara) declares again the same thing thus—"That greatness by which all this moveable and immoveable (creation) is pervaded is Thine." [*V. P.* I. 4. 38.].[112] Because all this moveable and immoveable (creation) is pervaded by Thee, therefore, all this has Thee for its Soul; and so there is nothing other than Thee. Hence, as being the Self of all, Thou alone art the only reality. Hence (also) it has been stated that what constitutes Thy greatness is Thy omnipenetrativeness. Otherwise it should have been stated that it (viz. Thy omnipenetrativeness) is an illusion; and the expressions[113] 'O, Lord of the Universe', 'Thou,' &c., would then have a figurative (or secondary) significance; and there would be the contradiction of the context wherein the Divine Lord's great boar incarnation is glorified as He is sportively lifting up the earth (from beneath the waters).

The whole world is, as if by its Soul, pervaded by Thee who art of the nature of intelligence, and constitutes Thy body; therefore those, who do not possess the means of perceiving (the world) as having Thee for its Soul, make out through illusory perception that this (world) is altogether made up of gods, men, and other such things; accordingly, he (*i. e.* Parāśara) says in this connection—"This which appears,

112. This is the second half of the stanza *V. P.* I. 4. 38.

113. These expressions are contained in *V. P.* I. 4. 38., which runs thus in the Sanskrit original:—*Paramārthaḥ tvam eva ekaḥ na anyaḥ asti jagataḥ pate | tava eshaḥ mahimā yena vyāptam etat charācharam.*||

&c. [*V. P.* I. 4. 39.].[114]

To perceive the world, which, in reality, has Thee for its Soul, as made up of gods, men, and other such things is, no doubt, an illusion in itself; but the perception which apprehends the individual souls, that have the nature of intelligence, as though they were made up of gods, men, and other such material configurations, is also an illusion; accordingly, he (*i. e.* Parâśara) says in this connection—"All this (world) is of the nature of intelligence, &c." [*V. P.* I. 4. 40.] [115]

Those who, on the other hand, are intelligent and understand the self, the nature of which is intelligence, and whose minds are well purified by the acquisition of what gives rise to the experience that the whole (universe) has the Divine Lord for its Soul,—they perceive that all this world has the characteristics of the body, being (itself) made up of such particular modifications of *prakṛiti* (or nature) as gods, men, &c., and then look upon it as constituting Thy body, and as having Thee, who art different from the body and hast the essential nature of intelligence, for its Soul: accordingly, he (*i.e.* Parâśara) says in this connection—"Those who know what is knowledge, &c."—[*V. P.* I. 4. 41.].[116]

114. This stanza is understood by the *Adwaitins* as follows:—"This which appears embodied belongs to Thee who art of the nature of Intelligence; and those who are not *Yogins* (*i. e.* those who are ignorant) look upon it, on account of (their) illusive perception, as though it formed the world." Vide *supra* p. 29.

115. This stanza is interpreted by the *Adwaitins* thus:—"All this world is of the nature of Intelligence. Ignorant men look upon it as though it were made up of material things, and are tossed to and fro in a flood of illusions." Vide *supra* p. 29.

116. This stanza as interpreted by the *Adwaitins* has been already given as follows:—"Highest Lord! Those who know what is knowledge, and whose minds are pure, look upon the whole world as being made up of Intelligence and as consisting of Yourself." Vide *supra* p. 29.

Otherwise, among the stanzas, there would be a redundant repetition; the words (therein) would acquire a figurative (or secondary) significance; there would be the contradiction of things (as made out by perception and the other means of knowledge), the contradiction of the context, and also the contradiction of the purport of this *śāstraic* work.[117]

In this stanza also, namely,—"Although he is to be found in one's own body and in that of all others, (intelligence) which is one and simple, &c.,"—[*V. P.* II. 14. 31.],[118] what is meant is, that, while all the individual selves are similar in nature for the reason that they solely consist of intelligence, the perception of duality (or difference) in relation to individual selves, as though they (also), owing to their association with certain material masses, which are particular modifications of the *prakṛiti* and are known as gods, men, &c., had the nature of gods, &c.,—(that perception of difference) is unreal. The duality (or difference) found to exist in relation to masses of matter, and (the duality or difference) found to exist in relation to individual souls are not in fact denied (here). The meaning is, that the thing called the self, which exists in (association with) the varied and wonderful masses of matter known as gods, men, &c., is all alike; and to that same effect it has been declared by the Lord (Himself) in the following and other similar passages:—"The learned look alike

117. The *śāstraic* work here mentioned is the *Vishṇu-Purāṇa* of Parāśara from which the above stanzas [I. 4. 38 to 41.] as well as others, are all quoted, as the references given above show.

118. Vide *supra* p. 29. where the *Adwaitins* are made to quote this stanza as follows:—"Although He is to be found in one's own body and in that of all others, Intelligence which is one and simple indeed consitutes His reality. Dualists see things wrongly."

upon a dog and upon an outcast (or a *Chaṇḍāla*)."—[*B. G.* V. 18.];[119] "Indeed, the *brahman* (*i. e.* the individual soul here) is (by nature) devoid of all evil and is alike in all beings."—[*B. G.* V. 19.]. Accordingly, in the passage,—"Although he is to be found in one's own body and in that of all others, &c.,"—[*V. P.* II. 14. 31.], the distinction between one's self and that of another is also distinctly mentioned as existing in relation to the thing which is other than the body (viz. the individual soul).

In this passage also which begins with—"If there were any other like me or any other unlike me"—[*V. P.* II. 13. 90.],[120] the essential identity of individual souls is not taught, because it is not admissible to use the word *para* (which means *another like me*) and the word *anya* (which means *another unlike me*) in one and the same sense, as though the statement meant—"If there were any one other than me other than me." There (*i. e.* in that passage), the word *para* (which means another) denotes the self which is distinct from one's own self; and in as much as that (self) also is altogether of the nature of intelligence, the word *anya* (or different) means the negation of any other nature (to the self than that of intelligence). What is said is this:—"If some individual self other than my own self be of a different nature from intelligence which is my nature, then, it is

119. The whole of this stanza is as follows:—"The learned look alike upon a person who has an abundance of knowledge and humility, upon a Brāhmaṇa, a cow, an elephant, a dog, and an outcast."

120. This *śloka* runs thus in the Sanskrit original:—*Yadi anyaḥ asti paraḥ kaḥ api mattaḥ pārthivasattama | tadā eshaḥ ayam ayam cha anyaḥ vaktum evam api ishyate.*|| Vide *supra* p. 29. where the *Adwaitins* interpret it as follows:—"O thou, the best of kings, if there were any other like me, or any other unlike (or different from) me, then alone would it be proper to say that such an one is me and such an one is not me."

possible to mention—'I am of this nature, he is of a different nature.' But it is not seen to be so, because all (the individual selves) are wholly of the nature of intelligence, and are therefore undoubtedly alike in nature."

In this passage also which begins with—"It is in consequence of the difference due to the holes in a flute", [*V. P.* II. 14. 32],[121] what is declared is that the difference of character in relation to the individual selves is not due to their essential nature, but is due to their having entered the (various) masses of matter known as gods, &c.; and it is not (declared herein) that all the selves are one (in essence). In the illustrative example also, there is no substantial sameness between the particles of air which are associated with the several holes (of the flute), but there is only similarity of nature (between them). Indeed, those (particles of air) are all of one character, because they possess the same aërial nature; and they have a variety of names such as *shaḍja*, &c.,[122] because they pass out through a variety of holes. In the case of the individual selves, also, the variety of names, such as gods, &c., results in a similar way. The things which form portions of the elemental substances fire, water, and earth are one in nature with those substances, on account of their being themselves made up of those particular substances; (but really) there can be no essential identity between them (*i. e.* between the part and the whole). Thus it has necessarily to be accepted that the various particles of air are also distinct from each other in essence, (though similar in nature).

121. This stanza is found on pp. 29 & 30. to the following effect:—"It is, in consequence of the difference due to the holes in a flute, that the distinctions named *Shaḍja* &c., (corresponding to the pitch of the sound) result to the air, which pervades all without distinction; just so is it the case with the Highest Self."

122. Vide *supra* p. 29. n. 25.

In the stanza[123] which begins with—"He is myself and he is yourself" [*V. P.* II. 16. 23 & 24.], he (*i. e.* Parāśara) recalls to mind, by means of the word 'he', the aforesaid character of intelligence belonging to all the individual selves; then concludes, from *myself*, *yourself*, &c., being (here) grammatically equated, that intelligence alone constitutes the character of the things denoted by *myself*, *yourself*, &c.; and he at last says—"Give up that illusion of distinction between individual selves which is based upon the distinction of such material forms as gods, &c." Otherwise, in relation to that (self) which is to be taught here as being essentially different from the body, it would not be appropriate to point out those differentiations (in the forms of *I*, *thou*, &c.,) that are to be found in the statement that *I*, *thou*, and *all this* have the essential nature of the self. And it is not also possible for the words *I*, *thou*, &c., to be the accidental indicators (of the nature of the self), because they are grammatically equated with what constitutes the thing that has to be so indicated by means of accidental attributes; that is, (because they are equated) with—*all this has the essential nature of the self*. It is said that he (viz. the person so taught) acted up to that teaching, and "gave up the idea of distinction after seeing the highest reality." If it be asked, how this conclusion (of ours) is arrived at, (we reply) that it is arrived at because the teaching has reference to the process of discrimination between the body and the soul. And that (teaching) begins

123. This stanza runs in the Sanskrit original as follows:—*Saḥ aham sa cha tvam sa cha sarvam etat ātmasvarūpam tyaja bhedamoham | itīritaḥ tena sa rājavaryaḥ tatyāja bhedam paramārthadṛishtiḥ* ‖. This stanza has been already translated on p. 30, *supra* thus:—"He is myself, and He is yourself and all this is the same as the Self. Give up the illusion of distinctions. Thus taught by him, that great king, saw the Highest Reality and gave up distinctions."

thus :—"Because the body which is characterised by head, hand, &c., is distinct from the *purusha* (*i. e.* the self)"—[*V. P.* II. 13. 89.].[124]

The stanza[125] beginning with—"When the knowledge which gives rise to distinctions",—[*V. P.* VI. 7. 96.] is also not intended to establish the essential oneness in the nature of individual selves. Nor (is it intended to establish the essential oneness) of the individual self and the Supreme Self. The essential oneness of the individual selves is negatived in the manner already stated. There is also no essential identity between the individual self and the Supreme Self, in the same way in which (there is no essential identity) between the body and the individual self. To this effect, indeed, are the following and other *Vedântic* passages :—"Two birds, which possess similar attributes and are inseparable friends, cling to the same tree; one of them eats the sweet *pippala* fruit, while the other shines in splendour without eating at all." [*Muṇḍ. Up.* III. 1. 1.]; "Those who know the *Brahman*, and who have worshipped the five fires and also the *triṇâchiketa* fire, declare that there are the two that enjoy[126] the reward of works in the world of good deeds, that they have entered into the cave (of the heart), in the transcendentally excellent ether of which they reside and are as shadow and sunlight." [*Kaṭh. Up.* III. 1.]; "He who has entered within, is the ruler of all things that are born, and is the Self of all." [*Taitt. Âr.* III. 24.]. In this

124. The latter half of this *śloka* is to the following effect :—"Therefore which of these am I to designate by this name of 'I'?"

125. This stanza has been already translated while stating the position of the *Adwaitins.* Vide *supra* p. 30. where it is given as follows :—"When the knowledge which gives rise to distinctions has undergone complete destruction, (then), who will create the unreal difference between the self and the *Brahman*?"

126. Literally, *drink in*.

śāstraic work (also, viz. the *Vishṇu-Purāṇa*), the distinction (betwen the individual self and the Supreme Self) is declared in the following manner:—"O sage! He (viz. the Lord) transcends the *prakṛiti* (which forms the natural and material foundation) of all beings, (transcends) all its modifications, and all the blemishes (arising out) of its qualities. He, who is the Self of all, has passed beyond all veils, and by Him is pervaded all that is within the universe. He is of that nature which is characterised by all auspicious qualities.... He is high among the highest, and in Him, who is the Lord of the higher and the lower, the afflictions and all other such undesirable things have no place." [*V. P.* VI. 5. 83 to 85.];[127] "Another (power) named *avidyā* (or ignorance) and *karma* is said to be the third power by which, O king, the all-pervading power known as the *kshetrajña* is completely enclosed."[128] [*V. P.* VI. 7. 61 & 62.]: and (the same difference is taught) in the following aphorisms also, viz.—"And both of them (*i.e.* both the recensions of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka-Upanishad*, viz. the *Kāṇva* and the *Mādhyandina*) speak of it (*i. e.* of the individual self) as being different (from the internal Ruler who is the Highest)." [*Ved. Sūt.* I. 2. 21.]; "And on account of the declaration of difference, (the Supreme Self is) different (from the individual self)." [*Ved. Sut.* I. 1. 22.]; "(The *Brahman* is) indeed other than (the individual self), because of the (scriptural) declaration of difference (between them)." [*Ved. Sūt.* II. 1. 22.]. Moreover, the following and other *Vedāntic* texts, viz.—"He who dwelling in the self, is within the self, Whom the self does not know, Whose body is the self and Who internally rules the self.—(He is your Self &c)." [*Mādh. Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 22.]; "He is embraced by

127. Vide *supra* p. 125.   128. Vide *supra* p. 128.

the omniscient Self." [*Bṛih. Up.* 4. 3. 21.]; "He is ridden upon by the omniscient Self." [*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 3. 35.], determine that the essential nature of the individual self and that of the Supreme Self are both of a mutually exclusive character. (For all these reasons there can be no substantitial unity between the individual self and the Supreme Self).

Moreover, in the case also of one who has been released from *avidyā* by adopting the means (intended therefor), there cannot be essential unity with the Supreme Self, (which is incapable of being the seat of *avidyā* or ignorance); because that which is capable of being the seat of ignorance can never acquire the character of what is (naturally) unfit to be the seat thereof. To the same effect, it is taught in the following passage :—"If it be held that the identity of the Highest Self with the individual self is the highest truth, it is wrong (to hold so); because any substance which is different from another cannot indeed acquire the character of that other substance." [*V. P.* II. 14. 27.]. Besides, it is stated in the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, that a released soul attains only His character, (but not His essential nature) :—"Depending upon this knowledge, those who attain sameness[129] of nature with Myself are not born at the time of creation, and are not hurt at the time of dissolution." [*B. G.* XIV. 2.]. Here (*i. e.* in the *Vishṇu-Purāṇa*) also, there is the following passage to the same effect :—"O sage, that *Brahman*, by His own power, makes this worshipper, who is deserving of a change of state for the better, acquire His own nature in the same way in which a magnet makes the metal acquire its own magnetic

129. The idea is that the released soul possesses the same nature as the Supreme Self, but does not become one in substance with the Supreme Self.

character." [*V. P.* VI. 7. 30.]. The word *ātmabhāva* (in this stanza)[130] means His own nature. Surely, the thing which is attracted does not become identical with that which attracts. Says (the same thing the *Sūtrakāra)* also thus :—"Except in the matter of the activity relating to (the creation &c., of) the world, (the released souls possess all the powers belonging to the Lord), because (the Lord Himself forms) the topic of the contexts (wherein the above-mentioned activity is referred to), and because also (the individual souls) are not mentioned (therein)." [*Ved. Sūt.* IV. 4. 17.]; "And on account of the characteristic of equality (between the individual self and the Supreme Self) being solely confined to enjoyment"—[*Ved. Sūt.* IV. 4. 21.]; "And on account of (the *Brahman)* being taught to be that which is to be approached by the released (souls.)"—[*Ved. Sūt.* I. 3. 2.]. The *Vṛitti* also (of Bodhāyana) states it thus :—"Except in the matter of the activity relating to the creation of the world, (the released soul)is equal to the Highest Light (*i. e.* to the *Brahman*)." And the commentator Dramiḍa also says—"On account of close association with the Deity, he who is devoid of the body (*i. e.* the released soul) may become capable of enjoying all desirable objects like the Deity Himself." (To the same effect) are also the following and other scriptural texts :—"Those who depart from here, after having known the Self and also His eternal and auspicious qualities, for them there is free movement in all the worlds." [*Chhānd. Up.* VIII.1. 6.]; "He who knows the *Brahman* attains the Highest." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.]; "He attains, with the intelligent *Brahman*, all the

130. The stanza quoted above runs thus:—*Ātmabhāvam nayati enam tat brahma dhyāyinam mune* | *vikāryam ātmanaḥ śaktyā loham ākarshakaḥ yathā.*||

auspicious qualities." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.]; "He (*i. e.* the released self), having reached that Self which consists of bliss and moving about in all these worlds, enjoying whatever things he likes, and assuming whatever form he likes, (sits down singing this *sāman.*—*Hā, vūhā, vūhā, vū*)." [*Taitt. Up.* III. 10. 5.]; "He moves about there." [*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 12. 3.]; "Bliss indeed is He. Having obtained this very Bliss, he becomes blissful." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 7. 1.]; "Just as flowing rivers disappear in the sea losing their name and form, so also the wise man, freed from name and form, reaches that Divine Person who is higher than the highest." [*Muṇḍ. Up.* III. 2. 8.]; "Then the wise man, shaking off merit and demerit and being untainted, attains the highest degree of equality (with the *Brahman*)." [*Muṇḍ. Up.* III. 1. 3.].

In the following and other aphorisms—"Bliss and other qualities (have to be assumed in all the *vidyās*),[131] because the possessor (of those qualities happens to be the same *Brahman* in all the *vidyās*)."—[*Ved. Sūt.* III. 3. 11.]; "Because they (viz. the *vidyās*) do not differ in their results, there is freedom of choice (in regard to them)."—[*Ved. Sūt.* III. 3. 57.],—it is stated by the *Sūtrakāra* himself that the qualified *Brahman* alone is the object of worship in all the *vidyās* relating to the Supreme Being, that the result (of all such meditations or forms of worship) is of one and the same nature, and that, therefore, there is freedom of choice

131. The *Vidyas* are forms of worship. For example, the *Sad-vidyā* taught to Śvetaketu in *Chhānd. Up.* VI. is that form of worship in which the *Brahman* is taught to be worshipped as the self-existent Soul of the universe. Similarly the *Pratardanavidyā* is a form of worship taught to Pratardana by Indra in *Kaush. Up.* III. The *Daharavidyā* is another form of worship in which the *Brahman* is taught to be worshipped as residing within the small etherial space of the heart. *Chhānd. Up.* VIII.

in regard to the *vidyās*. By the *Vākya-kāra* (Ṭaṅka) also, in the passage—"That (object to be attained) is what is possessed (of qualities), because worship relates to that which possesses qualities"—it is stated that the qualified *Brahman* alone is worthy of being the object of worship, and that there is freedom of choice in regard to the *vidyās* (relating to the attainment of the *Brahman*). This is also similarly explained by the commentator (Dramiḍāchārya) in the passage beginning with[132]—"Even when one is bent upon meditating on (the *Brahman* as) pure existence."

This passage—"He who knows the *Brahman* becomes the *Brahman* indeed."—[*Muṇḍ. Up.* III. 2. 9.], has to import the same thing as the following and other passages:—"Freed from name and form, he reaches the Divine Person who is higher than the highest."—[*Muṇḍ. Up.* III. 2. 8.]; "Being untainted, he attains the highest degree of equality (with the *Brahman*)."—[*Muṇḍ. Up.* III. 1. 3.]; "Having reached the Highest Light (*i.e.* the *Brahman*) he (*i.e.* the released soul) manifests himself in his own true form."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 3. 4.);—therefore, here also, one, who is freed from the name and form that belong to *prakriti* (or nature) and who is destitute of the distinctions resulting from that (name and that form), is said to possess the same character as the *Brahman*, for the reason that he also is (then) solely of the nature of intelligence. Moreover,

132. This passage is quoted in full in the *Vedārtha-saṅgraha* of Rāmānuja and it runs thus:—*Yadyapi satchitto na nirbhugnadaivatam guṇaguṇam manasānudhāvet tathāpyantarguṇāmeva devatām bhajata iti tatrāpi saguṇaiva devatā prāpyate.* Its meaning is:—Even when one is bent upon meditating on the *Brahman* as pure existence, one should not steadily pursue in one's own mind merely a collection of qualities as unassociated with the Deity; even then, one worships that Deity alone which is possessed of qualities, and so, in such a case also, that deity alone which is possessed of qualities is attained.

when one thing possesses the same nature as another, then the experession that this thing is the same as that other has a real and natural significance,[133] as, in the instance, "This (thing) here is an ox." Here also (*i.e.* in the *Vishṇu-Purāṇa*) in the passage—"O king, that which leads (us) to the object of (our) attainment (viz. the *Brahman*) is knowledge. Similarly, what has to be led (unto the *Brahman*) is the individual self in whom all the *bhāvanās*[134] are extinguished." [*V. P.* VI. 7. 93.],—it is (first) declared that, by meditating on the Highest *Brahman*, the individual self, who is, like the Highest *Brahman*, freed from all the *bhāvanās*, that is, from the three[135] *bhāvanās*, namely, *karma-bhāvanā*, *brahma-bhāvanā* and *ubhaya-bhāvanā*, becomes worthy to be led (unto the *Brahman*); then in the passage—"O, thou, the twice-born one, the *kshetrajña* (or the individual self) is the owner of the means (for obtaining final release), and knowledge is the means which is thus at his disposal. After accomplishing the end, namely, final

133. Vide *supra* p. 4. n. 10.

134. *Bhāvanās* mean here the innate tendencies for indulging in wrong conceptions regarding the ultimate nature of things. In Indian psychology, a *bhāvanā* is spoken of as a *saṃskāra* *i. e.* as an innate impression or an innate tendency. Memory (*smṛiti*) and *bhāvanā* (conception) are both classed as *saṃskāras*, and curiously enough elasticity (*sthitisthāpaka*) also is spoken of as a *saṃskāra*; the idea being that, just as the elasticity of bodies is no more than a tendency impressed upon the particles of those bodies, so also, memory and conception are innate tendencies impressed upon the mind-substance. The three *bhāvanās* or wrong conceptions referred to above are:—(1). The conception that we merely do the work, (2) the conception that we wholly become the *Brahman*, and (3) the conception that, on the other hand, we do the work and also become the *Brahman*. It seems to be held here that, in religion, it is as wrong to rely solely upon the performance of prescribed duties, as to believe in the possibility of our attaining identity in essence with the Supreme Self; because the perfection of the individual indeed constitutes the true goal of every true religion.

135. Vide nn. 100. & 134., *supra*.

release, it (*i. e.* that knowledge) will cease to operate as a means, having fully performed its functions."—[*V. P.* VI. 7. 94.],—it is stated that the means, which is in the form of the meditation of the Highest *Brahman*, ceases to operate as a means, after having fully performed its function in the way of causing, to the individual self, the attainment of its own nature which is free from all the *bhāvanās*; and then it is said that, in consequence, meditation should be practised till the accomplishment of the end in view; and then at last the essential nature of the released self is thus described in the following passage :—[136] "Having then attained the state which corresponds to the nature of that (*Brahman*), he (viz. the released self) becomes 'non-different' from the Highest Self, and distinctions (in relation to him) are the products of his ignorance." [*V. P.* VI. 7. 95.]. (Here) the word *tadbhāva* means the *bhāva* of the *Brahman*, that is, His nature; (but it does) not (import) substantial unity (between the individual self and the Supreme Self); because, if it did, the second word *bhāva*, in the expression *tadbhāvabhāvamāpannaḥ*, would be of no use, and because also there would then arise the contradiction of the teaching given before. Whatever constitutes the condition wherein the *Brahman* is completely free from all the *bhāvanās*, the attainment of that is the attainment of the state corresponding to the nature of that (*Brahman*). When one has (thus) attained that state, then one becomes 'non-different' from the Supreme Self, that is, one becomes free from difference. This (individual self), by reason of its possessing the nature of intelligence, is itself of the same character as the Supreme Self, and hence its difference from

136. This passage is as follows in the original :—*Tadbhāvabhāvamāpannas tadāsau paramātmanā | bhavatyabhedī bhedaścha tasyājñānakṛito bhavet* ||

Him consists in its having the form of gods and other (material embodiments). The association of this (individual self) with such (an embodiment) results from the ignorance which is of the nature of *karma*, but is not due to its own essential nature. When *karma*, which has the nature of ignorance and forms the root of all distinctions in the form of gods, &c., is destroyed by means of the meditation of the Highest *Brahman*, then that distinction of gods, &c., ceases to be, owing to the cessation of the cause thereof; and accordingly, he (*i. e.* the released soul) does not differ (from the *Brahman*). It is thus stated in this passage:—"But the distinction of one individual self (from other similar selves) which are all of the same nature results from the external covering of *karma*. When the distinction of gods, &c., (in relation to them) ceases to exist, the covering altogether ceases to exist, and indeed he alone remains." [*V. P.* II. 14. 33.]. The same thing is explained elsewhere thus:—"When knowledge which produces distinctions has undergone complete destruction, (then) who will create the unreal difference between the self and the *Brahman*?" [*V. P.* VI. 7. 96.].[137] (Here) the word *vibheda* means various kinds of distinctions, such as those which are found in the (varied) forms of gods, animals, men and immoveable things. This same thing is stated by Śaunaka also thus:—"This fourfold distinction also is dependent upon false knowledge." [*V. Dh.* C. 20.]. The meaning is this:—Ignorance, otherwise called *karma*, forms, in regard to the individual self which is of the nature of intelligence, the cause of the various kinds of distinctions, such as gods, &c.; and when it is totally destroyed by means of the meditation

137. This stanza is as follows in the original:—*Vibhedajanake jñāne nāśam ātyantikam gate | ātmano brahmaṇo bhedam asantam kaḥ karishyati ‖* Vide *supra* p. 30.

of the Highest *Brahman*, then who is there that will perceive, between the individual self and the Highest *Brahman*, the distinction that consists in having the forms of gods, &c., which owing to the non-existence of the cause thereof, has itself become non-existent ? In this very work itself (*i. e.* in the *Vishṇu-Purāṇa*) it has indeed been stated that "Another (power) named *avidyā* and *karma* (forms the third power of the *Brahman*)." [*V. P.* VI. 7. 61.].[138] In the passage—"And know also the *kshetrajña* (or the individual self) to be the same as Myself."—[*B. G.* XIII. 2.], and in others, the declaration of oneness (between the individual self and the Supreme Self) is based on the (*Brahman*) constituting the Self of all in the form of their internal ruler. Otherwise, there would arise the contradiction of the following and other passages :—"The destructible is (made up of) all created beings, and it is stated that the indestructible is the eternally unchangeable. Different from these is the Highest Person." [*B. G.* XV. 16 & 17.]. In this very work (viz. the *Bhagavad-Gītā*), it is explicitly stated by the Lord Himself that He is the Self of all in the form of their internal ruler, as for instance, in the passage—"O Arjuna, the Lord exists in the region of the heart of all beings." [*B. G.* XVIII. 61.], and also in the passage—"And I am also seated in the heart of all." [*B. G.* XV. 15.]. The same thing is also declared in the passage—"O Gudākeśa, I am that Self who is established in the interior of all beings." [*B. G.* X. 20.].[139] In fact, (here), the word *bhūta* denotes the body which includes the self also. Because He is the Self of all, for that very reason, all things constitute His body ; and hence their separate existence is negatived in the passage

138. Vide *supra* p. 128.

139. This passage is as follows in the original:—*Ahamātmā gudākeśa sarvabhūtāśayasthitaḥ*.

—"That exists not which is without (Me)." [*B. G.* X. 39.]. This passage contains the summary of the Lord's sovereign glories, and has therefore to be understood to possess such a significance (as has been given above). Next to this, it is stated—"Whatever thing is full of glory, or of wealth, or of power, know thou that particular thing to proceed from a part of My splendour."— [*B. G.* X. 41.], and "I stand supporting the whole world by a small part (of My power)." [*B. G.* X. 42.]. Therefore, in all the *śāstraic* works,[140] there is no establishment of that thing which is devoid of attributes, nor is there the establishment of illusoriness in regard to the totality of perceivable objects, nor also is there the negation of the natural difference between the individual self, non-intelligent matter, and the Lord.

It has been also declared[141]—by the *Pūrvapakshins*—to the following effect:—The whole universe, with its infinite distinctions in the form of the ruler and the ruled and the like, is the result of the superimposition of error on an attributeless and self-luminous thing. And that error is the beginningless ignorance (or *avidyā*) which cannot be defined either as existent or as non-existent, and which, (nevertheless) is the cause of those varied and wonderful illusory projections that conceal the true nature of things. And that *avidyā* has necessarily to be admitted, because there is the following among other scriptural texts (to prove it):—"For

140. The *śāstras* are works of religious authority and include four different kinds of them, known by the names of *Śruti*, *Smṛiti*, *Itihāsa* and *Purāṇa* in the order of their importance. *Śruti* is revelation and is made up of the *Vedas* and the *Upanishads*, &c. *Smṛiti* embodies tradition and the sacred laws. *Itihāsa* deals with ancient history, and the *Purāṇas* are semi-historical works containing also myths and legends which are intended to illustrate important principles of religion and conduct.

141. Vide *supra* pp. 27, 30, & 31.

they (*i. e.* the creatures) are drawn away (from the *Brahman*) by means of ignorance."—[*Chhând. Up.* VIII. 3. 2.]; because also there would (otherwise) result in regard to the *Brahman* the impossibility of His being one with the individual self, in accordance with what is learnt from the grammatical equation found in the passage—"That thou art"[142]—and in others like it. That *(avidyâ)* again is no real entity, because in relation to it there is no illusion and no stultification (of illusion). And it (viz. that *avidyâ*) is not a non-entity either, because (in relation to it) there is no manifestation and no stultification (of manifestation). [143] Therefore those that know the truth hold that this *avidyâ* (or ignorance) is different from both these alternative ways of looking at it.

This (view) is improper. Indeed, residing in what, does it (viz. *avidyâ*) produce illusion ? Surely, (it does) not (produce illusion), itself residing in the individual self; because the self-hood (of the individual self) is itself projected by *avidyâ*

142. Vide *Chhând. Up.* VI. 9. 4; VI. 10. 3; VI. 11. 3; VI. 12. 3; VI. 13. 3; VI. 14. 3. VI. 15. 3; VI. 16. 3.

143. The way in which the object of any notion is made out to be either a real entity or a non-entity is given in this brief formula: *Sannabâdhyate, asannapratîyate*, which means that the perception of the real entity is never altogether stultified, and that the non-entity is never really perceived. In the passage above, *avidyâ i.e.* ignorance, is said to be neither an entity nor a non-entity—neither an entity like a rope, nor a non-entity like the horns of a hare. The rope, being an entity, is capable of being perceived as a rope, or as something other than the rope, for instance, as a snake. This perception of the snake in the rope is an illusion which is capable of being stultified, and the rope is thus an object of illusion as well as of the stultification of that illusion. The horns of a hare, being non-existent, are of course incapable of being perceived. Nevertheless, they are manifest to the mind, in as much as they constitute the object of a notion corresponding to them, and also of the stultification of the reality of the contents of that notion.

(or ignorance). Neither (does it produce illusion), itself residing in the *Brahman*; because He has the essential nature of self-luminous intelligence, and is thus opposed to *avidyā* (or ignorance). Moreover, it is admitted (by you) that it (viz. *avidyā*) is destroyed by knowledge. "If ignorance, which has the nature of unreality and is removable by knowledge, may veil the Highest *Brahman* who has the nature of intelligence, then who is there that is competent to be its remover? If it be said that to know the *Brahman* to be (pure) intelligence is what (really) removes ignorance, (we say) that it (viz. such knowledge) also cannot, like the *Brahman*, certainly be the remover of *avidyā* (or ignorance); because, it (viz. that knowledge) makes that same (*Brahman*) luminous (*i. e.* intelligible). If it be possible to have the cognition that the *Brahman* is (pure) intelligence, there would then result cognisability (to the *Brahman*); but, according to your own saying, it must be that the *Brahman* should not possess the (cognisable) character of an experience".[144] If it be said that that knowledge, which is to the effect that the *Brahman* has the essential nature of intelligence, is the destroyer of that *avidyā* (or ignorance), but not that (other) knowledge (or intelligence) which constitutes the essential nature of the *Brahman*, we reply that it is not right to hold so; because while both possess in common the power of bringing the true nature of the *Brahman* to light, it is not possible to make out any differentiating peculiarity (about them) to the effect that one of them is contradictory of *avidyā* (or ignorance), and that the other is not. What is said is this:—Whatever is, by means of that knowledge which is to the effect that the

144. The above quotation is in all probability from the *Nyāyatattva* of Nāthamuni, the grandfather of the famous Yāmunāchārya known in the Tamil land as Ālavandār.

Brahman has the nature of intelligence, made out to be the true nature of the *Brahman*,—that becomes evident of itself on account of the self-luminous character of the *Brahman*; and so, in the matter of contradicting *avidyâ* (or ignorance), there is no differentiating peculiarity about the knowledge (or intelligence) which constitutes the essential nature (of the *Brahman*), or about that (other) knowledge whose object is that (essential nature of the *Brahman*).

Moreover, according to you—the *Pûrvapakshins*, the *Brahman* whose essential nature consists of experience is incapable of being experienced by any other experience; and so (to you) there can be no knowledge which has that (*Brahman*) for its object. Therefore, if knowledge (or intelligence) is held to be contradictory of *avidyâ*, then He (viz. the *Brahman*) is of his own nature opposed (to that *avidyâ*); and thus it is not possible for that (*avidyâ* or ignorance) to reside in the *Brahman*. The mother-of-pearl and other such substances, (on which illusions are superimposed), are themselves incapable of bringing their own reality to light, and are not opposed to the ignorance which relates to themselves; therefore they require some other knowledge for the removal of that (*avidyâ* or ignorance). But the *Brahman* constitutes the reality of Himself, as established by His own self-experience; and so, He is opposed to that ignorance which relates to Himself. For this very reason, it (viz. that ignorance which relates to the *Brahman*) does not further stand in need of any other means to remove it.

However, it may again be said that the knowledge of the unreality of what is other than the *Brahman* is opposed to this ignorance. But it is not so. (Here) it has to be discriminated whether this knowledge of the

unreality of what is other than the *Brahman* is opposed to the ignorance of the real nature of the *Brahman*, or, whether it is opposed to that (other) ignorance which is to the effect that the world is real. Surely, this (knowledge) is not contradictory of the ignorance which relates to the real nature of the *Brahman*, because it has not that (real nature of the *Brahman*) for its object. Indeed, there arises contradiction only when (both) knowledge and ignorance have one and the same thing for their object. The (true) knowledge that the world is unreal is contradicted by the ignorance (or false knowledge) that the world is real. By that (knowledge which establishes the unreality of the world), only that ignorance is contradicted which leads to the conclusion that the world is real. Hence the ignorance relating to the essential nature of the *Brahman* surely continues to persist. It may be said that the ignorance which relates to the essential nature of the *Brahman* is indeed to the effect that He has a second, and that that (ignorance) is removed, as a matter of fact, by the knowledge of the unreality of what is other than that (*Brahman*), and that the true nature of the *Brahman* is made out by self-experience. But this is not so. If it is established by self-experience that the true nature of the *Brahman* is to be without a second, then there can arise neither that ignorance which is opposed to that (true nature) and is to the effect that He has a second, nor can there arise any stultification of that (ignorance). If it be said that this secondlessness is an attribute (of His), we say it is not so ; because you have yourselves declared that the *Brahman* is essentially of the nature of (pure) experience, and is thus free from all attributes that are capable of being experienced. Therefore, solely on account of (such) incompatibility, the *Brahman*, whose essential nature is

intelligence cannot be the abode of ignorance (or *avidyā*).

Moreover, he who declares that the *Brahman*, whose essential nature entirely consists of luminosity, is (nevertheless) concealed by *avidyā* (or ignorance),—by him is declared the destruction of nothing other than the very essential nature of the *Brahman* Himself. The concealment of luminosity means either the obstruction of the origination of luminosity or the destruction of existing (luminosity). Since it is admitted that this luminosity of the *Brahman* is incapable of being a produced thing, the concealment of luminosity (here) means only the destruction of luminosity.

Then again it is said that, on account of a misguiding thing resident in itself, this objectless and self-luminous experience which is not dependent upon anything else, realises itself as having an infinite number of abodes, and as having an infinite number of objects to experience; and here it has to be determined whether this misguiding thing, which is resident in that (experience) itself, is of the nature of a reality, or is of the nature of an unreality. Surely, it is not a reality, in as much as it is not admitted (by you) to be so. Nor is it an unreality. For if it were an unreality,[145] it (viz. this misguiding thing) must be acknowledged to be either the knower, or the known object, or the knowledge. Surely, it is not knowledge, because distinctions in relation to the essential nature of know-

145. The distinctions in the universe in the forms of the knower, the known object and the knowledge are held by the *Adwaitins* to be due to *māyā*. Consequently any unreal thing which is the result of such *māyā* or ignorance has to be made out either as the knower or as the known object or as the knowledge, which together make up the visible universe.

ledge (or consciousness) are not admitted (by you); and because also unreality is not admitted (by you) in relation to consciousness itself which forms the basis of illusion, lest such (an admission) should give room to the hypothesis of the Mādhyamikas.[146] The knower, the known object, and the knowledge (or consciousness) conditioned by them (both), may themselves be characterised as constituting the misguiding error (for the reason that they are conditioned); but then they require another error at their root (to make them conditioned and erroneous); and thus arises a *regressus in infinitum*. And then, wishing to avoid this (difficulty), you may say that the really existent experience itself, which is the same as the *Brahman*, forms this misguiding error. And if the *Brahman* Himself form the misguiding error, then, the appearance of the phenomenal universe would itself be dependent upon that (*Brahman*). What is the use of assuming (in such a case) another *avidyā* (or ignorance) which is similar in nature to the phenomenal universe? If the *Brahman* Himself have the character of the misguiding error, (then), owing to His eternity, there would be no final release (to the individual self). Therefore, as long as a *real* misguiding error, different from the *Brahman* Himself, is not admitted, so long it is not possible to explain (the theory of) illusion.

Again, what is the meaning of the (alleged) impossibility of definition (in relation to *avidyā*)? It may be said that this consists in its (*i. e. avidyā's*) having the characteristics neither of an entity nor of a non-entity; if so, such a thing is sure to be incapable of definition, be-

146. The Mādhyamikas are Nihilistic Buddhists. Vide *Ved. Sūt.* II. 2. 30. for a fuller discussion and criticism of their theory.

cause there is no means of knowing a thing of that kind. What is said is this:—The whole of the totality of things has to be established as existent (only)by means of (mental) cognitions, and all cognition relates to entities or non-entities. And if it be held that the object of a cognition, which has (thus) to relate to entities or non-entities, has neither the characteristics of an entity nor those of a non-entity, then all things might become the objects of all cognitions.

It may be again stated here as follows:—A certain particular thing which conceals the true nature of all things, which is the material cause of various internal and external superimpositions, which is itself incapable of being defined either as an entity or as a non-entity, which is denoted by the words *avidyā*, *ajñāna*, &c., and which is itself capable of being removed by the knowledge of the real nature of things,—(such a thing) is indeed made out, by means of perception and inference, to be altogether existent in the form of an entity, in as much as it happens to be different from the antecedent non-existence[147] of knowledge. The superimposition of such distinctions, as egoity (or knowership), knowledge, and the thing known, on the internal self, the essential nature of which is concealed by that (*avidyā*) itself, and which (however) is (really) unchangeable and is made up of self-luminous intelligence,—(such a superimposition) has for its material cause the *Brahman* who is conditioned by that (same *avidyā*). For the reason that there are various particular states of that same (*avidyā*), there also arises, in regard to the world which is itself a super-imposition, the further superimposition, which consists of (the falsely perceived)

147. Vide *supra* p. 49. n. 37.

snake, silver, &c., that are capable of being stultified by (correct) knowledge, and consists also of the (correct) knowledge relating to all the various particular things (in the world). And the fact also, that all things which possess the nature of unreality have that (*avidyā*) for their material cause, is made out by the force of the reasoning, that, of a thing which is unreal, the cause also deserves to be certainly unreal. Indeed, the perception which has for its object that *avidyā*, which forms the cause (of such a world), is a direct manifestation (of *avidyā*) to consciousness to the effect—"I am ignorant, I do not know myself, nor do I know another." But this (direct perception of ignorance) has not for its object the antecedent non-existence of knowledge; for, that (antecedent non-existence) is made out with the aid of the sixth means of proof,[148] whereas this (perception of ignorance) is quite as direct as when (one feels) "I am happy." Even when it is granted that non-existence (of knowledge) is capable of being directly experienced, this experience can not deal with the non-existence of knowledge in the self; because there is the knowledge (of such non-existence) even at the time of this experience, and because also, if it (viz. such knowledge) were not existent then, there would be the impossibility of making out that there was no knowledge.

What is said amounts to this:—In this experience—

148. The six means of proof are:—(1). *Pratyaksha*, perception by the senses; (2) *Anumāna*, inference; (3) *Upamāna*, analogy or comparison; (4) Śabda or *Āptavachana*, verbal testimony or revelation; (5) *Arthāpatti*, circumstantial presumption; (6) *Anupalabdhi* or *Abhāvapratyaksha*, negative proof of non-cognition intended to establish the non-existence of things. It is said that, according to this last, we make out the non-existence of a pot, for instance, by not perceiving it. There are also three other means of proof known to Indian philosophers, namely, *Sambhava*, equivalence; *Aitihya*, tradition or fallible testimony; and *Cheshtā*, gesture.

'I am ignorant',—is there or is there not any cognition of the self, namely, the 'I', as the thing which has the non-existence of knowledge for its characterising attribute, and also (is there or is there not any cognition) of knowledge as the thing which is opposed to ignorance? If there is, then, wholly owing to self-contradiction, it is impossible to have any experience of the non-existence of (all) knowledge. If there is not, then that experience of the non-existence of knowledge cannot at all come into existence, in as much as it depends upon the knowledge of the thing characterised by that (non-existence of knowledge) and also upon the knowledge of the thing which is contrary (to the same non-existence of knowledge). This objection holds good equally in the case where non-existence of knowledge is taken to be deducible by inference, and also in the case where it is taken to form the object that is to be establshed by the means of proof known as *abhāva* (or *anupalabdhi*).[149] When, however, it is granted that this *avidyā* (or ignorance) has the nature of an entity, then, even though there is the knowledge of that thing which has this (non-existence of knowledge for its) characterising attribute, and also (the knowledge) of that thing which is contrary (to the non-existence of knowledge), it has to be admitted that there is no contradiction (between this knowledge and that *avidyā* or ignorance which is not merely the negation of knowledge, but is a positive entity of some sort). Therefore, this experience—'I am ignorant'—relates only to that *avidyā* (or ignorance) which has the nature of a (positive) entity.

Again, it may be objected that, although (this) ignorance

149. *Anupalabdhi* is the negative proof of non-cognition intended to establish the non-existence of things. Vide *supra* n. 148.

(or *avidyā*) has the nature of a (positive) entity, yet, it is contradicted by the witnessing principle of intelligence, the nature of which is to make the truth of things manifest. But this is not right. The witnessing principle of intelligence does not deal with the truth of things, but deals with this ignorance; for, otherwise, the manifestation to consciousness of all such things as are unreal would be impossible. Indeed, (this positive) ignorance (or *avidyā*) is not removed by that knowledge which has (that same) ignorance for its object; and, accordingly, there is here no contradiction (between this positive entity called ignorance and the knowledge of that same 'ignorance').

And again it may be said:—This ignorance, although it possesses the nature of an (independent) entity, becomes a thing that is directly cognisable by the witnessing principle of intelligence, only in definitive association with a particular (external) object. And the object here (which by association defines this ignorance) is itself capable of being established independently of any means of proof. Therefore, how can this ignorance (or *avidyā*), which is definitively associated with the thing 'I', (that is not an external object), become a thing cognisable by the witnessing principle of intelligence? There is, however, nothing wrong in this. The whole of the totality of things is made up of objects which are cognisable by the witnessing principle of intelligence, either in the form of known things or in the form of unknown things. It being so, there is need of the interposition of a means of proof to prove only that thing which happens to be known as non-intelligent. But to prove the thing which is intelligent, subjective and self-evident, there is no need of the interposition of (such) a means of proof. Therefore, the presentation of this thing (viz. the thing 'I') to consciousness, as that which is al-

ways definitively associated with *avidyā* (or ignorance) is quite consistent with reason. And consequently, by means of direct perception which is supported by logical reasoning, this ignorance (or *avidyā*) is made out to have indeed the character of a positive entity.

This ignorance (or *avidyā*) which has the nature of an entity is established by means of inference also thus :—That knowledge, which is obtained with the help of the accepted means of proof and (the nature of) which is the subject of dispute (between us), has, for its antecedent in time, another existent thing which is different from the antecedent non-existence of that (knowledge) itself, and veils the objects of that same (knowledge), and is capable of being removed by that (very knowledge), and is existent in the same place as that (knowledge); because it brings to light objects which were unknown before, and is thus like the light of the lamp-flame first lit up in the midst of darkness. Darkness is merely either the absence of light or the absence of the perception of colour, but is not a substance ; and if, (on this supposition), it be asked how it is that it is put forth here as an illustration to prove that ignorance (or *avidyā*) which has the nature of a positive substance,—it is replied that, because darkness is perceived to possess the conditions of density, thinness, &c., and because also (it is perceived) as having colour, it cannot but be a distinct substance. Therefore this (argument here advanced) is unobjectionable.

To all this, we make the following reply :—In the cognition—'I am ignorant, I do not know myself, nor do I know another,'—that ignorance which has the nature of an entity is not made out either by perception in itself or (by perception) as supported by logical reasoning. The contradiction, that has been pointed out in relation to (the ignor-

ance which forms) the antecedent non-existence of knowledge, applies equally well to this (other) ignorance also which has the nature of an entity. Is the internal subject (viz. the ego) made out or not made out to be that which is definitively distinct from ignorance by forming the abode and the object (thereof)? If you hold that it is so made out, then when it is so made out, how can there remain yet that ignorance of it which is capable of being removed by the knowledge of its true nature? If you hold that it is not so made out, then, how is it possible to experience the ignorance which is not associated with the necessary concomitants of an abode and an object?

Then again, it may be said that the opposite of ignorance consists in the distinct manifestation of the true nature (of the ego), and that (to us however) there is that apprehension (of the ego) the true nature of which is indistinct; and that, therefore, even when there is the knowledge of that (ego) which forms the abode and the object (of this positive ignorance), there is no contradiction at all in experiencing such ignorance. Indeed, if this is true, the antecedent non-existence of knowledge also forms the object of that (ego) the true nature of which is distinct, (*i. e.* this antecedent non-existence of knowledge is thus like your 'positive ignorance'). And the knowledge of the abode of this (negative ignorance also), as well as of what constitutes its contradiction, relates to that (ego) the true nature of which is, (of itself), indistinct. Therefore, (in upholding your 'positive ignorance'), there is nothing special, apart from the stubborn adherence to your own views.

Even that ignorance, which has the nature of an entity,is, while it is being made out as ignorance, really dependent upon other (correlated) things; just as the apprehension

of the antecedent non-existence (of knowledge) is (so dependent). Accordingly, ignorance may be either the absence of knowledge, or what is different from that (knowledge), or what is the opposite of it. In the case of all these three (ways of looking at ignorance), the need for making out the true nature of that (knowledge, the absence of, the difference from, or the contradiction of which constitutes ignorance) has necessarily to be admitted. Surely, in making out the true nature of darkness, there is no need of light. Nevertheless, when that (darkness) has to be made out to be the same as that which is the opposite of light, there certainly is needed the (previous) knowledge of light. The ignorance admitted by you is never realised as it is in itself, but is merely realised as that which is not knowledge. Such being the case, it (viz. the ignorance assumed to be a positive entity by you) is as dependent upon knowledge as (is the idea of) the non-existence of knowledge. And the antecedent non-existence of knowledge is admitted by you also, and it is moreover understood by all. Therefore, it has to be granted that, in the cognition 'I am ignorant, I do not know myself, nor do I know another,' what is experienced is only that antecedent non-existence of knowledge which is accepted by both of us.

Moreover, the experience of ignorance (or *avidyâ*) is not possible to the *Brahman*, whose essential nature is altogether made up of eternal, free, self-luminous and uniform intelligence; because He is Himself of the nature of self-experience. If it be said that, even the *Brahman*, whose essential nature is self-experience, perceives ignorance (or *avidyâ*) when that essential nature of His is concealed, it is asked, what it is to have the concealment of one's own essential nature. If it be replied that it is the possession of an

unmanifest nature, it is asked again how that *Brahman*, whose essential nature is self-experience, can possess an unmanifest nature. If it be again said, in reply, that it is possible for that *Brahman*, whose essential nature is self-experience, to acquire an unmanifest character through the influence of something other than Himself, then, as has been already stated, there would result to the *Brahman* the destruction of His own essential nature, owing to the influence of that other thing; because (according to you) luminosity (or, in other words, manifest intelligibility) has to constitute the essential nature of that (*Brahman*), owing to the fact that an attribute called luminosity is not acknowledged (by you in relation to the *Brahman*). Again, this ignorance (or *avidyā*), which forms the cause of the concealment of the essential nature of the *Brahman*, conceals the *Brahman*, only after it is itself experienced (by the *Brahman*); and it is after (thus) concealing the *Brahman*, that it in itself becomes the object of His experience. Thus there arises the logical fallacy of reciprocal dependence. If it be said that it (viz. *avidyā*) conceals (the *Brahman*) only after it is experienced (by the *Brahman*), it would follow that that *Brahman*, whose essential nature is not concealed, Himself experiences that ignorance (or *avidyā*). Then the hypothesis of concealment would be purposeless, as also the hypothesis of this (concealing) ignorance itself; because it must be possible for the *Brahman* to perceive the world also which is acknowledged to be the result of ignorance (or *avidyā*), in the same way in which (it is possible for Him) to perceive this ignorance (or *avidyā*).

Further, does the *Brahman*, of Himself, experience this ignorance, or (does He experience it) through the influence of something other than Himself? If it be said that He

of Himself (experiences it), we reply that, because the experience of ignorance is thus associated with the essential nature of the *Brahman*, there can be no release (from it). Or, owing to the fact that the *Brahman*, whose essential nature is experience, acquires thus the character of being the experience of ignorance, there will arise the destruction of the essential nature of the *Brahman* Himself, through the knowledge which is destructive (of that ignorance or *avidyā*); in the same manner in which the perception of silver (in a mother-of-pearl) is destroyed by means of the knowledge which stultifies the falsely perceived silver. If the *Brahman* experience ignorance (or *avidyā*) through the influence of something other (than Himself), what is that other thing? If it be said that it is another ignorance (or *avidyā*), there would result the fallacy [150] of *regressus in infinitum*. If it be (again) said that after having concealed the *Brahman* Himself, it (viz. ignorance or *avidyā*) becomes the object of experience, then it is replied that, in such a case, like *kācha*[151] and other causes of false perception, this ignorance (or *avidyā*) also, through the mere fact of its own existence as an entity, conceals the *Brahman*; and that, in consequence, there will be no removal of ignorance (or *avidyā*) by means of knowledge.

It may be said again that this ignorance (or *avidyā*) is itself beginningless, and that it causes the *Brahman* to be the witness[152] of (that ignorance) itself, at the same

150. Because this other ignorance would have to depend upon a third ignorance, which again would have to depend upon a fourth, and this again upon a fifth, and so on *ad infinitum*.

151. Vide *supra* p. 104. n. 69.

152. In this case, one and the same ignorance produces the concealment of the *Brahman* at the same time that it causes Him to be a witness of itself, and so there is no such fallacy as requires the postulation of a series of *avidyās*.

time that it also (produces) the concealment of the essential nature of the *Brahman,* and that there is, in consequence, no room for fallacies like *regressus in infinitum,* &c. But it is replied that this is not right; because it is impossible for the *Brahman,* whose essential nature is self-experience, to acquire the character of being a witness without the concealment of His own true nature. If it be said in reply that (the true nature of the *Brahman*) is concealed by some other cause (than ignorance or *avidyā*), then, it is pointed out that the beginninglessness of this ignorance (or *avidyā*) is (thereby) given up, and the aforesaid fallacy of *regressus in infinitum* also follows. If one, whose essential nature is altogether unconcealed, acquires the character of being a witness, then that one cannot possess the character of being altogether the basis of self-experience.

Furthermore, when the *Brahman* is concealed by ignorance (or *avidyā*), does not that *Brahman* shine forth even a little? Or does He shine forth a little? On the former supposition, the *Brahman,* whose essential nature is pure luminosity, becomes non-luminosity; and, as it has been already stated more than once, He (thus) acquires the character of a mere nothing. On the latter supposition, it is asked, which is the part concealed, and which is it that shines forth, in the *Brahman* who is uniformly Existence and Intelligence and Bliss throughout? As it is impossible for a thing, which is destitute of parts, destitute of attributes, and is pure luminosity, to have two distinct forms, concealment and luminosity cannot, at one and the same time, exist together in that thing.

Then, again, it may be urged that, when concealed by ignorance (or *avidyā*), the *Brahman* who is uniformly Existence and Intelligence and Bliss throughout, appears like

a thing which has an indistinct nature. Then, of what nature is the distinctness and indistinctness of that thing the essential nature of which is pure luminosity ? What is said is this :—Whatever is possessed of parts, whatever is possessed of attributes, whatever forms the thing illumined by luminosity, — the complete manifestation of that thing is distinct manifestation. That manifestation in which a few of the attributes (of a thing) are absent is indistinct manifestation. It being so, whatsoever aspect of the thing is unknown, in that aspect, there is the absence of luminosity ; and for that very reason, there can be no indistinctness in relation to luminosity. Whatsoever aspect of the thing is known, in that aspect the luminosity relating to it is undoubtedly distinct. Hence, under all circumstances, there can be no indistinctness in relation to what constitutes luminosity. Even in perceiving an external object as it is, even then indistinctness consists in not knowing a few of the attributes belonging to it. Therefore, when the *Brahman* who is not the object of perception, who is devoid of attributes, and is pure luminosity, is of Himself completely manifest in His own true nature, then that indistinctness, which consists in the non-perception of a few of His attributes and which is said to be the result of ignorance (or *avidyā*), cannot at all exist (in relation to Him).

Moreover, does this indistinctness which is the result of ignorance (or *avidyā*) disappear at the rise of the knowledge of truth, or does it not ? If it does not disappear, then there cannot be the beatific state of final release. If it disappears, then it has to be determined of what form the reality is. If it be said that it has a distinctly manifest nature, then, it is asked, whether or not this distinctly manifest nature existed before (that reality was veiled by igno-

rance or *avidyā*). If it did exist before, then, (in relation to that reality), there cannot be that indistinctness which is the result of ignorance (or *avidyā*), and (there cannot be) also the disappearance of that (same indistinctness). If it did not exist before, then the beatific state of final release acquires the character of an effect, and thus becomes impermanent.

And it has been already stated[153] that this ignorance (or *avidyā*) cannot exist, simply because its abode cannot be defined. Moreover, even he, who maintains that illusion has an unreal misguiding cause at its root, will find it difficult to establish that illusion does not arise without a (really existing) basis (for it to be imposed upon); because illusion is possible, even when its basis is unreal, in the same way in which that illusion is possible when the misguiding cause producing the illusion and (the reality forming) the seat of (such) a misguiding cause are (both) unreal. And from this (possibility of illusion without a real basis) there will only follow the nothingness of all things.

What has been stated already to the effect that ignorance (or *avidyā*), which has the nature of an entity, is established by the logical process of inference also,—that is not right; because (such) a logical process of inference is impossible. But it may be said that the inference intended to establish this has already been given. True, it has been so given; but it is wrong; because, in (establishing) the ignorance (accepted by you), the middle term of the syllogism[154] proves also that other ignorance which is not acceptable (to you), and is hence unfavourable (to you). There (*i. e.* in your syllogism), if it (viz. the middle term) does not

153. Vide *supra* pp. 157. et seq.

154. Vide *supra* p. 167. where this syllogism is given in full.

form the means of proving that other ignorance, then it ceases to be absolute.[155] If it does form the means of proving that (ignorance) also, then this other ignorance prevents (the *Brahman*) from becoming the witness of the ignorance (or *avidyā* accepted by you); and consequently, the hypothesis of (a positive) ignorance (or *avidyā*) becomes purposeless.

Moreover, the illustrative example[156] is deficient in regard to the middle term, because the light of the lamp-flame does not really possess the power of illumining such things as were unknown before. Indeed, everywhere, it is intelligence alone that possesses the power of illumining (things). For, even when the lamp-flame is in existence, in the absence of intelligence, there will be no illumination in relation to objects. The senses also are merely the means of producing knowledge; but they do not possess the power of illumining (things). The light of the lamp-flame possesses only the power of being helpful to the knowledge-producing sense of sight, through removing the darkness which obstructs (the production of knowledge). The current notion that the lamp-flame is an illuminator, depends upon its being a serviceable means to the sense of sight, which is engaged in the production of that knowledge which illumines (things). It may be said—"The light of the lamp-flame has been cited by us as an illustration, not because we admit it to possess the same illuminating

155. If the middle term of the syllogism here prove an ignorance or *avidyā*, other than what has the nature of a positive entity, then the reasoning becomes too wide. If the same middle term do not, however, prove the ignorance or *avidyā* which is other than the positive one under discussion, then the reasoning becomes too narrow. In either case, this syllogism cannot but be fallacious.

156. Vide *supra* p. 167.

character as knowledge has; but because we admit that knowledge itself has the power of causing such illumination as comes after the removal of what conceals its own object." This is not, however, right. Surely, the character of an illuminator does not consist merely in the removal of what obstructs (illumination); but (consists) wholly in the definite presentation of things (to consciousness), or, in other words, (it consists) in making things fit to be realised. And this (power) belongs only to intelligence. If the power of illumining things, that were not illumined before, is admitted in relation to such things also as are helpful (in the production of knowledge), then, surely the power of illumining things not illumined before has to be admitted in relation to the senses also, because, (in the production of knowledge), they are helpful in the highest degree. If it be so admitted, then, because, (in producing knowledge), they (viz. the senses) are not preceded in time by some other thing capable of being removed by them, the middle term (in your syllogism) ceases to be absolute. And now let us have done with this (kind of criticism.)

And in this connection there are the following counter-syllogistic statements:—That ignorance (or *avidyā*), which is the subject of dispute (between us), has not for its abode the *Brahman* who is pure intelligence: because it (viz. that *avidyā*) possesses the character of (illusory) non-knowledge,[157] like the (illusory) non-knowledge which relates to the mother-of-pearl, &c; indeed this has the knower for its abode. That ignorance (or *avidyā*), which is the subject of dispute (between us), does not conceal the

157. Non-knowledge is used here so as to denote, either false knowledge, or the opposite of knowledge, or what is other than knowledge.

Brahman who is pure intelligence : because it possesses the character of (illusory) non-knowledge, like the (illusory) non-knowledge which relates to the mother-of-pearl, &c ; indeed this conceals (only external) objects. That ignorance (or *avidyā*), which is the subject of dispute (between us),is not capable of being removed by knowledge: because it does not possess the power of concealing the objects of knowledge. Whatever non-knowledge is removed by knowledge, that (non-knowledge) conceals the objects of knowledge, like the non-knowledge relating to the mother-of-pearl, &c. The *Brahman* is not the seat of ignorance (or *avidyā*), because, (according to you), He, like pots, &c., does not possess the quality of being the knower. The *Brahman* is not concealed by ignorance (or *avidyā*) ; because He is not, (according to you), an object of knowledge. Whatever is concealed by non-knowledge, that has to be an object of knowledge, like the mother-of-pearl, &c. The *Brahman* is not that ignorance (or *avidyā*) which is capable of being removed by knowledge ; because He is not an object of knowledge. Whatever non-knowledge is capable of being removed by knowledge, that (non-knowledge) is an object of knowledge, like (the non-knowledge relating to) the mother-of-pearl, &c. That knowledge which is acquired with the help of the accepted means of proof, and (the nature of) which is the subject of dispute (between us,) has not, for its antecedent in time, any ignorance (or *avidyā*) which is different from its own antecedent non-existence ; because that (knowledge also) possesses the character of such knowledge as is obtained with the help of the accepted means of proof; like the knowledge which, being derived with the help of the accepted means of proof, proves (according to you) the ignorance (or *avidyā*) that is admitted by you. Know-

ledge cannot be the destroyer of an entity; because it possesses the character of knowledge, even when it is not associated with the manifestation of any particular (constructive or destructive) power. Whatever happens to be the destroyer of an entity, that is seen to be either the knowledge or the non-knowledge which is associated with the manifestation of a particular power, like the knowledge which is possessed by the Lord, and by *Yogins* and others, or like the (non-knowledge which is found in a) club and other similar objects. That ignorance (or *avidyā*) which has the nature of an entity is not capable of being destroyed by knowledge; because it possesses the nature of an entity, like pots, &c., (which are not destroyed merely by any knowledge).

It may be said again here that we (actually) see the (subsequent) stultifying knowledge destroy fear[158] and other such emotions, which are (positive entities) caused by the previous (false) knowledge (of a serpent superimposed upon a rope, for instance). But that is not right. Indeed, the disappearance of those (emotions of fear, &c.,) is not due to knowledge ; because, being transitory, they themselves go out of existence, and because also, when their cause is removed, they never recur again. Their transitoriness is made out from the fact that they are experienced, like knowledge, only in the presence of that which brings them into existence, and also from the fact that they are not experienced otherwise. And if fear and other

158. This is an oft-quoted illustration of the *Adwaitins*. They hold that fear and such other emotions are of the nature of positive entities, and may arise from illusory causes like the false perception of a snake in a rope, and that they can be destroyed by the knowledge of the reality. So also ignorance or *avidyā* has the nature of an entity and can be destroyed by the knowledge of the *Brahman*.

such emotions are not transitory, then, in a continuous succession of the same mental impressions which form the cause of fear and other such emotions, every one of those mental impressions will, without any difference whatever, act as the cause of the production of fear and of other such emotions ; and thus there will be room for many fears (to arise without cessation from the same cause to the same person) : and therefore also (they cannot but be transitory).

By the mention of purposeless qualifications in the statement that (knowledge) has, for its antecedent in time, another existing thing which is different from the antecedent non-existence of that (knowledge itself),[159] your wonderful skill in using words is indeed well shown forth.

Therefore, by means of the logical process of inference also, there cannot be the establishment of that ignorance (or *avidyâ*) which has the nature of an entity.

It will be stated presently that ignorance (or *avidyâ*) cannot be established by scriptural evidence as well as by the evidence of circumstantial presumption in relation to the interpretation of the scriptures. This proposition[160] also, namely, that the cause of a thing, which is unreal, is also certainly unreal, will be disproved by the logical

159. Vide *supra* p. 167., where the statement in which these qualifications occur, runs thus;—"That knowledge, which is obtained with the help of the accepted means of proof and (the nature of) which is the subject of dispute between us, has for its antecedent in time, another existing thing which is different from the antecedent non-existence of that (knowledge) itself." The object of the statement above quoted is to prove that ignorance or *avidyâ* is a positive entity, but not simply the negation of knowledge. This idea that it is an entity is expressed by the use of the word *vastu* which means an existent thing. Therefore it is pointed out in the argument, here, that all the qualifications attached to that word *vastu* so as to make it signify an entity are redundant in as much as, of itself, it signifies an entity.

160. Vide *supra* p. 164.

arguments that are appropriately given in the section[161] which begins with the aphorism.—"(The *Brahman*) is not (the cause of this world) being different from this world &c." [*Ved. Sūt.* II. 1.4.].

Hence, there can be no perception which has that indescribable ignorance (or *avidyā*) for its object. It (viz. that ignorance) can not be admitted to be of such (indescribable) nature even though (in relation to it), there are perception, illusion, and stultification. Whatever becomes manifest to consciousness, that alone forms the object of perception, illusion, and stultification. It is not proper to assume that what is not arrived at by means of these modes of manifestation, as well as by means of any other mode of manifestation, forms the object of these (very modes of manifestation). It may be said again, thus:—There is the perception of silver, &c., in the mother-of-pearl, &c.; and even at the time of this perception there is the stultification to the effect that it (viz. silver) is not in existence (there); and one thing cannot, possibly, appear like another: for all these reasons, it has to be assumed that a new indescribable something in the form of this silver becomes manifest under the influence of a misguiding cause. But it is not right to say so: because, even when such an assumption is made, the appearance of one thing like another is not avoided; and because it is possible to have perceptual manifestation, volitional activity, illusion, and stultification (of illusion), only when it is admitted that it is possible for one thing to appear like another; and because also it is improper to assume the existence of a

161. This section comprises *sūtras* II. I. 4 to 12. and goes by the name of the *Vilakshaṇatwādhikaraṇa*, on account of the first *sūtra* in the section being as follows:—"The *Brahman* is not the cause of this world, being different from this world; and such difference is made out from the scripture."

thing which is absolutely unseen and has no originating cause whatsoever. Indeed, this (silver) which is assumed (by you) to be indescribable is not perceived (then at the time of the illusion) to be indescribable, but (is perceived) to be nothing other than real silver. If, (however), it appeared to be altogether indescribable, then, there would be no room for illusion, for stultification, and also for volitional activity. Hence, you also have to admit the view that it is only the mother-of-pearl and other such things which appear to consciousness in the form of silver and other such things; because, when one thing does not appear like another, it is not possible to have (the related) manifestation, volitional activity, stultification, and illusion (in connection with things), and because also it is not possible to avoid that (kind of otherwise-manifestation).

Moreover, even those, who hold other opinions regarding the manifestation of things to consciousness, have necessarily to accept the appearance of things otherwise than as they are, although they may have gone very far (in their course of reasoning). According to the view[162] which says that what becomes manifest to consciousness is mere non-existence, (this non-existence has to appear) in the form of existence. According to the view[163] which says that what becomes manifest to consciousness is merely the idea, (this idea has to appear) in the form of objects. According to the view[164] which says that what becomes manifest to consciousness is the non-apprehension (of the differ-

162. This refers to Nihilism or the view of the Mādhyamikas.

163. This refers to Idealism, or the view of the Yogāchāras.

164. This is the view of those who are known as *Akhyātivādins*. The names of the several *khyātis* or theories of perception are given in this commonly quoted *śloka*—*Ātmakhyātirasatkhyātirakhyātiḥkhyātir-anyathā | tathānirvachanakhyātirity-etatkhyātipañchakam||*

ence (between two things), the characteristic of one thing has to appear as the characteristic of another thing, and two perceptions have to appear as only one; and even on the supposition that there is no object corresponding to this erroneous perception, (a non-existent) object has to appear as existent.

Moreover, he, who holds the view that here (*i. e.* in the mother-of-pearl) a kind of new and indescribable silver is born, has also to state the cause of the origin of that (silver). It (viz. the cause of the origin of that silver) can not be the mere manifestation of that silver, because that (manifestation) has that (same silver) for its object, and so cannot itself come into existence before the production of that (silver). That (a particular manifestation) has arisen without relating to any particular object, that that (manifestation itself) has afterwards produced that (object), and then has made it its own object,—this is indeed the teaching of very great men!! Again (it may be said that) it (viz. the cause of the origin of that silver) is an error (or defect) found in the senses, &c. This is not so, because it (viz. such a cause of erroneous perception) abides in the person, and so cannot have the power of producing an effect that is found in relation to external objects. Then again it is not the senses (that form the cause of the origin of such silver), because they are the means of producing knowledge. Nor are the wrongly affected senses (the cause of the origin of that silver), because they also are capable of giving rise to something peculiar, only in relation to that knowledge which is produced by themselves. That the beginningless ignorance (or *avidyā*) constitutes the cause (of the production of that silver) has, indeed, been already disproved.

Again, how is it that this indescribable and newly produced totality of things is made to be the object of the

notion and of the word which denote silver and other (such falsely perceived) objects, but is not made the object of the notion and of the word which denote pots and other (correctly perceived) things? If it be said that it is due to their similarity with silver and other (such falsely perceived) objects, then let the notion and the word (which denote this new and indescribable totality of things) denote that (totality) to be the same as that (silver and other such things which are perceived to be unreal). If it be said that it is due to their association with the genus of silver and of other (such falsely perceived) objects, it is asked whether this genus is real, or whether it is unreal. Surely, it cannot be real; because, (in such a case), it cannot be (inseparably) associated with what is unreal. Nor can it be unreal; because, (then), it cannot be in (inseparable) association with what is real, and because also it is not possible for the notion and the word which denote reality to be made to denote that which is unreal. Thus we have had enough in the way of criticising unripe and fallacious reasoning.

On the other hand, (the truth is as follows):—"The opinion of those who know the *Vedas* is that all knowledge is real, because, according to the *Śrutis* and the *Smṛitis*, every thing may become manifest in the form of every other thing. At the commencement of (the portion dealing with) creation and the other acts (of the Lord) which are preceded by His volition—'May I become manifold'—[*Chhând. Up.* VI. 2. 3.]—it is urged in the *Śruti* itself—'(I will make) each of these[165] tri-partite'.[166]—[*Chhând. Up.* VI. 3. 3 &

165. These, namely, the things fire, water and earth. Vide *Chhând. Up.* VI. 2, 3 & 4.

166. Tripartition is the process by which each one of the three things namely, fire, water and earth is so constituted as to possess the character of all the three elements of *tejas*, water, and earth. This composition is said to be caused at the beginning of creation. Vide *Chhând. Up.* VI. 3. 4 & 5. Thus, when the thing fire is

4.]. Thus, indeed, the tri-partition (of the elements) is made out by direct revelation. The red colour of fire is the colour of (the element) *tejas*, the white (colour of fire) is (the colour of the element) of water, and the black (colour of fire) is (the colour of the element) of earth.[167] Thus this tripleness of form is shown by the *Śruti* itself to exist in relation to fire itself. It is so stated in the *Vishṇu-Purāṇa*[168] also at the commencement of (the portion dealing with) creation, in the following and other passages :—'Then they (viz. the constituent elements[169]

divided into two equal parts, one of these halves is found to be made up of the element of fire; and if the other half be again subdivided into two parts, one of these would be seen to be made up of the element of water, and the other, of the element of earth. Such is the case also with watery and earthy things. Hence 50 per cent of the thing fire, is made up of the element *tejas*, 25 per cent, of the element of water, and 25 per cent, of the element of earth. To this thing the name of fire is given, because in it the element *tejas* preponderates over the other two elements. Similarly that thing is called water in the composition of which the element of water preponderates over the other two elements of *tejas* and earth. And that thing is called earth in the composition of which the element of earth preponderates over the other two elements of *tejas* and water. In this manner every thing in the world may be said to contain every other thing in the world, but it derives its name from that element in its composition which preponderates over the others.

167. Vide *Chhānd.Up.*VI.4. 1 to 6.

168. Vide *V. P.* I. 2.

169. The constituent elements or *Tattvas* of the universe are as follow in the descending order:—(*1*) *Pradhāna* or *Prakṛiti*, nature, (*2*) *Mahat* or *Buddhi*, the 'great principle', (*3*) *Ahaṅkāra* or egoity; the *Tanmātras* or the subtle and rudimentary elements characterised by (*4*) *Śabda*, sound, (*5*) *Sparśa*, touch, (*6*) *Rūpa*, form or colour, (*7*) *Rasa*, taste, (*8*) *Gandha*, smell ; the grosser elements corresponding to these *Tanmātras* are (*9*) *Ākāśa*, ether, (*10*) *Vāyu*, air, (*11*) *Tejas*, light or heat, (*12*) *Ap*, water, (*13*) *Saṅghāta* or *Pṛithivī*, the earth ; (*14*) the mind ; the senses of (*15*) *Śrotra*, hearing, (*16*) *Tvak*, touch, (*17*) *Chakshus*, sight, (*18*) *Rasa*, taste (*19*) *Gandha*, smell ; and the organs of (*20*) speaking, (*21*) working, (*22*) walking, and the organs connected with (*23*) defæcation and (*24*) reproduction. The 25th element is the individual soul, which is beyond the *Prakṛiti*, in the ascending order.

themselves) possessing varied powers were, while separate, wholly unable to create beings, without (themselves) having been thrown together. Having secured combination with each other, and abiding in each other, the elements, that begin with the universal principle known as the *mahat* and end with the (well known) particular principles, have gone to make up the universe indeed.'[170] Further, the *Sûtrakāra* (viz. Bādarāyaṇa) also has similarly spoken of the tripleness of form, belonging to the elements, to the effect that, although all created things consist of the three elements (of *tejas*, water and earth), still the mention of water as the name of a particular thing is due to the preponderance of that element in it;[171] and thus arises a difference of names (in relation to things). The wise hold that the direction of the *Śruti* to use the *pûtika* plant in the absence of the *soma* plant is due to the presence of the constituents of the *soma* (in the *pûtika*). The use of wild rice (for offerings) in the absence of cultivated rice is due to (the wild rice) possessing the characteristics of the cultivated rice. That which is found to form a part of any (homogeneous) substance—that alone is similar (in essence) to that (substance). The presence of silver, &c., in the mother-of-pearl, &c., is thus taught by the *Śruti* itself. The difference in the names of things such as silver, mother-of-pearl, &c., has preponderance for its cause. Moreover, the mother-of-pearl, &c., are perceived as being similar to silver, &c.. Hence, the presence here (*i. e.* in the mother-of-pearl) of that (viz.

The *Sâṅkhyas* admit only these 25 *tattvas* or principles. The *Vedântins* however add the *Brahman* as the 26th *tattva*, above and beyond the individual soul. Cf. *M. Bh.* II. 223. & *Manu.* I.

170. For the seven principles from the *Mahat* downwards, vide *supra* n. 169. These are called universal principles, and the remaining sixteen are called particular principles. Vide *V.P.* I. 2. 52 to 54.

171. *Ved. Sût.* III. 1. 2.

silver) is determined by perception. Sometimes, on account of a defect in the sense of sight, &c., the silver-part (in the mother-of-pearl) is apprehended without the shell-part; and, accordingly, one in quest of silver begins to act in obedience to volition. When the defect is removed, and the shell-part of the mother-of-pearl is apprehended, that (volitional activity in regard to silver) ceases. Therefore, the perception of silver &c., in the mother-of-pearl, &c., is real. The relation of the stultified and the stultifier also, (existing between these perceptions), results from the preponderance of the one (perception) over the other, according as the apprehension of the preponderance of the mother-of-pearl (over the silver) is partial or complete. Therefore, this (relation of the stultified and the stultifier) is not dependent upon their relating to unreal things and real things. The rule that every thing has the characteristics of every other thing is thus established."

In the condition of dreams also, according to the merit and demerit of living beings, God Himself creates corresponding objects, which are capable of being perceived by certain particular persons, and which come to their end after a certain particular length of time. To this same effect is the following scriptural text relating to the condition of dreams:—"There (*i.e.* in the condition of dreams), there are no chariots, no horses to be yoked, and no roads. But He creates the chariots, the horses to be yoked, and the roads. There is no bliss, no happiness and no joy, but He creates bliss, happiness and joy. There, there are no puddles, no lakes, and no rivers, but He creates the puddles, the lakes, and the rivers. Indeed, He is the creator." [*Brih. Up.* IV. 3. 10.]. Although these things are not at that time (of dreaming) capable of being perceived by all persons other (than the dreamer), yet the Lord creates such things

to be perceived only by each particular (dreaming) person. Indeed, He is the creator. That kind of creatorship is appropriate to Him who wills the truth and whose powers are wonderful. This is the meaning (of the above scriptural text). Again (it is stated in the scripture thus) :—" That Person, who, engaged in creating things according to His free will and pleasure, is ever wakeful, while all these are asleep,—That is the Brilliant One, That is the *Brahman*, That alone is called the Immortal. All the worlds abide in Him, and there is none to transcend Him." [*Kaṭh. Up.* V. 8.]. The *Sūtrakāra* also, (first of all) in these two aphorisms, namely, "In the intermediate state (*i. e.* in the dreaming state), there is creation, for, it (viz. the scripture) says (so)."—[*Ved. Sūt.* III. 2. 1.], "And some (say the individual self is the creator, sons and others (being the things created)." [*Ved. Sūt.* III. 2. 2.],—supposes the individual self to be the creator in relation to the things seen in dreams; then by means of this aphorism, namely,—" But it (viz. all that is seen in dreams) is merely the *māyā*[172] (of the Lord but not the creation of the individual self), because they (viz. the attributes of willing the truth, &c.,) have not their nature manifest in full (the individual self in the *samsāra* state)."—[*Ved. Sūt.* III. 2. 3.],—and by means of other aphorisms, he shows that the individual self cannot have the characteristics of the creator, because the natural characteristics of willing the truth, &c., belonging to the individual self, are all unmanifest there in the *samsāra* state. This wonderful creation, created so as to be capable of being perceived by certain particular (dreaming) persons, altogether proceeds from the Lord. Seeing that the scripture says—" All the worlds abide in Him." [*Kaṭh. Up.*

172. *Māyā* here means wonderful creation.

V. 8], it is made out that the Supreme Self is Himself the creator there (*i. e.* in dreams). Thus, he (the *Sūtrakāra*) disproves (the supposition with which he started). To him, who, sleeping in a room or in any other place, experiences a dream, it is possible to go to another country with his own body, to be crowned there as a king, to be decapitated, and so on. These are the results of his *karmic* merit and demerit, and are possible only in consequence of the creation of another body having the same form and configuration as the body that is in the state of sleep.

But in the (perception of the) yellow conch and other such things (by the jaundiced eye), the ocular rays[173] combined with the bilious substance existing in the eye are brought into association with the conch and other such things. The whiteness belonging to the conch is not apprehended, because it is overpowered by the yellow colour belonging to the bile. Hence, as in the case of the conch-shell covered with gold, there is the perception that the conch is yellow. The bilious substance and the yellow colour, belonging to it, are very subtle, and are not therefore apprehended by the standers by. But, by him who is (thus) afflicted with biliousness, they are, though subtle, apprehended well, because they have proceeded from his own eyes and are thus in very close proximity (to him). They are also, though at a distance, apprehended by means of the ocular rays, which possess that peculiar power which is due to having apprehended them (in close proximity). A crystal gem lying close to a china rose is apprehended to be red, because it is overpowered by the brilliant coloration of that (china rose). Although the (coloured) brilliance of the china rose radi-

173. Vide *supra*. p. 93. n. 59.

ates in all directions, yet it is apprehended with great clearness, only when it is in association with a transparent substance (like the crystal gem). Thus, this (redness of the crystal gem) is capable of being established by perception. Again, the perception of water in a mirage possesses the character of reality, because water is (always) found in association with both the elements of *tejas* and earth, and because there is (here) no apprehension of *tejas* and earth on account of some defect in the sense organs, and because also there is the apprehension of water through the influence of some unseen agency. Also, in regard to the circle of fire produced by the rotation of a fire-brand, the perception of that (circle) is rightly caused, in consequence of there being no apprehension of the interspaces (between any two successive positions of the fire-brand), owing to the very rapid motion of the fire-brand and its consequent association with all the parts (of the circumference). Even in the perception of this circle, there is indeed such apprehension of certain particular objects in association with certain particular positions, as is attended with the non-apprehension of the interspaces. In the case of some positions there is the non-apprehension of interspaces, for the reason that the interspaces are themselves absent. In other positions, there is the non-apprehension (of interspaces) on account of the rapidity of motion. Such is the difference (between them). Therefore, this (perception of the circle of fire) is based upon reality. The perception of one's own face in the mirror and in other such things is also based upon reality. The rays proceeding from the eye are stopped and reflected in their movement by the mirror and other such things; and thus, they first apprehend the mirror and other such things, and then apprehend one's own face and other similar

objects. In this case also, on account of the rapidity of movement (of the ocular aura), there is no apprehension of the interspace (between the mirror and the image), and consequently there is such a perception. Also in regard to the illusion relating to direction in space, since any other region of space may be actually found to exist in this (region of space), that other region of space is, through the influence of some unseen agency, apprehended as if unassociated with this region of space. Therefore the apprehension of one region of space as another is also based upon reality itself. Even in the case of the perception of two moons and other such perceptions, there is a division caused in the movement of the aura proceeding from the eye, owing to *timira*,[174] pressure with the fingers, &c., and hence there arises a variety in the means intended to help (the apprehension of the moon). Thus a duality of the means which are independent of each other forms the cause of the two apprehensions of the (one) moon. Of this (duality), one means apprehends the moon in its own place. But the second one, being somewhat crooked in its movement, first apprehends the region near to the moon and then apprehends the moon there as dissociated from its own place. Therefore, in the apprehension of the moon in association with two regions at the same time, there arises, on account of the variety in the apprehension, a variety in the form of the thing apprehended; and there is also the absence of the apprehension of unity. Thus there is this particular perception to the effect that there are two moons. The association of that (moon which is perceived in a place other than its own), with that place which is other than

174. Vide *supra* p. 104. n. 69.

its own, is due to the incessant apprehension of (that) other place and of the moon as unassociated with its own place. Therefore, the two apprehensions of the moon which are associated with two regions are also real. On account of there being a duality in the apprehension, the duality of the form which is apprehended in relation to the moon is also real. However, it may be held (here) that of the two apprehensions of the moon which are characterised by two different qualifications, only one moon has to be the object. But, in such an apprehension, there is no power possessed by the eye itself (to reduce it to only one apprehension), as (there is) in the case of the recognitive cognition; and so the ocular perception (of two moons) continues to remain as such. Although both the eyes form (only) one means intended to help (the apprehension of things), nevertheless, we have to assume from the effect produced (in this case of double vision) that the aura proceeding from the eye becomes changed into two means intended to help (the apprehension of things), for the reason that it (viz. that aura) is split up by *timira* and other such misguiding causes. But when the misguiding cause is removed, the moon, as associated with its own region, becomes known by means of only one apprehension. Therefore, the belief arises that the moon is only in one place. This duality of the means is due to the misguiding cause; the duality of apprehension is due to that (duality of the means); the duality in the form of the thing apprehended is due to that (duality of apprehension). Accordingly, it (viz. this explanation) is faultless. Therefore it is a settled conclusion that the totality of all perceptions is (altogether) based upon reality.

Criticisms of the other theories of perception are fully given by those who maintain those (various) theories

themselves, and so no attempt is made (here) in the way of (discussing) them. Or rather, what is the use (of indulging) in too many forms of discussion of this kind? To those who accept the whole collection of the criteria of truth known as perception, inference, and scripture, and who acknowledge that Highest *Brahman* who is understood by means of the scripture, who is devoid of the least taint of all evil, who is possessed of hosts of innumerable auspicious qualities unsurpassed in excellence, and who is omniscient and wills the truth—(to them), what is there that cannot be proved and what is there that cannot be accomplished ? Indeed, the Divine Lord, who is the Highest *Brahman*, creates the whole of this world to suit the merit and demerit of the individual souls, so that it may be enjoyed (and endured by them). Accordingly, by Him there are created certain things which form the common objects of experience to all, and are capable of being experienced as the experience of (*karmic*) results in the form of pleasures, pains, and states of indifference to pleasures and pains; and (by Him are also created) certain other things which are the objects of the experience of certain particular persons only, and which last only for a certain length of time, and are to be experienced as subject to various specific conditions. It being so, the relation of the stultified and the stultifier (between these two sets of things) is due to the one constituting the object of the exprience common to all, and the other not constituting such an object.

Thus the whole (argument) is perfectly appropriate.

Then again what has been urged[175] to the effect that (the *avidyā*), which is unfit to be defined either as an entity or as a non-entity, is established by revelation,

175. Vide *supra* pp. 30 & 31.

—that is not right; because in the following scriptural passage—*Anṛitena hi pratyūḍhāḥ*[176]—and in others, the word *anṛita* does not denote what is indescribable. Indeed, the word *anṛita* denotes what is not *ṛita*. The word *ṛita* expresses *karma*[177] (or the fruits of action), because it is stated[178] in the scripture that "there are the two enjoying *ṛita* (or the fruits of action)." *Ṛita* is that *karma* which is free from attachment to fruits, which consists in the worship of the Highest Person, and the fruit of which is the attainment of that Person. Here (in the passage under discussion), *anṛita* is the *karma* which is different from this (*ṛita*), and (therefore) has *samsāra*[179] for its result, and is (thus) opposed to the attainment of the *Brahman*. This (we learn) from the scriptural passage[180]—"They (*i. e.* the creatures) do not obtain this world of the *Brahman*, being drawn away by *anṛita*." Also in the passage[181]—"Then there was neither existence (*sat*) nor non-existence (*asat*)"—the words *sat* and *asat* refer to intelligent and non-intelligent objects as produced by the secondary particular creation;[182] because this passage is intended to establish that the two things, which, as found at the time of creation, are denoted by the words *sat* and *tyat*[183] and form the

176. Vide *supra* pp. 31 & 157. This is apparently a quotation from *Chhând. Up.* VIII. 3. 2.—"For they (*i. e.* the creatures) are drawn away (from the *Brahman*) by means of *anṛita*."

177. *Ṛita* may also mean religious duties or works performed in this life, truth, law, &c.

178. Vide *Kaṭh. Up.* III. 1.

179. The word *samsāra* means the ever-recurring succession of births and deaths and the consequent continuance of the bondage of the soul.

180. Vide *Chhând. Up.* VIII. 3. 2.

181. *Taitt. Br.* II. 8. 9. & *R. V.* X. 129. 1 & 3. Vide *supra* p. 31.

182. This is the creation of form-possessing conscious and unconscious bodies taking place after the creation of undifferentiated primordial matter.

183. Vide *Taitt. Up.* II. 6. 1., where the individual self which is intelligent and the non-intelligent *Prakṛiti*, or nature in its undifferentiated primordial state, are respectively called *Sat* and *Tyat*, for the reason that the

differentiated intelligent and non-intelligent objects produced by the secondary particular creation, are, at the time of universal dissolution, absorbed into the thing which is denoted by the word *tamas*[184] and constitutes the undifferentiated primordial non-intelligent matter. In this (passage), there is no mention made of anything which is said to possess the character of being indescribable either as an entity or as a non-entity; because only the absence, at a particular time, of the things denoted by the words *sat* and *asat* is (herein) mentioned. What is denoted by the word *tamas* here is made out to mean undifferentiated primordial non-intelligent matter from another scriptural passage (also) which is to the effect—"The *avyakta*[185] is absorbed into the *akshara*; the *akshara* is absorbed into the *tamas*." [*Sub. Up.* II.]. By the word *tamas* is denoted the subtle state of that *prakṛiti* which is made up of undifferentiated primordial non-intelligent matter; this is indeed true. But if it be said that this (*prakṛiti*) is denoted by the word *māyā*, as in the passage

individual self is incapable of undergoing any transformation, and the non-intelligent *Prakṛiti* is capable of undergoing transformations at all times.

184. *Tamas* is one of the names of the *Pradhāna* or the *Prakṛiti* in its undifferentiated primordial state. Vide *Sub. Up.* II. In this state, it is said to be very subtle, so that it cannot be easily distinguished from the individual self with which it is invariably associated.

185. Four different states of the *Prakṛiti* or nature are mentioned in *Sub. Up.* II. In its primary undifferentiated state, it is called the *Avibhakta-tamas*; in its first differentiated state, it is called the *Vibhakta-tamas*; in its next state, it is called the *Akshara* in which even the qualities of *Sattva*, *Rajas* and *Tamas* are not seen to be differentiated and in which it is also said to be promiscuously mixed up with the individual self; in its last state, it is called the *Avyakta* in which the differentiation of the three *Guṇas* has begun to take place. From this *Avyakta* proceeds the principle known as the *Mahat*, from this again proceeds the principle called *Ahaṅkāra* or egoity; and so on.

"Know then that *prakṛiti* is *māyā*." [*Śvet. Up.* IV. 10.], and that it is therefore indescribable; it is replied that it is not so, because the word *māyā* is not known to express what is indescribable. If it be said (again) that the word *māyā*, being synonymous with unreality (*i. e.* ignorance or *avidyā*), expresses what is indescribable, it is replied that this (also) is not right. Indeed, the word *māyā* does not, in all cases, denote unreality (*i. e.* ignorance or *avidyā*) ; because the word *māyā* is used to denote the weapons of *Rākshasas* and *Asuras* which, surely, are really existent things. Accordingly, there is this passage :—"The thousand *māyās* (or wonderfully created weapons) of Śambara were destroyed one after another by that quickly moving (discus of the Lord) in guarding from injury the body of the boy (Prahlāda)." [*V. P.* I. 19. 20.]. Hence the word *māyā* denotes the creation of wonderful things. *Prakṛiti* also is called by the name of *māyā*, because it certainly possesses the power of creating wonderful things. The scriptural passage—"Out of this (*prakṛiti*), He, who is the owner of the *māyā* (*i. e.* the Lord), creates this world wherein another being (viz. the individual self) is bound down by *māyā*."—[*Śvet. Up.* IV. 9.]—also points out that the *prakṛiti*, which is denoted by the word *māyā*, possesses the power of causing the creation of wonderful things. The Highest Person is called the *Māyin*, simply because He is the owner of that (*māyā*),[186] but not because He is characterised by ignorance (or *avidyā*). Indeed, it is stated in the scriptural passage—"And in that (world) another being (viz. the individual soul) is bound down by *māyā*." [*Śvet Up.* IV. 9.], as also in the passage—"When the individual soul, that has been asleep under the influence

186. The word *māyā* means either wonderful powers or wonderful creation. It also means skill, knowledge, &c.

of the beginningless *māyā*, wakes up, (then he knows the Unborn One)."—[*Māṇḍ. Up.* II. 21.], that the individual soul is bound down by *māyā* (*i. e.* by nature). In the (following) scriptural passage also—"Indra (*i.e.* the Highest Lord) is known to assume many forms through *māyās* (or His wonderful powers of creating things)"—[*Bṛih. Up.* II. 5. 19.],[187] the wonderful powers (of the Lord) are denoted (by the word *māyā*). Indeed, it is only for this reason that it is said—"He (*i. e.* the Lord) shines very much like *tvashṭṛi* (*i. e.* the creator)." [*R. V.* VI. 47. 19.]. Indeed nothing shines forth that is overpowered by unreality (viz. ignorance or *avidyā*). Even in the passage—"My *māyā* is difficult to transcend."—[*B. G.* VII. 14.], it is stated that it (viz. *māyā*) consists of qualities; therefore, what is denoted (by *māyā*) is that *prakṛiti* itself which is made up of the three qualities (of *sattva* or goodness, *rajas* or passion, and *tamas* or darkness). Thus, by means of the scriptures, there is no establishment of that ignorance (or *avidyā*) which cannot be described either as an entity or as a non-entity.

Nor (is that ignorance or *avidyā* established) by means of the inappropriateness (which, in the absence of ignorance or *avidyā*, would result) in relation to the teaching of unity (between the individual self and the Supreme Self). For, in the passage[188]—"That thou art,"—there is the teaching of unity between the individual self and the Supreme Self; yet we do not see here any such inappropriateness as forms the cause for assuming that ignorance (or *avidyā*) which is contrary to (the nature of) the *Brahman* who is referred to in the context, who is known here by the word

187. Vide also *R. V.* VI. 47. 18. 7. & also n. 142 *supra*.
188. Vide *Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8.

'That', who is omniscient, and who wills the truth, and is the cause of the creation, preservation, and destruction of all the worlds. The teaching of unity (here) is very appropriate, because by the word 'thou' also, (as by the word 'That'), is denoted the *Brahman* whose body is the individual soul. By the scriptural passage—"Entering in along with this individual self which is (also) the same as Myself, I evolve the differentiation of names and forms."—(*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 3. 2.]—it is stated that all things possess names and forms only to the extent that they include the Highest Self. Hence, there need be no assumption of ignorance (or *avidyā*) in relation to the *Brahman*.

In the *Itihāsas* and the *Purāṇas*[189] also, the discussion regarding any *avidyā* that is related to the *Brahman* is nowhere to be found. Nevertheless, it may be said as follows:—The passage[190] beginning with—"The Lights are Vishṇu"—[*V. P.* II. 12. 38.]—lays down the proposition that the *Brahman* is the only reality; then the passage beginning with[191]—"Because the Lord has the nature of Intelligence, therefore, He (has the All for His form)"—explains that the world which is differentiated by the distinctions of mountains, oceans, lands, &c., is the result of the display of *avidyā* in relation

189. Vide *supra* p. 136. n. 140.

190. The whole of this passage is as follows:—"The Lights are Vishṇu, the worlds are Vishṇu, the forests are Vishṇu, the mountains and the regions of space, the rivers and the seas, all that is existent and all that is non-existent, are all He alone, O thou, the best of Brāhmaṇas!"

191. Vide *supra* p. 31. where the *Adwaitins* are made to quote this passage thus:—"Because the Lord is of the nature of Intelligence, therefore He has the All for His form. But He is no material thing. Know then that the distinctions of mountain, ocean, land, &c., are indeed born out of Him and are the outcome of illusion in Intelligence." *V. P.* II. 12. 39.

to the *Brahman* whose essential nature is altogether Intelligence; afterwards the passage[192] beginning with—"But when.........(there remains Intelligence alone) in its own form, and pure, (then indeed cease to exist the fruits of the tree of illusion)"—confirms that it (viz. the world) is the result of the display of ignorance, by means of the fact that, at the time when the *Brahman*, whose true nature is Intelligence, exists in His own natural state, there is to be found no distinction whatever between things; thereafter by means of the two stanzas, one beginning with[193]—"Is there any (external) object"—and the other beginning with[194]—*Mahī ghaṭatvam* (which means "the mud, the formation of a pot out of it,")—the unreality of the distinctions between things is stated even from the stand-point of the perception[195] of the world; then the

192. This again has been quoted according to the *Adwaitins* on pp. 31 & 32 *supra*, thus:—"But when, after all the effects of works are destroyed, there remains Intelligence alone in Its own true form, pure and devoid of evil, then indeed cease to exist those fruits of the tree of illusion, which form the distinctions of things in things." *V. P.* II. 12. 40.

193. The whole of this passage is to the following effect:—"Is there anywhere any (external) object which is without beginning, middle and end, which is always uniform, and which, moreover, undergoes changes of state, and which frequently is not what it was. If such a thing there be, how can it indeed be the reality?" *V. P.* II. 12. 41.

194. This passage may be translated thus:—Those who, through the influence of their own *Karmas*, are prevented from having correct notions regarding (the nature of) the self—by them are seen (those various states of matter such as) the mud, the formation of a pot (out of it), the breaking (up of that pot) into two halves, its turning into particles, their turning into dust, and this again into atoms. (This being so), tell me whether this (matter) can be the (unchangeable) reality. *V. P.* II. 12. 42.

195. According to the *Adwaitins*, the true nature of perception is to apprehend the one Reality which exists at all times, but not to apprehend those distinctions which make up the world and are all super-imposed on the Reality by Ignorance or *Avidyā*. Vide *supra* pp. 42 & 43.

stanza beginning with[196]—"Therefore, (there can be) nothing other than Intelligence"—sums up the already enunciated unreality of whatever is different from the *Brahman*; then by means of the passage[197] beginning with—"The one Intelligence...(is apprehended in many ways)"—it is made clear that one's own *karma* alone is the basis of ignorance (or *avidyâ*) which is the cause of the perception of difference in relation to the *Brahman* whose true nature is Intelligence; then, by means of the passage[198] beginning with—"The Intelligence which is pure............(is one)."—the true nature of the *Brahman*, who has the character of Intelligence, is examined; and (lastly) by means of the passage[199]—"(Thus) have I told you of what is real, &c."—the truth has been taught to you to the effect that the *Brahman* whose true nature is Intelligence is alone real and nothing else (is real); that everything else is certainly unreal; and that the reality of the world and all other things is merely phenomenal. And such, indeed, is seen to be the teaching (given in the *Vishṇu-Purâṇa* in the portion

196. This passage is found quoted on p. 32. *supra* as follows:—Therefore, at no time and in no place, can there be any group of things other than Intelligence, O thou, the twice-born one. *V. P.* II. 12. 43.

197 This is the second half of the passage *V. P.* II. 12. 43:—The One Intelligence is apprehended in many ways by those whose minds are variously constituted on account of the variety of their own *Karmas*.

198. This passage runs thus on p. 32. *supra*:—The Intelligence which is pure, devoid of evil, devoid of sorrow, and is free from contact with all greed, &c., is one and always one, is the Highest and the Highest Lord; He is Vâsudeva, other than whom there is nothing. *V. P.* II. 12. 44.

199. This again is quoted on p. 32. *supra* as follows:—Thus have I told you of what is real existence, and how Intelligence is real and all else is unreal; and I have told you also that this which is phenomenally realised well for practical purposes is that on which the world is dependent. *V. P.* II. 12. 45.

named *Bhuvanakośa*).[200]

All this is not right. Here, after explaining *in extenso* the nature of the world which is conceived to be an unopened flower-bud, another form of it that was not mentioned before is set forth briefly, beginning with[201] "Listen." In the world which is made up of the intelligent and the non-intelligent things, that intelligent part, the individual peculiarity of which is beyond the sphere of speech and mind and which is known to itself, and which, being entirely of the nature of intelligence, is untouched by any modifications of matter, (that part) is expressed by the word 'existence', for the reason that it is indestructible. But the non-intelligent part undergoes a variety of modifications caused by the *karma* of the intelligent part, and is destructible; and it is (therefore) expressed by the word 'non-existence'. And both form the body of Vāsudeva, the Highest *Brahman*, and have Him for their Self. Therefore, this form (of the Lord) is (thus) briefly described here. Accordingly, in the passage—"That water[202] which is the body of Vishṇu, from that, O

200. *Bhuvanakośa* is the name given to chapters 1 to 12. of the second *Amśa* of the *Vishṇu-Purāṇa*, because in these chapters the world is described under the conception of a lotus-bud. Vide *V. P.* II. 2. 10.

201. Vide *V. P.* II. 12. 36. This stanza and the stanza preceding it are as follow :—Thus, then, the situation of the earth and of the Lights, of the divisions of the terrestrial world, and of the oceans and of the mountains, has all been described at length, as also of the lowlands between the principal mountains, and of the rivers. Moreover, the nature of the beings which live in them (has also been described). Listen again to another description which is brief.

202. Here *water* is used so as to mean the primordial substratum of the whole universe known as the *Brahmāṇḍa*; because water has been held to be the first created thing, and in it the Self-existent Lord is said to have placed the seed which became a golden egg. Out of which was born the four-faced Brahmā, the creating deity. Hence primordial matter and all its evolved modifications are denoted by the word *water* here. Cf. also *Manu* I. 8 & 9, et seq.

Brāhmaṇa, sprang the earth, lotus-shaped, together with its mountains, oceans, and all other such things."—[*V. P.* II. 12. 37.]—it is said that, because water forms the body of Vishṇu, the world also, being a modification of water, forms the body of Vishṇu, and that Vishṇu is the Self of that (world). Hence, he (Parāśara) says that, of the grammatical equation which is itself an explanation of the teaching of identity (between the individual self and the Supreme Self) as found in all scriptures, and which is also dealt with in the passage[203] beginning with—"The Lights are Vishṇu"—(of that equation) the foundation is nothing other than the relation of the soul and the body (between the *Brahman* and the universe). In this *śāstraic* work (viz. the *Vishṇu-Purāṇa*) itself, even earlier (than in this context), this very thing is mentioned more than once thus :—"They are all His body"—[204] "The whole of that is the body of the Lord."—[205] "Being indestructible, He alone is the Self of all beings, and has the form of the universe."[206] This identity (between the individual self and the Supreme Self), as consisting of the relation of the body and the soul, is taught by the equation stated in the passage beginning with—"The Lights are Vishṇu." Here, the thing which has the nature of existence and (the thing) which has the nature of non-existence, both of which are found in the world, are spoken of as forming the body of

203. Vide *supra* p. 197. n. 190.

204. Vide *V. P.* I. 22. 86. The whole passage containing this statement runs thus :—"Here, there, or anywhere else, whatever things exist embodied and unembodied, they are all His body."

205. Vide *V. P.* I. 22. 38. which contains this statement and is to the following effect :—Whatever forms the instrumental cause of any created thing which is created by any living being, the whole of that, O Brāhmaṇa, is the body of the Lord.

206. Vide *V. P.* I. 2. 69.

Vishṇu, and as having that Vishṇu for their Self. This (viz. the individual soul) is of the nature of existence; that (viz. *prakṛiti* or matter) has the nature of non-existence. The reason for this (viz. *prakṛiti*) having the nature of non-existence is given thus:—"Because the Lord is of the nature of Intelligence, therefore, He (has the All for His form)".[207] The natural form of the Lord, who is established as the Self of all the individual souls, is Intelligence alone; but it is not the form of things such as gods, men, and other embodied objects; and because this is so, therefore, the forms of non-intelligent matter such as gods, men, ocean, land, and other such things are the result of the display of His intelligence, and are based upon the continuous apprehension of the self-differentiations of that (self) which is known as existence, and which has altogether the nature of intelligence; they (viz. those differentiations) are in the form of gods and other material embodiments; that is, they are based upon *karma* which (in its turn) is based upon the continuous apprehension of the forms of gods and other material embodiments (in association with the self). This is the meaning (of the stanza under discussion). From this, it is implied that, because the non-intelligent thing is the seat of transformations according to the *karma* of the individual soul, therefore it is expressed by the word 'non-existence', and that all else is expressed by the word 'existence'. He (Parāśara) explains this same thing in the passage[208] beginning with—"But when......(there remains intelligence) in its own true form, and pure,.........(then, indeed, cease to exist the fruits of the tree of illusion)." When, after the destruction of all the *karmas* which form the basis for the continuous apprehension of the self-differentiations (of

207. Vide *supra* p. 31. & also n. 191. also n. 192.

208. Vide *supra* pp. 31 & 32. &

the self) in the form of gods, &c., the thing which is called the self, and the nature of which is pure intelligence, becomes free from evil and perfectly pure and assumes its own natural form, then, among things, there will not be those distinctions of things which are intended for the 'enjoyment' of the (self), and which are themselves the results of the *karma* that is at the root of the supposition that the self is identically the same with material forms, such as those of gods, &c. Those modifications of the material entity, which are in the form of gods, men, mountains, oceans, lands, &c., and which form the objects of enjoyment among those things known as gods, &c., and which are wrongly taken to be the same as the self,—they cease to exist when the *karma* which forms their basis is destroyed. Therefore, the meaning is that the non-intelligent thing, which is capable of being found in certain particular states which last only for a time, has to be denoted by the word 'non-existence', and that all else has to be denoted by the word 'existence'; because this (latter) is, at all times, altogether of the form of self-evident intelligence. Accordingly, in the passage beginning with—"Is there (anywhere) any (external) object,"[209]—he (Parāśara) says that the non-intelligent thing is to be denoted by the word 'non-existence' alone; because, every moment, it becomes altered in form and is, in consequence, found in conditions which last only for a time. Indeed, that thing which is always uniform and which is without beginning, middle and end, is that which is denoted by the word 'existence'; because it is not proper to think of it as non-existent at any time. Nothing that is non-intelligent is seen anywhere to be of that description. In the passage beginn-

209. This is the first half of *V. P.* II. 12. 41. Vide *supra* p. 198. n. 193.

ing with[210]—"(Is there anywhere any external object) which, moreover, (undergoes) changes of state"—he (Parāśara) says what it then (really) is. That thing which undergoes changes of state every moment,—that gives up its former states one after another, as it passes into latter states one after another; and so, when it is in any one of its former states, it can not be in simultaneous association with any one of its latter states. Hence, at all times, it is to be denoted by the word 'non-existence' alone. That it has, indeed, to be so made out, is declared in the passage[211] beginning with *Mahī ghaṭatvam*. Those who, through their own *karmas*, are found in the form of gods, men, &c., and are, in consequence, prevented from having correct ideas regarding the (nature of the) self,—by them, the non-intelligent thing which is the object of their 'enjoyment' is perceived to undergo transformations every moment. The meaning is that it is actually experienced (to be of such a nature). This being the case, is there any non-intelligent thing which is seen to be always in the same state and to be without beginning, middle and end, and thus deserves to be denoted by the word 'existence'? The intended conclusion is that there is no such thing. Because this is so, therefore, the non-intelligent thing, which is different from the self the true nature of which is intelligence, is never and nowhere fit to be denoted by the word 'existence'. Accordingly, he (Parāśara) gives the passage[212] beginning with—"Therefore, (at no time and in no place can there be any collection of

210. This is the latter half of the passage *V. P.* II. 12. 41. Vide *supra* p. 198. n. 193.

211. Vide *supra* p. 198. n. 194. *V. P.* II. 12. 42.

212. This is the first half of stanza *V. P.* II. 12. 43. Vide *supra* p. 199. n. 196.

things) other than intelligence." But the self has everywhere the uniform nature of intelligence, and is, in consequence, essentially opposed to the distinctions known as gods, &c. Nevertheless, those who think of the self itself as being differentiated by those distinctions known as gods, &c., which are based upon the various kinds of *karma* performed by themselves and form the cause of their entering into the bodies known as gods, &c.,—(they) imagine (the self) to be so varied in nature as to correspond to each of those particular forms. Accordingly, he (Parâśara) says in the passage[213] beginning with—"The one intelligence is apprehended in many ways"—that the conception of those distinctions is not due to anything in the essential nature of the self (itself). Indeed, the essential nature of the self is free from *karma*; and for that very reason, it is untouched by *prakṛiti* (or nature) which acts as a taint. Therefore again, it is dissociated from all evil qualities such as sorrow, ignorance, greed, and the like. It is one, because it is not capable of increase and decrease; for that very same reason, it is always in the same state; and forming the body of Vâsudeva, it has Him for its Self, because there is nothing which has not Him for its Self. Accordingly, he (Parâśara) gives the passage—"The intelligence, which is pure,...(is one)."[214] The intelligent thing, being always in the same state, is denoted by the word 'existence'. But the non-intelligent thing is every moment subject to modifications, and is thus always subject to destruction; therefore it is always fit to be denoted by the word 'non-existence'. The world, which is thus made up of these intelligent and non-intelligent

213. This is the second half of stanza *V. P.* II. 12. 43. Vide *supra* p. 199. n. 197.

214. *V. P.* II. 12. 44. Vide *supra* p. 199. n. 198.

things, forms the body of Vāsudeva, and has Him for its Self. Thus the reality of the world is very well explained. For this same purpose, (Parāśara) gives the passage[215] beginning with—"Thus (have I told you) of what is real." Here, (this explanation of what is) real (*satyam*) and unreal (*asatyam*) concludes the topic the consideration of which was begun in the passage[216]—"All that is existent and all that is non-existent (are Vishṇu)." This thing (viz. the self) is altogether of the nature of intelligence, and is thus similar throughout; and its essential distinction (from other selves) is inexpressible by means of words. And it is this thing alone which, when mixed up with non-intelligent matter and thus brought within the material world, acquires those distinctions in the form of gods, men, &c., as required for the proper practical realisation of things. Of these (distinctions) which so exist, the cause is stated to be nothing other than *karma*. Accordingly, he (Parāśara) gives the passage—"And (I have told you also) that this is that."[217] He explains this very same thing in the passage beginning

215. This passage *V. P.* II. 12. 45. is as follows in the original:—*Sadbhāva evam bhavato mayokto jñānam yathā satyam asatyam anyat* || Its meaning is:—Thus have I told you of what is real existence and how intelligence is *real* and all else is *unreal*. Vide *supra* p. 32. & n. 199.

216. These expressions occur in *V. P.* II. 12. 38. Vide *supra* p. 197. n. 190, where it has been already quoted in full. This *śloka* is as follows in the original:—*Jyotimshi vishṇur bhuvanāni vishṇur vanāni Vishṇur girayo diśaścha* | *nadyas samudrāścha sa eva sarvam yadasti yannāsti cha vipravarya* || Here, the expression *yadasti* means all that is existent and the expression *yannāsti* means all that is non-existent.

217. Vide *V. P.* II. 45. This passage is as follows in the original:—*Etattu yat samvyavahārabhūtam tatrāpichoktam bhuvanāśritam te* || According to the *Adwaitins*, the meaning of this passage has been already given (vide *supra* p. 32, & n. 199.) as follows:—"And I have told you also that this which is phenomenally realised well for practical purposes is

with[218]—"(The *karmas* which are made up of) the sacrifice, the sacrificial animal, &c." He says in the passage beginning with[219]—"And this which (I have described to you to be the world,—to this indeed goes he who is altogether under the influence of *karma*......),"—that the object of the knowledge that the world is real is to induce the effort to secure the means for the attainment of beatific release.

Here (*i. e.* even in this context), there is not seen any one appropriate word used to denote that Highest *Brahman* who is devoid of attributes, or (to denote) that ignorance (or *avidyā*) which is resident in that (*Brahman*) and is incapable of being defined either as an entity or as a non-entity, or (to denote that) the world is manufactured by that (*avidyā*). The *karma* of the individual selves is opposed to the knowledge of the truth of things, and is

that on which the world is dependent." This interpretation is here criticised by Rāmānuja. According to him, the meaning of this passage, as made out from the context in which it occurs, is to the following effect :—And I have told you also that this individual self, the nature of which is pure intelligence, when mixed up with non-intelligent matter, and thus brought within the world, is that which causes those distinctions which are required for the proper realisation of things in the form of gods, men, &c.

218. The whole of this passage is as follows:-The *Karmas* which are made up of the sacrifice, the sacrificial animal, the sacrificial fire, all the officiating priests, the *Soma* juice, the gods, and the heavenly world of pleasure, form the (commonly adopted) path, and in it are seen (the forms of gods, &c.), and the results of these *Karmas* are the enjoyments of the earthly world and of the other parts of the universe. *V. P.* II. 12. 46.

219. This *śloka* *V. P.* II. 12. 47., runs thus :—"And this which I have described to you to be the world,—to this, indeed, goes he who is altogether under the influence of *Karma*. Knowing the impermanent character of the fruits of *Karma*, one has to aim at that which is firm, unchangeable and always uniform, so that one may thereby surely enter into Vāsudeva."

declared to be thus the cause that makes the self, the nature of which is pure intelligence, experience such varied conditions as those of gods, &c.;—and it is also declared to be the cause that makes non-intelligent (inert) matter undergo (all its) transformations; moreover, the words *existence*, *non-existence*, *reality* and *unreality* are (all) incapable of denoting that thing which cannot be defined either as an entity or as a non-entity: for these reasons, the whole world which is expressible by the words *existence* and *non-existence*, and is made up of intelligent and non-intelligent things, constitutes the body of the Most High, the Highest Lord, the Supreme *Brahman*, namely, Vishṇu. The words *non-existence* and *unreality* are the opposites of *existence* and *reality*; therefore, by means of them, only unreality or non-existence is made out, but not indescribability. The words *non-existence* and *unreality* which have been applied to the non-intelligent thing are not here used to denote what is a mere nothing or what is false, but are used to denote destructibility. It is only this destructibility which is set forth in the passages beginning with[220] "Is there any (external) object"—and also with[221] *Mahī ghaṭatvam*. (In regard to our view), there is neither want of proof nor stultification by means of right knowledge; because what is experienced in one form at one time is perceived to be otherwise at another time by reason of a certain transformation (thereof), and it is, in consequence, spoken of as non-existent. Indeed, to be a mere nothing is to be unworthy of any association with any means of proof. And if a thing, which is experienced as existent in relation to a particular place and time, is also perceived as non-existent in relation to that same place and

220. Vide *supra* p. 198. n. 193. 221. Vide *supra* p. 198. n. 194.

time, then there is stultification; but not when a thing experienced at one time is, through transformation and other such causes, made out to be non-existent at another time; because (in this latter case) there is (really) no contradiction owing to there being a difference in the time (of the two opposite experiences). Therefore there is no falsity (here at all).

What is said is this:—The thing known as the self is essentially of the nature of intelligence; it is without beginning, middle and end, and is always in one and the same natural condition; therefore, it is always and of itself expressible by the word *existence*. But the non-intelligent thing, which forms the object of the 'enjoyment' of the individual selves, is subject to transformation and destruction, in accordance with the *karma* of those (selves), and so is always full of the import of the word *non-existence*; therefore it is expressible by the words *non-existence* and *unreality*.

This same thing is also stated in the following passages:—"Whatever, even by a change of time, does not undergo such a change of name as arises out of transformations and other similar causes, what is that object, O king, what is it?" [*V. P.* II. 13. 100.]; "The wise acknowledge that what is indestructible forms the reality; and that, no doubt, is non-existent, which is produced by destructible things." [*V. P.* II. 14. 24]. Unreality has been declared to be the realisation of the conception of pure existence in relation to a thing which is found to be existent or non-existent in accordance with particular conditions of place, time, and activity. The realisation under the conception of pure existence belongs (rightly) only to the self, and so it is declared to be real. Further, from the listener Maitreya's repetition (of the teaching listened to by him) in the *śloka* which says—"It has been taught to me how all the three worlds exist sup-

ported by Vishṇu, and how intelligence is, by pre-eminence, the reality."—[*V. P.* II. 13. 2.], it is made out that the foundation of the grammatical equation, contained in the passage[222] beginning with—"The Lights are Vishṇu", is the relation of the soul and the body (between the *Brahman* and the universe), that the intelligent and non-intelligent things are denoted, as a rule, by the use of the words *existence* and *non-existence*, that intelligence has a natural condition uncaused by *karmà* and is thus pre-eminent, and that the non-intelligent thing is not pre-eminent for the reason that it undergoes transformations which are due to the *karma* of that (intelligent self).

What has been urged[223]—by the *Pūrvapakshins*—to the effect that the scriptures speak of the cessation of ignorance (or *avidyā*) as taking place by means of the knowledge of the attributeless *Brahman* alone,—that is not right; for, (in such a case) there would be the contradiction of the following and many other scriptural passages:—"I know this great Person of sun-like lustre who is beyond darkness. He who thus knows Him becomes immortal here; there is no other path for the attainment of final release." [*Taitt. Ār.* III. 12. 7.];[224] "All the *nimeshas*[225] were born out of the Person who has the lustre of lightning." [*M. Nār.* I. 8.]; "There is no ruler over Him; His glory is

222. Vide *supra* p. 197. n. 190.

223. Vide *supra* p. 32.

224. Vide also *Vāj. Samh.* XXX. 18. Cf. *Taitt. Ār.* III. 13. 1; *B. G.* VIII. 9; *Śvet. Up.* III. 8. & VI. 15.

225. A *nimesha* is a twinkling of the eye considered as a measure of time. According to some, it is=1/18 *kāshṭhā*=1/540 *kalā*=1/16200 *kshaṇa*=1/194400 *muhūrta*=1/5832000 day=7/135th of a second, a day being equal to 24 hours. According to *V. P.* I. 3. 8, 9 & 10, a *nimesha* is=1/15 *kāshṭhā*=1/450 *kalā*=1/13500 *muhūrtā*=1/405000 day=16/75th of a second.

indeed great." [*M. Nār.* I. 10.]; "Those who know this Person, they become immortal." [*M. Nār.* I. 11.]. It is only because the *Brahman* is possessed of attributes, that all the scriptural passages declare that final release results solely from the knowledge of the *Brahman* as possessed of attributes. It has been already stated that the probative[226] passages also prove only that *Brahman* who is qualified.

The grammatical equation, found in the passage[227]—"That thou art"—and in other similar passages, has no reference to the oneness of any attributeless thing, because the words 'That' and 'thou' have the power of denoting the *Brahman* as qualified. Indeed, the word 'That' points to the *Brahman* who is omniscient, who wills the truth, and who is the cause of the world; because in the passage—"That thought—'May I become many'"—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 3.], and in other similar passages, it is He who forms the subject. The word 'thou' which is equated with 'That' sets forth the *Brahman* whose body is that individual self which is associated with non-intelligent matter; because a grammatical equation has to denote only one thing which exists in two forms. If these two forms are given up, then the equation will have also to be given up; because, (when those two forms are given up), there will be no difference in the significations (of the words 'thou' and 'That'), and because also there will then have to be a figurative (or secondary) signification in relation to both these words.[228] And when it is said—'This is that Devadatta',

226. Such as "The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity." *Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1. Vide *supra* pp. 111. et seq.

227. Vide *Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 7. & n. 142. *supra.*

228. For a *Sāmānādhikaraṇya* or a grammatical equation to be right, it is necessary that it should not be a mere identity, and also that the words equated in the equation should not all have figurative or secondary significations.

there is no secondary signification (in relation to all the equated words); because there is no contradiction in perceiving identity (in relation to Devadatta) as associated with a past and a present time. The contradiction arising from the same thing being found in different places is removed by the difference in time. (If, in the equation—'That thou art', the two forms of the one thing referred to in it be given up), there would then be a contradiction of the beginning of that context wherein it is said—"That thought,—'May I become many'";[229] the proposition that, by knowing one thing, all things become known, would also thus become inappropriate; and He whose true nature is intelligence, who is devoid of all evil, who is omniscient, and whose nature is characterised by all the auspicious qualities, would thereby acquire ignorance (or *avidyā*) and (would become) the object of all the innumerable wrong aims of life which are produced by that (ignorance or *avidyā*). If the equation (here) implies the stultification (of a previously existing wrong conception), then the two words 'That' and 'thou' have to figuratively signify a basis (for the super-imposition of that wrong conception) and the removal (of that super-imposition). These figurative significations, &c., constitute those defects (which have been referred to above). There is, however, this much of peculiarity. Here, there is the unavoidable forced assumption of a stultification which is not realised in the same way in which it is realised in the cognition—"This (mother-of-pearl) is no silver"; and there is also the impossibility of a stultification (arising), because the word 'That' does not, beyond expressing merely a basis (for the super-imposition of a wrong conception), denote any attribute (of that basis, so as to contradict such a super-imposition). If it

229. Vide *Chhând. Up.* VI. 2. 3.

be said that the word 'That' denotes the unveiled nature of what was formerly veiled, (it is replied that it is) not (so); because when first the basis itself is unknown, illusion and its stultification which are dependent thereon are impossible. If it be said (again) that the basis which forms the seat of illusion is itself unconcealed, then that very nature of the basis would be contradictory to illusion; and therefore when that (basis) becomes clearly known (by means of the import of the equation under reference), then there can absolutely be no illusion and no stultification, as both of them are dependent on that (basis). Consequently it is difficult to establish an illusion and its stultification (in relation to the grammatical equation 'That thou art'), when a really existing attribute and its concealment are not admitted (to be denoted by the word 'That') over and above (its denoting) the basis (for that attribute and its concealment). Indeed, when a basis which is merely of the form of a person, for instance, is being perceived, and when the really existing attribute of royalty (which belongs to that person) and which is other than that (basis) is concealed, it is only then that there can be the illusion of (that person) being, (say), a wild hunter; and there will be the cessation of that (illusion) on explaining that the attribute of royalty (belongs to that person), but not on merely explaining that basis (to be a person); because that (basis), being (itself) plainly visible, does not stand in need of being explained; and because also, there can be no destruction of illusion (when merely the basis is thus explained). The two words ('That' and 'thou') mainly signify the *Brahman* who is the cause of the world, and who has the individual soul for His body. It has been (thus) established that the grammatical equation (here) is due to the fact of there being the denotation of one and the same thing as existing in association with

two (different) modes (or forms). (By means of this grammatical equation) another peculiar characteristic in relation to the *Brahman*, who is devoid of all evil, and whose nature is characterised by all the auspicious qualities, is established in the form of His being the internal ruler of all individual souls; and (this conclusion) is completely in harmony with the beginning of the context (in which this grammatical equation occurs). Thus also there results the demonstration of the proposition[230] that, by knowing one thing, all things become known; because the *Brahman*, who owns the intelligent and the non-intelligent things in the subtle state as His body, is Himself an effect (in the form of the *Brahman*) who possesses the intelligent and the non-intelligent things in the gross state as His body. (According to our interpretation) there is also no contradiction of other scriptural passages such as the following :—"(May we know) Him who is the highest and greatest Lord of lords."—[*Śvet. Up.* VI. 7.]; "His supreme power is revealed indeed as varied."—[*Śvet. Up.* VI. 8.]; "He (*i.e.* the Lord) is devoid of sins, He desires the truth and wills the truth."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 5. & VIII. 7. 1.].

If it be asked in what manner the subject and the predicate in the sentence 'That thou art' are particularised, it is replied that there is (really) nothing predicated here of anything; because, in the (earlier) statement[231] itself—"All this has that (*Brahman*) for its Self"—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 7.], it (viz. the predication of oneness) has been already arrived at. Indeed the *śāstra* has a meaning only

230. Vide *Chhānd. Up.* VI. 1. 3. wherein this proposition is given.

231. This statement occurs in the context earlier than the grammatical equation 'That Thou art', in *Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 7. where we read —"All this has That for its Self. That is Existence, That is the Self. That thou art, O Śvetaketu."

in so for as it relates to what has not been already arrived at.[232] Here, (*i. e.* in this statement), by means of the expression 'all this', the world with the individual souls is first pointed out; it is then declared, by means of the expression 'has this (*Brahman*) for its Self', that this (*Brahman*) is the Self of that (world); and the reason for it is given in the passage which says—"All these things which are born, my dear one, have their origin in the *sat* (*i. e.* in the Existent One), have their abode in the *sat*, and are established in the *sat*." [*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 4 & 6.], as (it is also given) in the passage which says—"Let a man (meditate), being tranquilled in mind by the knowledge that all this, indeed, is the *Brahman*, that all this is born in Him, is absorbed into Him, and lives in Him." [*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 1.]. Similarly, other scriptural passages also speak of the identity of the *Brahman* with the intelligent and the non-intelligent things, which are different from Him, as being nothing other than the relation of the soul and the body (between them). Among others, they are as follow:—"He, who has entered within, is the ruler of all things that are born and is the Self of all." [*Taitt. Ār.* III. 24.]; "He who, dwelling in the earth, is within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body is the earth, who internally rules the earth,—He is thy internal ruler and immortal Self." [*Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 3.]; "He who, dwelling in the self, is within the self, whom the self does not know, whose body is the self, and who internally rules the self,—He is thy internal ruler and immortal Self." [*Mādh. Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 22.]; "He who is moving within the earth,.........whose body is matter (*mṛityu* or *prakṛiti*),

232. Cf. *Pūr. Mīm.* III. 4. 15. & X. 4. 22.

whom matter (*prakṛiti*) does not know,—He is the internal Self of all beings, He is devoid of all sins, He is the Divine Lord, He is the one Nārāyaṇa." [*Sub. Up.* VII. 1.]; "Having created that (viz. the world), He entered into that same (world); having entered into that same (world), He became the *sat* and the *tyat*."[233] [*Taitt. Up.* II. 6. 1.]. In this context also by the statement—"Entering in along with this individual self which (also) is the same as Myself, I evolve the differentiations of name and form." [*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 3. 2.],—it is declared that all things acquire the character of being things, and of being expressible by means of words, only by reason of their having been entered into by the individual selves which, (in their turn), have the *Brahman* for their Self. Because the statement—"Having entered into that (world), He became the *sat* and the *tyat*"—has to possess the same meaning as this (statement above viz. that all this has that *Brahman* for its Self), it follows that the individual self also has the *Brahman* for its Self wholly owing to the fact of the *Brahman* having entered into it. Hence, it is concluded that the whole totality of beings which is made up of the intelligent and the non-intelligent things is identical with the *Brahman*, only because of the relation of the body and the soul (existing between them). Hence all that is different from the *Brahman* becomes an entity only through constituting His body; and accordingly, the word also which denotes that (entity or thing) imports its (full) meaning only when it includes that (*Brahman*). Therefore it is a demonstrated conclusion, that all words have severally the power of denoting the *Brahman*, as in association with the thing denoted re-

233. Vide *supra* p. 193. n. 183. The reference given above is according to Jacob's *Concordance to the Upanishads.*

spectively by every one of them, in accordance with that import of theirs which is made out by popular usage. Thus the import of the proposition, enunciated to the effect that "All this has that (*Brahman*) for its Self", is specially summed up by means of the grammatical equation—"That thou art."

Hence it is, that, in the case of those who[234] maintain that there is only one attributeless thing, and in the case of those who[235] maintain that there is difference and non-difference (between the individual soul and the *Brahman*), and also in the case of those who[236] maintain that there is absolute difference (between the individual soul and the *Brahman*), all such teachings regarding the identity between the *Brahman* and the individual soul, as are given by means of grammatical inequalities[237] and by means of gram-

234. These are the *Advaitins* who are of opinion that the *Brahman* who is devoid of all characterising attributes is alone real, and that all else is unreal.

235. These are the *Bhâskarîyas* and *Yâdavaprakâśiyas*. The former of these maintain that the difference between the individual self and the *Brahman* is due to limiting conditions, and that, on the removal of those conditions, the individual self becomes one with the *Brahman*. For instance, the spatial ether in its original state is unconditioned, but it may get conditioned by the material outline of a pot or any other such thing. The ether within the pot is compared to the individual self. On the destruction of the pot, the ether in the pot becomes one with the spatial ether which is compared to the *Brahman*.

The latter, viz. the *Yâdavaprakâśiyas*, hold that just as one portion of a lump of clay may be converted into pots and dishes, while another portion remains as clay pure and simple, so also the *Brahman* evolves the individual selves out of a portion of Himself, the other portion remaining undifferentiated, so that He is both distinct from the individual selves and also non-distinct from them.

236. These are the *Vaiśeshikas* who hold that the *Brahman* is entirely distinct from the individual selves.

237. A grammatical inequality may be exemplified by—*Tasya esha eva śârîra âtmâ* which means—"The embodied Self of that is He Himself." *Taitt. Up.* II. 3. 1. Here the word

matical equations, will amount to having been completely thrown away. When there is only one thing in existence, in relation to what (other thing) can there be the teaching of its identity? If it be replied that that (identity) is only in relation to that same (thing), it is rejoined—that that (identity of the one existent thing with itself) has been already made out from the scriptural text[238] relied upon by yourselves (*i. e.* the *Adwaitins*), and that there is thus nothing which remains to be learnt from (a fresh statement of) identity. If it be said again that it is the destruction of the superimposed differences (which forms the purpose of the teaching of this identity), it is replied that it has been already pointed out that that (purpose) cannot be accomplished at all by means of the identity found in the equation—'That thou art'. Moreover, (this) grammatical equation indicates two (different) modes (or forms) in relation to the *Brahman*, and thus proves what is altogether unfavourable (to this monistic position). And according to the opinion of those who maintain that there is both difference and non-difference (between the individual self and the *Brahman*), the *Brahman* Himself

tasya (meaning *of that*) stands in the genitive case *i. e.* in a different grammatical case from that of the words *esha* (He), *śārīra* (the embodied), *ātman* (the Self) all of which stand in the nominative case. However, in a sentence forming a grammatical equation, all the words have to be in the same grammatical case as in *Satyam jñānam anantam Brahma.*

238. This text is, among others, stated by the *Śrutaprakāśikāchārya*, to be nothing other than *Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1., "The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity." The idea is that, since this text itself declares that the one existing thing is identical with itself, no more teaching as to identity is necessary and consequently the grammatical equation "That thou art," is meaningless. The text referred to here may also be *Aitadātmyam idam sarvam*, which means that all this has Him for its Self, in as much as the equation 'That thou art' comes after this.

has to be in association with limiting conditions; and consequently all the blemishes, which are found in individual souls and are due to those (limiting conditions), will tend to taint the *Brahman* Himself. Therefore, all the teachings which teach the identity of the individual soul with the *Brahman*, who is characterised by the utter absence of all blemishes and possesses all the auspicious qualities, will, solely owing to self-contradiction, amount to having been wholly thrown away. And again, according to the opinion of those who maintain that the difference and non-difference, (between the individual soul and the *Brahman*), are both natural (*i. e.* uncaused by any limiting conditions whatsoever), it has to be admitted that the *Brahman* Himself acquires (quite naturally) the condition of the individual soul, and thus all the blemishes (belonging to the individual self) will become as natural (to Him) as (His own) auspicious qualities. Consequently, to teach the identity (of the individual soul) with that *Brahman*, who is devoid of all blemishes, is certainly inconsistent. Further, according to the opinion of those who maintain that there is absolute difference (between the individual soul and the *Brahman*), it is impossible to have any kind of identity between things which are so altogether different; and it is for this very reason that the teachings which teach the identity of the *Brahman* and the individual soul become inappropriate. Thus (in this case) the whole of the *Vedânta* will have to be given up as meaningless.

However, according to those who[239] maintain that, as proclaimed in all the *Upanishads*, the whole world forms the body of the *Brahman*, all those teachings which teach

239. These are the *Viśishṭâdvaitins* who hold that the *Brahman* has the intelligent individual selves as well as the non-intelligent matter as His body.

that the *Brahman* Himself forms the whole world become appropriate explanations (of the truth). A grammatical equation which expresses that, through the influence of *karmas*, an individual self has become an ox, a horse, a man, or a god, is generally seen, in popular usage as well as in the scriptures, to possess a real and natural significance; because, like generic characterisations and qualities, substances also may become the attributes (of things) when they constitute the bodies (of those things). Moreover, the fact that generic characterisations and qualities are merely the modes of substances forms the basis of grammatical equations like—'The ox is broken-horned', and 'The cloth is white'. Seeing that the material masses, which are characterised by the attributes of man and of other forms of physical embodiment, become intelligible things only when they constitute the modes of the individual self, the grammatical equation which says that the individual self has become a human being, a male, a eunuch, or a female, is, in all cases, equally appropriate. Therefore, the basis of grammatical equations is altogether this (kind of) modality, but does not consist of generic characterisations and other such things all of which exclude each other. Indeed, when such substances as are capable of existing in themselves form the attributes of (other) substances occasionally and in special cases, then there is seen the use of an affix having the force of *matup*,[240] as in the instances of *daṇḍin* (one who possesses a *daṇḍa* or a stick) and *kuṇḍalin* (one who possesses a *kuṇḍala* or an ear-ring). Such is not the case with substances which are incapable of existing in a condition in which they may be separately perceived. The

240. When one who possesses a stick (*daṇḍa*) is called a *daṇḍin*, the affix having the force of *matup* here is *ṇini*, which signifies the possession of a thing.

attributive character of those (substances) is to be conclusively made out only by means of grammatical equations.

Here, however, it may be said thus:—In the case where, through the influence of *karmas*, an individual self has become an ox, a horse, a man, a god, a male, a female, or a eunuch, the material embodiment known as man and the other (material embodiments) are all held to be the modes of that individual self; in the same way in which, when it is said—'The ox is broken-horned and hornless', 'The cloth is white', 'The cloth is black', generic characteristics and (other) qualities (form the modes of the substances they qualify). If it be so held, then, as in the case of the genus and the individuals (belonging to it), so in the case of the body and the individual self also, there must be, as a general rule, the simultaneous perception of the mode and the possessor of the mode. But it is not seen to take place thus. Indeed, as (they do perceive) the generic characteristics (of the ox and of other beings), simultaneously and in inseparable association with what those characteristics qualify, so, people do not, as a general rule, perceive the material embodiments like those of man, &c., simultaneously and in association with the individual self, so as to make out that they are entirely dependent upon the individual self. Hence, the grammatical equation which says that a man is an individual self has a merely figurative signification.

But this is not right. The material embodiments like those of man, &c., possess, equally with generic and other qualifications, the character of being entirely dependent on the individual self, the character of being serviceable only to that (self), and the character of being the mode of that (self). The character of their being altogether dependent upon the individual self alone is made out from the destruc-

tion of the body (taking place) on the separation of the individual self (from it). The character of their being serviceable to the individual self alone (is made out) from the fact of their existing merely to enjoy the fruits of the *karma* of that (self). Also, the character of their being the modes of that (self is made out) from the knowledge that they constitute the attributes of the individual self, as in the instances of a god and a man. This is, indeed, the reason why (generically significant) words like ox, &c., have their meanings so as to include the individuals (belonging to their respective genera). Being devoid of this aforesaid nature, such (words) as *daṇḍa* (stick), *kuṇḍala* (ear-ring) and others, have an affix possessing the force of *matup* (attached to them) when they form attributes, as in the instances of *daṇḍin* (the possessor of a stick) and *kuṇḍalin* (the possessor of an ear-ring). The material embodiments like those of gods, men, &c., possess, of their own nature, the character of being dependent upon the individual self alone, the character of being serviceable to that (self) alone, and the character of being the mode of that (self) alone; it is therefore that the grammatical equation, which says that an individual self is a god or a man, is freely current in popular usage as well as in the scriptures. There is, as a general rule, the simultaneous perception of the genus and the individual (belonging to it), because both of them are capable of being apprehended by the eye ; but the individual self is not apprehended at the time of the ocular apprehension of the body, because the individual self is not capable of being apprehended by the eye. Do not say that a thing, which is capable of being apprehended as existing separately, cannot have mere modality to constitute its own nature : because, it is made out that, like generic and other qualifications, the body also

possesses altogether the nature of being a mode of that (self), owing to its being solely dependent upon that (self), and owing to its being solely serviceable to that (self), and owing also to its being an attribute of that (self). And it has been stated that the law of simultaneous perception is dependent upon the knowability (of the mode and of the possessor of the mode) by means of one and the same perceiving apparatus. Thus the eye cannot apprehend the possession, by the earth and other substances, of smell, taste, and other qualities, although these (qualities) naturally belong to them. Similarly, although the body, which is capable of being apprehended by the eye, possesses fully the nature of being a mode of the individual self, yet, it is not so apprehended, because the eye does not possess the power of apprehending the individual self. Merely on account of this much, the body cannot be destitute of the character of being a mode of that (self). The basis of the grammatical equation (between the body and the individual self) is nothing other than (the body) possessing the character of being altogether a mode of that (self).

Moreover, that word, which is capable of denoting (the body) as a mode of the individual self, denotes that body to be the mode of the individual self at the same time that it denotes the individual self also. It may, however, be said that, solely in accordance with the practical usage of words, it is only the body that is apprehended by means of the word 'body', and that therefore the word 'body' does not possess the power of including the individual self also in its meaning. To this it is replied that it is not so; because, (here, *i. e.* in the case where the word 'body' denotes merely the body), that body, which is nothing other than a mode of the individual self, is specifically mentioned with the object of pointing out its distin-

guishing feature as a thing. Therefore, the word 'body' is a definitively determinative word, like the words 'ox-ness' (*i. e. gotva*), 'whiteness', 'quality', 'form', &c. Consequently, like the words 'ox', &c., the words, 'god', 'man', &c., include the individual self in their import. Similarly, the individual selves, which are associated with material forms like those of god, man, &c., form the body of the Highest Self, and hence possess the character of being His modes. Therefore all the words which denote the individual self include the Highest Self also in their import. Consequently, all the intelligent and the non-intelligent things possess the character of being things, solely because they are the modes of the Highest *Brahman*; and that is why they are so spoken of in practice as to be grammatically equated with that (*Brahman*). This matter is fully proved in the *Vedārtha-saṅgraha*.[241] He (viz. the *Sūtrakāra*) speaks of this very identity, which has the character of the relation between the soul and the body, in the aphorism—"But they (viz. the Jābālas) worship the Lord as the self, and they (viz. the scriptural texts) make us comprehend (it as such)." [*Ved. Sūt.* IV. 1. 3]. And the *Vākyakāra* also says,—[242] "The Lord is to be comprehended as nothing other than the self."

The truth here is this. Some of the scriptural passages, such as the following among others, speak of the distinction in nature between the non-intelligent thing (*prakṛiti*), the intelligent thing (or the individual self), and the Highest *Brahman*, as consisting in their possessing, (respectively), the character of being the object of enjoyment,

241. Vide *Vedārtha-saṅgraha* pp. 20 to 60, edited at Madras in Telugu characters by Messrs. J. Tirumalāchārya and A. K. Vijayarāghavāchārya.

242. Vide *supra* p. 33.

the character of being the enjoyer, and the character of being the Supreme Ruler :—"Out of this(*prakṛiti* or nature), He who is the owner of the *māyā* (*i. e.* the Lord) creates this world wherein another being(viz. the individual self) is bound down by *māyā*."—[*Śvet. Up.* IV. 9.]; "Know then that *prakṛiti* is *māyā*, and the great Lord the *Māyin* (*i. e.* the possessor of the *māyā*)."—[*Śvet. Up.* IV. 10.]; "The destructible is the *prakṛiti* ; the immortal and the indestructible is the *hara* (*i. e.* the individual self); and the Lord alone rules over the destructible (*prakṛiti*) and the individual self."—[*Śvet. Up.* 1. 10.];—here, by the expression that 'the immortal and the indestructible is the *hara*,' the enjoyer is pointed out ; he (viz. the individual self) is (called) the *hara* because the individual self utilises the *prakṛiti* as an object of his own enjoyment;—" He is the cause, He is the Lord of what is the lord of the senses (*i. e.* of the *jīva* or the individual soul); He has no progenitor and no superior."—[*Śvet. Up.* VI. 9.];" He is the Lord of the *prakṛiti* (nature) and of the individual soul and is the regulator of the qualities."[243]—[*Śvet. Up.* VI. 16.]; " He is the Lord of the universe, He is the Lord of the individual souls, and is eternal, auspicious and inexhaustible."—[*M. Nār.* XI. 3.]; "The two unborn, the Intelligent and the non-intelligent (are) the Lord and the non-lord."—[*Śvet. Up.* 1. 9.] ; " The Eternal among the eternals, the Intelligent among the intelligent, who, though One, fulfils the desires of the many."—[*Kaṭh. Up.* V. 13. & *Śvet. Up.* VI. 13.]; "Knowing the enjoyer, the object of enjoyment and the Impeller,"—[*Śvet. Up.* I. 12.]; " One of them eats the sweet *pippala* fruit, while the other shines in splendour without eating at

243. These qualities are the well-known *Sattva*, goodness, *Rajas*, passion and *Tamas*, darkness, by which primordial *prakṛiti* becomes differentiated.

all."—[*Śvet. Up.* IV. 6. & *Muṇḍ. Up.* III. 1. 1.]; "Knowing the individual self and the Impeller to be different, and being therefore blessed by Him, he attains immortality." [*Śvet Up.* I. 6.]; "There is one unborn female being (*ajā*) which is red, white and black, and which produces numerous offspring of the same kind as herself; there is another male being (*aja*) who loves her and is close to her; there is still another male being (*aja*) who, after having enjoyed her, gives her up." [*Śvet. Up.* IV. 5.];[244] "On the same tree, the *purusha* (*i. e.* the individual self) sits immersed in grief, and, being ignorant and powerless, he feels sorry. When he sees another, the Lord, to be fully satisfied, then he (also), reliev-ed from grief, attains His greatness." [*Śvet. Up.* IV. 7.].

(To the same effect are) the following passages in the *Smṛiti* also:—"This *prakṛiti* of Mine is divided into eight[245] parts in the form of the *ahaṅkāra*, &c. This is My lower *prakṛiti*. Know that to be My higher *prakṛiti* which is other than this (lower one), and which consists of individu-al selves. By it, this world is supported, O thou, mighty-arm-ed one!"—[*B. G.* VII. 4 & 5.]; "All created beings, O son of Kunti, enter into My *prakṛiti* at the end of each *kalpa*,[246] and at the beginning of each *kalpa* I again send them forth.

244. The female being referred to in this passage is the *Prakṛiti* or primordial nature; the first male being is the individual soul in the *samsāra* state; the second male being is the individual soul in the released state. The three colours red, white, and black, are explained as signifying the three *Guṇas* or qualities, viz. *Rajas*, *Sattva*, and *Tamas*, respectively.

245. These eight parts are the five elements, viz. the earth, water fire, air and ether (or *ākāśa*); the mind; the principle known as the *Mahat* or *Buddhi*, and the *Ahaṅkāra*.

246. A *Kalpa* is a period of time equal to 4,320,000,000 solar years. It is a day of the creating Brahmā and his night also is equal to the day. At the beginning of each *Kalpa*, the creation of the world is said to begin and at the end of each *Kalpa* happens the destruction of the whole world.

Transforming My own *prakṛiti*, I send forth again and again, the whole of this collection of beings, which is itself not free, in as much as it is under the influence of *prakṛiti*." [*B. G.* IX. 7 & 8.] ; "Presided over by Me, *prakṛiti* gives birth to all this movable and immovable creation. Indeed, for this reason it is, O son of Kunti, that the world goes on undergoing transformation."—[*B. G.* IX. 10.]; "And know that the *prakṛiti* and the *purusha* are both beginningless." [*B. G.*XIII. 19.]; "My womb is the great *brahman* (or *prakṛiti*); in it I place the embryo; the origin of all beings proceeds from that, O Bhārata." [*B. G.* XIV. 3.]. That great *brahman* of Mine which is the source of this world and is called the *prakṛiti*, and which is a subtle and non-intelligent entity,—in it, I place the embryo known as the intelligent thing. From thence, that is, from the connection between the intelligent and the non-intelligent things which is caused by Me, there results the origin of all these beings which begin with the gods and end with the immovable things, and which are all thus mixed up with the non-intelligent thing. This is the meaning (of the last quoted *śloka*).

Similarly, several other scriptural passages declare that the Highest Person forms the Self (of all), and that the intelligent and the non-intelligent things have no separate existence from Him; because those intelligent and non-intelligent things, which exist in the form of the enjoyer and the thing enjoyed, and which exist also in all conditions, constitute the body of the Highest Person, and are, in consequence, subject to His control. They are those which begin with—"He who, dwelling in the earth, is within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body is the earth, and who internally rules the earth—(He is thy internal ruler and immortal Self)";—and conclude with—"He who, dwelling in the self,

is within the self, whom the self does not know, whose body is the self and who internally rules the self, He is thy internal ruler and immortal Self." [*Mādh. Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 3 to 22.]. To the same effect is the passage beginning with—"He who is moving within the earth, whose body is the earth, whom the earth does not know"—and (ending with)—"He who is moving within the *akshara*, whose body is the *akshara*, whom the *akshara* does not know; He who is moving within the *mṛityu* (or *prakṛiti*) whose body is *mṛityu*, whom *mṛityu* does not know;—He is the internal Self of all beings, He is devoid of sins, He is the Divine Lord, He is the One Nārāyaṇa." [*Sub. Up.* VII. 1.]. Here, the word *mṛityu* means that subtle non-intelligent thing which is expressed by the word *tamas*,[247] because in this very *Upanishad* it is stated—"The *avyakta* is absorbed into the *akshara* and the *akshara* is absorbed into the *tamas*." [*Sub. Up.* II.], and (because) it is stated also (elsewhere)—"He, who has entered within, is the ruler of things that are born and is the Self of all." [*Taitt. Ār.* III. 24.]. Thus the Highest Person Himself, who, by having the intelligent and the non-intelligent things existing in all conditions as His body, owns them as His modes, exists in the form of the world in its condition as cause as well as in its condition as effect. Accordingly, with the object of making this very thing known, some scriptural passages say that the world in its condition as cause and also in its condition as effect is He Himself. They are those which begin with—"Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning, one only without a second. It thought—'May I become manifold and be born.' It created *tejas*." [*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 3.],—and (end with)

247. Vide *supra*. p. 194. n. 184.

—"All these things which are born, my dear one, have their origin in the *sat* (*i. e.* in the Existent One), have their abode in the *sat*, and are established in the *sat*....All this has That (*Brahman*) for its Self. That (*Brahman*) is existence. He is the Self. That thou art, O Śvetaketu." [*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 4, 6 & 7.]. To this effect, there is, among others, the following scriptural passage which begins with—"He willed—'May I become manifold and be born.' He performed *tapas*. Having performed *tapas*, He created all this";—and concludes with—"While being the unchangeable individual self (*satya*) and the changeable matter (*anṛita*) He has remained true to His own nature." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 6. 1.]. That distinction in nature which exists between the intelligent and the non-intelligent things (on the one hand), and the Highest Person (on the other hand), and which is learnt from other scriptural passages as well, is brought to mind here also, (*i. e.* in the following passage)—"Entering into these three deities[248] along with this individual self which is (also) the same as Myself, I evolve the differentiations of name and form."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 3. 2.],—and also in the passage—"Having created that, He entered into that same (world). Having entered into that (world), He became the *sat* and the *tyat*.........He became the intelligent thing and the non-intelligent thing. While thus being the unchangeable individual self and the changeable matter, He has remained true to His own nature." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 6. 1.]. The idea that the individual soul has the *Brahman* for its Self, as made out from the expression—"Entering along with this individual self which is (also)

248. These are the elements *tejas*, water and earth. They are called deities because they are said to be the very first things created by the presiding Deity of the universe.

the same as Myself'—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 3. 2.],—that is understood to be dependent upon the relation of the soul and the body (existing between the *Brahman* and the individual self); because that expression has to import the same meaning as this expression—"Having entered into that (world), He became the *sat* and the *tyat*, (He became) the intelligent thing and the non-intelligent thing." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 6. 1.]. That differentiation of names and forms which is exactly of this very kind is mentioned in this passage also, namely, "Indeed, this was then undifferentiated. It has been now differentiated by means of names and forms." [*Bṛih. Up.* I. 4. 7.]. Thus He who exists in the condition of effect, and who exists in the condition of cause, and who owns the intelligent and the non-intelligent things in their gross and subtle states as His body,—He is the Highest Person alone. Therefore, for the reason that the effect is nothing other than the cause (modified), and that, in consequence, the effect becomes known when the cause is known, the desired knowledge of all things as resulting from the knowledge of one thing is possible and very appropriate. In the passage—"Entering into these three deities along with this individual self which is (also) the same as Myself, I evolve the differentiations of name and form"—all the non-intelligent things are referred to by the expression 'the three deities'; and then the differentiation of names and forms is said to result from the fact of the individual souls, which have Him for their Self, entering into those things. Thus, all significant words signify only that Highest Self who is associated with the individual selves which are themselves associated with non-intelligent matter. Therefore the equating of the word which denotes an effect, with the word which denotes the Highest Self in the condition of cause,

has a real and natural significance. Thus that *Brahman*, who owns the intelligent and the non-intelligent things in their gross and subtle states as His modes,—(He) is Himself the effect and the cause; and accordingly the world has the *Brahman* for its material cause. The *Brahman* Himself forms the material cause of the world, for the reason that that *Brahman*, who owns the intelligent and the non-intelligent things in their subtle state as His body, constitutes the cause (of all); nevertheless, by virtue of the material cause (of the world) being a composite thing (made up of the individual souls, the *prakṛiti* and the *Brahman*) the non-mixing-up of the natures of the *Brahman* and of the intelligent as well as of the non-intelligent things is perfectly possible and appropriate. Thus, for instance, although a variegatedly woven cloth has for its material cause a mixture of white, black and red threads, the association of whiteness, &c., is to be found confined only to the region where a particular kind of thread exists; and accordingly, in the condition of effect also, there is no fusion of the colours in all the parts (of the cloth). Similarly, although the world has for its material cause the mixture of the intelligent thing and the non-intelligent thing and the Lord, nevertheless, in its condition as an effect also, there is no fusion of the characteristics of the enjoyer, of the thing enjoyed, and of the controller, &c. These threads which are capable of existing independently, when they are occasionally brought together by the will of man, acquire the character of a cause and (also) the character of an effect. But here (*i. e.* in the case of the world) there is this much peculiarity, namely, that the intelligent and the non-intelligent things existing in all conditions acquire their character of being things, only because they form the modes of the Highest Person through constituting His body, and that

therefore the Highest Person who has those things as His modes is always denoted by all words. The existence of distinctions in nature and their non-mixing-up are both alike here (*i. e.* in the case of the production of the world) as well as there (*i. e.* in the case of the production of the variegatedly woven cloth). This being the case, although the Highest *Brahman* enters into the production of an effect, there being no transformation of His own nature, the immodifiability (of the Highest *Brahman*) is well established. The condition of an effect is also very appropriate (in relation to the *Brahman*), for the reason that He is the Self of the intelligent and the non-intelligent things in their gross state, when they are differentiated by the divisions of names and forms. Indeed, to become an effect is nothing other than passing into another condition. The scriptural statements regarding the attributelessness (of the *Brahman*) are also appropriate because the Highest Person is not in association with evil qualities. This scriptural passage[249] which, in the portion—"He (*i. e.* the Self) is devoid of sins, is free from old age, free from death, free from sorrow, free from hunger, free from thirst,"—negatives all evil qualities (in relation to the *Brahman*), and then lays down in the portion—"He (the Self) desires the truth and wills the truth"—the auspicious qualities (of the *Brahman*);—(this scriptural passage) alone settles that the negation of qualities, which is declared elsewhere in the scriptures and is understood to be applicable in a general sense, relates (only) to evil qualities. The statement that[250] the *Brahman* possesses the nature of intelligence is quite appropriate, because it amounts to saying that the true nature of the *Brahman* who is omnisci-

249. Vide *Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 5. & VIII. 7. 1 & 3.

250. Vide *V. P.* I. 2. 6. & also *Bahvṛichopanishad.*

ent and omnipotent, who is opposed to all that is evil, and who is the mine of all auspicious qualities, is capable of being described only as Intelligence, and that He has the nature of intelligence for the reason that He possesses self-luminousness. The following and other scriptural passages, namely, "He who understands all and who knows all"—[*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 1. 9.], "His supreme power is revealed, indeed, as varied and natural and as consisting of knowledge, strength, and action."—[*Śvet. Up.* VI. 8.], "My dear one, by what means has one to know the knower."—[*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 14.],—teach that the *Brahman* is the knower; and this passage,—"(The *Brahman* is) Existence, Knowledge, (Infinity)."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.], and others (teach that the *Brahman*) has the essential nature of intelligence, because He can be described only as Intelligence, and because also He is self-luminous. In the passages—"He willed—'May I become many.'"—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 6.1.], "It thought—'May I become many.'"—[*Chhând. Up.* VI. 2. 3.], "It is differentiated by means of names and forms."—[*Bṛih. Up.* I. 4. 7.],—(it is declared) that the *Brahman* Himself exists, of His own free will, in various modes by reason of His possessing the wonderful unchangeable things and changeable things as His body; and that, in consequence, the manifold nature of such things, as are opposed to Him and as have not the *Brahman* for their Self, is unreal. Therefore it is this (unreal manifoldness of things) that is negatived in the following and other passages:—"He, who sees this world as though it were manifold (or varied), obtains death from death. There is nothing here that is many and varied."—[*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 19. & *Kaṭh. Up.* IV. 10.]; "But where there is duality, as it were, there one sees another; but where to one all this becomes

the Self, there who shall see whom by what, and who shall know which by what?"—[*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 14. & IV. 5. 15.]. On the contrary, it is not also that manifold modality of the *Brahman* which is due to His assumption of various names and forms, which is established in scriptural passages such as "May I become manifold and be born"—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 6. 1. & *Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 3.],—and in others, and which (again) is due to His own free will, —(it is not this manifold modality) that is negatived. This (manifold modality) is proved to be existent in the commencement of even that passage which negatives (manifoldness) by saying—"But where to one all this becomes the Self, &c." [*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 14. & IV. 5. 15.]; and (it is also established to be existent) by means of the following and other passages:—"He who knows all things to be apart from Him, him will all things abandon."—[*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 6. & IV. 5. 7.]; "That which is this *Rig-Veda* is the breath of Him *i. e.* of this great Being." [*Sub. Up.* II.].[251] Thus there is no contradiction whatsoever in relation to all those scriptural passages which speak of such distinctions in essence and in nature as exist between the intelligent thing (or the individual soul), the non-intelligent thing (or *prakṛiti*) and the Lord; and (there is no contradiction also) in regard to those scriptural passages which speak of the relation of cause and effect (as existing between the *Brahman* and the universe) and (also in regard to those which speak) of the identity of the effect with the cause. The relation of the body and the soul exists at all times between the intelligent thing (or the individual soul) and the non-intelligent thing (or *prakṛiti*, on the one hand), and the Highest Self (on the

251. Cf. *Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 10.

other). This is made out by means of the scriptural passages which declare that those things which form the body (of the Lord) acquire, when in the condition of cause, that subtle state which is incapable of being differentiated by means of names and forms, and acquire (again), when in the condition of effect, such a gross state as is capable of that (differentiation by names and forms). Therefore there is to be seen no room whatsoever for maintaining the view[252] which imposes *ajñāna* (or ignorance) on the *Brahman*. And the view[253] which brings about distinctions in the *Brahman* Himself by means of limiting conditions, and all those other views, which are based upon fallacious reasoning and are contradictory to (the teaching of) all the scriptures, (are also untenable). The intelligent thing (or the individual soul), the non-intelligent thing (or matter), and the Lord, are all proved by means of special scriptural texts to be possessed of independent characteristics; and they are also proved by the scriptures themselves to constitute respectively the modes (of the *Brahman*) and the possessor of those modes, for the reason that there is (between the intelligent and the non-intelligent things on the one hand and the Lord on the other hand) the relation of the body and the soul. In regard to these, other scriptural passages prove (the consequent) relation of effect and cause, and also prove (the resulting) identity of the effect with the cause. Indeed, there is no contradiction in this. For instance, the mandatory passage,[254] which says "(Let him perform) the new-moon sacrifice and the full-moon sacrifice," lays down in one commandment that, on the part of him who is desirous (of *Swarga*),[255] it is obligatory

252. This view is held by the *Adwaitins*.

253. This is the view of the *Bhāskarīyas*.

254. Vide *Taitt. Saṁh.* II. 2. 5.

255. *Swarga* is the celestial world of enjoyments.

to perform the six sacrifices beginning with the *Āgneya* which have all separately come into existence from the various scriptural passages[256] relating to their origin, and which, nevertheless, have fallen into two groups in accordance with the two[257] passages that refer to their grouping.

256. The names of the six sacrifices are *Āgneya*, *Agnishomīya*, the two *Aindras*, *Aindrāgna*, and *Upāmśu*. The passage relating to the origin of the *Āgneya* sacrifice is given in *Taitt. Samh.* II. 6. 3. 3. to the effect *Yadāgneyoshtākapalomāvāsyāyām cha paurṇamāsyām chāchyuto bhavati.* This means that the sacrifice known as the *Āgneya*, in which eight clay cups are used for the purpose of making offerings to the god *Agni*, and which is to be performed on the days of new-moon and full-moon, never fails to be successful in producing the desired results. The passage relating to the *Agnishomīya* sacrifice is as follows :—*Tābhyāmetamagnishomīyamekādaśakapālam pūrṇamāse prāyachchhat. Taitt. Samh.* II. 5. 2. 3. That is to say, he, Indra, gave to *Agni* and *Soma*, on the full-moon day, that portion of the sacrificial offering which is known as *Agnīshomīya* wherein eleven clay cups are used to make offerings to the deities. The two sacrifices known as the *Aindras* are mentioned in the passages :—*Aindram dadhyamāvāsyāyām. Taitt. Samh.* II. 5. 4. 1.; *Aindram payomāvāsyāyām.* These mean respectively that the *Aindra* sacrifice, consisting in the offering of curds, is to be performed on the new-moon day, and that the other *Aindra* sacrifice consisting in the offering of milk is also to be performed on the new-moon day. The sacrifice known as *Aindrāgna* is given in *Taitt. Samh.* II. 5. to the effect that the *Aindrāgna* sacrifice which consists in the offering of curds in eight clay cups is to be performed on the new-moon day. The *Upāmśu* sacrifice is given in the passage—*Tāvabrūtāvagnishomāvājyasyaiva nāvupāmśu pūrṇamāsyām yajan.* Both *Agni* and *Soma* said—"Perform for us on the full-moon day the sacrifice known as *Upāmśu* and consisting in the offering of ghee." All these six passages enjoin in six separate commandments the performance of all the six sacrifices mentioned above.

257. The performance of all these six sacrifices is again enjoined in two commandments, viz. *Ya evam vidvān pūrṇamāsīm yajate*|| *Ya evam vidvān amāvāsyām yajate. Taitt. Samh.* I. 6. 9. 1 & 2. "He who knows thus performs the full-moon sacrifice, he who knows thus performs the new-moon sacrifice." Thus the six sacrifices become reduced, as it were, to two.

Similarly, the following and other scriptural passages declare separately that the intelligent thing (viz. the individual self), the non-intelligent thing (viz. matter or *prakṛiti*), and the Lord are distinct in essence and in nature :—"The destructible is the *prakṛiti*, the immortal and the indestructible is the *hara* (*i. e.* the individual self), and the Lord alone rules over the destructible (*prakṛiti*) and the individual self."—[*Śvet. Up.* I. 10.]; "He is the Lord of the *prakṛiti* and of the individual souls, and is the regulator of the qualities."[258] [*Śvet. Up.* VI. 16.]; "He is the Lord of the world, the Lord of the individual souls. The Highest Self is Nârâyaṇa." [*M. Nâr.* XI. 3.]. Then the following and other scriptural passages declare that the intelligent thing and the non-intelligent thing, existing in all conditions, form the body of the Highest Self and that that Highest Self constitutes the Self of those things :—"(He) whose body is the earth,"—[*Sub. Up.* VII. 1.]; "(He) whose body is the individual self,"—[*Mâdh. Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 22.]; "(He) whose body is the *avyakta*,...whose body is the *akshara*,[259]......He is the internal Self of all beings ; He is devoid of all sins, He is the Divine Lord, He is the one Nârâyaṇa."—[*Sub. Up.* VII. 1.]. Then again the following and other scriptural passages—"Existence (or *Sat*) alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning"—[*Chhând. Up.* VI. 2. 1.]; "All this has that (*Brahman*) for its Self (or *Âtman*)."—[*Chhând. Up.* VI. 8. 7.]; "All this, indeed, is the *Brahman*."—[*Chhând. Up.* III. 14. 1.];—declare, by means of words like *Sat*, *Brahman*, *Âtman*, &c., which denote the Highest Self who is the Embodied Being, that the Highest

258. The 'qualities' are the well known three qualities of *Sattva*, goodness, *Rajas*, passion, and *Tamas*, darkness.

259. Vide *supra* p. 194. n. 185.

Self who is one only, who is in the condition of cause, and who is also in the condition of effect, is Himself all the three[260] (kinds of real) entities which are separately made out. There is, indeed, nothing wrong in denoting that Highest Self, who owns the intelligent and the non-intelligent things as His body, by the word *Paramātman*; in the same way in which (there is nothing wrong) in denoting a particular individual self, that has the figure of man for his body, by the word *ātman*, as when it is said (in relation to a man)—"This individual self is happy." Therefore let this overlong discussion come to an end.

Again what has been further stated[261] (by the *Pūrvapakshins*) to the effect that it is right to hold that the cessation of ignorance (or *avidyā*) takes place solely by means of the knowledge of the oneness of the self and the *Brahman*,—that is not right; because the bondage (of ignorance) is real and is thus incapable of being removed by knowledge. How is it possible to predicate unreality in relation to this bondage which consists in the (individual self) entering into bodies such as those of gods, &c., owing to its meritorious and unmeritorious *karmas* and is of the nature of the experience of the pleasures and pains that arise out of that (embodiment)? It has been already[262] explained that the cessation of the bondage which is of this nature is attainable by that grace of the Highest Person which is consequent on His being pleased with the worship that is offered in the form of loving devotion (by the worshipper). As that knowledge, which is accepted by you, and (according to you), relates to what is different from things as

260. These are:—the *Prakṛiti* or matter, the individual self, and the Supreme Self.

261. Vide *supra* pp. 32 & 33.

262. Vide *supra* pp. 20, 21 & 22.

they are, is of an unreal nature, the consequence (thereof) is only the intensification of the bondage; because the *śastra*[263] says—"It is false, because an object which is different from another cannot, indeed, acquire the character of that other object."—and because also, in the following passages—"Different from these is the Highest Person."—[*B. G.* XV. 17.]; "Knowing the individual self and the Impeller to be different"—[*Śvet. Up.* I. 6.],—it is taught that the knowledge relating to the *Brahman*, who is different from the individual self, and who is the internal ruler thereof, is the means of obtaining the final release which possesses the characteristics of the highest object of human pursuit. Moreover, that knowledge which is capable of removing (ignorance or *avidyā*), and which is accepted by you, is itself unreal. Therefore, (to remove it), some other remover has to be sought and found. If it be said that this knowledge, which removes (ignorance or *avidyā*), removes that whole totality of distinctions which is opposed to itself, and then, being itself momentary, perishes of itself,—it is replied that it is not so. As its essence, its origin and destruction are all false, some other (knowledge), which is capable of removing that *avidyā* (or ignorance) by which (its) destruction and the hypothesis in relation to it are (both) falsely assumed, has to be sought and found. If it be said (again) that the destruction[264] of that (knowledge which removes *avidyā*) is nothing other than the manifestation of the true nature of the *Brahman* Himself, it is replied that, in that case, there

263. Vide *supra* p. 148. where this stanza is quoted as follows:—"If it be held that the identity of the Highest Self with the individual self is the highest truth, it is false, because an object which is different from another cannot, indeed, acquire the character of that other object." *V. P.* II. 14. 27.

264. This is the non-existence consequent on the destruction of a thing. Vide *supra* p. 49. n. 37.

will be no origination of that knowledge which removes (ignorance or *avidyā*); for, as long as what constitutes the destruction of a thing continues in existence, so long there is no possibility of the origination of that thing. Moreover, it is asked who it is that is the knower of this knowledge, which relates to the negation of all that is different from the *Brahman*, who is Himself pure intelligence. If it be replied that that (knower) is merely a superimposition, then it is replied that it cannot be so; because that (knower) forms the object of the knowledge which is calculated to remove (*avidyā*), and consequently deserves to be negated; thus there is no possibility of that (knower) being (also) the agent (in the removal of ignorance by means) of that (knowledge which is calculated to remove ignorance). If it be said (again) that that (knower) is of the nature of the *Brahman* Himself, it is asked whether the knowership of the *Brahman* is, so far as it relates to that knowledge which removes (ignorance), natural or superimposed. If superimposed, then this (superimposition) and the other *avidyā* on which that (superimposition) is based cannot form the objects of that knowledge which is calculated to remove ignorance; and therefore it (viz. this superimposed knowership) certainly continues to persist. If some other knowledge that is calculated to remove (ignorance or *avidyā*) be admitted, then, since that (knowledge) also is subject to the three-fold differentiation(of the knower, the thing known,and the knowledge), there would result a *regressus in infinitum*[265]

265. Because this knowledge that is calculated to remove the *avidyā* or ignorance, which superimposes knower-ship, is itself based upon another *avidyā*; and so, another knowledge has to be assumed to remove it, and again another to remove each such knowledge so assumed in succession. Thus there will result an infinite series leading to no end.

in relation to the knower. If this (knowership) belongs, by nature, to the *Brahman* Himself, then our view must find acceptance (with you). The statement, that the knowledge which removes (ignorance or *avidyâ*) and the knower of that (knowledge) are (both) different from the *Brahman*, and are therefore included among those things that deserve to be removed by that (knowledge) itself, is as ludicrous as the statement which makes out that, in saying that Devadatta has cut off all that is above the surface of the earth, the cutter and the process of cutting relating to this very same cutting action (of Devadatta) are also to be included among the things cut off (by Devadatta). That knower who is superimposed cannot himself become the agent in the act of producing the knowledge which is calculated to remove (ignorance or *avidyâ*), and which (again) forms the cause of his own destruction; because one's own destruction is not an object of human pursuit. If, moreover, the destruction of that (superimposed knowership) is admitted to be the same as the (manifestation of the) true nature of the *Brahman*, then, there will be no room at all for the assumption of the *avidyâ* and the other such things and (also for the assumption) of the perception of distinctions as consequent thereon. Therefore, let us have done with this (criticism); it amounts to beating with a club him who has been already killed by fate.

Therefore, as the bondage (of *samsâra*) is based upon that *ajñâna* (or ignorance) which is of the nature of a stream of beginningless *karma*, the destruction of that (*ajñâna*) results only from that knowledge[266] which possesses the characteristics already mentioned (by us). The

266. Vide *supra* pp. 17 to 22.

production of that (knowledge) is the result of the performance of those duties which are appropriate to the various stages and conditions of life, and are characterised by the (spiritual) refinement due to that peculiar knowledge of the real nature of the individual self, which manifests itself in the form of the daily practised worship of the Highest Person.

This being so, mere (ritualistic) works yield (only) small and transitory results. On the other hand, such works as constitute the worship of the Highest Person, and are performed without attachment to results, yield an infinite and ever enduring result in the form of that experience of the real nature of the *Brahman* which is caused by the origination of the knowledge which is the same as steady meditation (or worship). Both (these) cannot become known without a knowledge of the true nature of works. (Without such knowledge), there can be no rejection of (mere ritualistic) works as they ordinarily are, and no subsequent adoption of them in the form pointed out above. Therefore, for this very reason, the enquiry into the *Brahman* has necessarily to be conducted immediately *after* the enquiry into works; and hence it has been stated (by the *Sūtrakāra*)—**"Then therefore, &c."** [*Ved. Sūt.* I. 1. 1.].[267]

Under these circumstances, another *pūrvapakshin* [268] may hold the following opinion :—

It is not possible to determine the power of a word to signify a meaning, except by means of the use it is put to

267. This *sūtra* is in full as follows:- 'Then therefore the enquiry into the *Brahman*."

268. These *Pūrvapakshins* are the *Mīmāmsakas* known as the Prābhākaras. Vide *supra* p. 41. n. 34.

by such (speakers and responsive listeners) as are well acquainted with the significations of words. And accordingly, the true signification of a word is only to denote an action; because it is with the object of denoting actions that words are actually made use of. Consequently the import of the *Vedas* is merely in the form of actions. Therefore, the *Vedânta* is not capable of occupying the position of authority in relation to the Highest *Brahman* whose meaning is already established (otherwise than as an inference from actions).

Moreover, in regard to those sentences which relate to things that have an already established signification, as when they speak of the birth of a son[269] and other such happy incidents, it is not possible to determine that, through the joyous expansion of the face resulting from the attainment of a desired object, and through other such indications (alone), they (viz. those sentences) form the means of importing a special meaning; because the things which are productive of joy are existent in all the three (different) times (viz. past, present, and future), and are (indeed) endless in number; and because also (in the present case of the birth of a son) there is the possibility of its association with other joy-giving things such as an auspicious and lucky moment (of birth), an easy and happy delivery, and so on.

Further,[270] that a word has the power of denoting a thing which has an already established import,—(this) it is not possible to determine by means of the fact that the meanings of ununderstood words and terminations are

269. The *Mîmâmsakas* mentioned above criticise thus this example of the birth of a son, which is cited by the *Bhâṭṭas* or the followers of Kumârila-Bhaṭṭa.

270. Here again, the same *Mîmâmsakas* criticise this example cited by the *Naiyyâyikas*.

made out either by ascertaining their etymological significance, or by ascertaining the meaning of the other (related) words (in a sentence); because that (ascertainment of the etymological significance of ununderstood words and terminations, as well as that ascertainment of the meaning of the other words), relates to a number of words known to denote actions, and is (therefore) the same as determining a particular variety of those (actions).

And again,[271] it cannot be maintained that, in the case of the person who is afraid of an (illusorily perceived) serpent, the fear of the serpent is seen to disappear immediately after he hears the words—'This is no serpent, this is a rope', and that therefore this (statement 'This is no serpent, this is a rope') forms the means of knowing the absence of the (illusorily perceived) serpent; because, in this case also there are many causes for the cessation of the fear, such as those which give rise to the knowledge that this thing (viz. the illusorily perceived serpent) is devoid of motion, devoid of poison, is inanimate, and so on; and it is not thus possible (for that statement alone) to produce this special conviction in particular (viz. that the illusorily perceived serpent is a mere rope).

It may again be said as follows:—[272] On the strength of the universal concomitance of volition with voluntary activity, it is made out that words give rise to that knowledge which induces volitional activity. Thus every word relates to an action, and so all the words (in a sentence) denote only a conjointly determined action. Consequently, it is not possible to conclude with certainty that the significant power of a word consists only in denoting its own

271. The example which is cited by the *Adwaitins* is here criticised by the *Mīmāmsakas* above mentioned.

272. The very same *Mīmāmsakas* here cite and criticise the position of Vāchaspati who is, in all probability, the *Mīmāmsaka* known as Vāchaspati Miśra.

meaning in association with that of the other (words in the sentence). The desire to accomplish one's own wishes forms the cause of voluntary activity through giving rise to volition, but not by itself; for, (otherwise), there would be no possibility of voluntary activity in regard to the desire to accomplish such wishes as relate to the past, to the future and (even) to the present. For, as long as the belief which is to the effect—"Without my own effort, it is not possible for me to accomplish the fulfilment of my desires; therefore it has to be accomplished by my own actions"—is not produced in one, so long one does not put forth voluntary activity. Consequently, volition alone is the cause of voluntary activity. And accordingly, that which induces voluntary activity is itself the thing which is expressed by words; therefore action alone constitutes the thing that is to be learnt from the *Vedas*. Thus indeed there can be no acquisition of the infinite and eternal results which are of the nature of the attainment of the *Brahman* (whose significance is) already naturally established; and it is declared in the following passage among others, namely, "Those meritorious results of works which accrue to him who performs the *chāturmāsya* [273] sacrifice are indeed indestructible."—[*Āp. Śr.* VIII. 1. 1.], that works alone are capable of producing permanent results; for all

273. *Chāturmāsya* is the name given to three seasonal or four-monthly sacrifices which are performed at the *Parvans* or commencement of the three seasons, the spring, the rainy season and the autumn. These sacrifices are:—(1) The *Vaiśvadeva* which is generally performed on the full-moon of *Phālguna*, (2) the *Varuṇapraghāsa* which is performed on the full-moon of *Āshāḍha*, (3) and the *Śākamedha* which is performed on that same day of *Kārtika*. The sacrifice known as the *Śunāsīrīya* is considered by some to be a fourth *Chāturmāsya*, but the exact time of its performance is not known. All these sacrifices belong to the larger subdivision called *Haviryajña*. Vide *Śat. Br.* II, 5.

these reasons it is improper to undertake that enquiry into the *Brahman* which gives rise to the knowledge of the inconsiderable and impermanent character of the fruits of works, (and gives rise also to the knowledge) of the infinite and ever enduring character of the fruits that result from 'knowing' the *Brahman*.

To all this, the following is the reply:—Those who are guided by the accepted criteria of truth do not highly value that opinion according to which that manner of apprehending the relation between words and their meanings, which is known all the world over, is discarded, so as to give rise to the belief that words have the power of producing the knowledge of only such significations as are not commonly current in the world. Indeed, children understand the relation between words and their meanings in the following manner. Mothers, fathers, and others frequently indicate with (their) fingers (to children their) mamas, papas, maternal uncles and others, as well as the moon, (domesticated) animals, men, beasts, birds, serpents, &c., with the object of telling (the children that they should) know a particular person (to be such and such), and know a particular thing (to be such and such); then, by means of the particular words used, they (viz. the children) largely learn those particular meanings; and then they perceive that the knowledge which associates every one of those particular words with their particular meanings very gradually arises in themselves. Afterwards they come to the conclusion that the use of those words with those significations forms the foundation-principle according to which words acquire their character of being significant; because no other relation is seen to exist between words and their meanings, and because also there is no

knowledge of any person who fixes by convention (the relation between words and their meanings). And when, in regard to words other than those the meanings of which are already known, they (*i. e.* the childern) are, in addition, taught by speakers (who are well acquainted with the meanings of words) that a particular word has a particular meaning, only then do they come to know the meanings of all the words; and afterwards, for the purpose of imparting their ideas to others, they make use of a number of sentences which give expression to those ideas.

In another way also it is very easy to understand the relation between words and their meanings. (For instance), a certain person, by means of the movements of his hands and other gesticulations asks another to go and tell Devadatta that his father is doing well. Then this (other) person, when engaged in so informing (Devadatta) makes use of the words—"Your father is doing well." A (third) person who is standing near and is desirous of learning the meanings of words, and who, like a dumb man, is well conversant with the details of gesticulation, learns that this person is called upon so to inform (Devadatta), follows (him), and then listens to the words which are made use of in giving that information; and at last he thus arrives at the conclusion that a particular word signifies a particular meaning. Therefore the rule that the meaning of words is only to denote actions is not binding. Accordingly, the *Vedânta* signifies the Highest *Brahman* (the import of the words signifying whom is) naturally established, and (it) also (signifies) that worship which relates to Him and yields unlimited results. Consequently, that enquiry about the *Brahman*, the aim of which is to find out that (*Brahman* and that worship relating to Him), has necessarily to be

conducted.

Even if the *Vedas* are denotative of actions, the enquiry into the *Brahman* has indeed necessarily to be conducted. How is that? Because they (viz. the *Vedas*) yield results which flow from the actions that relate to such worship as is taught in the following and other scriptural passages:—"Verily, my dear one, the Self has to be seen, has to be heard, has to be reflected upon, has to be steadily meditated upon."—[*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 5. 6.]; "He has to be sought after, He has to be specially desired and known."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 7. 1.]; "Having discovered Him, let him practise knowledge."—[*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 21.]; "There is in it the small etherial space. What exists within that (small etherial space), that has to be sought after, that has to be well understood."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 1.]; "There also is the blissful small etherial space. Whatever is within it, that has to be meditated upon." —[*M. Nār.* X. 7.]: and because also, it is declared in the following scriptural passage—"He who knows the *Brahman* attains the Highest."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.], as well as in other similar scriptural passages, that the *Brahman* is attained as a consequence (of those results of worship). Therefore the true nature of the *Brahman* and His attributes are made out only as being helpful to actions, in the same way in which (the knowledge of the nature of the thing to be attained is helpful to action) in the analogous case of *Swarga*,[274] which is in itself a particular place of

274. The *Vedas* give the injunction—"He, who desires to attain *Swarga*, shall perform the *Jyotishṭoma* sacrifice"; and the statement given elsewhere describing the nature of *Swarga* as that world "in which there is no heat, no cold and no disagreeableness" is helpful in producing the desire for the attainment of *Swarga* and is, in consequence, helpful in causing the performance of the *Jyotishṭoma* sacrifice in obedience to the injunction relating to it.

such pleasure as is unmixed with pain, and also in other similar cases; (it is found to be so helpful) in the case of the pre-eminence[275] which is to be derived from the performance of the nocturnal *satras*[276] and (also) in the case of that relation of cause and effect which exists between the reviling and beating[277] (of the Brāhmaṇas) and the fine of a hundred gold coins (prescribed therefor).

Even in sentences like—"Bring the ox", the significance of words does not relate to actions, because the 'action' thought of by you is difficult of definition. Indeed, your 'action' comes into existence after the volition (in relation to it), and is (simply) that which is aimed at by that volition. To be that, which is aimed at by volition, is to be the object of volition. And to be the object [278]of volition is to be that which (that) volition most desires to attain. And that which is most desired to be attained is pleasure, or the avoidance of existing pain by its means. This being so, if

275. Again, the *Vedas* give, in one place, the injunction—"He shall perform the nocturnal sacrifices." Elsewhere, the result of the performance of nocturnal sacrifices is stated to be the attainment of eminence, as, for instance, in the passage—"Those, indeed, who perform these nocturnal sacrifices, they attain eminence." This passage is helpful to action in as much as it stimulates the desire to attain eminence, and thus leads to the performance of those nocturnal sacrifices. Vide *Pûr. Mîm.* IV. 3. 17 to 19.

276. A *Satra* is a long sacrifice or sacrificial session lasting, according to some, from 13 to 100 days. *Satras* of many years' duration are also mentioned in *Vedic* literature.

277. And again, the *Vedas* prohibit the reviling and the beating of a Brāhmaṇa by means of the injunction—"Therefore, let him not revile and beat a Brāhmaṇa." *Taitt. Saṁh.* II. 6. 10. 2. The effect of violating this injunction is given in the following passage :—"He who reviles and beats (a Brāhmaṇa), let him be punished by the fine of a hundred gold coins." *Taitt. Saṁh.* II. 6. 10. 2. This passage mentions the result flowing from disobeying the injunction, and thus is helpful in producing the desire to act in accordance with the above prohibition.

278. Vide *Pāṇini* I. 4. 49., for this definition of *karma* or object.

a person, who desires to have pleasure, &c., perceives that these things cannot be acquired without any effort on his own part, then, that person is seen to act voluntarily like one who is desirous of putting forth effort. Thus, regarding that which is the object of desire, it is nowhere seen that to possess the characteristics of the thing aimed at by volition is anything other than to have its (own) accomplishment dependent on (that) volition. And an object of desire possesses the character of what stimulates (the accomplishment of that desire), only in so far as the accomplishment (of that object of desire) is dependent upon effort; because (all) activity proceeds only from this (dependence of accomplishment on effort).

Moreover, to be aimed at by volition is not to be that which is agreeable to men; because pleasure itself (which is no action) is that which is agreeable to men. Further, the cessation of pain does not possess the (positive) character of being what is agreeable to men. Indeed, the discrimination between the true nature of pleasure and pain is to the effect that what is agreeable to men is pleasure, and that what is disagreeable to them is pain. Pain is that which is disagreeable; and hence, its cessation becomes a desirable thing, but not because that (cessation) is (in a positive way) agreeable. Indeed, the existence of a thing in accordance with its own true nature, in a condition which is free from the association of what is agreeable as well as of what is disagreeable, constitutes the cessation of pain. Therefore action and (all) other similar things, which are different from pleasure, cannot possess the character of what is agreeable. Moreover, it (viz. action) also cannot be what is agreeable, even on account of its aiming at pleasure; because it is itself of the nature of pain. Even when it aims at pleasure, there is only the mere

desire to appropriate that (pleasure). Further, to be what is aimed at by volition is not to be that principal thing which has (that) volition subordinate to itself; because, on your side, the character of being (such) a principal thing has not been defined. And since the character of being so subordinate (to a principal thing) is the same as to be capable of being invariably influenced by the volition which is set in motion in obedience to the purposes of another,—it is not thereby made out that the character of being (such) a principal thing is to be that which is oppositely correlated to that (subordinate thing). For, if it were so, the volition would not possess the character of what is so subordinate; and that which is to be accomplished by it would not, in consequence, have the character of a principal thing. And again, for the reason that the character of being a subordinate thing is (simply) to be capable of producing that practical activity which is intended to serve the purposes of another, it cannot be said that that another forms the principal thing; because the character of being what is aimed at (by volition) is all that is to be defined (here), and because also the master too is seen to be capable of producing the activity which is intended to serve the purposes of the servant. But if it be said that the master, in accordance with his own desire, puts forth voluntary activity even in the matter of feeding the servant, it is replied that this is not right; because the servant also, out of his own desire, puts forth voluntary activity in the matter of feeding the master. Thus the true nature of 'action' itself has not been defined; and it is improper (to hold) that what is correlated to 'action', (as the thing to be accomplished by it), is the subordinate thing, and that what is correlated to this (subordinate thing as the owner thereof) is the principal thing.

Also, to be what is aimed at by volition is not the same as to constitute the utility of volition. The utility of the volition of a person is indeed nothing other than that utility which leads to the origination of his volition; and he is himself actuated by desire. Therefore, the thing aimed at by volition has not been definitely shown to be other than the thing desired. Consequently, it is certainly difficult to demonstrate that 'action' consists in being that which is accomplished by volition as well as in being the principal object of volition.

Moreover, a commandment also is different from pleasure and the cessation of pain, both of which are immediate objects of desire; therefore its desirability and the possibility of its being accomplished by volition are both due wholly to its forming a means of attaining those (objects of desire which are in the form of pleasure and the cessation of pain). It is for this very reason that it (viz. the commandment) is other than the verb (denoting action). Otherwise, (the action denoted by) the verb itself would form the object to be accomplished. The object of accomplishment expressed by the *liṅ*[279] and other verbal forms, in harmony with their use along with the word *swargakāma* (in the *Vedic* commandment *Jyotishṭomena swargakāmo yajeta*), is nothing other than the attainment of *Swarga*; therefore the object of accomplishment here is that new and invisible something itself (known as *apūrva*),[280] which is other than the ephemeral action (of sacrificing), and which causes the enduring attainment of *Swarga*. Accordingly, the import of this new and invisible something (*apūrva*) has indeed to be made out by imagining it to be the means of attaining *Swarga*. Thus it is said here that that object

279. Vide *supra* p. 41. n. 35. 280. Vide *supra* p. 41. n. 36.

which is to be accomplished is, at first, arrived at independently of all other things; and then, for the purpose of upholding this independent character (of that object of accomplishment), it is said that it is only the *apûrva* which later on becomes the means of causing the attainment of *Swarga*. Surely this is ludicrous; because that word (viz. *yajeta*) which denotes, while in association with the word *swargakâma*, the object of accomplishment, cannot at first denote the independent character (of that object of accomplishment); and because also that independent thing, which is different from pleasure, from the cessation of pain, and from the means of attaining them, is not seen to be capable of being accomplished by means of volition.

And again, what is this usefulness of the commandment? If it be said that, like pleasure, commandment (also) possesses the character of being agreeable, (it is asked) whether commandment constitutes pleasure; for pleasure alone is what is agreeable. If it be said (again) that, like some particular kind of pleasure or other, it is also a peculiar pleasure that is synonymous with commandment, it has to be explained what means of proof there is to establish this. If it be said that one's own experience is the means of proof, it is seen not to be so; because even you do not experience in any definite manner any pleasure arising out of the experience of a commandment, in the same way in which (you experience) the pleasure arising out of the experience of (pleasurable) external objects. If it be said that a commandment is declared by an authoritative regulation to be an object of human pursuit, and that it is, therefore, carried into effect subsequently, it is asked what that authoritative regulation is which says that a commandment is an object of human pursuit. It is not the (law-imposing) voice of the people;

because that (voice of the people which imposes a commandment) relates to work which is identical with pain; and because also it merely declares (the commandment) to be worthy of being carried into effect by volition, only in so far as it forms a means for the attainment of pleasure and other such things. Nor is it the voice of the *Vedas*, for that also enjoins the duty to be performed only as a means for the attainment of *Swarga* and other such things. It is neither the daily obligatory nor the occasionally obligatory injunction (of the *Smṛitis*); because that also possesses its power of importing it (*i. e.* a commandment), only through the knowledge of (that) new and invisible something (or *apūrva*) which is found in the sentence[281] containing (the word) *swargakāma*. Therefore, as now stated, it is unavoidable that that (injunction of the *Smṛitis*) also implies the performance of works, (only) for the attainment of pleasure and other such things. Those works, the results of which are systematically temporal, bear fruit, as soon as they are performed, in the form of plenty of food, healthiness, and such other things which are enjoyed then (and there); and consequently there is no knowledge of the experience of that pleasure which in contradistinction to them has the nature of (the working out of) a commandment. Thus we have no means whatsoever to prove that a commandment is a pleasure.

Even in the explanatory and eulogistic allegories and fables found in the *Vedas*, [282]you do not generally see the

281. This sentence is—*Jyotishṭomena swargakāmo yajeta.*

282. The *Veda* consists, according to the opiñion of the *Mīmāmsakas*, of three parts, viz. *Mantras*, *Vidhis* and *Arthavādas*. *Mantras* are sacred hymns and prayers, &c. *Vidhis* are injunctions *i. e.* rules laying down the performance of particular rites. *Arthavādas* are explanatory remarks on the meaning of *Mantras* and the purpose of rites, and consist of *Nindā* or censure *i. e.*

description of the various modes of that pleasure which has the nature of a commandment, in the same way in which (you there see) the description of the various modes of the pleasure which relates to *Swarga* and such other things. Therefore, it is finally concluded that, even in those passages which give out only injunctions, the *liṅ* and the other inflectional forms of the verb denote, as established by the science of grammar itself, the fact that the meaning of a root relates to nothing other than what is to be accomplished by the activity of the agent. Under the aphorism—"From Him (comes) the fruit (of our works), because (such a thing) is appropriate."—[*Ved. Sût.* III. 2. 37.], it will be established that sacrifices and other such things, which are denoted by the verbal roots (used in scriptural commandments), possess the character of constituting the worship of the Highest Person who is the internal ruler of gods like *Agni* (Fire), &c.; and that the accomplishment of the results aimed at (by such works) comes from that Highest Person (who is so) worshipped.

Therefore it is conclusively proved that the *Vedânta* teaches the Highest *Brahman* (the import of the words denoting whom is) naturally established. Accordingly, the endlessness and the eternity of the fruits resulting from

controversial remarks; *Śamsâ i. e.* eulogium or 'recommendation'; *Purâkalpa* or the account of sacrificial rites in former times; *Parakṛiti i. e.* the achievement or the feat of another. This last comprises the stories about certain performances of renowned *Śrotriyas* or sacrificial priests, about gifts presented by kings to Brâhmaṇas, &c. Under the head of *Purâkalpa* come the numerous stories of the fight between the Devas and the Asuras, as also the legends concerning the sacrifices performed by the gods. Thus *Arthavâda* includes all the explanatory and eulogistic allegories, fables, &c.

the worship of the *Brahman* are also proved. In the case of the *chāturmāsya*[283] sacrifice and other such (ritualistic) works also, it is taught that mere works yield unenduring results ; and therefore it has to be understood that the teaching regarding (their) indestructible results is meant to be indicative of (their) relative superiority, as in the following among other passages where the scripture says,—"This *vāyu* (air) and (this) *antariksha* (ether) are immortal." [*Bṛih. Up.* II. 3. 3.].[284] Thus, mere works yield inconsiderable and unenduring results, and the knowledge of the *Brahman* yields infinite and ever enduring results. Consequently, it is maintained that it is proper to commence that enquiry into the *Brahman* the fruit of which is the determination of that (knowledge of the *Brahman*).

283. Vide *supra* p. 245. n. 273

284. The idea intended to be conveyed here is this :—There are explicit statements in the scriptures to the effect that the results derived from the performance of ritualistic works are impermanent. This general proposition allows no room for exceptions, and the *Chāturmāsya* sacrifice is no exception to the rule. Therefore the statement that it yields permanent results can only mean that its results last longer than those of any other kind of 'work'. Similarly, the immortality of air and ether implies that they are less mortal than other things. For the general statement regarding the impermanence of the results of 'works',—vide *Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 6., where it is said—"Just as the world obtained by works perishes here, so also, there, the world obtained by merit perishes."

ADHIKARAṆA. II.

Janmādyadhikaraṇa.

To point out what that *Brahman* really is which is stated to be the object of the enquiry here, he (the *Sūtrakāra*) says—

Sūtra 2. Janmādyasya yataḥ.

(The *Brahman* is that) from whom (proceed) the creation, &c., of this (universe).

The word ***janmādi*** means creation, preservation, and destruction. The attributive compound[285] (here) denotes that (collection of things) which is characterised (as having 'creation' at its beginning). The word ***asya*** denotes the world which is constituted in an unthinkably varied and wonderful fashion, and which is mixed up with (all) the individual souls, beginning with Brahmā and ending with a clump of grass, each of which has its own particularly assigned enjoyment of the fruits (of *karmas*) limited to particular times and places. The word ***yataḥ*** denotes that that Highest Person who is the Lord of all, who possesses a nature which is hostile to all that is evil, who wills the truth, who possesses innumerable auspicious qualities, such as knowledge, bliss, &c., who is omniscient, omnipotent, and merciful in the highest degree, and from whom proceed creation, preservation, and destruction,—(it denotes that that Highest Person) is the *Brahman*. This is the meaning of this *sūtra*.

There is the scriptural passage which begins with—"The celebrated Bhṛigu, son of Varuṇa, approached his father, saying 'Reverend sir, teach me the *Brahman*",—and con-

285. Vide Patanjali's *Mahā-Bhāshya* on *Pāṇini* I. 1. 27 ; II. 2. 24 ; VI. 1. 1.

cludes with—"From whom all these beings are born, by whom, when born, they are all preserved, and to whom they go when they perish,—do thou desire to know that well; that is the *Brahman*." [*Taitt. Up.* III. 1. 1.]. Here there arises the doubt whether or not it is possible to know the *Brahman* definitely by means of this passage. It is perhaps held that it is not possible. The words creation, &c., do not, indeed, define the *Brahman* by constituting His characterising attributes; for, (if they did), there would result the predication of non-unity in relation to the *Brahman*, in consequence of His being characterised by many attributes. Indeed to be the characterising attribute (of a thing) is to be that which distinguishes it (from other things). It may be urged that in the instance,—"Devadatta is brown, youthful, red-eyed, and symmetrical in form",—there is seen only one Devadatta, although there are many characterising attributes (in relation to him); and that, similarly, in the case here also there is only one *Brahman*. It can not be so. In that case, all the characterising attributes meet in only one individual, because the oneness (which relates to Devadatta) is made out through other means of proof. Otherwise, even in that case, the predication of non-unity would be unavoidable on account of this distinguishing character (of those attributes). But here, (in the case under discussion), it is intended to define the *Brahman* by means of this same (collectively given) attribute (of creation, &c.,); accordingly, that predication of plurality in relation to the *Brahman*, which results from a variety of distinguishing attributes, is unavoidable for the reason that the oneness of the *Brahman* is not made out by other means of proof. If it be said that that oneness is made out here also, because the word *Brahman* (in the scriptural passage under discussion) is only one,—it is replied that it cannot be so

made out. If, to a person who does not know any individual ox, and who is desirous to know (the ox), it is given out—"An ox is that which is broken-horned, hornless and fully horned",—there will then be the apprehension (by him) of a plurality of individual oxen, owing to there being a variety of distinguishing attributes, such as the possession of broken horns and so on, although the word ox is used only once; accordingly, there must be many individual *Brahmans.* For this very reason it is not possible for these characteristics (of creation, &c.,) to constitute even collectively the definition of the thing which it is intended to define. Nor can (these attributes of creation, &c.,) point out (the *Brahman*) by constituting (His) accidental characteristics, because there is no apprehension (of the *Brahman*) in any other form. Indeed, all accidental characteristics are seen to be the means of apprehending, under a different form, a thing already known in some one particular form; as in the following among other instances, namely,—"Where there is that crane, that is Devadatta's field." And it may be said that the creation, &c., of the world form accidental characterisations in relation to Him who has already been made out by means of (the passage)—"The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.]. But it is not right, for the reason that, in relation to these two passages which define the *Brahman*, there results the fallacy of reciprocal dependence; in as much as the form (of the thing to be defined) denoted by either (of those passages) is dependent upon that which is denoted by the other. Therefore it is not possible to know the *Brahman* by means of any definition.

To this it is said in reply as follows:—It is possible to know the *Brahman* by means of the creation, preserv-

ation, and destruction of the world, which (together) constitute (His) accidental characteristics. Moreover, there can be (here) no non-apprehension of the *Brahman* due to the non-apprehension of a form (in relation to Him), other than the form which is characterised by these accidental characteristics. Indeed, that which is characterised (here) by means of accidental characteristics is Greatness unsurpassed in excellence; and it is Growth also, because the root[286] *bṛih* (to grow) is capable of that meaning. And the creation, preservation, and destruction of the world constitute the accidental characteristics of that (*Brahman* thus made out to be Greatness and Growth). By the expressions—'from whom', 'by whom' and '(to) whom', the cause of the creation, &c., (of the world) is pointed out (in this passage) as though it is a well known thing; and it is, accordingly, restated here in conformity with that well known knowledge. And the fact of (that cause) being thus well known is due to the only one thing, which is expressed by the word 'Existence' (or *sat*), forming the instrumental and the material cause (of the world), as it is given in the passage—"Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning, one only, without a second.......It thought—'May I become many and be born'. It created *tejas*." [*Chhând. Up*. VI. 2. 1 & 3.]. And this (fact of the *Brahman* forming the instrumental and the material cause of the world) results thus: from the statement that this 'Existence' was one only in the beginning, there is the predication of the character of a material cause (in relation to that only one thing); and from the expression 'without a second', there is the negation of any other presiding deity; and

286. See *Ait. Up*. 4. & also *V. P*. III. 3. 22.

again from the statement—"It thought, 'May I become many and be born'; It created *tejas*"—there is the declaration of only one (Being as constituting the deity presiding over creation). Hence that is the *Brahman* from whom proceed the creation, preservation, and destruction of the world; consequently, the attributes of creation, preservation and destruction define the *Brahman* to be that thing which is their own instrumental and material cause. The *Brahman* is understood to be that Greatness which consists in possessing omniscience, the quality of willing the truth, and wonderful powers and so on, which are all implied in His being the instrumental and the material cause of the world; and for this reason also there does not arise the inappropriateness which is due to the non-realisation of another form (in relation to the *Brahman*), because creation, &c., constitute the characteristics (of the *Brahman*) so realised.

There is nothing wrong in creation, &c., forming even the defining characteristics (of the *Brahman*), in as much as they are (His) attributes. Even those attributes which form the defining characteristics (of a thing) denote that thing which is contrary to what is characterised by their opposites. Even when the thing, which it is desired to define, happens to be (only) one and has its essential nature unknown,—(even then for that one thing) to be characterised by many attributes, which do not conflict with each other, does not imply any differentiation (in relation to it); because all the characterising attributes are seen to relate to one and the same thing, and are thus applied together to one and the same thing. But the attributes of being broken-horned, &c., (mentioned before in relation to the ox), indicate different individual oxen, solely by reason of the contradiction (existing between

the attributes themselves). But here (*i.e.* in the case of the *Brahman*) the attributes of creation, &c., do not contradict (each other) owing to the difference in the time (of their occurrence). The *Brahman*, who is the cause of the creation, &c., of the world, is apprehended from the passage which begins with—"From whom all these beings are born"—[*Taitt. Up.* III. 1. 1.], and deals with the cause of the universe; and the scriptural passage—"The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.], —denotes that essential nature of His which is different from all other things. Here the word 'Existence' denotes the *Brahman* as possessing the state of the unconditioned being. By this (word) the non-intelligent thing (or matter) which is subject to modifications, and the intelligent thing (or the individual soul) which is associated with it are (both) excluded; because these two (things) are not capable of unconditioned existence, owing to the fact that they are capable of existing in various states so as to assume various names. The word 'Knowledge' denotes (in relation to Him) the eternal and uncontracted condition of pure intelligence. By this (word) the released souls are excluded (from the definition of the *Brahman*), owing to the fact that their intelligence must have been at one time in a contracted state. The word 'Infinity' denotes that essential nature (of His) which is free from the limitations of space, of time, and of being some one particular thing (among others). This essential nature (of the *Brahman*) is possessed of attributes, and therefore (His) infinity is the consequence of (His) nature as well as qualities. By this (word) are excluded (all) those freed individual souls whose nature and qualities are not unsurpassed (in excellence), and who are distinct from the two classes of things already excluded (from the definition of the *Brahman*) by

means of the first two words (*Existence* and *Knowledge*); because characterising attributes possess the power of exclusively defining things. Therefore, by means of this passage, namely,[287] "The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity", that *Brahman*, whose true nature is made out from the creation, &c., of the world, is defined as being different from all other things; and thus there is (here) no fallacy of reciprocal dependence. Consequently, it is a settled conclusion that the *Brahman* who is the cause of the creation, &c., of all the worlds, who is untainted, who is omniscient, who wills the truth, and who is omnipotent, is capable of being understood by means of a definition.

Those again who say that the object of the enquiry (here) is the attributeless thing,—according to their view, the aphorisms[288]—"(Then therefore) the enquiry into the *Brahman*", and "(That is the *Brahman*) from whom (proceed) the creation, &c., of this (universe)."—would be inappropriate; because there is (here) the etymological explanation[289] that the *Brahman* is unsurpassed Greatness and Growth; and also because that same *Brahman* is declared (herein) to be the cause of the creation, &c., of the world. Similarly, in the groups of succeeding aphorisms, as well as in the groups of scriptural passages quoted under those aphorisms, it may be observed that the association of the powers of 'seeing', &c., is predicated (in relation to the *Brahman*). Hence the *sūtras* (or aphorisms) and the scriptural passages quoted under those aphorisms do not constitute any authority for that (*i. e.* for holding the view that the object of the enquiry here is the attributeless thing). Logic also is no means of proving that thing

287. *Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.

288. Vide *Ved. Sūt.* I. 1. 1 & 2.

289. Vide *supra* n. 286.

which is devoid of characterising attributes; because it[290] deals with such a thing as is associated with the characteristics of that which forms the basis of logical inference, and which is invariably concomitant with the characteristics of the thing to be proved. The thing which is devoid of characterising attributes is not established even according to your own imaginary position that the *Brahman* is that from whom proceeds the illusion regarding the creation, &c., of the world; because thereby it will have to be admitted that ignorance (or *avidyā*) is the source of this illusion, and that the *Brahman* is the witness of this ignorance. Indeed, (He) is said to be a *witness* simply because (He) has the character of homogeneous luminosity. And luminosity is a characteristic which distinguishes (the possessor thereof) from what is non-intelligence, and it has the nature of what makes itself and other things fit to be realised (by the mind). If this be so (admitted), then there results (to the *Brahman*) the condition of being qualified by characterising attributes. If this be not (so admitted), there would be no luminosity at all, and there would be only nothingness.

ADHIKARAṆA. III.

Śāstrayonitwādhikaraṇa.

It has been stated that the *Brahman*, who is the cause of the creation, &c., of the world, is capable of being made out from the *Vedānta*. This is improper. Indeed,

290. The meaning is this:—In a syllogism, the minor term is found associated with the characteristics of the middle term which is associated with the characteristics of the major term. Thus in the syllogism, "The mountain is fiery, because it smokes", the minor term 'mountain' is associated with the characteristics of the middle term 'smoke' which again is associated with the characteristics of the major term 'fire'.

that (*Brahman*) is not established by (*Vedānta*) passages, because He is established by means of logical inference. To such a supposition, he (the *Sūtrakāra*) says in reply—

Sūtra 3. Śāstrayonitwāt.

(That the *Brahman* is the cause of the creation, &c., of the universe, follows altogether from the scripture), because the scripture forms the source (of the knowledge relating to Him).

He, in relation to whom the scripture forms the source, or the instrument (of knowledge), or the means of proof,—He is the scripture-sourced one. And the state of His being so scripture-sourced is His scripture-sourcedness. From that, (that is), from the *śāstra* having the character of being the means of acquiring the knowledge relating to the *Brahman*, the *Brahman* has that (*śāstra*) for (His) source. The *Brahman* is altogether beyond the senses, and so does not form the object of any means of proof, such as perception, &c.; and the *śāstra* alone forms the means to prove Him. Consequently, the scriptural passage beginning with—"From whom all these beings are born"—[*Taitt. Up.* III. 1. 1.],—certainly teaches that *Brahman* who is of the nature already described. This is the meaning (of this *sūtra*).

It may, however, be said here thus:—Indeed, it is not possible for the *Brahman* to be that which has the *śāstra* as the means of proving Him; because the *Brahman* is capable of being made out by other means of proof. And the *śāstra*[291] has a meaning only in so far as it relates to what has not been already arrived at.

What[292] then is the means of proving that (*Brah-*

291. Cf. *Pūr. Mīm.* III. 4. 12. & III. 5. 21. Vide *supra* n. 232.

292. Here, the objector is the *Mīmāmsaka*.

man)? Surely, it is not perception. It (viz. perception) is of two kinds; that which is born of the senses, and that which is born of *yoga* (or introspective realisation through mental concentration). The (perception) which is born of the senses is of two kinds, namely, outside-born (or external) and inside-born (or internal). The external senses give rise to the knowledge of such of their own objects as are fit to be brought into contact (with them) in the usual way; and accordingly they do not produce the knowledge which relates to that particular Person who is capable of directly perceiving all things, and is (also) capable of bringing them into existence. Nor does the internal (perception prove the *Brahman*); because, in relation to external objects (naturally) distinct from pain, pleasure, &c., which are (all)internal, it cannot operate independently of the external senses. Even *yogic* perception[293] does not (prove the *Brahman*). It (viz. *yogic* perception) results from the utmost intensification of mental conception, and although it has the character of a clear presentation before consciousness, it is nothing other than the mere remembrance of previously experienced things; and it is, therefore, no (separate) means of proof. Under these circumstances, how can it have the character of direct perception, seeing that there is no cause to make it deal with things other than those (to which that remembrance and that conception relate)? If it did deal with such things, it would acquire the character of an illusion. Inference also, whether arrived at through the particular way of deduction or arrived at through the generic way of induction, is not (the means of proving the *Brahman*). (Inference) arrived at through the particular way of deduction is not (the

293. Vide *supra* p.69. n. 46.

means of proof here), because there is no knowledge of its relating to anything which is beyond the senses. There is also no such basis of inductive inference as is seen to give rise to a generalisation and as is invariably associated with that particular Person who is capable of directly perceiving all things and of actually bringing those (things) into existence.

It may, however, be again objected thus:—[294] (The idea of) the world being a produced effect is invariably associated with (the idea of) there being, (in relation to it), an agent, who knows thoroughly its material cause, its auxiliary implements of production, its disposal and its purpose. The idea also that the world is produced by the non-intelligent thing (or matter) is invariably associated with the idea of its being subject to the control of a single intelligent being. Indeed, all produced effects such as pots, &c., are seen to be associated with a producing agent who knows their material cause, their auxiliary implements of production, their disposal and their purpose. (For example), one's own body, which is produced out of non-intelligent matter and is free from disease, is indeed subject to the control of a single intelligent being. The world is a produced effect, because it is made up of component parts.

It is replied (to this) as follows:—What is it (for a thing) to be subject to the control of a single intelligent being? It is, surely, not to have the origin and the existence (of that thing) subject to the control of that (being); for, then, the illustrative example (given above) will be found to be defective in regard to that which is to be proved. Indeed, one's own body, which is free from

294. The objector here is one who partly accepts the doctrines of the *Naiyâyikas* and believes in the value of the 'design argument'.

disease, has not its origin and existence subject to the control of a single intelligent being; because, to all (those) intelligent beings, such as the wife, &c., who are the enjoyers of that body, the origin and the existence of that (body) appear to be due to something that is unknown. Moreover, the body which is organically made up of constituent parts does not, for the purpose of existing in the form of a complete whole the constituent parts of which are inherently associated together, stand in need of an intelligent being over and above the peculiar putting together of its constituent parts. And that (kind of) existence, which is characterised by life, can not possibly be predicated in relation to the earth, the ocean, the mountain, &c., which are all admitted to fall into the same class (as the body); and hence, we find that there is no (kind of) existence that is of a uniform nature and is found to be alike in the case under consideration as well as in other parallel cases. If it be said that (for a thing) to be subject to the control of a (single intelligent) being, is the same as to have its movements determined by that (single being), then, this (law) is seen to be transgressed in the case of heavy chariots and stones and trees and other such objects, which are all capable of being moved only by many intelligent beings,—(although they are all produced out of non-intelligent matter and have thus to be understood in accordance with the above hypothesis to be subject to the control of a single intelligent being). If it be said that it (viz. the fact of being produced out of non-intelligent matter) is the same as to be simply dependent upon intelligent beings, then, there arises the fallacy of proving the proved. Moreover, it is proper to admit that the individual souls alone, which are accepted by both parties, do possess the quality of being agents; because there is

(the support of) simplicity (in favour of such an admission). And it is not right to hold that it is impossible for the quality of being an agent to exist in relation to the individual souls, since they do not know the material cause, &c., (in regard to the production of things); for, all the individual souls are in possession of the power of directly perceiving the material cause (of things) such as the (element) earth, &c., and (also) the auxiliary means (of producing them), such as sacrifices, &c. Accordingly, the (element) earth, &c., and sacrifices, &c., are directly perceived by them now. In relation to the intelligent beings (viz. the individual souls), there is (indeed) no impossibility of the quality of being an agent, even in the absence of the direct perception of that unseen something[295] which is expressed by the word *apûrva* and by other words, and has the nature of the power which results from sacrifices, &c., that form the auxiliary means (of producing things); because the production of a thing, does not stand in need of such direct perception. Indeed, the direct perception of that which has power is alone useful in causing the production of anything. It is the knowledge alone, but not the direct perception, of power that is (here) useful. As a matter of fact, potters and others do not begin their work of making jars, water-pots, and such other things, only after having directly perceived the power of those things (which form the auxiliary implements of production); in the same way in which (they perceive) the rod, the wheel, and the other things that form the auxiliary means to the performance of their work. And, in the case of those intelligent beings (or the individual souls) who are, in accordance with the *śâstras*, understood to possess the particular kind of power which results

295. Vide *supra* p. 41. n. 36. Vide also *Pûr. Mîm.* II. 1. 1 to 4.

from sacrifices, &c., it is not (at all) inappropriate here that they do the work (of producing things). Moreover, that thing the making of which is possible and the knowledge relating to the material cause, &c., of which is also possible,—that thing alone is seen to have (been produced by) an agent who knows those (possibilities). But the earth, the mountain, the great ocean, &c., are things the making of which is impossible (to individual souls), and the knowledge of the material cause, &c., in relation to them is also impossible (to individual souls); therefore they are not made by intelligent beings (or the individual souls). Hence, it is only such a quality of being a produced effect as is found in association with a thing which is like jars, water-pots, and other objects resembling them, which is itself capable of being made (by individual souls), and the material cause, &c., relating to which are (all) capable of being known (by them),—(it is only this quality of being a produced effect) that is competent to establish that an intelligent maker (or agent) must have necessarily preceded (the production of that thing). Further, such a produced effect as a pot or any other similar object is seen to have been caused by one who is not the lord of all, whose knowledge and power are very limited, who has a body, who is provided with auxiliary implements of production, and whose desires are unfulfilled; accordingly, this means of proving an intelligent agent (in relation to the world), from the fact of the world possessing the characteristics of a produced thing, establishes an intelligent agent who is altogether of the above-mentioned nature; and thus it proves unfavourable, for the reason that it establishes in relation to the Person intended to be proved here (as the agent in the act of creation) the opposites of omniscience, the lordship of all, and other

such qualities. Moreover, owing to this much alone, it cannot be said that all logical inferences have to be given up (in this matter). If a thing which has to be proved by logical reasoning falls (also) within the scope of some other means of proof, then all such mistaken characteristics (in relation to that thing), as are arrived at on the strength of the bases of logical inference, are contradicted by that (other) means of proof; and hence those (characteristics) cease to be.[296] But here, in the case of Him who is the thing to be proved, who is incapable of being dealt with by all other means of proof (than the *śâstras*), and who is skilled in the creation of all the worlds, all the attributes, which are, as a rule, invariably associated with Him and are made out by means of direct and converse processes of logical inference, are, without exception, rightly found to be relevant and admissible; and they continue to remain as such, because there is no other means of proving (Him) by which these attributes may become stultified. Therefore, how is the Lord to be established without the *âgamas* (or *śâstras*)?

Here (again), they (viz. the *pûrvapakshins*)[297] say as follows:—It is not possible to deny the fact that the world is a produced effect; simply because it is made up of constituent parts. And the following are the syllo-

296. For example, a traveller who has missed his way, and is overtaken by darkness, happens to see at a distance the *ignis fatuus*; and mistaking it to be some kind of light lit up by man, he draws the inference that a human habitation must be found near the light. He moves on in the direction of the light, and at last perceives no such habitation. Here, the existence of the human habitation is capable of being made out by means of logical inference as well as by means of direct perception; and the inferred *existence* of the habitation is contradicted by means of the perceived *non-existence* thereof. Only thus can the conclusions of logic become stultified.

297. The *Pûrvapakshins* here are the *Vaiśeshikas*.

gistic statements (in regard to this position):—(1) The earth, the mountain, &c., which are (all) the subject of discussion (here), are produced effects,—because they are made up of constituent parts; as is the case with pots, &c. (2) Similarly, the earth, the ocean, the mountain, &c., which are (all) the subject of discussion (here), are produced effects,—because, being themselves gross, they possess the power of being set in motion; as is the case with a pot. (3) The body and the world, &c., are produced effects,—because, being themselves gross, they have a definite form; as is the case with a pot. In the case of such substances as are made up of constituent parts, we do not find any characteristic, other than the fact of their being made up of constituent parts, which uniformly defines the state of a produced effect so as to point out what is (really so) produced and what is not. If it be said that the possibility of (such things) being made, and the possibility of knowing their material cause, &c., are found invariably associated with the fact of things being produced effects,—it is replied that to hold so is not right. Even in the case of things which are accepted to be produced effects, the knowledge and the power (relating to the maker of the produced thing) are inferred from the product itself. Elsewhere also, the fact of a thing being a produced effect is made out through its being made up of constituent parts and through such other (causes). Hence, those two things (viz. the knowledge and the power of the producer of an effect) are certainly capable of being established (by inference). There is, thus, no peculiarity here. Accordingly, in the case of jars, water-pots and other made things, a person, after knowing that they are produced effects, makes out, by means of inference, the knowledge and the power which are found in the producing agent and are needed for the

making of those things. And (such a person) sees the palace of a king which he had never before seen, and which is wonderfully planned. Then, by means of the peculiarity in the arrangement of its parts, he arrives at the conclusion that it is a produced effect ; and immediately afterwards he learns by inference the wonderful nature of the knowledge and the power possessed by the producer (of that palace) for (the purpose of producing) it. Therefore, if the character of being a produced effect is established in the case of the body, of the world and such other things, then, a particular Person, who is capable of directly perceiving and of creating all things as well as of performing other actions in relation to them, is certainly proved. Moreover, in the case of intelligent beings (*i. e.* the individual souls), the enjoyment of pleasure and pain is based upon merit and demerit (respectively) ; however, these two things (viz. merit and demerit) are not themselves intelligent, and are not presided over by any intelligent being ; hence they are not themselves capable of being the means of yielding the fruits (of *karma*). Accordingly, some particular Person, who is capable of skilfully awarding all fruits in accordance with all the (various) *karmas*, has to be postulated ; because hatchets and other instruments, which are themselves not intelligent, are not, for instance, seen to be the means of producing the sacrificial pole and such other things, when not presided over by a carpenter, even though the proper place, the proper time, and the numerous other accessories (for making them) are all available and at hand. The case of the seed becoming the sprout and all other similar cases (also) fall within the scope of this case under discussion ; therefore to maintain any variation in logic in relation to them is to display that ignorance which belongs to demons learned in the scriptures.

For the very same reason, the statement which maintains that the above logic has to vary in the case of pleasure and other such things is (also) quite similar in character.[298] Further, it is not proper to assume, for the sake of simplicity, that this kind of presidentship belongs to the individual souls themselves, which are admitted by both parties; because, in their case, it is conclusively established that they do not possess the power of perceiving what is subtle, what is hidden, and what is far away. Indeed, in all cases, the hypothesis has to be altogether in accordance with the perception. And, in the case of the Lord of all, there can be no demonstration of powerlessness, as (there is) in the case of the individual soul. Therefore, it is not impossible to prove Him by other means of proof (than the scripture). He (the Lord) is proved to be arrived at as the cause of a produced effect which is invariably associated with an efficient producing agent; and hence He is surely made out as naturally possessing the power of directly perceiving and controlling all things. What has been already stated[299] to the effect that, by postulating the absence of lordship, &c., (in relation to the agent of creation), there results the fact of proving, (in relation to that agent), the opposites of certain

298. Pleasure and other sensations and emotions give rise to their corresponding physical expressions. These expressions are therefore produced effects having those sensations and emotions for their cause. And the sensations and emotions are not themselves *intelligent agents*. It may therefore be argued that all produced effects need not have an intelligent agent engaged in producing them. As the hatchet has to be handled by the carpenter, so also these sensations and emotions have to be felt by an intelligent being; otherwise, there can be no physical expression corresponding to them. Consequently, even here the predication of the *intelligent agent* cannot be avoided.

299. Vide *supra* p. 270.

(desired) attributes, — that is due to the ignorance of the various processes of logical inference; because all the attributes which are found to exist together in analogous and parallel cases, but do not themselves form the cause of producing the effect (in question), are not found to exist in the thing to be proved. What is said is this:— Anything which has to be produced (or made) by any one requires, for its production, that its producer should have the power of producing it, and have also the knowledge of its material cause and of the auxiliary means (needed for producing it). It does not require, (on his part), the incapability of producing other things and the ignorance in regard to other (causes and means); because they (viz. this powerlessness and this ignorance) do not form the cause (of what he has to produce). When, indeed, the production of a thing is possible by means of the power of producing it and by means of the knowledge of its material cause and of the accessories (needed for producing it), the ignorance, &c., of other things do not in any way affect (the production of it); and hence they do not deserve to form the cause of its production, merely on the score that they are seen to be in some way related (to that cause). Moreover, do (that) ignorance and that other thing (viz. powerlessness) which, relating to objects other than the thing to be produced, are, (according to you), capable of affecting the production of a thing—(do they) relate to all (such producible) things, or do they relate to only a few (such) things? Surely, they cannot relate to all (such) things, for it is not right to say that potters and others do not know anything other than what has to be produced by them. Nor do they relate only to a few (such) things; because there is no definite rule to settle, in the case of every one of all the agents, what particular kind of ignorance

and powerlessness he is to have, and there results, in consequence, a straying away from the hypothesis to postulate ignorance, &c., in relation to all things. Therefore, the fact that non-lordship and other such attributes, which do not affect the producibility of things, are not found in association with what is to be proved (*i. e.* with the Creator), does not (indeed) prove the contrary (of what is to be proved). It may be said that, since potters and others are seen to possess the power of controlling the use of rods, wheels, &c., only with the help of their bodies, it is therefore impossible for the Lord who has no body to become the controller of the material cause of the world and of the auxiliary means (needed for producing it). In such a case, it is replied that it is not right to hold so, because the expulsion and destruction of ghosts, demons, poisons, &c., found in the bodies of others are seen to result solely with the help of the will (of the magician) If it be asked, how the Lord who has no body can Himself have that will which makes others act, it is replied that the will is not dependent upon the body, in as much as the body does not form the cause of the will. The mind alone is the cause of the will, and that is admitted to be found in the Lord also; because, from the very same fact of (the world's) being a produced effect, His mind also is arrived at (by us through inference), in the same way in which His knowledge and power are. If it be said that, since he alone has the mind who has the body, the will born of the mind belongs only to him who has the body,—it is replied that it cannot be so; because the mind is eternal, and the mind continues to exist even after the destruction of the body, and is not, in consequence, invariably associated with it. Thus, the individual soul who is under the influence of merit and demerit, and who is possessed of power and knowledge, is

not competent to produce such effects as the creation of the body, the world, &c., which are all characterised by a peculiarly wonderful arrangement of (their) constituent parts. Consequently, that particular Person, namely, the Lord, who is clever in the creation of all the worlds, whose knowledge, power, and lordship are unthinkable and immeasurable, who is without a body, who, merely by means of the instrument of volition, has established this infinite and wide world of wonderful arrangements,—(such a Lord) is established solely by means of the logical process of inference. Therefore, in as much as the *Brahman* is capable of being conclusively made out by a means of proof (other than the scriptures), this scriptural passage (viz. "From whom, all these beings are born, &c.",) does not establish the *Brahman*. Moreover, it is seen that only two very extremely different things, namely, the mud and the potter, constitute the material and the instrumental causes (of a pot). It is not further proper to suppose that the spatial ether and such other things, which have no constituent parts, possess the character of a produced effect. Consequently it is not possible to establish that the only one *Brahman* constitutes (both) the material and the instrumental causes of the whole world.

If it be thus argued, we make the following reply :—

The scriptural passage[300] relating to the origin, &c., (of the world) certainly gives rise to the knowledge of the *Brahman* as possessing the above-mentioned characteristics. Why? Because the *Brahman* is to be proved solely by means of the *śâstras*. What has been stated to the effect that the whole world is a produced effect, in as much as it is made up of constituent parts and (possesses) other allied

300. Vide *Taitt. Up.* III. 1. 1.

(characteristics); that a produced effect is seen to be invariably associated with a special agent suited to the production thereof; and that, therefore, some one who is clever in the creation of all the worlds, and in knowing their material cause and the auxiliary means of producing them, has to be inferred;—this is improper: because, though the earth, and the great ocean, &c., are produced effects, there is no proof to show that they were created by one (agent) at only one particular time. Again, all the things (in the world) do not possess the character of constituting a single produced effect, in the same way in which a pot does (possess such a character), so that there may be one agent (to produce them all) at one and the same time; because, in the case of produced things, which are quite distinct from one another, there is the perception of difference in time and of difference in agents; and there is, in consequence, no apprehension of any rule laying down only one particular agent and one particular time (in regard to the production of things). Again, in as much as the individual souls are incapable of creating the wonderful world, and in as much as it is inappropriate to assume many (individual souls to be the creators of the world), when, on the strength of the world being a produced effect, an agent different from those (individual souls) has to be assumed (as the creator of the world),—merely on this score it is not right to hold that there must be only one agent (in the matter of creating the world): because, owing to the fact that those individual souls themselves who have increased their special merits are seen to possess wonderful powers, and owing also to the fact that to them alone there is the possibility of the fruition of that highly increased influence (of the *karmas*) which is known as *adṛishṭa*,[301] it is appropriate for each

301. Vide *supra* p. 41. n. 36.

of those (individual souls) to form the cause of producing particular and distinct created effects; and it is not, in consequence, proper to assume (as the agent in the act of creation) a person who is distinct from them and is quite unseen. Again, the (conceptions of the) simultaneous origination of all things and the simultaneous destruction of all things do not deserve to occupy the position of proved truth; because such a thing is not seen (to occur), and because creation and destruction are seen to take place only one after another in order, and because also, even when the simultaneous origination and destruction of all things have to be assumed owing to the fact of their being produced effects, there is nothing wrong in supposing that those acts (of creation and destruction) take place in accordance with what is ordinarily perceived (to be the case). Therefore, if it is the agency of one intelligent being (in regard to the production of all things) that is to be established, then, there is no invariable association of the produced character of things (with such a single producing agent). Moreover, the subject of the discussion (viz. such an intelligent being) will (then) have to possess attributes generally unknown to be possessed by him, and the given example (of the pot) will be defective in illustrating the thing to be proved; because such a single person as is capable of creating all things is not known to exist. If it is only an intelligent agency that is to be established, then there results the fallacy of proving the admittedly proved. Is this character of being a produced effect, which is intended to prove some one being who is possessed of omniscience and omnipotence,—(is this) found in relation to all such things as are produced at one and the same time? Or is it found in relation to all such things as are produced one after another

in order? If it be found in relation to all things which are held to be produced at one and the same time, then (owing to the hypothesis being untrue) the character of being a produced effect would itself remain unproved (in relation to the world); and if it be found in relation to all things which are held to be produced one after another in order, then, it would be established that they must be produced by many agents, and there would be the consequent contradiction (of what is to be proved here). Under these circumstances, in proving the agency of (only) one being (in relation to all produced things in the world), there is not only the contradiction of perception and inference, but (there is) also the contradiction of the scriptures; for, we see it mentioned (separately) in the scriptures that the maker of the pot is born, and also that the maker of the chariot is born.[302]

Moreover, all produced effects such as bodies, &c., are seen to be associated with pleasures, &c., which are themselves the produced effects of the qualities of goodness, &c.[303] Therefore, it has necessarily to be admitted that all produced effects result from the qualities of goodness, &c. The qualities of goodness, &c., which form the source of the wonderful variety of produced effects, are indeed the special characteristics found in the (producing) cause. It is (only) in consequence of the modification of the internal organ (or *manas*) of the person who is possessed of those (qualities) that it becomes appropriate to declare that those

302. The idea is that, if all things are produced only by one agent, the maker of the pot cannot be different from the maker of the chariot. The scripture mentions these separately so as to imply that they are different from each other. Accordingly, the scriptures contradict the idea that all produced things have only one producing agent.

303. These are the three well known qualities of *Sattva*, goodness, *Rajas*, passion & *Tamas*, darkness.

produced effects result from those (qualities). And, in the case of such a person, the possession of those (qualities) is due to *karma*.[304] Therefore, for the very commencement of any particular work, as the producing agent's knowledge and power, his association with *karma* (also) has necessarily to be admitted to form, indeed, the cause of a produced effect. (It has necessarily to be so admitted), for the reason that the wonderful nature of (the agent's) knowledge and power is (itself) due to *karma*. Even when it is held that desire is the cause of the commencement of work, it is not possible to give up the (agent's) association with *karma*, for the reason that that (desire), which is specially characterised by its relation to some particular object or other, is itself due to the qualities of goodness, &c. Therefore the individual souls alone become the agents, and some one else who is distinct from them cannot be established (as agent) by means of logical inference. And the syllogistic statements (in this connection) are as follow :—(1) The body, the world, &c., have the individual souls for their (producing) agents; because they possess the character of being produced effects, (even) as a pot does: (2) The Lord is no agent (in the act of creation); because He has no purpose (in creation), just as released souls (have not): (3) The Lord is no agent (in the act of creation); because He has no body, just as those same (released souls have not). And this (last reasoning) is not fallacious in being too widely applicable to the case of individual souls getting to preside over their own bodies, because, in such a case also, there is the (previous) existence of the beginningless subtle body (in association with those souls): (4) Time, about

304. The word *karma* here means actions done in previous births and the effects of those actions.

which there is difference of opinion, can never have been devoid of (created) worlds; because it possesses the character of being time, (even) like the present time.

And again, does the Lord perform work with a body, or (does He do so) without a body? Surely, (He does) not (do so) without a body; because it is not possible for him who has no body to be an agent. Even mental actions are possible for him alone who has a body; because, although the mind is eternal, the released souls are not known to be characterised by those (mental) actions. Nor indeed (does He perform actions) while possessing a body; because it (viz. the embodied condition of the Lord) does not admit any of the possible alternative views (in regard to it). Is that body (of the Lord) eternal or non-eternal? Surely, it is not eternal; for, if that (body) which is made up of constituent parts be eternal, there would be nothing wrong in the world also being eternal; and consequently, there would be no proving of the Lord. Nor also is that (body) non-eternal; because that which is different from it and forms (in its own turn) the cause of that body can not then be existent. If it be said that He, (the Lord) is alone the cause (of His own body), it is replied that it cannot be so; because it is impossible for him who has no body to be the cause of that (viz. his own body). If it be said that, (at the time of creation), He acquires a body by taking unto Himself some body other than His own, it is replied that it cannot be so; because this will lead to the fallacy of *regressus in infinitum*. Is He full of activity or is He devoid of all activity? He is not full of activity, because He has no body at all. Neither does He who is, like a released soul, devoid of all activity, perform any work. If it be maintained that the world which is a produced thing has for its (producing)

agent one whose activity is only to desire, then the subject of the discussion (viz. the creating agent) will have to possess attributes generally unknown (to be possessed by such as he); and the given example will be defective in illustrating the thing to be proved. Therefore, the process of logically inferring the Lord, in accordance with what we perceive, is itself stultified by having to accord with what we actually see. Consequently, the Highest Person who is the Lord of all, and is the Highest *Brahman*, is proved only by the *śâstras*. And the *śâstras* declare Him to be entirely distinct from all the things which are cognised by all the other means of proof, to be an ocean of such unsurpassingly great and noble qualities as are made up of omniscience, the quality of willing the truth, and numerous other similar qualities, and to be possessed of a nature which is in itself hostile to all that is evil; and hence there cannot result, (in relation to Him), even a tittle of that defect which is due to any similarity with those things that are established to be existent with the help of the other means of proof.

It has been stated already—by the *pûrvapakshin*—that the identity of the material and the instrumental causes (of produced things) is not actually perceived, and that the character of being produced effects cannot be established in relation to spatial ether and such other things as are not made up of (various) constituent parts. Even this is not opposed to reason; and it will be proved so under the aphorisms—"(The *Brahman* is) also the material cause of the world, because (His being so) does not disagree with the example given to illustrate the proposition." [*Ved. Sût.* I. 4. 23.]; and—"The spatial ether is not (a produced thing) on account of the absence of scriptural statements to that effect." [*Ved. Sût.* II. 3. 1.].

Therefore, it is a demonstrated conclusion that the scriptural passage, which begins with—"From whom all these beings (are born)"—[*Taitt. Up.* III. 1. 1.], proves the *Brahman* to be possessed of the above-mentioned characteristics; for the reason that He is not cognisable by any other means of proof, and is, in consequence, to be dealt with solely by the *śāstras*.

ADHIKARAṆA. IV.

Samanvayādhikaraṇa.

Although the *Brahman* is not cognised by any means of proof (other than the *śāstras*), nevertheless, the *śāstras* may not prove the *Brahman*, the idea corresponding to whom is naturally established in as much as He does not import any activity or cessation from activity. In answer to such a doubt, he (the *Sūtrakāra*) says:—

Sūtra 4. Tattu samanvayāt.

That (viz. the fact that the scripture forms altogether the source of the knowledge relating to the *Brahman*) results, however, from (His constituting) the true purport (of the scripture).

The word **however** is intended to remove the doubt raised. The word **that** denotes the fact that the *śāstras* form indeed the means of proving the *Brahman*. How? **From (His constituting) the true purport (of the scripture).** (His constituting) the true purport (of the scripture) is (the same as His being) the highest object of human pursuit; because, the *Brahman* who is the highest object of human pursuit is alone intended to be denoted (by the *śāstras*). All the *Upanishadic* passages such as the following and others have to be interpreted to mean this very same

thing :—"From whom all these beings are born"—[*Taitt. Up.* III. 1. 1.]; "Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning, one only, without a second"—[*Chhând. Up.* VI. 2. 1.]; "It thought—'May I become manifold and be born'. It created *tejas*."—[*Chhând. Up.* VI. 2. 3.]; "The *Brahman*, indeed, this one alone was in the beginning"—[*Bṛih. Up.* I. 4. 11.]; "The Self, indeed, this one alone was in the beginning"—[*Bṛih. Up.* I. 4. 17.]; "From that same Self, indeed, the spatial ether came into existence."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.]; "Indeed Nārāyaṇa alone then was"—[*Mah. Up.* I.]; "The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.]; "The *Brahman* is bliss."—[*Taitt. Up.* III. 6. 1.].

Moreover, those collections of words (that make up the scriptural passages) are capable of denoting such well established things as are made out in accordance with the natural process of deriving the meanings of words, and the true purport of those (passages) is the *Brahman* who is the cause of the creation, preservation, and destruction of all the worlds, who is hostile to all that is evil, and who is an ocean of innumerable noble qualities, and has the nature of unsurpassed bliss; and it cannot be that they (viz. such scriptural passages) deal with things other (than the *Brahman*), seeing that they are (while so denoting the *Brahman*) devoid of utility either in the way of inducing activity or cessation from activity; for, every one of all the means of proof has its finality in giving rise to the knowledge of that which forms its own particular object. Again, the operation of a means of proof is not determined by utility. Utility, indeed, is determined by the means of proof. Further, that (viz. the scriptural passage) which is free from all concern with inducing activity or cessation from activity can not be said to be devoid of utility; because it is seen to be related

to one of the objects of human pursuit. For instance, in passages like—"A son is born to you",—"This is no serpent", which deal with matters of fact (without importing any activity or cessation from activity), it is seen that they are (also) possessed of utility in the way of (producing) joy and (causing) the removal of fear (respectively).

Here, he (viz. a *Mīmāmsaka Pūrvapakshin*) says:—

The *Vedānta* passages do not establish the *Brahman*, because the *śāstra*, which is incapable of importing any activity or cessation from activity, is (thus) purposeless. No doubt perception and the other means of proof have their finality in giving rise to the knowledge of the truth of things. Nevertheless the *śāstra* (or the scripture) must have its finality in utility. Neither in popular usage nor in the *Vedas* do we see the use of any sentence that is purposeless. It is not possible for a sentence to be made use of, or to be listened to, without there being some utility or other in view. And that utility is made out to have the nature of the acquisition of what is desirable and of the getting rid of what is undesirable by means of voluntary activity or cessation from activity, as is seen in the following and other instances:—'One who is desirous of wealth should go to the palace of a king'; 'One whose digestion is weak should not drink (too much) water'; 'One who is desirous of *Swarga* should perform (the *Jyotishṭoma*) sacrifice'; 'One should not eat onions'.

Moreover, it has been already stated to the effect that, even in the case of the statements—"A son is born to you",—"This is no serpent, but a rope", and in other similar (statements), all of which deal with things, the ideas corresponding to which are already naturally established, there is seen the association of utility (with those statements) in the form of (the production of) joy and the removal

of fear, &c. Here, it has to be discriminated whether the attainment of utility results from the fact of the birth of a son, and so on, or from the (mere) knowledge thereof. If it be said that a thing, although existing, is of no utility when unknown, and that therefore it (viz. the attainment of utility) results from the knowledge thereof;—then, even when the thing itself is non-existing, utility must result merely from the knowledge (regarding that thing). Thus, although the *śâstra* has its finality in utility, nevertheless, it (viz. the *śâstra*) is no means of proving the existence of things in as much as it does not relate to things (but relates to knowledge merely). Therefore, all sentences have their finality in some utility or other, either as relating to voluntary activity or cessation from activity, or as relating to knowledge. Hence, no sentence is capable of importing things, the ideas corresponding to which are already naturally established. Consequently the *Vedânta* passages do not establish the *Brahman*, the idea corresponding to whom is already naturally established.

Here another (*pûrvapakshin*)[305] may say:—The *Vedânta* passages also are the means of proving the *Brahman* solely by reason of their relating to actions. How? Because the *Brahman* becomes the object of a commandment, which relates to the destruction of the phenomenal world, and is to the effect that the *Brahman*—who is (in Himself) non-phenomenal, who has no second and is uniform intelligence, and who, nevertheless, appears to be in association with the phenomenal world owing to the influence of the beginninglessly old ignorance,—should be realised as non-phenomenal. What is that commandment,

305. Namely, the *Nishprapañchîkaraṇaniyogavâdin*.

which relates to the *Brahman* who is uniform intelligence, and is to be realised by means of the destruction of the phenomenal world that is found to exist in the (differentiated) condition of the knower and the known? (That commandment is to be found in the following and other passages):—"Thou shalt not see the seer of the sight, nor think the thinker of the thought".—[*Bṛih. Up.* III. 4. 2.]. The meaning is that the *Brahman* should be realised as pure and simple experience which is devoid of the distinction of the knower and the known. Even if the *Brahman* is self-evident, there is nothing wrong in (His) being made the object of an action so as to realise (Him) in the non-phenomenal form.

It is wrong to hold so—(says the *Mīmāmsaka*).[306] He, who maintains that the syntactical meaning of sentences is a commandment, has surely to point out what the commandment is, the attribute of the person to whom the commandment is directed, the special object (of the commandment), the performance thereof, the details of the procedure to be adopted, and the performer (of the commandment). Among these, the attribute of the person to whom the commandment is directed is, indeed, incapable of being postulated (in regard to this commandment of realising the *Brahman* as non-phenomenal). And that (attribute) is of two kinds as causal and as resultant. It has to be discriminated here what the attribute of the person is to whom this commandment is directed, and whether it is causal or resultant. If the experience of the truth regarding the

306. The *Mīmāmsaka* is the main objector against the *Vedāntin* in this *Adhikaraṇa*. The *Mīmāmsaka* refutes from his own stand-point the *Nishprapañchīkaraṇaniyogavādin* who holds that the *Upanishads* give us the commandment to non-phenomenalise the *Brahman*. Then the *Mīmāmsaka* is himself refuted by the *Vedāntin*.

essential nature of the *Brahman* constitutes the attribute of the person to whom the commandment is directed, then, this (attribute) cannot be causal; because it has not already become available (to him), unlike life, &c., (which have so become available, and form the necessary conditions preceding, for instance, the performance of the *agnihotra* sacrifice as long as life lasts, in accordance with the *Vedic* injunction—"One should perform the *agnihotra* sacrifice as long as life lasts").[307] However, if that (attribute) be causal, then, owing to its being eternal, there would be room for the performance of what constitutes the special object of that ever obligatory (commandment) even after the attainment of final release, in the same way in which the *agnihotra* sacrifice, &c., which are dependent upon life (are to be performed as long as that life lasts). Nor also is that (attribute which has the character of the experience of the real nature of the *Brahman*) resultant; because, by being the result of the working out of a commandment, it has, like *Swarga*, &c., to become non-eternal. Again what is the special object of the commandment here? If it be said that it is the *Brahman* Himself, it is replied that it cannot be so; because He, being eternal, cannot be produced anew, and because also He is not imported by any verbal form signifying an action. If it be said that the non-phenomenal *Brahman* is the thing to be worked out (under the commandment), then, although He is (thus) the thing to be (immediately) accomplished (under the injunction), He forms the final result itself (of the injunction). He cannot form the special object of the commandment, because He is not imported by any verbal forms signifying an action. More-

307. Vide *Bahvṛicha-Brâhmaṇa*.

over, what is it that has to be accomplished (under the injunction)? Is it the *Brahman*, or (is it) the destruction of the phenomenal world? It is not the *Brahman*; because He is ever-accomplished, and because also there would result non-eternity (in relation to the *Brahman* if he had to be accomplished). Nor is it the destruction of the phenomenal world (that has to be accomplished under the injunction). Then, indeed, the *Brahman* would not be the thing to be accomplished (under the injunction). If it be said that the destruction of the phenomenal world itself forms the special object of the commandment, it is replied that it cannot be so; because that (destruction) is the final result (to be achieved under the commandment) and cannot hence form the immediate object of the commandment. Indeed, the destruction of the phenomenal world is itself the beatific release (of the bound soul); and that is the final fruit (of the injunction). And if this, (however), form (also) the immediate object of the commandment, then the destruction of the phenomenal world would be due to the carrying out of the commandment, and the commandment would be carried out by the destruction of the phenomenal world. There would, in consequence, be the logical fallacy of reciprocal dependence.

Further, is the phenomenal world, which has to be put an end to, false or real? If it be of a false nature, then it has to be put an end to by right knowledge alone, and consequently the injunction (to do something) would be of no use whatsoever. If it be said that the injunction, after producing the knowledge which puts an end (to the phenomenal world), thereby puts an end to the phenomenal world,—(then, it is replied that) this (knowledge) results from the scriptural texts[308] on which you yourself

308. Such as *Bṛih. Up.* III. 4. 2; *Chhand. Up.* VI. 2. 1; *Bṛih. Up.* IV.

rely, and that there is therefore no use for this commandment. Moreover, the whole phenomenal world which is false, and is distinct from the *Brahman*, is stultified by means of the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of scriptural sentences. Consequently, the commandment, with all its accessories, is itself *non est*. If the phenomenal world happens to be the thing which is to be destroyed, then, does the commandment, which is intended to bring about the destruction of the phenomenal world, relate to that which is the same in nature as the *Brahman*? Or (does it) relate to that which is different from Him? If it relate to that which is the same in nature as the *Brahman* Himself, then, (He being eternal), the very existence of the phenomenal world that is to be destroyed would indeed be impossible, for the reason that the destroyer thereof is eternal; again in such a case (that) commandment would become eternal, and it would not be possible for it to be accomplished by working out its immediate object. Or (the commandment may relate to) that which is different in nature from the true nature of the *Brahman*. Since that (commandment) is to be fulfilled by working out its immediate object which consists in the destruction of the whole phenomenal world, the person who has to carry out (the commandment) is also destroyed thereby. Consequently, there is no establishment (of the injunction) for want of a (personal) foundation (for it) to rest upon. Since, by merely working out that immediate object (of the commandment) which consists in the destruction of the phenomenal world, all that is different from the essential nature of the *Brahman* becomes destroyed, what is known as *moksha* or beatific release cannot be the final fruit obtained by (obeying)

4. 19; &c., which are quoted by you *i. e.* the *Nishprapañchîkaraṇaniyogavâdin* to show that the *Brahman* alone is real and the world unreal.

the commandment.[309]

Moreover, in regard to such a performance of the commandment as leads to the destruction of the phenomenal world, there are to be found no details of the procedure to be adopted; and whatever (commandment) is (thus) unassisted (by the details of procedure), that cannot be carried out. Consequently, there can be no performability (in relation to the commandment under consideration). If it be asked how there is (here) the absence of the details of procedure, it is pointed out that it is thus:—The details of procedure in regard to this (commandment) are either of a positive character or of a negative character. Such (details of procedure) as are of a positive character are divided into the different classes of those that bring about the *corpus* of the performance and those that (merely) render help to the performance. And both these kinds are not admissible (in this case). Indeed, like the stroke of a heavy club, &c., (which destroy a pot or some such thing), there is not seen (here) anything that is (by its operation) capable of putting an end to the whole phenomenal world. Therefore, these (details of procedure) are not (of a positive character and) thus perceivable. Nor also is it possible for a completed performance to stand in need of any accessory help for the production of the thing to be accomplished (by that performance); because (in such a case), owing to there being the (associated) existence of the thing which helps (the performance), it is not

309. The distinction between what is called the *immediate object* of a commandment and what constitutes its *final fruit* may well be illustrated in connection with the *Vedic* commandment which says that he who is desirous of obtaining *Swarga* shall perform the *Jyotishṭoma* sacrifice. Here the *Jyotishṭoma* sacrifice is the immediate object of the commandment, and *Swarga* is its final fruit.

possible to (distinctly) realise the essential nature of such a performance (of the commandment) as consists in the destruction of the whole phenomenal world. If it be said that to know the *Brahman* to be without a second produces the *corpus* of the performance, which consists in the destruction of the phenomenal world, then, by that same (knowledge), final release which is in the form of the destruction of the phenomenal world is attained; accordingly, it has been already stated that, (in consequence), there remains nothing to be accomplished by the performance, &c. If (the details of procedure are) of a negative character, then solely owing to their being non-existent, they do not produce the *corpus* of the performance; nor do they help it. Therefore, it is not possible (to hold) that this injunction[310] relates to the non-phenomenal *Brahman*.

Again, another (*pūrvapakshin*)[311] may say as follows:—

No doubt, the *Vedānta* passages are of no authority as relating to the true nature of the *Brahman*, the idea corresponding to whom is already naturally established. Nevertheless, the true nature of the *Brahman* is certainly proved (by means of them). How? On the strength of the commandment enjoining meditation. Thus, indeed, do the scriptures declare:—"Verily, my dear one, the Self has to be seen,..........has to be steadily meditated upon,"—[*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 5.];[312] "The Self who is devoid of sins;...He has to be sought after, He has to be specially desired and known".—[*Chhānd.*

310. *Bṛih. Up.* III. 4. 2. &c.

311. This objector is the *Dhyānaniyogavādin.*

312. Vide also *Bṛih. Up.* IV. 5. 6.

Up. VIII. 7. 1.]; "Meditate on Him as the self itself." [*Bṛih. Up.* I. 4. 7.]; "Let him meditate upon the Self alone as the object to be attained." [*Bṛih. Up.* I. 4. 15.]. Here the commandment which certainly relates to meditation implies the thing to be meditated upon; because the meditation which forms the special object of that (commandment) is itself capable of being defined solely by means of the thing to be meditated upon. And that thing to be meditated upon is the Self, as it is shown by the scriptural passages[313] relied upon by yourselves. If it be asked of what nature He (*i. e.* the Self) is, then (it is replied that), by way of stating the peculiarity of His true nature, the following and other similar passages become authoritative, as being complementary to the injunction relating to meditation, and that, therefore, those (passages) do, indeed, denote by implication the true nature of the *Brahman* who is included within the body of the meditation which forms the special object of the injunction (here):—"The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.]; "Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 1.]. Therefore, by means of the following passages, namely, "One only without a second" —[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 1.]; "That is Existence, He is the Self, That thou art, O Śvetaketu."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 7.]; "There is nothing here that is many and varied."—[*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 4. 19.];—as well as by means of other passages, it is made out that only the essential nature of the *Brahman* is undoubtedly real, and that all else that is different from Him is unreal. Distinction is apprehended by

313. See *Bṛih. Up.* III. 4. 2 II. 4. 5. & IV. 5. 6. The *Dhyānaniyogavādin* criticises the *Nishprapanchikaraṇaniyogavādin* who has quoted *Bṛih. Up.* III. 4. 2, wherein the Self is mentioned.

perception and the other means of proof, as well as by means of the *śāstra* which relates to works and rests upon distinctions. When there is mutual contradiction between distinction and non-distinction, then, since it is also possible for the perception of distinctions to be based upon the beginninglessly old ignorance (or *avidyā*), it is decided that the absence of distinctions alone is the reality. It being so, by means of the injunction relating to such a meditation of the *Brahman* as gives rise to the direct perception of Him, that final release is obtained which is the same as becoming the *Brahman*, who is devoid of all the manifold distinctions due to ignorance, who is without a second and is uniform intelligence. Moreover, it cannot be proved with the help of *Vedānta* passages that it is possible (for us) to become the *Brahman* merely by means of the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of scriptural sentences; because such a thing is not known to take place, and because also the (actual) perception of a variety of distinctions continues to persist (even after the acquisition of such a knowledge). Under these circumstances, the injunction[314] regarding 'hearing', &c.,[315] becomes purposeless.

(Here), again, it may be said[316] thus:—It is seen that the fear which is due to the (falsely perceived) snake ceases by means of the teaching—"This is a rope, (but) not a

314. This injunction is *Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 5 or IV. 5. 6 wherein it is declared that "The Self has to be heard, to be reflected upon, and to be steadily meditated upon."

315. 'Hearing', &c., *i. e.* 'hearing', reflection, and steady meditation.

316. This is the well known example of the *Adwaitin* who is of opinion that the *Brahman* alone is real and all else unreal; in the same way in which the snake falsely perceived in a rope is unreal while the rope alone is *real*. The *Dhyānaniyogavādin* here states in anticipation the objection from the stand-point of the *Adwaitin* before refuting it.

snake." And like the snake (falsely perceived) in the rope, the bondage of the world also is of a false nature. Consequently, it must be capable of being stultified by knowledge. Therefore, it is proper (to hold) that freedom from such (bondage) results wholly from the knowledge derived from scriptural passages, but not from (working out) any commandment. If final release be capable of being accomplished under an injunction, then there would be non-eternity in relation to it also, as (there is) in the case of *Swarga*, &c. But the eternal character of final release is, indeed, acknowledged by all the disputants.

Moreover, the merit and the demerit (of works) have the power of giving rise to their effects only in the way of producing such bodies as are fit for the enjoyment of those particular effects. Therefore, they (viz. merit and demerit) must inevitably possess the character of giving rise to *samsāra*,[317] the nature of which consists in an association (of the individual souls) with the four[318] kinds of bodies commencing with Brahmā and ending with the immovable things. Therefore, final release is not capable of being accomplished by merit. To the same effect is the following scriptural passage :—"To him who is and has a body, there is no destruction of the pleasing and the unpleasing ; the pleasing and the unpleasing touch not him who is and has no body." [*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 12. 1.]. Thus, regarding final release the nature of which is to be without a body, it is declared that there are no pleasing or unpleasing effects produced by merit and demerit. Therefore, it is made out that the unembodied

317. *Samsāra* is the circuit of mundane existence. In other words, it is the ever-recurring succession of births and deaths, and the consequent continuance of the bondage of the soul.

318. The four kinds of bodies are those of gods, men, lower animals and of immovable things (*Sthāvaras*). Vide *supra* p. 154. Cf. also *V. Dh.* C. 20.

condition cannot be accomplished by merit. And in the way in which a particular result is to be accomplished by means of a particular commandment, the unembodied condition cannot be accomplished by means of the injunction relating to meditation; because the unembodied condition constitutes the essential nature (of the self) and is not, therefore, a thing which is to be accomplished. The following and other scriptural texts declare the same thing thus:—"Knowing Him to be the unembodied One who exists in non-eternal bodies, (knowing Him) to be the Self which is great and omnipresent, the wise man does not grieve."—[*Kaṭh. Up.* II. 22.]; "Indeed He is pure, without life, without mind."—[*Muṇḍ. Up.* II. 1. 2.]; "Indeed this Person is devoid of attachment,"—[*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 3. 15.]. Therefore, final release which is the same as the unembodied condition is eternal, and is, in consequence, incapable of being produced by merit. To the same effect is the following scriptural passage:—"That which is other than merit and demerit, that which is other than this effect and cause, that which is other than the past and the future, say, if thou seest that." [*Kaṭh. Up.* II. 14.].

Again, it is surely impossible to predicate in regard to final release that capability of being accomplished (anew), which (accomplishing) is four-fold in the forms of origination, attainment, modification, and refinement. It is not capable of being originated; because final release, being of the nature of the *Brahman*, is itself characterised by eternity. Nor is it capable of being attained (anew); because the *Brahman* Himself is of the nature of the self, and hence it (viz. final release) has the character of being ever attained. Nor also is it capable of being modified; because non-eternity would result to it thereby, as (there is) in the case of curds, &c. Nor again is it capable of

being refined. Refinement, indeed, is accomplished either by the removal of defects or by the addition of excellence. Surely it (viz. refinement) cannot be (produced here) by the removal of defects, on account of the eternal purity of the *Brahman*. Nor is it (viz. refinement) to be (accomplished here) by the addition of excellence, because (the *Brahman* is) of the nature of such excellence as cannot be added to. By reason of its being eternally immodifiable, it cannot form the object of any action which takes place either in itself or takes place in others; thus no refinement can be effected (in relation to it), as (it is effected) in the case of mirrors, &c., by the action of rubbing; and the self is not purified by the act of bathing, &c., which relate to the body; but (what is so purified is) that egoistic agent which is caught hold of by ignorance (or *avidyā*) and is in association with that (body): and to him (*i. e.* to that agent) alone belongs the enjoyment of the result of that (act of bathing). But the egoistic agent himself is not the self, because he has that (self) for his witness. Similarly, the words of the scriptural hymn also declare:—"One of them eats the sweet *pippala* fruit, while the other shines in splendour without eating at all." [*Muṇḍ. Up.* III. 1. 1.].[319] Moreover, the essential nature of the self is distinctly made out to be different from the egoistic agent who is caught hold of by ignorance (or *avidyā*),—(it is made out) to possess such excellence as cannot be added to, to be eternally pure and to be immodifiable, from the following scriptural passages:—"The wise say that what is associated with the body, the senses, and the mind, forms the enjoyer."—[*Kaṭh. Up.* III. 4.]; "The one Lord is hidden in all beings, pervades all, and is the inter-

319. See also *Śvet. Up.* IV. 6.

nal Self of all beings; He is the presiding deity over actions, and lives in all beings; He is the witness, the intelligent one, who is absolute and devoid of qualities."—[*Śvet. Up.* VI. 11. & *Brah. Up.* III.]; "He understood Him to be bright, bodiless, scatheless, without sinews, pure, and untouched by evil."—[*Īś. Up.* VIII.]. Hence, owing to its being of the nature of the Self, final release is not a thing that can (thus) be accomplished (anew).

It may be asked—If so, what is it that is accomplished by means of the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of sentences? We say (in reply) that it is merely the removal of the obstruction to final release (that is so accomplished). To the same effect are the following and other scriptural passages:—"Thou art our Father who enablest us to cross to the other shore which is far away from Ignorance."—[*Pr Up.* VI. 8.]; "I have, indeed, learnt the *śāstras* thus. He who knows the Self crosses the ocean of misery, only with the help of venerable teachers like yourself. Venerable sir, I who am so (destitute of the knowledge of the Self) feel very grieved. May you, venerable sir, enable me, who am so, to cross over to the other shore (of the ocean of misery)."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 1. 3.]; "To him whose sins have been destroyed, the venerable Sanatkumāra shows the other shore of darkness."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VII. 26. 2.]. Therefore, the removal of the obstructions to that final release, which is certainly eternal, is accomplished by means of the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of scriptural sentences. But (such) removal, although capable of being accomplished anew, has itself the nature of that non-existence[320] which follows destruction; and hence it cannot have an end. The following and other scriptural

320. Vide *supra* p. 49. n. 37.

statements, namely, "He who knows the *Brahman* becomes the *Brahman* indeed."—[*Muṇḍ. Up.* III. 2. 9.], "He who thus knows Him transcends death."—[*Śvet. Up.* III. 8. & VI. 15.],—declare that final release follows immediately after the knowledge (of the *Brahman*), and (so) oppose the interposition of any injunction (bearing upon meditation). Moreover, it (viz. final release or the attainment of the *Brahman*) does not acquire the character of a produced effect, either by being the object of the act of knowing, or by being the object of the act of meditation; because such a character of being the object of both (these acts) is negatived in the following and in other scriptural passages:—"It is certainly different from the known, and is also different from the knower."—[*Ken. Up.* I. 3.]; "By Whom one knows all this, by what is He to be known?"—[*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 14. & IV. 5. 15.]; "Know thou That alone to be the *Brahman*, not this which they worship."—[*Ken. Up.* I. 4, 5, 6, 7 & 8.]. By this much, it does not also follow that the *śāstras* have no object whatsoever; because the *śāstras* relate to the removal of distinctions manufactured by ignorance. Indeed, the *śāstras* do not deal with the *Brahman* as possessing definitely discernible characteristics; but, while declaring the true nature of the internal (subjective) self which is no (external) object, they put an end to the distinctions which are in the form of the knowledge, the knower, and the object of knowledge, and which are all manufactured by ignorance (or *avidyā*). To the same effect, there is, among others, the following *śāstraic* injunction:—"Thou shalt not see the seer of the sight, &c." [*Bṛih. Up.* III. 4. 2.]. Further, it should not be (supposed) that the cessation of bondage results wholly from knowledge, and that consequently the injunction relating to 'hear-

ing', &c., is purposeless; because they (viz. 'hearing', reflection and steady meditation) form the means of understanding the syntactical meaning of scriptural sentences, by causing us to turn away from all such distractions as relate to things other than the *Brahman* and are (all) due to our own nature.

Again it should not be urged that the cessation of bondage is not seen to take place by means of knowledge alone; because bondage is of a false nature, and it is not hence possible for it to remain (even) subsequently to (the birth of) knowledge. For this same reason it is not right to say that the cessation of bondage takes place only after the falling off of the body. Indeed, the cessation of the fear due to the falsely perceived serpent does not require any destruçtion of a serpent beyond the (mere) knowledge of the reality of the rope. If the association of the body (with the self) were of the nature of a reality, then there would be the necessity for its destruction. But that (association), being distinct from the *Brahman*, is not of the nature of a reality. It is known that, to him whose bondage has not ceased, knowledge is not born; because the effect of knowledge is not seen (in relation to him). Therefore, whether the body exists or not, immediately after knowing the syntactical meaning of sentences, one is undoubtedly released (from bondage).

Consequently, final release is not capable of being accomplished by the injunction relating to meditation; and hence, the *Brahman* is not proved to be dependent upon the injunction relating to meditation; but (He is established) by means of the following scriptural passages which altogether relate to Him:—"The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.]; "That thou art."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 7.]; "This self

is the *Brahman*."—[*Bṛih. Up.* II. 5. 19. & IV. 4. 5.].[321]

This (position)[322] is not right; because it is not possible for the cessation of bondage to take place merely by means of the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of sentences. No doubt, the bondage which is of a false nature is capable of being stultified by knowledge. Nevertheless, as that bondage is directly perceived, it cannot be stultified by that knowledge of the syntactical meaning of sentences which is of an indirect (abstract) nature; because, when the direct perception of a snake is existent in relation to the rope and other such things, it is not seen that the removal of fear takes place merely by that indirect (abstract) knowledge, which is contradictory of the serpent and is produced by the teaching of trustworthy persons to the effect—"This is no serpent, this is a rope." And the teaching of trustworthy persons becomes the cause of the removal of fear, only by happening to be the cause of such activity as results from the direct perception of the reality of things. Accordingly, a person who has fled away, taking fright at the sight of the serpent falsely perceived in a rope, begins to see the reality of things by means of the teaching of trustworthy persons to the effect—"This is no serpent, this is a rope"; then he sees that (rope) itself directly, and then becomes free from fear. Moreover, it is not right to say that verbal testimony of itself produces such knowledge as has the nature of direct perception; because it (viz. verbal testimony) does not possess the character of an organ of sense. Among the apparatuses of knowledge, the senses alone form

321. Vide also *Māṇḍ. Up.* I. 2.

322. Here begins the *Dhyānaniyogavādin's* refutation of the objection against his views raised above by the *Adwaitin*.

the means of direct perception. And in the case of that person whose sins have not been destroyed by the performance of works without attachment to their fruits, and who has not turned away from external objects by 'hearing', reflection, and steady meditation, the *Vedic* text alone cannot produce direct knowledge. Even when (that) person has the obstructions (in the way of his acquiring knowledge) removed, and is devoted to those things (viz. 'hearing', reflection, and steady meditation), it is not possible (for him) to have that (direct knowledge from verbal testimony alone); because the senses, which (alone) form the special apparatus of (direct) knowledge, are not seen to transgress their limitations in regard to what constitutes their object.

Moreover, meditation is no means of knowing the syntactical meaning of sentences; because, (in such a case), there will arise the fallacy of reciprocal dependence,—in as much as the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of sentences must be born before there can be the meditation of its object, and meditation must be completed before there can be the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of sentences. And it should not be (urged) that meditation and the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of sentences relate to different things. If they did so, then meditation would be no means of producing the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of sentences. Indeed, the meditation of one thing cannot lead to the fruition of another thing. It is unavoidable (to hold) that meditation, which is the same as an unbroken flow of memory relating to a thing that is known, has invariably to be preceded by the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of sentences; because there is no other means by which the knowledge relating to the *Brahman*, who is the object of medi-

tation, can be produced. Further it is not right to say that the knowledge which is at the root of meditation is derived from a different set of passages, while the knowledge which relates to the removal (of ignorance) is derived from passages like—"That thou art." [*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 7.]. Does this knowledge which is at the root of meditation, and is derived from a different set of passages, relate to the same thing as that to which the knowledge derived from passages like—"That thou art", &c., relates? Or does it relate to a different thing? If that (knowledge) relates to the same thing (as this), there results the already stated fallacy of reciprocal dependence. If that knowledge relates to a different thing (from what this knowledge relates to), then it is not possible to prove that by means of meditation there arises the fruition of what this (latter knowledge) relates to. Further, meditation pre-supposes many phenomenal entities like the object of meditation, and the agent of meditation, &c. Consequently it is of no use, so far as we see, in producing that knowledge of the syntactical meaning of sentences which relates to the oneness of the self with the non-phenomenal *Brahman*. Therefore, the commandments enjoining 'hearing', reflection, and steady meditation are certainly useless to him who maintains (the view) that the destruction of ignorance (or *avidyā*) takes place merely by means of the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of sentences.

For whatsoever reason, direct (perceptual) knowledge (of things) is not produced by means of scriptural passages, and ignorance (or *avidyā*) remains, in consequence, undestroyed by means of the knowledge of the syntactical meaning of scriptural sentences,—for that very same reason, the idea that (the self's) release from the bondage (of *samsāra*) takes place even while in this life is also driven

away (as untrue). And what is this release from bondage even while in this life? It may be said that it is release resulting (to the self) even in the embodied condition; but then such a statement will be self-contradictory in meaning like the statement—"My mother is barren"; because it has been declared by yourself, with the help of scriptural passages, that to be embodied is to be in bondage, and that to become unembodied is to obtain release. And again it is not (right to say) that, when the appearance of the association (of the self) with the body is in existence, then, whoever has the belief that (such an) appearance is false,—to him there is the destruction of (this) association with the body. If (his) association with the body is destroyed by the belief that it is false, how can there be release to him even when he has the body? That release (from embodiment) which results to one after death is also undeniably the destruction of the false appearance of one's being associated with a body. Then what is the peculiarity about this release which takes place even while in this life? Moreover, it may be said that, in whomsoever this false appearance of his (self) having a body persists even after the stultification (of that falsity), just like the false perception of two moons (persisting even when one knows that there is only one moon),—(it may be said that) such a person is he who is released even while in this life: if so, it is replied that it cannot be so; because this stultifying knowledge relates to all things other than the *Brahman*. Together with the false appearance of (the self) having a body, the blemishes resulting from ignorance (or *avidyâ*) and from 'work' (or *karma*) and from other such things, which are all the causes (of the false appearance of the self's embodiment itself), are all stultified by that (stultifying knowledge) alone; and thus, it is not possible to say that (any)

stultified thing does persist. But in the case of (the perception of) two moons (when there is in reality only one moon), that defect, which is the cause of such a false appearance, is no object of the stultifying knowledge which is to the effect that the moon is only one; and hence it is not thereby stultified. Consequently the persistence of the false appearance of two moons is proper. Moreover, this scriptural text, which says—"So long as he is not freed (from the body), so long there is delay; then he will be blessed."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 14. 2.],—declares that, in the case of him who observes the form of worship known as the *Sadvidyā*,[323] final release stands in need of only the falling off of (his) body; and thus it prohibits the (occurrence of) release even while in this life. This aforesaid release even while in this life has been discarded by Āpastamba also in the following aphorisms:—"Giving up the *Vedas*, this world, and the other, one should seek the Self. It may be said that, on knowledge arising, there is the attainment of bliss; but that is negatived by the scriptures. If the attainment of bliss were possible on knowledge arising, then, even here, one should not have misery. By this, the other (also) has been explained." [*Āp. Dh.* II. 21. 13 to 17.]. By these (aphorisms), (the opinion that) final release (occurs) by means of mere knowledge alone is also discarded. Therefore that release, which has the nature of the removal of all distinctions, does not result to one who is alive. Consequently, bondage comes to an end only by means of that injunction which relates to meditation, and which produces the direct knowledge of the *Brah-*

323. This is a form of worship taught to Śvetaketu by his father. Vide *Chhānd. Up.* VI., wherein it is given that the Supreme Self is to be meditated upon so that He may be realised as the self-existent Soul of the whole universe.

man. No non-eternal character can result to final release simply on the score that it is accomplished in accordance with an injunction; because what is (so) accomplished is merely the removal of the obstructions (to final release). Further, the cessation of bondage is not caused directly by the injunction (itself); but (it is caused) by the direct knowledge of the *Brahman* who is non-phenomenal, and who is homogeneous intelligence. And the injunction produces this direct knowledge. If it be asked how an injunction may be the cause of producing knowledge, it is asked in reply,—how do your 'works' performed without attachment to results form the cause of the production of knowledge? If you say, (that they do so), through the purification of the mind,—I say that it is the same in my case also. It may be said again (by you) that, in your case, knowledge is produced, by means of the *śāstras*, in the mind which is (already) pure, but that, in my case, that thing has (indeed) to be pointed out which forms the apparatus for producing knowledge in the mind which is purified by the injunction. If so, we say in reply that that mind, which is purified by the injunction relating to meditation, is itself the means for the production of knowledge. If it be asked how this is made out, we ask in reply,—how is it made out in your case that the mind becomes pure by means of 'works' and that by means of 'hearing', reflection, and steady meditation, the *śāstras* produce that knowledge, which is stultificatory (of ignorance), in the pure mind of him alone who has turned away from all other things than the *Brahman*? You may answer that it is (so) made out by means of the following and other scriptural passages:—"They desire to know (the *Brahman*) by sacrifices, by giving gifts, by religious austerities associated with fasting."—[*Bṛih. Up.*

IV. 4. 22.]; "(The Self) has to be......heard, has to be reflected upon, has to be steadily meditated upon."—[*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 5. 6.]; "He who knows the *Brahman* becomes the *Brahman* indeed."—[*Muṇḍ. Up.* III. 2. 9.]. If so, I reply that, in my case also, in accordance with the following among other scriptural passages, namely—"(The Self) has to be...heard, has to be reflected upon, has to be steadily meditated upon."—[*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 5. & IV. 5. 6.]; "He who knows the *Brahman* attains the Highest."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.]; "He (*i.e.* the Lord) is not apprehended by the eye nor even by speech."—[*Muṇḍ. Up.* III. 1. 8.]; "But He (the Lord) is apprehended by the pure mind."—[?]; "He (the Lord) is apprehended by the heart, by steady wisdom, and by the mind."—[*Kaṭh. Up.* VI. 9.];[324]—it is made out that the mind becomes pure by means of the injunction relating to meditation, and that the mind (so) purified gives rise to the direct knowledge of the *Brahman*. Thus it (viz. the whole argument) is faultless.

If you say that by means of the scriptural passage—"Not this which they worship"—[*Ken. Up.* I. 4. et seq],—the character of being the object of meditation is denied (in relation to the *Brahman*), it is replied that it cannot be so. The fact of the *Brahman* being the object of meditation is not denied (herein), but the fact that the *Brahman* is distinct from the world is declared in this passage. The meaning of this passage[325] is this:—"This world which people[326] here worship,—that is not the *Brahman*. Know

324. Vide also Śvet. *Up.* III. 13. & *M. Nār.* I. 11.

325. The whole of this passage runs as follows:—"Know thou Him alone to be the *Brahman* who is not made out by speech and by whom speech is brought into existence; but not this which they worship." Vide *Ken. Up.* I. 4. et seq.

326. Literally, *living beings* (*prāṇinaḥ*).

thou Him alone to be the *Brahman* who is not made out by speech, and by whom speech is brought into existence." Otherwise, the statement—'Know thou Him alone to be the *Brahman*'—would be contradicted, and the injunction enjoining meditation would become purposeless.

Therefore the whole of the bondage, which is made up of unreality and is of the nature of the phenomenal world consisting of the knower, the known, &c., comes to an end by means of that very injunction which enjoins meditation, and the result of which is the direct realisation of the *Brahman*.

It is also asserted by some[327] that there is no contradiction between distinction and non-distinction. This is improper; for distinction and non-distinction cannot meet together in one and the same thing, as heat and cold, light and darkness, &c., (can not so meet). (To this) it may be said again as follows:—

The whole of the totality of things is indeed established by perception and all things are apprehended as distinct and non-distinct. There is non-distinction (when they are looked upon) as constituting causes and as constituting genera (and species), and there is distinction (when they are looked upon) as constituting effects and as constituting particular individuals. The contradiction existing between sunlight and shadow, &c., is characterised by their not being found together, and by their having a diversity of abodes. But in the case of causes and effects, as well as in the case of genera and (their) individual members, both those (characteristics) are not found; but, on

327. This position is maintained by the *Bhâskarîyas* and it is here explained in full before it is contradicted. Vide *supra* p. 217. n. 235.

the contrary, one and the same thing appears in two forms as (when it is said)—'This pot is clay',—'This ox is broken-horned',—'This ox is hornless'. And in this world there is nothing that is generally seen to have only one form. Nor is non-distinction seen to be that which destroys distinction, as when fire and such other things (consume and destroy the distinction) of grass and such other things; accordingly, there is no substantial contradiction (between distinction and non-distinction); for, that object which exists in the form of clay, gold, ox, or an equine animal, &c., may itself exist (also) in the shape of a pot, a crown, a broken-horned (ox), or a mare, &c. There is no fiat of the Lord to the effect that non-distinction and distinction should (respectively) constitute the singular characteristics of the thing (genus) which is non-distinct, and of the thing (individual) which is distinct. If it be said that there is oneness of form (in relation to those things), because it is so perceived; then let it be admitted that there are also the two forms of distinction and of non-distinction for the same reason that they are also perceived. Indeed, when things such as pots, dishes, broken-horned (oxen), and horn-less (oxen), &c., are perceived, a person who has his eyes wide open is not able to discern (any) distinction (in each of his perceptions) to the effect—'This is clay, that is pot', and 'This is the general property of the species ox, but this is the individual ox'. On the other hand, his perceptions are only to the effect—'This pot is clay',—'The ox is broken-horned'. If it be said that he does discern distinction (in each of his perceptions), on the score that the cause and the class are made out from the knowledge of their persistence, while the effect and the individual are made out by means of the knowledge of their power of logical

exclusion, it is replied that it cannot be so; because (such) a distinction in character is not perceived. Indeed, even those who observe very minutely do not perceive, in relation to the thing placed before them, any distinction in character to the effect—'This is what persists' and 'This is what excludes'. Just as, in the case of an effect and of an individual, (both of) whose oneness (with the corresponding cause and the corresponding genus respectively) is well perceived, the idea of oneness is born (in the mind); so also, in the case of what has a cause and belongs to a genus, that idea of oneness is born without any difference whatsoever. It is exactly similarly that the recognitive cognition, which is to the effect—'This is that same thing', is born even in regard to all such objects as are extremely different from one another owing to (differences in) space, time, and the characteristic form. Therefore, in as much as (all) things appear as having certainly two natures, the enunciation of any extreme difference between the cause and the effect as well as between the genus and the individual is contradicted by perception.

It may be again said that, as in the instances—'This pot is clay', 'This ox is broken-horned',—(so also) in the instances—'I am a god', 'I am a man', there is the perception of oneness owing to there being a grammatical equation; that in consequence there is distinction and non-distinction between the self and the body also; and that, accordingly, this declaration of distinction and non-distinction acts like the flame of fire set to (consume) one's own house. This statement—(we, the *Bhâskarîyas*, say)—is the outcome of undeveloped wisdom regarding grammatical equations which establish distinction and non-distinction, and regarding (also) the knowledge of the real meaning of those (same grammatical equations). Thus, for instance,

it is the unstultified idea alone which everywhere proves things. But the imposed idea of the self, existing in (intimate) association with gods and other (material embodiments), is contradicted by all the means of proof which establish the reality of the self; and that (idea) does not prove, (in consequence), the non-distinction between the self and the body; in the same way in which the idea of the serpent (falsely perceived) in a rope, &c., (does not prove any non-distinction as existing between the serpent and the rope). And the grammatical equations, which are to the effect—'The ox is broken-horned',—'The ox is hornless', are not seen to be stultified anywhere by anything; hence there is no exaggeration in (our) statement. For these same reasons, the self also is not totally distinct from the *Brahman*. On the other hand, as being a part of the *Brahman*, it is (both) distinct and non-distinct (from Him). It being so, non-distinction alone is natural, and distinction is due to limiting conditions. If it be asked how this is made out, it is replied (that it is made out) by means of the following and other scriptural texts:—"That thou art."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 7.]; "There is no other seer than He."—[*Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 23.]; "This self is the *Brahman*".—[*Bṛih. Up.* II. 5. 19. & IV. 4. 5. & *Māṇḍ. Up.* I. 2.]. Non-distinction (between the self and the *Brahman*) is declared in the hymn which relates to the *Brahman* and forms the *Samhitopanishad* of the Ātharvaṇikas; and it says, after introducing the subject-matter of the topic by mentioning the *Brahman* to be these two, namely, the Earth and the Heaven, that "The fishermen are the *Brahman*, the slaves are the *Brahman*, and these gamblers are also the *Brahman*, man and woman are born out of the *Brahman*; women are the *Brahman*, and man also (is the *Brahman*)." And distinction

(between the self and the *Brahman*) is also declared in the following and other scriptural passages :—"The Eternal among the eternals, the Intelligent among the intelligent, who, though One, fulfils the desires of the many."—[*Kaṭh. Up.* V. 13. & *Śvet. Up.* VI. 13.]; "The two unborn, the intelligent and the non-intelligent (are) the Lord and the non-Lord."—[*Śvet. Up.* I. 9.]; "Another (viz. the Lord) also is seen to be the cause of their association with the qualities of the 'works' (which lead to *samsâra*) and the qualities of the self (which lead to beatific release)."—[*Śvet. Up.* V. 12.]; "He is the Lord of the *prakṛiti* and of the individual soul, and is the regulator of the qualities ; He is the cause of *samsâra*, of final release, of existence, and of bondage."—[*Śvet. Up.* VI. 16.]; "He is the cause, the Lord of what is the lord of the senses (*i. e.* of the *jîva* or the individual soul)."—[*Śvet. Up.* VI. 9.]; "One of them eats the sweet *pippala* fruit, while the other shines in splendour without eating at all."—[*Muṇḍ. Up.* III. 1. 1. & *Śvet. Up.* IV. 6.]; "He who, dwelling in the self, &c."—[*Mâdh. Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 22.]; "He is embraced by the omniscient Self and knows nothing that is external."—[*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 3. 21.]; "He is ridden upon by the omniscient Self and goes away giving[328] up his body."—[*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 3. 35.]; "Knowing Him alone, one transcends death." [*Śvet. Up.* III. 8.]. Therefore, (both) distinction and non-distinction have necessarily to be admitted between the individual self and the Supreme Self. It being so, non-distinction is, however, made out to be natural, because the scriptural passage—"He who knows the *Brahman* becomes the *Brahman* indeed."—[*Muṇḍ. Up.* III. 2. 9.],

328. The word used in the original is *utsarjan* which is interpreted by Sankara to mean *groaning along.*

—and others like it declare that, in the condition of final release, the individual self acquires the nature of the *Brahman*; and because also the passage—"But where to one all this becomes the Self, there who shall see whom by what ?"—[*Bṛih. Up.* II. 4. 14. & IV. 5. 15.],—negatives the apprehension of the Lord then as being different (from the individual self).

However, it may be said that even then distinction is perceived in accordance with the scriptural passage which speaks of the association (of the individual self with the *Brahman*), and is to this effect—"He attains with the omniscient *Brahman* all the auspicious qualities."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.]; and that he (the *Sūtrakāra*) also says the same thing in these aphorisms—"Except in the matter of the activity relating to (the creation, &c., of) the world, (the released souls possess all the powers belonging to the Lord); because (the Lord Himself forms) the topic of the contexts (wherein the above-mentioned activity is referred to), and because also (the individual souls) are not mentioned (therein)."—[*Ved. Sūt.* IV. 4. 17.]; "And on account of the characteristic of equality (between the individual self and the Supreme Self) being solely confined to (the matter of) enjoyment."—[*Ved. Sūt.* IV. 4. 21.].. (But) this is not so; because the distinction of the individual self (from the *Brahman*) is denied by hundreds of scriptural passages such as—"There is no other seer than He."—[*Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 23.],—and others. By means of the passage—"He attains with the omniscient *Brahman* all the auspicious qualities."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.],—what is said is that he enjoys the *Brahman* along with all (His) desirable qualities; that is, he enjoys the *Brahman* possessed of all those qualities. Otherwise, the phrase "with the (omniscient) *Brahman*" would lead to the *Brahman* be-

coming unimportant. If, by means of the aphorism—"Except in the matter of the activity relating to (the creation, &c., of) the world, &c.", the released souls are made out to have a distinct existence (from the *Brahman*), then it is the same as stating (that these individual souls have a) deficiency of lordship. For, otherwise, there will be the contradiction of this aphorism among others, namely,—"(Only) after attaining the Highest Light, is there the manifestation (of the individual self's own nature; as may be inferred) from (the use of) the word 'own'."—[*Ved. Sût.* IV. 4. 1.].[329] Therefore, non-distinction (between the self and the *Brahman*) is alone natural.

But the distinction of the individual selves from the *Brahman* as well as from each other is due to limiting conditions, such as the intellect, the senses and the body. Although the *Brahman* is not made up of constituent parts and is found everywhere, yet there certainly results distinction even in relation to the *Brahman* by means of the limiting conditions, such as the intellect, &c., just as (distinction results) in the case of the spatial[330] ether by means of (limiting conditions like) pots, &c. And there is (here) no fallacy of reciprocal dependence to the effect that there is the association of limiting conditions like the intellect, &c., with the *Brahman* who is already differentiated, and

329. The passage which is the basis of this aphorism and contains the word *own* (or *sva*) runs thus:—*Paraṅ-jyotirupasampadya svena rûpeṇâbhinishpadhyate* || [*Chhând. Up.* VIII. 12. 2.]. "After attaining the Highest Light (*i.e.* the *Brahman*), he (the individual self) becomes manifest in his *own* nature."

330. The ether which exists within a pot (*ghaṭâkâśa*) is said to be conditioned by the pot. On the destruction of the pot, the ether which was within it becomes one with the spatial ether outside (*mahâkâśa*), which, in itself, is unconditioned.

that there is differentiation in relation to the *Brahman* by means of His association with limiting conditions like the intellect, &c.; because the limiting condition and its association (with the *Brahman*) are (both) due to *karma*;[331] and because also the stream of that (*karma*) is beginningless. What is said is this:—By means of the individual self which is held in bondage by its past *karma*, there is produced that limiting condition which is found in association with that (self) itself; and *karma* (is produced) by the (self's) being associated with that (limiting condition): thus there is nothing wrong (here), in as much as the relation between *karma* and (these) limiting conditions is beginningless in accordance with the argument[332] derived from the seed and the sprout. Therefore, it is the non-distinction of the individual selves from each other as well as from the *Brahman* that is certainly natural.

But distinction arises, however, from limiting conditions. The distinction also of these limiting conditions from each other as well as from the *Brahman* is natural, like (their) non-distinction; because these limiting conditions are not subject to other limiting conditions, and because also, if these (latter) be admitted, there would result a *regressus in infinitum*. Consequently, according to the *karma* of the individual selves, such limiting conditions are produced (in relation to the *Brahman*) as have, indeed,

331. Here *karma* means the effects of past works.

332. A seed produces a sprout this sprout produces another seed, this seed another sprout, this again another seed, and so on. Similarly a *karma* produces a limiting condition, this condition produces another *karma*, this *karma* another limiting condition, and so on. Thus there can be no beginning to the relation which exists between *karma* and limiting conditions.

a nature which is (both) distinct and non-distinct from the *Brahman*.

(In reply to this), it is said here[333] thus :—

It has been stated that the whole collection of *Vedāntic* passages relate to the injunction regarding the meditation of the *Brahman* who is without a second, and is existence, knowledge and bliss; that consequently it is non-distinction which is made out by means of *Vedāntic* passages; and that distinction is made out by means of the *śāstras* relating to 'works', as well as by means of perception, &c., which are all dependent upon distinctions; and that, (under these circumstances), non-distinction is alone the reality, because, there is mutual contradiction between distinction and non-distinction, and because also the perception of distinctions may result even from the beginninglessly old ignorance (or *avidyā*) as its source. But what has been stated there (in that context) to the effect that there is contradiction between distinction and non-distinction, for the reason that both of them are established by perception,—that is improper. Indeed, for a thing to be distinct from another thing is the same as that thing having characteristics which are different from those of the other thing; and non-distinction is the condition opposite to this. Who is there that is in his senses, and will speak of the existence in one and the same place of those two things (viz. distinction and non-distinction) which have (respectively) the nature of a particular condition and of the opposite of that particular condition? If it be said that non-distinction exists in the form of the cause as well as in the form of

333. Hereunder, the *Dhyānaniyogavādin* refutes the position of the *Bhāskarīyas* stated above.

the genus, and that distinction exists in the form of the effect as well as in the form of the individual, and that, owing to there being (such) a difference between their forms there is no contradiction (between them),—it is replied that it is not (right to say so); because such (a position) does not admit of any one of the possible alternative views (in relation to it). Does he who says that there is no contradiction (between distinction and non-distinction) owing to the difference in the form of their appearance,—(does he) hold that distinction exists in one particular form, while non-distinction exists in another particular form? Or (does he hold) that both of them are to be found in one thing which is capable of adopting both those forms? In the first alternative, distinction belongs to the individual and non-distinction belongs to the genus, and hence, no one thing has both these forms (of distinction and non-distinction). If it be said that the genus and the individual are both one and the same thing, then (the contention), that there is no contradiction (between them), in as much as there is a difference in the form of their appearance, will amount to have been given up. It has been already stated that it is contrary to reason for one and the same thing to have its own peculiar characteristics and (also) their opposites. And, in the second alternative, there are two forms which are mutually contradictory, and the thing with which they are associated is unknown. Hence, even if a third form (other than the *jāti* or genus, and the *vyakti* or the individual) be admitted, there would be only the proving of the mutual distinction between (all) the three forms, but no (proving of the) absence of distinction (between them). If it be said that that non-contradiction (between distinction and non-distinction), which it is sought to maintain by the

(supposition of) two forms, is the same as being (both) distinct and non-distinct from the thing which forms the abode of those (two forms),—it is asked in reply how the two forms, which abide in a thing and are themselves (thus) different from (that) thing, can be capable of introducing into that thing hostile attributes (at the same time). Of what nature is non-distinction then? If the two forms (on the one hand) and the thing, (on the other hand), which possesses them are admitted to be (distinctly) two in nature, then, there would be the necessity for another form that is capable of holding them together. Consequently, there would be the fallacy of *regressus in infinitum*. Moreover, there is the apprehension of an admitted oneness in relation to the perception of individuals; similarly, however, in regard to that thing also which has (its) similars, there arises no such perception as is characterised by oneness; because all perception arises only as relating to the characteristic modes (of things) and to the things characterised by those modes, to the effect that a particular thing is of a particular nature. In such (a perception), the thing which characterises is the genus, and the thing which is characterised is the individual (belonging to that genus); and therefore perception has not (only) one form. For this same reason, the quality of being (both) distinct and non-distinct from the *Brahman* is not possible in relation to the individual self also. Accordingly, the perception of distinction is solely based upon the beginninglessly old ignorance (or *avidyâ*), in as much as non-distinction is based on the *śâstras* (the logical result of which is) arrived at independently (of all other means of knowledge).

It may be said that, if such be the case, the *Brah-*

man Himself would possess ignorance, and that consequently the evils of birth, old age, death, &c., resulting from that (ignorance) would taint (Him); and that for the same reason the following and other scriptural texts, namely, "He who understands all and who knows all"—[*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 1. 9. & II. 2. 7.]; "This Self is devoid of sin."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 5. & VIII. 7. 1 & 3.], would also be contradicted. But this is not right; because the evils of ignorance, &c., are not real. But, in as much as you[334] do not admit (the existence of) things other than the limiting conditions and the *Brahman*, the association of those limiting conditions with the *Brahman* Himself and the evils of (His) constituting the individual self, of (His) being (thus) ignorant, &c., (all of) which result from that (association), would all occur (according to you) in reality. Indeed, these limiting conditions,which are associated with the *Brahman* who is without constituent parts and indivisible, do not get into association (with Him) either after cutting Him or after dividing Him. But, on the contrary, they are associated with His essential nature, and hence they work out their effects within Himself.

You may, however, hold that the *Brahman* limited by conditions is the individual self; and that that (individual self) is atomic (in size); that its atomic character is due to the atomic (or non-pervasive) nature of the *manas* which is one of the limiting conditions; that this limiting condition is beginninglessly old; and that, therefore, the evils, which are associated with the thing that is limited by conditions,

334. *You* means the *Bhāskarīyas* who admit only the *Brahman* and the conditions limiting Him. Beyond these, they do not admit the existence of anything else.

are not associated with the Highest unconditioned *Brahman*. If so, it has to be asked whether the individual self which is atomic in size is a bit of the *Brahman* cut off (from Him) by limiting conditions; or whether it (viz. the individual self) is any such special part of the *Brahman* as is not at all divided from the *Brahman* and is (nevertheless) associated with that limiting condition which is characterised by the atomic size; or whether it is, in essence, the *Brahman* Himself in association with limiting conditions; or whether it is some other intelligent being associated with limiting conditions; or whether it is the limiting condition itself. As the *Brahman* is incapable of being divided, the first alternative cannot be assumed; and (if it be assumed), there would be a beginning (in time) to the individual self; indeed cutting off means the splitting of an already existing thing into two. In accordance with the second alternative, a particular part of the *Brahman* Himself is associated with limiting conditions, and hence all the evils arising out of limiting conditions accrue to Him alone; and when a limiting condition is detached and transferred (from one part of the *Brahman* to another), then, owing to the fact that it is not possible for the limiting condition to carry with itself that part of the *Brahman* which was associated with itself (before), and owing also to the fact that the part of the *Brahman* which is associated with limiting conditions varies from moment to moment, both bondage and final release have to be taking place every moment. If it were possible (for the limiting condition) to carry with itself (that part of the *Brahman* with which it is associated), then, since the *Brahman* is indivisible, the whole (of the *Brahman*) would have to be so carried. If it be said that a thing which has no constituent parts and is all-pervading cannot be (so) carried,

then the statement already made to the effect that the limiting condition is detached and transferred must itself become an error. When all the limiting conditions are associated with the (various) parts of the (one) undivided *Brahman*, then, since all the individual selves form such parts of the (one undivided) *Brahman*, they will have all to be put together and realised as one. If, owing to their forming (His) various parts, there can be no putting them together (so as to cause their coalescence), then, even after the limiting conditions are detached and transferred, there can be no coalescence of even a single part (freed from limiting conditions with the unconditioned whole). In accordance with the third alternative, the essential nature of the *Brahman* Himself assumes the state of the individual self, through association with limiting conditions; and hence there can be no establishment of the unconditioned *Brahman* as apart from that (individual self), and there will have to be only one individual self in all bodies. In accordance with the fourth alternative, the individual self is (by nature) altogether different from the *Brahman*, and therefore the idea that the differentiation of the individual self (from the *Brahman*) is due to limiting conditions will amount to have been given up. In accordance with the last alternative, the view of the Chārvākas[335] themselves will come to have been accepted. Therefore, on the strength of the *śāstras* declaring that there is non-disinc-

335. The Chārvākas are the materialists of Hindu philosophy. Their sceptical doctrines were handed down to Chārvāka and his followers by one Vāchaspati or Bṛihaspati. Their opinions are embodied in what are called *Bārhaspatya-sūtras*. They are regarded as atheists by the orthodox in matters of *Vedic* faith. The Chārvākas believe only in one criterion of truth, namely, perception. According to them non-intelligent matter itself is the cause of creation.

tion (between things), it has to be accepted that all distinctions are based upon ignorance (or *avidyā*) alone.

Accordingly, although the *śāstras* are authoritative only in so far as they relate to utility either in the form of activity or of cessation from activity, it is established that *Vedāntic* passages are authoritative in relation to the essential nature of the *Brahman* (also), in as much as they are needed as a complement to the injunction relating to meditation.

This (view) also is improper.[336] Even though it be granted that they are needed as a complement to the injunction relating to meditation, there is no authoritative proof that *Vedāntic* passages import anything that is real. What is said is this:—Do the passages relating to the essential nature of the *Brahman* possess authoritativeness in relation to that essential nature of the *Brahman*, by importing the same thing as the injunction relating to meditation (does)? Or (do they do so) independently and of their own accord? If they have (such) oneness of import, then they must refer mainly to the injunction relating to meditation; and thus it is not possible for them to aim at denoting the essential nature of the *Brahman*. If they import a different thing (from the injunction relating to meditation), then, since they are devoid of utility in the form of inducing either activity or cessation from activity, they certainly cannot have any (real) meaning at all. Moreover, it should not be urged—that meditation has the nature of a flow of memory, and is capable of being

336. Hereunder the *Mîmāmsaka*, who is the main objector against the views intended to be propounded by the *Sūtrakāra* in *Ved. Sût.* I. i. 4., refutes the position of the *Dhyāna-niyogavādin*.

definitely described only by means of what constitutes the thing that is to be remembered ;—and that, if it be asked what the particular object of remembrance in connection with this injunction bearing upon meditation is, then, the following passages—"All this is that Self."—[*Bṛih. Up*. II. 4. 6. & IV. 5. 7.]; "The *Brahman* is omniscient."—[*Bṛih. Up*. II. 5. 19.]; "The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity."—[*Taitt. Up*. II. 1. 1.], and other such passages point out the essential nature and the peculiar characteristics of that (object of remembrance), and thus acqure the sameness of import with that (injunction relating to meditation), and become authoritative in establishing the reality of the thing (imported) : because, although the injunction relating to meditation is necessarily dependent upon what forms the object of remembrance, yet the reality of the thing to be meditated upon is not absolutely needed, for the reason that the completion of meditation becomes possible even with the help of a certain thing which is unreal, as in the case of the injunction[337] enjoining the realisation of the *Brahman* as a Name. Thus it is arrived at that the *Brahman* is not proved by means of the scriptures ; because *Vedāntic* passages are devoid of utility in the form of inducing either activity or cessation from activity ; and because, even when needed as a complement to the injunction relating to meditation, they have their finality only in denoting the essential nature of the particular object of meditation ; again because, even when they are capable of having an independent import, there is to be found in merely knowing (their meaning) the whole range of their utility, as is the case with sentences (uttered) to gratify children,

337. Vide *Chhānd. Up*. VII. 1. 5. where this injunction is given.

sickly persons, and other such people ; and because also they (viz. *Vedântic* passages) cannot point out the reality of those things the ideas corresponding to which have been already naturally established.

In this connection, it is laid down (by the *Sûtrakâra*) —**"That (viz. the fact that the scripture forms altogether the source of the knowledge relating to the *Brahman*) results, however, from (His constituting) the true purport (of the scriptures)."**[338] The word ***samanvaya*** means the proper purport, that is, such a purport as constitutes an object of human pursuit. The meaning is that, owing to the fact that the *Brahman* who is the highest object of human pursuit and whose very nature is unsurpassed bliss forms the purport (of the scriptures) by constituting the thing that is to be denoted (by them), **that,** namely, the fact that the scripture forms the means of proving (the *Brahman*), is undoubtedly established.

The whole collection of *Vedântic* passages teaches the *Brahman* who is the highest object of attainment, in as much as His essential nature is devoid of all evil and consists of unsurpassed bliss ; and whoever says that, nevertheless, it (viz. that collection) has not its finality in utility, because it does not lead to either activity or cessation from activity, (he) says, (as it were), that a person who dwells in a palace is destitute of all usefulness in as much as he does not get into a dog-kennel.

What is said is this :—Individual souls have the knowledge of their own nature as well as of the reality of the higher and the lower truths that are concealed by the veil of that ignorance which is the same in nature as the beginninglessly old *karma* ; they exist in the form of gods, *Asuras*,

338. This is *Ved. Sût.* I. 1. 4. and is as follows :—*Tattu samanvayât.*

Gandharvas, Siddhas, Vidyādharas, Kinnaras, Kimpurushas, Yakshas, Rākshasas, Piśāchas, men, beasts, birds, reptiles, trees, shrubs, creepers, grass, and other (material embodiments); they are differentiated by the distinctions of the male sex, of the female sex, and of sexlessness, and have their own specially appointed supporters, protectors and special objects of enjoyment: and (under these circumstances) that passage alone has its finality in utility which teaches that there exists the Highest *Brahman* who, by means of His own essential nature, character and qualities, greatness and activity, causes to these (individual souls) unlimited and unsurpassed joy at the time when there happens to be no difference between the (personal) experience of (the *Brahman*) Himself and the experience which these (souls) have in their released state (of beatitude). But that (other kind of) passage, which relates to activity and cessation from activity, has not its finality in utility, in as much as it gives rise to that knowledge which can be utilised only so long as there are (desirable) objects to be attained. When it is desired to know how the *Brahman* who is of this nature is to be attained, then, worship (or *upāsana*) is enjoined, as the means of attaining the *Brahman*, by the words *vedana*, &c., (meaning *knowledge*, &c.,) in the following passages:—"He who knows the *Brahman* attains the Highest."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.]; "Let him worship the Self alone as the object to be attained."—[*Bṛih. Up.* I. 4. 15.]. This (utility of the teaching given by *Vedānta*) is analogous to the case of a person who, on hearing the statement that there is hidden treasure in his house, comes to know of the existence of (such a) hidden treasure, (thereby) becomes pleased, and then tries to get at it. It is also analogous to this other case:—A young prince, while engaged in play

with (other) lads, gets out of the palace, and, straying from the right road, is lost, and is taken by the king (to be so lost). (The prince) himself does not know his (own) father, is brought up by a Brāhmaṇa of merit, and is made to learn (all) the *Vedic* scriptures. When he is sixteen years of age and is the possessor[339] of all auspicious qualities, he hears a statement made by a very worthy person to this effect :—"Your father is the lord of the whole world, and is blessed with the qualities of dignity, liberality, affection, excellent behaviour, heroism, bravery and overwhelming strength, &c. He is waiting in the best of cities solely with the desire to see you, (his) lost son." When (the prince hears this statement), he becomes then and there full of unsurpassed joy by realising (within himself)—"I am indeed the son of a person who is alive, and my father is abundantly blessed with all kinds of wealth." The king also,—on hearing that his own son is alive, is healthy, is beautiful to look at, and is conversant with all that has to be known,—becomes like one who has attained all the objects of human pursuit; and thereafter he tries to get him (*i. e.* the son) back. And at last they both meet together. Such also is (this utility).

Again what has been stated—by the *pūrvapakshin*—to the effect that *Vedāntic* passages relate to things, the ideas corresponding to which have been already naturally established, and are hence no means of proving the real existence of the things imported (by them), but are like the sentences which are uttered for the gratification of children, sickly persons and other (such people), in as much as their utility has its finality only in (producing) the mere (mental) knowledge of that (to which they relate);—that is

339. The word used in the text is metaphorically used to signify an *ākara* which means a mine. It is inexhaustible source of anything.

wrong. When the absence of the reality of the thing imported (by a sentence) is definitely determined, then, even if that (thing) be (mentally) known, it cannot serve any useful purpose. In the case of children, sickly people &c., joy &c., are produced by the illusion that the thing (imported by the sentences uttered for their gratification) is really existent. If, at the time when such (illusory) knowledge is existent, the conviction should arise that the thing imported is really non-existent, then joy, &c., would, (in consequence), disappear that very moment. If, in the case of the *Upanishadic* passages also, it be determined that they do not denote the real existence of the *Brahman*, then, although they give rise to the (conceptual) knowledge of the *Brahman*, there would be (to those passages) no finality in utility.

Therefore, it is a demonstrated conclusion that the scriptural passage, which begins with—"From whom all these beings are born"—[*Taitt. Up.* III. 1. 1.], declares that that *Brahman*—who is the only cause of all the worlds, who is devoid of even the smallest taint of all that is evil, who is the abode[340] of innumerable auspicious qualities, such as omniscience, the quality of willing the truth, &c., and who is bliss unsurpassed in excellence,—is really existent.

ADHIKARAṆA. V.

Īkshatyadhikaraṇa.

Sūtra 5. Īkshaternāśabdam.

Because the activity imported by the root *īksh* (*to see i. e. to think*) is predicated (in relation to what constitutes the cause of the world) that which is not reveal-

340. Here again the word used in the text is *ākara*. Vide *supra* n. 339.

ed solely by the scripture, (viz. the *pradhâna*)[341] is not (the *Sat* or the Existence which is referred to in the scriptural passage relating to the cause of the world).

It has been already stated that that *Brahman*, who is taught in the scriptural passage which relates to the cause of the world and which begins with—"From whom all these (beings are born)"—[*Taitt. Up.* III. 1. 1.],—(that *Brahman*) who is omniscient, who is omnipotent, who is hostile to all that is evil and forms the only seat of all the auspicious qualities,—has to be enquired into. Now, by means of this aphorism—"Because the activity imported by the root *iksh* (*to see i. e. to think*), is predicated (in relation to what constitutes the cause of the world), that which is not revealed solely by the scripture (viz. the *pradhâna*) is not (the *Sat* or the Existence which is referred to in the scriptural passage relating to the cause of the world)",—and by means of other aphorisms, it is declared that the scriptural passages[342] which mention the cause of the world do not possess the power of denoting the *pradhâna* and other similar things which are capable of being established by the process of logical inference. This is what is revealed in the *Chhândogya*:—"Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning, one only, without a second........It thought—'May I become manifold and be born'. It created *tejas*, &c." [*Chhând. Up.* VI. 2. 1, 2, et seq.]. Here the doubt arises whether that, which is the cause of the world and is denoted by the word *Existence* (or *Sat*), is the

341. The *Pradhâna* of the *Sânkhyas* is what is otherwise known as the *Prakriti*. It is Nature, or the self-evolving material substratum of the universe.

342. The passages forming the basis of this *Adhikarana* are contained in *Chhând. Up.* VI.

pradhāna which has been mentioned by others and is capable of being established by logical inference, or whether it is the *Brahman* who possesses the characteristics already stated? It is perhaps held[343] that it is the *pradhāna*. Why? The passage—"Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning, one only, &c."—speaks of the causal condition of that thing which is denoted by the word 'this', which constitutes the thing to be enjoyed (or endured) by intelligent beings (viz. the individual souls), and which is made up (of the qualities) of *sattva* (goodness), *rajas* (passion), and *tamas* (darkness), and which (again) exists in variously modified forms such as the ether, &c. Indeed, a thing which exists in the condition of a cause acquires the character of an effect merely by getting into another condition. Whatever thing and whatever (general) nature (thereof) exist in the condition of a cause, that same thing and that same nature (thereof) exist also in the condition of an effect. Moreover, a produced effect is made up (of the qualities) of *sattva*, &c. Therefore that *pradhāna* in which these qualities are held in a state of equilibrium[344] is

343. The *Sāṅkhya* is the *pūrvapakshin*, or the objector here.

344. According to the *Sāṅkhyas*, the evolutionary processes of creation are possible only when there is heterogeneity in the constitution of the *Prakṛiti*. This heterogeneity is the result of the differentiation of the *Prakṛiti* into the three *Guṇas* of *Sattva*, *Rajas*, and *Tamas*. When this differentiation ceases, or when there is homogeneity in the constitution of the *Prakṛiti*, there can be no creation and no evolution. *Sattva* represents the condition of completed development and perfect equilibrium. *Rajas* represents the condition of active up-building heterogeneity, the want of equilibrium in which is the cause of the progress of evolution. And *Tamas* represents that other condition which causes the evolved universe to tend towards dissolution. These three terms are also used with a psychological significance, which is partly figurative but is more largely due to the belief that the material of the body of the incarnating soul determines largely the nature of the mental and moral qualities possessed by it in the embodied condition, and that this material itself is so chosen

alone the cause (of the universe). That same (*pradhāna*) is, in the passage—"Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning, one only, without a second",—declared to be that undifferentiated existence which has absorbed into itself all differentiating peculiarities. It is for this reason that a cause and its effect have no (essential) difference between them. Only thus can this proposition become appropriate (which says) that, by knowing one thing, all things become known. Otherwise, there would further be a complete difference between the thing intended to be illustrated and the example of the lump of clay and of the produced effects thereof, which are (all) given as an illustration in the scriptural passage that begins with—"Just as, my dear child, by one lump of clay, &c."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 1. 4.]. Therefore, in the scriptural passage which relates to the cause of the world, nothing other than the *pradhāna* taught by the great sage Kapila is mentioned. Moreover, this passage (now under discussion) contains a proposition and an illustration, and thus it has surely the form of a logical inference. Consequently, what is denoted by the word *Existence* (or *Sat*) is nothing other than that (*pradhāna*) which is capable of being proved by inference (to be the cause of the world).

If it be so held, it is stated (in reply) thus:—"Because the activity imported by the root *iksh* (*to see i. e. to think*), is predicated (in relation to what constitutes the cause of the world), that which is not revealed solely by the scripture (viz. the *pradhāna*) is not (the *Sat* or the Existence which is referred to in the scriptural passage relating to that cause of the world)." **That which is not revealed solely**

as to suit the *Karma* of the incarnating soul.

by the scripture is that in relation to which the scripture alone does not form the means of proof. It is that which is capable of being established by the process of logical inference. The meaning is that it is the *pradhāna*. That (*pradhāna*) is not denoted by the scriptural passages relating to the cause of the world. Why? **Because the activity imported by the root** ***īksh*** **(*to see i. e. to think*) is predicated.** That is, because the root *īksh* is used, in the scriptural passage—"It thought—May I become manifold and be born."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 3.],—to denote a particular kind of activity in relation to what is imported by the word *Existence* (or *Sat*). And it is not possible for the non-intelligent *pradhāna* to be associated with the activity of *seeing* (*i. e.* of *thinking*). Therefore, what forms the import of the word *Existence* (or *Sat*) is that Highest Person who is capable of so 'seeing', and who is a particular intelligent Being that is omniscient and omnipotent. Accordingly, in all contexts which relate to creation, the act of creation is invariably preceded by the act of 'seeing' (*i. e.* of thinking), as in the following and other scriptural passages:—"He thought—'May I create the worlds'. He created these worlds." [*Ait. Up.* I. 1 & 2.]; "He thought.....He created the *prāṇas*." [*Pr. Up.* VI. 3 & 4.].

It may, however, be said here that the cause has necessarily to be in natural conformity with the effect. That is true; and the Highest Person who is omniscient and omnipotent, who wills the truth, and who owns the intelligent as well as the non-intelligent things in their subtle state as His body, is certainly in natural conformity with all produced effects. For example, the following scriptural passages say the same thing:—"His supreme power is revealed, indeed, as varied, natural, and as consisting of knowledge, strength, and action."—[*Śvet. Up.*

VI. 8.]; "He who understands all and who knows all and whose *tapas*[345] consists of knowledge"—[*Muṇḍ. Up.* I. 1. 9.]; "He whose body is the *avyakta*,[346] whose body is the *akshara*......whose body is *mṛityu*, He is the internal Self of all beings."—[*Sub. Up.* VII.]. And this will be fully explained under the aphorism—"(The *Brahman* is) not (the cause of the world), because (He is) different (from this world)"—[*Ved. Sût.* II. 1. 4.], and also under other aphorisms. Here, (however), it is maintained that the scriptural passages relating to the creation of the world are not capable of importing the *pradhâna*. The logical objections in regard to what actually forms the import (of those passages) will be invalidated in that same context (in which this above-mentioned aphorism occurs).

What has been stated to the effect that this passage (viz. *Chhând. Up.* VI. 1 & 2.) is decidedly in the form of a logical inference, on account of its containing a proposition and an illustration,—that is not right; because there is not given in it any basis of logical inference (*i.e.* the middle term). When, by means of the passage—"(Did you ask for that teaching) by which what is not heard becomes heard"—[*Chhând. Up.* VI. 1. 3.], it is desired to teach how by knowing (a certain) one thing all things become known, then, the example (of the clay, &c.,) is indeed made use of merely to show the possibility of such a thing—to him who is of opinion that such a thing is

345. The word *tapas* ordinarily denotes penance and religious austerities. It is frequently said in *Vedic* and *Vedântic* literature that before creation the Creator performed *tapas*. Surely this *tapas* cannot mean penance or austerities, and it is generally interpreted to mean His inner mental effort of thinking and willing which has been at the root of all creation.

346. Vide *supra* nn. 184 & 185.

altogether impossible. As a matter of fact, solely for the reason that the activity imported by the root *īksh* (*to see i. e. to think*), is declared (in relation to what forms the cause of the world), it is made out that there is not even the remotest mention of any logical inference (here).

It may again be said thus:—It is not that main and natural significance of 'seeing', which is found to exist in intelligent beings, that is mentioned here; but, on the other hand, it is a figurative significance of 'seeing' (that is implied here); because, in the following scriptural passages—"That fire *saw*"—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 3.], "Those waters *saw*"—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 4.],—there is the association of a figurative 'seeing' (with the *pradhāna*). Moreover, it is common to apply figuratively the attributes of intelligent beings to non-intelligent things, as in the instances,—"The paddy crops are expecting the rains",—"By means of the rains the (sown) seed became exceedingly gladdened."

Therefore, after stating the supposition that the 'seeing' (here mentioned) may be figurative, he (the *Sūtrakāra*) disproves it (thus).

Sūtra 6. Gauṇaśchennātmaśabdāt.

If it be said that it (viz. the import of the root *īksh*, *to see*) is (here) figurative, (it is maintained that) it cannot be so; because there is the word *Ātman* (or Self mentioned in the context).[347]

What has been stated (above) to the effect that, since there is the association of a figurative 'seeing' (with the

347. The *Upanishadic* context relating to this section is the whole of the sixth *Prapāṭhaka* of the *Chāndogya-Upanishad*.

pradhāna), this predication of 'seeing' in relation to Existence (or *Sat*) also is figurative, and is intended to denote that condition (of the *pradhāna*) which invariably precedes creation,—this is not right; because, in the following passage (occurring in that context)—"All this has That for its Self; That is Existence; That is the *Ātman* (or the Self)."—[*Chhând. Up.* VI. 8. 7.],—that which is denoted by the word *Existence* (or *Sat*) is (also) denoted by the word *Ātman* (or Self). What is said is this:—That teaching, which is found in the passage—"All this has That for its Self...... That is the Self."—[*Chhând. Up.* VI. 8. 7.],—has in view the world which is made up of intelligent and non-intelligent things, and points out that the *Sat* (or the Existence) is the Self thereof; and it (viz. such a teaching) cannot be appropriately given in relation to the (purely) non-intelligent thing *pradhāna*. Thus the elements of fire (*tejas*), water, and earth have also the Highest Self for their Self. Therefore the words *tejas*, &c., are also significant of the Highest Self alone. Accordingly there is the following scriptural passage:—"Indeed entering into these three deities along with this individual self which is (also) the same as Myself, I evolve the differentiation of names and forms." [*Chhând. Up.* VI. 3. 2.]. And from this it follows that *tejas* and the other elements acquire the character of being things and also the capability of assuming their own particular names wholly as a consequence of the Supreme Self entering into them. Therefore in these statements also, namely,—"That fire *saw*";—"Those waters *saw*"—[*Chhând. Up.* VI. 2. 3 & 4.],—the predication of 'seeing' has its primary and natural significance. Consequently, in the statement—"It *saw*"—[*Chhând. Up.* VI. 2. 3.],—the supposition, which gives a figurative significance (to 'seeing') even as a consequence of the associa-

tion (of that 'seeing' with the *pradhāna*), is altogether dispelled (as wrong). Such is the meaning of this aphorism.

What is denoted by the word *Existence* (or *Sat*) is not the *pradhāna*, for the following reason also :—

Sūtra 7. Tannishṭhasya mokshopadeśāt.

Because (also) it is taught (in the context) that he who is firmly devoted to That (viz. the *Sat*) obtains final release.

After the scriptural sentence—"That thou art"—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 7.],—teaches Śvetaketu, who is desirous of attaining final release, that the *Sat* is to be continuously meditated upon as the *Ātman* (or the Self), this (other) sentence—"As long as he is not freed (from the body), so long there is delay ; then he will be blessed."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 14. 2.]—tells him that in the case of the person, who is firmly devoted to that (*Sat* or One Existence), final release, the nature of which is the attainment of the *Brahman*, is delayed only till the falling off of the body. And if the non-intelligent *pradhāna* had been taught to be the cause of the world, then it would not have been appropriate to teach that the continuous meditation of it as the Self forms the means of attaining final release. And according to the passage — "Of whatever nature a man's worship is in this world, of that nature he becomes after death."—[*Chhānd. Up.* III. 14. 1.],—there must result to him, who is firmly devoted to that (*pradhāna*), nothing other than the attainment of that (same) non-intelligent thing (or the *pradhāna*). Moreover, the *śāstra*

(or the scripture), which is much more affectionate (towards us) than even thousands of mothers and fathers, cannot teach (us) to attain that non-intelligent thing (or *pradhāna*) which forms the cause of (our) being attacked by (our) well-known three miseries.[348] Indeed those who maintain that the *pradhāna* forms the cause of the world do not acknowledge that final release results to him who is firmly devoted to (that) *pradhāna*.

Again the *pradhāna* is not (what is denoted by the word *Sat* or *Existence*) for the following reason also :—

Sūtra 8. Heyatvāvachanāchcha.

Because also it is not declared (in the context) that it (viz. what is denoted by the word *Sat* or *Existence*) deserves to be discarded.

If the *pradhāna* alone were that cause (of creation) which is denoted by the word *Sat* (or *Existence*), then (the idea of) Śvetaketu, who was desirous of attaining final release, being the same as that (*Sat*) would be opposed to (his) final release, and should therefore have been taught (to him) to be only such (an idea) as altogether deserved to be discarded. And that is not done. On the contrary, in the following passages, namely, "That thou art,"—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 7.]; "So long as he is not (freed from the body), &c."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 14. 2.],—it is taught that that (idea of his being the same as the *Sat*) is necessarily such as deserves to be adopted (by him).

348. Vide *supra* p. 4. n. 12.

The *pradhāna* is not (what is denoted by the word *Sat* or *Existence*) for the following reason also:—

Sūtra 9. Pratijñāvirodhāt.[349]

Because (also) there would then be the contradiction of the proposition [350] **(enunciated in the context).**

If the *pradhāna* were taken to be the cause of the world, there would also be the contradiction of the proposition (enunciated in the context). Indeed, in the very beginning of the scriptural passage (under reference), the proposition is enunciated that, by knowing a (certain) single thing, all things become known. And that (proposition) has to be justified solely by means of the fact that, from the knowledge of the causal *Sat* (or Existence), the world, which is its produced effect and is made up of the intelligent and the non-intelligent things, becomes known; and the reason (for this) is that a cause and its effect are not different from each other. But the whole collection of intelligent beings (viz. the individual selves) cannot be the effects produced out of the *pradhāna*; and consequently, by knowing the *pradhāna*, the knowledge relating to the whole collection of intelligent beings cannot result; thus this (proposition itself) would be contradicted if the *pradhāna* be taken to be the cause of the world.

349. This *Sūtra* is not commented upon by Śankara and by Ānandatīrtha in their commentaries on the *Vedānta-Sūtras.*

350. This proposition is contained in *Chhānd. Up.* VI. 1. 3. and is to the effect—"Did you ask for that teaching by which what is not heard becomes heard, what is not thought becomes thought, what is not known becomes known."

The *pradhāna* is not (what is denoted by the word *Sat* or *Existence* in the scriptural passage under discussion) for the following reason also :—

Sūtra 10. Svāpyayāt.

Because (also), there is (mentioned in the context), the withdrawal (of the individual self) into its own cause, (*i. e.* into the *Sat*).

This scriptural passage, namely,—"Know from me, my dear child, what deep sleep is. When any person is known to be asleep, he is then in union with the *Sat*. He withdraws into his own cause. Therefore they say, he sleeps, because he is absorbed into his own cause (*i.e.* into the *Brahman*)."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 1.]—relates to that very subject which is denoted by the word *Sat*. It declares that the individual soul, who is asleep and is in union with the *Sat*, has withdrawn (himself) into his own cause; that is, that he has been absorbed into his own cause. And (the) dissolution (of a thing) is (its) absorption into (its) own cause. Moreover the non-intelligent *pradhāna* does not deserve to become the cause of the individual soul. The meaning of the scriptural statement—"He withdraws into his own cause,"—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 1.],—is that the individual soul goes back only unto the Supreme Self. It is declared in the scriptural passage[351] relating to the differentiation of names and forms that that *Brahman* Himself, who has the intelligent thing (or the individual soul) for His body and forms its Self, is denoted by the word *jīva* (which ordinarily means the individual soul). By means of the statement—"He is then in union with the *Sat*; He withdraws into his own cause."—[*Chhānd.*

351. Vide *Chhānd. Up.* VI 3. 2.

Up. VI. 8. 1.]—it is taught that that *Brahman* who is denoted by the word *jiva* is free from (any) association with names and forms at the time of deep sleep also, as (He is) at the time of universal dissolution; and (He) is hence to be denoted merely by the word *Sat* (or *Existence*). To the same effect it is stated in similar contexts (elsewhere) that, owing to his (*i. e.* the individual self's) not being associated with names and forms, he is embraced by Him who is omniscient; and consequently it is said that, "When he is embraced by the omniscient Self, he does not know anything that is external nor anything that is internal." [*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 3. 21.]. Indeed, until final release takes place, the individual self is associated with names and forms; and it is, therefore, that there is born (in him) the knowledge of objects other than himself. At the time of deep sleep he certainly gives up names and forms, and is embraced by the *Sat* (*i. e.* by the *Brahman*): and again, in the wakeful state, he becomes associated with names and forms and assumes (for himself) a particular name and a particular form. This is clearly stated in other scriptural passages, namely,—"When he (*i. e.* the individual self) is asleep, he sees no dreams whatsoever; and he becomes one wholly with that *Prāṇa* (or *Brahman*)..................................From that Self, the *prāṇas* proceed each towards its (own) place."—[*Kaush. Up.* IV. 19.]. To the same effect is the following scriptural passage also—"Whatever these beings are here, (*i. e.* in the state of separation from their cause), whether a tiger, or a lion, or a wolf, or a boar,...............[352] or a fly, or a mosquito,—that they become again and again."

352. The quotation here is not complete, the portion omitted being "or an insect or a moth."

[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 9. 2. & VI. 10. 2.]. And a similar scriptural text also says that the individual soul who is so in deep sleep "is embraced by the omniscient Self." [*Bṛih. Up.* IV. 3. 21.]. Therefore, He who is denoted by the word *Sat* (in the scriptural passage under discussion), is that Highest Person alone who is the Highest *Brahman*, who is omniscient and is the Highest Lord. The *Vṛittikāra* (Bodhāyana) says the same thing thus:—"In the scriptural text—'Then he is in union with the *Sat*.'—this (viz. the fact that the *Sat* is the *Brahman* who is the cause of the world) is conclusively made out by means of (the creatures) withdrawing (into the *Sat*) and returning (from the *Sat*); and the scripture also says that 'He (the individual self) is embraced by the omniscient Self.'"

The *pradhāna* is not (what is denoted by the word *Sat*) for the following reason also:—

Sūtra 11. Gatisāmānyāt.

Because there has to be a similarity of import (between the passage under reference and the other passages relating to the cause of the creation, &c., of the world).

Whatever is the **import** of the following among other passages relating to the creation of the world, namely,—"The Self, indeed, this one only was in the beginning. Nothing else lived.[353] He thought—'May I create the worlds.' He created these worlds."—[*Ait. Up.* I. 1 & 2.]; "From that same Self, indeed, the spatial ether came

353. Literally, *winked* or *opened its eyes*.

into existence, from the spatial ether the air (came into existence); from the air, the fire; from the fire, the waters; and from the waters, the earth."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.]; "That which is this *Ṛigveda* is the breath of Him, that is, of this Great Being."—[*Sub. Up.* II.]—[354] (whatever) is (their) signification,—from the **similarity (of import)** with that, that is, from the sameness of meaning (which) this (passage under reference) is to have with that (signification)—(it has to be inferred that the *pradhāna* is not the *Sat*). In all these (above passages) also, the Lord of all is made out to be the cause (of the world). Therefore here (*i. e.* in this passage) also it is definitely determined that the Lord of all is alone the cause (of the world).

The *pradhāna* is not (what is denoted by the word *Sat*) for the following reason also:

Sūtra 12. Śrutatvāchcha.

Because also it is revealed (in the very *Upanishad* in which the passage under discussion occurs, and in other *Upanishads*, that the Supreme Self is the cause of the universe).

Indeed, in this very *Upanishad* (viz. the *Chhāndogya*), in the following passages, namely,—"Entering in along with this individual self which is (also) the same as Myself, I evolve the differentiation of names and forms."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 3. 2.], "All these things which are born, my dear one, have their origin in the *Sat* (*i. e.* in the One Existence), have their abode in the *Sat*, and are established in the *Sat*."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 4 & 6.], "All this has this (*Brahman*) for its Self. That (*Brahman*) is Existence.

354. Vide *supra* n. 251.

He is the Self."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 7.], "Whatever there is here as existent and whatever there is as non-existent in relation to him,—all that is contained in Him."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 3.], "In Him, all desires are contained."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 5.], "This Self is devoid of sin, is free from old age, free from death, free from sorrow, free from hunger, free from thirst, and desires the truth, and wills the truth."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 5. & VIII. 7. 1 & 3.],—it is declared that that, which is denoted by the word *Sat*, is, in consequence of its possessing the same character as the Self, capable of causing the differentiation of names and forms and possesses (the quality of) omniscience, (the quality of) omnipotence, the quality of being the support of all, the quality of being devoid of sin, &c., the quality of desiring the truth, and also the quality of willing the truth. To the same effect are the following and other scriptural passages found elsewhere also :—"He has none as His lord and (none) as His ruler in the world ; and He has no characteristic body whatsoever. He is the cause and is the Lord of what is the lord of the senses (*i. e.* of the *jīva* or the individual soul); He has no progenitor and no superior."—[*Śvet. Up.* VI. 9.]; "The omniscient Lord who creates all beings gives them names, and, calling them (by those names), He ever continues to be."—[*Taitt. Ār.* III. 12. 7.]; "He, who has entered within, is the ruler of all things that are born, and is the Self of all."—[*Taitt. Ār.* III. 24.]; "He is the Self of the whole universe and is the best refuge ; He is the Lord of the world, the Lord of the individual souls ; whatever thing there is in this world, either seen or heard, Nārāyaṇa pervades all that within and without and so remains for ever".—[*M. Nār.* XI. 3 & 5.]; "He is the internal Self of all beings, He is devoid of all

sins, He is the Divine Lord, He is the one Nārāyaṇa.' [*Sub. Up.* VII. 1.]. Therefore the scriptural passage which mentions the cause of the world is not capable of importing (as such) the *pradhāna* and other similar things. Consequently it is settled that that Nārāyaṇa alone—who is omniscient and omnipotent, who is the Lord of all lords, who is devoid of even the smallest taint of all that is evil, who is the great ocean that receives the flood of all the collections of (all) the innumerable auspicious qualities which are unsurpassed in excellence, who is the Highest Person,—He alone forms the one cause of the universe and is the *Brahman* that has to be enquired into.

For the same reason it has to be understood that the contention, which maintains that the *Brahman* is pure intelligence devoid of characterising attributes, has also been set at naught by the *Sūtrakāra* with the help of these (above quoted) scriptural passages; because it is established (by him) that that *Brahman*, who is to be enquired into, is associated with the *real* attribute of 'seeing', &c., which forms the main and natural significance of the root *īksh*, (to 'see'). Indeed, according to the contention which maintains that that (which is the cause of the world) is devoid of characterising attributes, even the character of a witness (*i. e.* of one who 'sees') has to be *unreal* (as applied to that cause). That the *Brahman*, who is to be made out from the *Vedānta*, has been enunciated to be the object of the enquiry (here), and that He is intelligent, are (both) declared by means of this aphorism among others; namely,—"Because the activity imported by the root *īksh* (*to see i.e. to think*) is predicated (in relation to what constitutes the cause of the world), that which is not revealed solely by the scripture (viz. the *pradhāna*), is not (the *Sat* or the Existence which is referred to in

the scriptural passage relating to that cause of the world)." [*Ved. Sût.* I. 1. 5.]. To possess the character of an intelligent being is known to be the same as to possess the quality of intelligence. And accordingly that which is devoid of the attribute of 'seeing' (or thinking) has exactly the same nature as the *pradhâna*.

Moreover, according to the position which maintains that the *Brahman* is pure luminosity devoid of characterising attributes, it is difficult even to establish that He is (such) luminosity. Luminosity (or intelligence) is indeed known to be that particular thing which is capable of making itself and other things fit to be realised (by the mind). The thing which is devoid of attributes does not possess both these characteristics, and it certainly has in consequence the character of a non-intelligent thing like a pot or any other similar object. If it be said that, even though it does not possess both these characteristics, it is as good as if it had them, it is replied that it cannot be so. To be as good as if it had them is indeed nothing other than (for it) to be able to do what they are capable of doing. On admitting the possession (by the *Brahman*) of the quality corresponding to this capability, the position which maintains the attributelessness (of the *Brahman*) will indeed amount to have been given up. Again, if it be urged that, on the authority of the scripture, this one particular characteristic quality (of capability) has to be admitted, then indeed, for that same reason, omniscience, omnipotence, the quality of being the Lord of all lords, the quality of being the abode of all auspicious attributes, the quality of being hostile to all that is evil, and all other similar qualities will have to be admitted. Again, to possess a capability is the same as to be able to produce a particular effect; and that (possession of the capability) has to be definitely determined

solely by means of (its) produced effect. When (such) a particular produced effect is incapable of being proved, then the possession of that capability, which has to be definitely determined solely by means of that (effect), becomes also incapable of proof.

Further, according to him who maintains (the *Brahman* to be) an attributeless entity, it is impossible to prove (that the *Brahman* possesses) the character of being a thing at all; for, it has been already[355] pointed out that perception, inference, revelation, and one's own experience deal with things which are possessed of attributes.

Therefore, it is conclusively established that that Highest Person alone, who is capable of 'seeing' and of willing to the effect[356]–'May I become manifold in the form of the world which is made up of wonderful intelligent and non-intelligent things',—that (Highest Person alone) is He who has to be enquired into.

ADHIKARAṆA. VI.

Ānandamayādhikaraṇa.

It has thus been pointed out how the *Brahman*, who is to be enquired into, is distinct from the *pradhāna* which is (merely) an object to be enjoyed (or endured) by intelligent beings (*i.e.* by individual souls), which is non-intelligent in its own nature, and which consists of the qualities of *sattva* (goodness), *rajas* (passion), and *tamas* (darkness). Now, it will be declared that the *Brahman*, who is hostile to all that is evil and who is unsurpassed bliss itself, is distinct (both) from the subjective self who is pure, and

355. Vide *supra* pp. 54 to 60.

356. Vide *Taitt. Up.* II. 6. 1. & *Chhāna. Up.* VI. 2. 3.

also (from the subjective self) who is under the influence of *karma* and is (thus) impure, owing to his being immersed in the ocean of varied and endless miseries resulting from his association with the *prakṛiti* which is made up of the three qualities (of *sattva*, &c.).

Sûtra 13. Ânandamayobhyâsât.

That which is denoted by the word *Ânandamaya* (is the *Brahman*); because there is, (in the context),[357] the repetition of various grades (of bliss which culminate in the *Ânandamaya* or the Highest Bliss).

Starting (the exposition of) the subject-matter of the context in the passage—"This *purusha* [358] is thus a modification of the essence of food",—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.], the *Taittiriyas* recite—"Different from this which consists of understanding (or knowledge) is the (still) inner Self, the *Ânandamaya* (or That which consists of Bliss)." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 5. 1.]. Here the doubt arises whether this *Ânandamaya* is the Highest Self, who is different from the individual self that is subject to bondage and release, and is generally denoted by the word *jîva*; or whether (the *Ânandamaya* is) that (individual self) himself. It is perhaps thought right to hold [359] that it is the individual self. Why? Because, in the passage—"This itself is the embodied Self of that (which consists of understanding or knowledge)."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 5. 1.]—it is declared that the *Ânandamaya* is associated with an embodiment. Indeed the embodied one is that individual

357. The context here is *Taitt.Up.*II.

358. The word *Purusha* is here interpreted to mean the body.

359. The *Pûrvapakshin* or the objector here is the *Sâṅkhya*.

self who is in association with the body. It may however be said that the scripture has (here) the aim of showing what that happiness is which is enjoyed by the *Brahman*, who is declared to be the cause of the world; and that, (with that object in view), it refers in the beginning to what consists of food, &c.; and that, going on step by step, it finally teaches that that same cause of the world is what consists of Bliss. And that which is the cause of the world has been stated to be the omniscient Lord of all, because it is revealed in the scriptural sentence—"It *saw*"—[*Chhānd Up.* VI. 2. 3.]—that that (cause) is capable of the activity of 'seeing' (*i. e.* of *thinking*). True, it has been (so) stated; but that (cause of the world) is nothing other than the *jīva* (or the individual self); because, in the passages—"Entering in along with this individual self which is (also) the same as Myself, &c."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 3. 2.]; "That thou art, O Śvetaketu."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 7.],—that which is pointed out to be the cause of the world is seen to be grammatically equated with the individual self. A grammatical equation is indeed intended to give the teaching of oneness (about the things equated therein); as in the instance—"This is that Devadatta",—and in other (such instances). And that act of creation which is invariably preceded by 'seeing' (*i. e.* by *thinking*) is certainly appropriate to the intelligent individual self (also). Therefore, by means of the passage—"He who knows the *Brahman* attains the Highest."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.], that essential nature of the individual self, which is (altogether) free from association with the non-intelligent thing (viz. matter), is taught to be the (final) object of attainment. The definition of that essential nature, which is free from association with the non-

intelligent thing (matter), is said to be this, namely, "The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.]. Indeed final release is nothing other than the attainment of this nature (by the individual self); because—"To him who is and has a body, there is no destruction of the pleasing and the unpleasing; the pleasing and the unpleasing touch not him who is and has no body." [*Chhând. Up.* VIII. 12. 1.]. Hence, that essential nature of the individual self, which is free from ignorance (or *avidyâ*) and is referred to in the very beginning (of the context under reference),—(that) is taught to be the *Ânandamaya* (or that which consists of bliss). Accordingly, with a view to indicate the essential nature of the individual self, the body is, in accordance with the manner of pointing out the moon with the help of (an apparently contiguous) branch of a tree, first of all pointed out in the statement that the *purusha* is made up of food—[*Taitt. Up.* II.1. 1.]; and then the five-fold *prâṇa* existing within that (body) and forming its support, then the mind existing even in the interior of that (*prâṇa*) and then the intellect existing within that (mind), are all mentioned, each in its particular place, in an order helpful to ready apprehension,—by means of the expressions (that the *purusha* is) *prâṇamaya* (or that which consists of *prâṇa*), is *manomaya* (or that which consists of mind), and is *vijñânamaya* (or that which consists of understanding or knowledge); afterwards, the individual self which exists in the interior of all these things is taught in the passage—"Different (from the *vijñânamaya*) is the inner self, the *ânandamaya*." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 5. 1.]; and then it (*i.e.* the context under reference) brings to a close the series leading to the internal self. Consequently, it is definitely determined that what is (here) taught is—that the essential nature of the individual self

itself is that *Brahman* which is referred to in the very beginning of the context in the passage—"He who knows the *Brahman* attains (the Highest)."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.], and that that same (essential nature of the individual self) is the *ānandamaya* (or what consists of bliss). It may also be said[360] that, in accordance with the scriptural statement—"The *Brahman* is the tail and the support."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 5. 1.], the *Brahman* is made out to be other than the *Ānandamaya* (or that which consists of bliss). But it can not be so (made out). The *Brahman* Himself who is (here) conceived to have the form of an embodied person (or *purusha*) is, in harmony with His own peculiar nature, represented to be possessed of the head, the arm and the tail. Just as, in the scriptural statement beginning with—"This is its head"—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.], the body, which is a modification of food and is an organic whole made up of constituent parts, is described as possessing the head, the arm and the tail which are (all) its own constituent parts and are not different from itself; so also, the *Brahman* too, who consists of bliss, is described by means of joy, &c., which are not different from Himself. It being so, on account of His being the seat of joy, pleasure, satisfaction and bliss, which are (all) described to be (His) constituent parts, the *Ānandamaya* who is an indivisible whole is spoken of as "the *Brahman* who is the tail and the support." And if anything other than the *Ānandamaya* (or what consists of Bliss) had been the *Brahman*, then it would have also been described to the effect that "Different from this, indeed, which consists of Bliss, is the (still) inner Self, the *Brahman*." And it is not so described. What is said is this:—The *Brahman*, who is referred to in

360. This objection against the *Sāṅkhya* proceeds from the *Advaitin*.

the very beginning (of the present context) in the passage—"He who knows the *Brahman* attains the Highest".—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.], is by means of the definition given in the passage[361]—"The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity" declared to possess such a nature as distinguishes Him from all other things; and then that same *Brahman* is mentioned by the word *Âtman* (or Self) in the passage—"From that same Self, indeed, (the spatial ether came into existence)",—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.]; and then the scriptural passage, which explains self-hood to consist in being the innermost (essence) of all, gradually passes in review the *prāṇamaya* and other such things which, owing to each of them being more and more within, are, one after another, represented to be the self of those things which are denoted as the *annamaya* and so on; and then (lastly) what is pointed out by the word *Âtman* (or Self), in the scriptural statement—"Different (from the *vijñānamaya*) is the inner Self, the *Ânandamaya*"—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 5. 1.], is made to have its final meaning in (denoting) the *Ânandamaya* (or what consists of Bliss). Therefore, by means of (the use of) the word *Âtman* (or Self), it is definitely determined that the *Brahman* who is referred to in the very beginning (of this context) is the *Ânandamaya* (or what consists of Bliss)

It may again be said as follows:—After stating that "the *Brahman* is the tail and the support"—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 5. 1.], it (viz. the context here) points out, by means of this (*śloka*)—"Whoever knows the *Brahman* as non-existent, he becomes non-existent indeed; whoever knows the *Brahman* as existent, him, therefore, they know as existing." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 6. 1.], that the existence and non-existence

361. *Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.

of the self result (respectively) from the knowledge and the ignorance relating to the *Brahman*, but not from the knowledge and the ignorance relating to the *ānandamaya* (or what consists of bliss). Further it is not appropriate to have any doubt in relation to the knowledge of the existence and non-existence of such an *ānandamaya* as is known all the world over to consist of joy, pleasure, &c. Therefore this *śloka* (mentioned above) is not given in reference to the *Ānandamaya* (or what consists of Bliss). Accordingly the *Brahman* is other than the *Ānandamaya* (or what consists of bliss). But it is not (right to say) so. Just as, after making the statements—"This is the tail and the support."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.], "The earth is the tail and the support."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 2. 1.], "The *Atharvāngirases* (or the hymns revealed by the Atharvas and Angirases) are the tail and the support."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 3. 1.], "The *mahas* (or splendour) is the tail and the support.".—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 4. 1.],—the *ślokas* commencing with–"All the creatures are produced from food *(anna)*" —[*Taitt. Up.* II. 2. 1.], are all given in their respective contexts so as not to denote merely the tail, but so as to denote the (whole) body which is made up of food, &c.; so also, here too, this *śloka* which says—"He becomes non-existent indeed, &c."—relates to the *Ānandamaya*, but does not relate to the tail which is different from the *Ānandamaya*. Even when the *Ānandamaya* is itself taken to be the *Brahman*, it is certainly appropriate to have the doubt regarding the existence and non-existence of that bliss which is (in itself) undefinable but is (merely) described as consisting of joy, pleasure, &c. The unknowability of that *Brahman* also who is spoken of as the tail is altogether due to (His) consisting of undefinable bliss. If it be said that the *Ānandamaya* is not the *Brahman*, because

the *Brahman* does not possess the head and other such constituent parts; it is replied that the tail also cannot be the *Brahman*, because the *Brahman* does not possess the nature of being a tail, and (does not also possess) the nature of being a support. It may (here) be said, however, that the expression—'the tail and the support' is a merely indicatory description of the *Brahman*, in as much as He forms the basis of that thing which is illusorily caused by ignorance (or *avidyā*). Then, indeed, to possess joy as the head, and other things as other parts (of the body) will (also) form an indicatory description of that *Brahman* who is different from pain and consists of bliss. The result is this :—In the passage—"The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.], He is declared to be different from all things which are other than Himself, which are subject to modification, and which are non-intelligent and definable ; and the statement that He is *Ānandamaya* teaches that He is different (also) from pain. And for this reason the affix *mayaṭ* found in (the word) *Ānandamaya*, which relates to the *Brahman* who is indivisible and wholly consists of uniform bliss, has to be understood to denote the same thing as the word to which it is affixed (viz. the word *Ānanda*), in the same way in which (that affix has to be understood) in the word *prāṇamaya*. The individual self, who is differentiated into the varied and wonderful divisions manufactured by ignorance (or *avidyā*) and consisting of gods and other such (embodied) beings,—has such an essential nature as is indivisible and homogeneous and forms the only seat of pleasure ; and he is accordingly called *Ānandamaya* (or that which consists of bliss). Consequently this *Ānandamaya* is the subjective self.

If it be so argued, we say in reply—"That which is denoted by the word *Ānandamaya* (is the *Brahman*), because there is, (in the context), the repetition (of various grades of bliss which culminate in the *Ānandamaya* or the Highest Bliss)." [*Ved. Sūt.* I. 1. 13.]. The *Ānandamaya* (or That which consists of Bliss) is the Highest Self. Why? Because there is a (graded) **repetition** (of bliss). In the passage beginning with—"Now this is an investigation into bliss."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 8. 1.] and ending with—"From Whom speech returns, &c."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 9. 1.],—bliss is continuously repeated, in an order in which each succeeding (bliss) is a hundredfold of the bliss (preceding it), so as to reach that (bliss) which forms the summit of an unsurpassable condition. This (last bliss) is not possible to the individual self who is capable of enjoying (only) a small and limited amount of pleasure which is mixed with endless miseries; and it (viz. this bliss), in consequence, denotes, as forming its abode, the Highest Self Himself who is hostile to all that is evil, who is the only seat of all auspicious qualities and is quite distinct from all other things (than Himself). Accordingly, the following passage says—"Different from this which consists of understanding (or the *vijñānamaya*) is the (still) inner Self, the *Ānandamaya* (or That which consists of Bliss)." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 5. 1.]. The *vijñānamaya* (or that which consists of understanding or knowledge) is, indeed, the individual self, and not merely the intellect; because, by means of the affix *mayaṭ*, a distinction is implied (between *vijñāna* and *vijñānamaya*). But, in the case of the word *prāṇamaya*, it is accepted as a matter of necessity that that (affix *mayaṭ*) imports the same thing (as the word *prāṇa* to which it is affixed). Here (in *vijñānamaya*) however, in as much as it is possible for the individual self to possess

it (*i. e. vijñāna*, or understanding), it is not right to make that (affix *mayaṭ*) meaningless. We have already mentioned that the individual self, in the bound and released conditions, is nothing other than the knower. And it will be stated presently[362] how, in the case of the (word) *prāṇamaya* and others, the affix *mayaṭ* is capable of being (fully) significant. It may be asked, how, if such be the case, the use of the word *vijñāna* itself (to denote the individual self) is appropriate in the *śloka* which, beginning with—"The *vijñāna* performs the sacrifice."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 5. 1.], relates to the *vijñānamaya* (or that which consists of understanding). It is nothing wrong to speak of *vijñāna* (or understanding) as constituting the essential nature of the individual self who is none other than the knower; because he possesses self-luminosity, and because also the essential nature of the knower (too) has to be described only by means of (his) knowledge. Indeed those words, which denote such attributes as are descriptive of the essential nature of things, import, by means of (those same) attributes, the essential nature also of that thing which is the possessor of those attributes; like *ox* and other words (which by means of the general attributes they denote import also the essential nature of the thing to which they belong). Or, in accordance with the (grammatical) aphorism—"The *kṛtya* affix[363] *lyuṭ* has more than one significance."—[*Pāṇini.* III. 3. 113.], it has to be accepted that, (in the case of the root *jñā*, to know, associated with the suffix *vi*), the affix *lyuṭ* denotes the agent. Or, accepting that it (viz. the root *jñā* to know) belongs to the group of roots commencing with *nand* (to please), the affix *lyur* has to be understood,

362. See under aphorism 14 *infra.*

363. The *Kṛtya* affix *Lyuṭ* (*i. e. Ana*) may denote the agent or the object or impersonal activity.

(in the case of the root *jnā* to know), to denote the agent, in accordance with the (grammatical) aphorism, which begins with (the group of roots commencing with) *nand*, (to please), and (the group of roots commencing with) *grah*, (to seize), and which prescribes (the affixes) *lyur*, &c., (to those respective groups of roots). [*Pāṇini*. III. 1. 134.].[364] And it is for this very reason that it is declared in the scriptural passage—"The *vijñāna* performs the sacrifice, and it also performs the *karmas*." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 5. 1.],—that the *vijñāna* possesses the quality of being the agent in performing sacrifices, &c. Indeed it is not possible for the mere intellect to possess the quality of being an agent. As a matter of fact, in relation to what is made up of food (*i. e.* the *annamaya*), as also in relation to other (similar) things which are all non-intelligent, which are all serviceable to intelligent beings, and which are all mentioned before the *vijñānamaya* (is mentioned in the context), there is no declaration of that quality of agentship which forms (exclusively) the attribute of intelligent beings. For the same reason, the scriptural passage—"(He *i. e.* the Supreme Person became) the intelligent thing and the non-intelligent thing."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 6. 1.] —separately points out the intelligent thing (or the individual self) and the non-intelligent thing (or matter) by means of their characteristic peculiarities of having a home and of being homeless (respectively); and accordingly this (passage) indicates by means of the word

364. That is to say, the affix *Lyur* is to be applied to the group of roots beginning with *Nand* to please; the affix *ṇini* is to be applied to the group of roots beginning with *Grah* to seize; and the affix *Ach* is to be applied to the group of roots beginning with *Pach* to cook. By the application of these several affixes nouns signifying agents are derived from these several roots.

vijñāna (*i. e.* knowledge or understanding) the intelligent being who possesses that (*vijñāna*) as his characteristic quality. Accordingly, in the *Brāhmaṇa* [365] which relates to Him who is the Internal Ruler of all, the Mādhyandinas—who mention the alternative passage which is to the effect—"He who, dwelling in the self, &c." —[*Mādh. Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 22.], in the place of that passage which is stated in other words, in the recension of the Kāṇvas to the effect—"He who, dwelling in knowledge (or understanding), &c."—[*Kāṇ. Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 22.],—make it clear that what is denoted by the word *vijñāna* (or understanding), as contained in the recension of the Kāṇvas, is (nothing other than) the individual self. The neuter gender used in the case of the word *vijñāna* denotes that it is intended to point it out as a thing. Therefore the *Ānandamaya* (or That which consists of Bliss) is accordingly different from the individual self consisting of intelligence, and is the Highest Self who exists within that (individual self). Although, in the *śloka*—"The *vijñāna* performs the sacrifice, &c."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 5. 1.], mere knowledge alone is mentioned but not the knower; nevertheless, by means of the statement—"Different (from the *manomaya*) is this inner self, the *vijñānamaya* (or that which consists of knowledge)."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 4. 1.],—it is the knower himself who possesses that (*vijñāna* or knowledge) that is taught (to be the individual self). For example, although merely the food is mentioned, in the following *śloka*, namely,—"All creatures are produced from food, &c."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 2. 1.]; nevertheless, in this (other) passage, namely,—"This same embodied person (*purusha*)

365. This is the seventh *Brāhmaṇa* of the third chapter of the *Bṛihadāraṇyaka-Upanishad.*

is thus what is made up of the essence of food."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.], it is not merely the food that is pointed out; but, on the other hand, (what is pointed out) is that which is made up of that (food), that is, what is a modification thereof. Bearing all this in mind, the *Sūtrakāra* himself says (almost) immediately afterwards, (that the *Ānandamaya* is different from the individual self)—"Because (also), there is, (in the context), the declaration of difference (between the individual self and the *Brahman*)." [*Ved. Sūt.* I. 1. 18.].

It has been stated (by the *Pūrvapakshin*) to the effect that what forms the cause of the world is also none other than what possesses the essential nature of the individual self, on the ground that He who is mentioned to be the cause of the world is (again) pointed out by being grammatically equated with the individual self in the scriptural passages—"Entering along with this individual self which is (also) the same as Myself, &c."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 3. 2.], and—"That thou art"—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 7.]; and (it has also been stated) that, bearing this in mind, that essential nature of the individual self itself, which, at starting, is referred to in the passage—"He who knows the *Brahman* attains the Highest."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.], is taught to be the *Ānandamaya* (or that which consists of bliss) owing to its being distinct from pain. This is not right; because, although the individual self possesses the nature of an intelligent being, it is not possible for it to be associated with that varied and wonderful act of creation which is invariably preceded by his own volition (as forming the cause thereof), in accordance with the passage—"It thought—'May I become manifold and be born'; It created *tejas*." [*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 3.]. Under the aphorisms—"Except in the matter of the activ-

ity relating to (the creation, &c., of) the world"—[*Ved. Sût.* IV. 4. 17.],—and—"And on account of the characteristic of equality (between the individual self and the Supreme Self) being solely confined to (the item of) enjoyment"—[*Ved. Sût.* IV. 4. 21.],—it will be established that, even when he (the individual self) is in the pure and free condition (of release), he cannot have the activity relating to (the creation, &c., of) the world. If it be asked, how, when the *Brahman* who is the cause of the world, is not admitted to possess the same essential nature as the individual self, the grammatical equation in the statements—"(Entering along) with this individual self which is (also) the same as Myself"—[*Chhând. Up.* VI. 3. 2.],—and—"That thou art."—[*Chhând. Up.* VI. 8. 7.],— would be appropriate; it is asked in reply, how the *Brahman*—who is devoid of even the smallest taint of all that is evil, who wills the truth, who is omniscient and omnipotent, who possesses the whole collection of innumerable auspicious qualities unsurpassed in excellence, and who is the cause of all things,—can acquire that essential nature of the individual self which is full of thinking and blinking, and (full) of all other similar activities resulting from the *karma* which is the abode of endless and varied miseries. If it be said that it (viz. the grammatical equation) becomes appropriate when either of the two (equated things) is taken to be false, it is asked—Pray, to which (does that falsity belong)? Does it belong to that (individual self) which is associated with evil, or to that (Supreme Self) the essential nature whereof is hostile to evil and forms the only abode of all auspicious qualities? If it be said that the *Brahman*, who is hostile to evil and forms the only abode of auspicious qualities, constitutes the basis of the beginningless ignorance (or *avidyâ*), and thus appears falsely to be associated with

evil, and that this (apparent association with evil) is false in nature; then it amounts to making a self-contradictory statement to the effect that the *Brahman* is hostile to evil and forms the only abode of auspicious qualities, and becomes, (at the same time), owing to His forming the basis of the beginningless ignorance (or *avidyā*) the abode of such false appearances as give rise to endless miseries. Indeed to be associated with evil is nothing other than to be the basis of ignorance (or *avidyā*), and to be also the abode of such false appearances as lead to the miseries resulting from that (*avidyā*). To be associated with them (viz. with *avidyā* or ignorance and its effects) and to be hostile to them are certainly contradictory of each other. In spite of this being so, do not say that there is no contradiction, for the reason that that (association with *avidyā* or ignorance and its results) is of a false nature. Whatever is of a false nature,—that certainly constitutes a wrong aim of life; and you yourself say that (the study of) the whole of the *Vedānta* is commenced for the destruction of that (wrong aim). And the association, with such a wrong aim of life as deserves to be set at naught, is undoubtedly contradicted by that nature (of the *Brahman*) which is hostile to evil and forms the only abode of (all) auspicious qualities. It may be said—What shall we do? The proposition that, by knowing one thing, all things become known has been enunciated in the passage—"(Did you ask for that teaching) by which what is not heard becomes heard?" [*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 1. 3.]; and then, in the passage beginning with—"Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning"—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 1.], it has been declared that the *Brahman* is the only cause of all the worlds; and in the passage—"It thought—'May I become manifold?'"—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 3.], (it has been declared) that He possesses

the quality of willing the truth; and afterwards, by means of the grammatical equation, contained in the passage—"That thou art"—[*Chhând. Up.* VI. 8. 7], it has been predicated in relation to that same *Brahman* that 'That' is one with the individual self who is the abode of endless miseries: and now, because this (oneness) is incapable of being otherwise explained, it has to be assumed that the *Brahman* Himself is the basis of ignorance (or *avidyâ*) and of other such things. If it be so said, it is replied that what is inappropriate and opposed to reason should not be assumed even for the purpose of making the scripture appropriate. Then again it may be said that (His) association with evil is indeed a reality, but (His) possessing the character of being the only abode of (all) auspicious qualities is of the nature of an unreality. Then this *śâstra*, which has been promulgated with the object of saving such intelligent beings (or individual souls) as are tormented by the three[366] miseries, saves them well enough indeed by teaching them that, in relation to Him (viz. the *Brahman*), the torment of the three miseries is alone real while (His) character of pure and unmixed auspiciousness is superimposed by illusion!! And again with the desire of avoiding this erroneous conclusion it may be said, regarding the *Brahman*,—that His possessing the character of the individual self and of one who is misery-stricken, &c., which are all different from His essential nature of pure and attributeless Intelligence, must be assumed to be false;—and that similarly His possessing the quality of willing the truth, His being the abode of auspicious qualities, His being the cause of the world, and His other such qualities also (have all to be assumed to be false). If you

366. Vide *supra* n. 12.

say so, how wonderful must be your skill in thinking out the meanings of sentences! The proposition that, by knowing one thing, all things become known, cannot at all hold good, when all things are taken to be unreal, in as much as all the things that have to be known will then be non-existent. If, in the way in which the knowledge in relation to the one thing is real, the knowledge relating to all things also is equally real and is included in that (knowledge relating to that one thing),—then indeed, it is possible to say that, by knowing that (one thing), all things become known. As a matter of fact, by knowing the really existent mother-of-pearl, the silver that is superimposed upon that (mother-of-pearl) and is unreal does not become known. It may be again said that the meaning of the proposition that, by knowing one thing, all things become known is this:—that thing which is attributeless is alone real and all else is unreal. Then surely it would not have been declared in the scripture thus:—"(Did you ask for that teaching) by which what is not heard becomes heard, what is not thought becomes thought, what is not known becomes known?"[367] [*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 1. 3.]. The meaning of this passage is indeed this:—when that one thing is heard, all that which was unheard becomes also heard. If the real existence of that one thing alone, which is attributeless and is defined to be the cause of the world, had been enunciated in the proposition, then the illustrative example given to the effect—"Just as, my dear child, by one lump of clay, all that is made of clay becomes known"—(*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 1. 4.),—would also have been found to

367. But it would have been declared to the effect—"Did you ask for that teaching by which all things are (taught) to be of a false nature, or by which all things become stultified."

be inappropriate. Indeed what is illustrated (here) is that, by knowing the lump of clay, all the modifications of that (clay) become known. It may be said that here (*i.e.* in this illustration) the unreality of the modifications is also implied. But then the unreality of these modifications of clay could not have been such a conclusively proved thing to the pupil[368] (Śvetaketu), as the (illusorily perceived) snake in the rope and other (such falsely perceived) objects (would have been). Accordingly, to illustrate the import of the proposition enunciated, it could not have been appropriate to introduce, as if they had been well known, the examples beginning with—"Just as, my dear child, &c."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 1. 4. 5 & 6.].[369]

Moreover it cannot be said that, previous to the genesis of the knowledge produced by the scriptural passage—"That thou art."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 8. 7.]—and by other similar passages, we have any such criterion of truth, either with or without the support of logic, as gives rise to the knowledge of that unreality which is associated with all modifications. This subject will be dealt with under the aphorism —"(The world) is not different from that (*Brahman*), because (it is so made out) from the (group of) passages having the word 'beginning' at their commencement." [*Ved. Sūt.* II. 1. 15.]. Accordingly there are the following and other similar passages:—"Existence alone, my dear child, this was

368. Literally, one who is desirous of 'hearing' *i. e.* of learning.

369. These are three illustrations given in *Chhānd. Up.* VI. 1. 4 5 & 6., and are to the following effect:—Just as, by knowing one lump of clay, all that is made of clay is known; just as, by knowing one nugget of gold, all that is made of gold is known; and just as, by knowing one pair of (iron) nail-scissors, all that is made of iron is known: exactly similarly by knowing the One Existence, namely, the *Brahman*, all that is evolved out of Him becomes known.

in the beginning, one only, without a second."—[Chhānd. Up. VI 2. 1.]; "It thought—'May I become manifold and be born.' It created tejas."—[Chhānd. Up. VI. 2. 3.]; "Indeed, entering these three deities along with this individual self which is (also) the same as Myself, I evolve the differentiations of name and form."—[Chhānd. Up. VI. 3. 2.]; "All these things which are born, my dear one, have their origin in the *Sat* (*i. e.* in the One Existence), have their abode in the *Sat*, and are established in the *Sat*."—[Chhānd. Up. VI. 8. 4 & 6.]; "All this has That for its Self."—[Chhānd. Up. VI. 8. 7.]. And by means of these, innumerable characteristic attributes (in relation to the *Brahman*),—such as are capable of being made out solely by means of the *śāstras*,—are predicated; and (those predications) are the following and others:—This world has the *Sat* (or the *Brahman*) for its Self; before the time of creation it is destitute of the differentiation of names and forms; in the matter of creating the world the *Brahman*, who is denoted by the word *Sat* (*or Existence*), does not stand in need of any cause other than Himself; He is at the time of creation possessed of that characteristic volition which is peculiar to none other than Himself and is to the effect—"I will myself become manifold in the form of endless immovable and movable things"; in accordance with His volition, creation is characterised by a peculiarly well defined arrangement of endless and wonderful entities; the differentiation of endless names and forms results from the entrance of the individual self, which has (the *Brahman*) Himself for its Self, into all the non-intelligent things; and all things other than (the *Brahman*) Himself have Himself for their basis, have Himself for their abode, are capable of activity through Himself, live by none other than Himself, and are established in Himself. In other con-

texts also such qualities as are all incapable of being made out by all other means of proof (than the *śāstras*) are in a thousand ways declared to be found in association with Him ; and they are, among others, the quality of being devoid of all that is evil so as to be wholly free from sin and of such other evil things, the quality of omniscience, the quality of being the Lord of all, the quality of desiring the truth and the quality of willing the truth, the quality of possessing that unsurpassed bliss which forms the cause of the bliss that belongs to all (others). (In the passage 'That thou art'), the word 'That' points out the *Brahman*, who forms the subject of the context and is characterised by endless attributes, which are (all), in this manner, not within the province of any other means of proof (than the scripture); and to say that that (word) is intended to teach only that thing which is devoid of attributes is to talk incoherently like a mad man ; because it is (so very) inappropriate (to say so). And the word 'thou' denotes the individual self who is associated with the condition of being in *samsāra* (or the circuit of mundane existence). If this (word) also be intended to denote that (thing) the essential nature of which is free from all attributes, then its own real signification would have to be given up. Moreover it has been already[370] pointed out that concealment by ignorance (or *avidyā*) is indeed not possible in relation to that thing which is, by nature, attributeless and luminous ; the reason is that, (if it were possible), it would lead to the destruction of the essential nature (of that thing) itself and to other such (inconsistencies). Again in such a case, in regard to both the words 'That' and 'thou' which are found in the grammatical equation ('That thou art)', their main

370. Vide *supra* p. 161.

and natural significance has to be given up, and in consequence a figurative significance (in relation to both of them) has necessarily to be accepted.

Further, it may be said thus :—The (words) which are found in a grammatical equation are not at all capable of importing (any) thing which has the character of a special attribute, because they are all intended to denote only one thing. And solely from this there results the negation of attributes which gives rise to the denotation of the oneness of the thing itself. Therefore there is no room for any figurative interpretation (here). For example, in the instance—"The lily is blue"—the two words (*blue* and *lily*) are intended to point out the oneness of that thing which is characterised (by what they denote); and therefore the quality of being a lily and (the quality) of being blue are not both meant to be spoken of (here). If they were (so) meant to be spoken of, then, indeed, there would result the denotation of the oneness of that form which is characterised by the quality of being a lily, with that (other) form which is characterised by the quality of being blue. But this cannot be. Indeed that (one) thing (which is imported by the grammatical equation) is not characterised by (what is signified by) the word *lily*, which is (itself) in the form of what is characterised by blueness; because there would (otherwise) be room for the relation of reciprocal inherence[371] between a class and a quality. Therefore what is denoted by the grammatical equation (here) is merely the oneness of that thing which is (at once) characterised by the quality of being blue and the quality of being a lily. For example, in the instance,—

371. The class would have to be inherent in the quality and the quality in the class. As a matter of fact, it is the quality that is inherent in the class.

'This is that Devadatta'—it is not possible for the grammatical equation to denote that a person, who was in association with a past time and a far off place, is existing in that very same condition in association with a near place and the present time; accordingly, what is denoted by the grammatical equation (here) is merely the oneness of that essential nature (of the person) which is characterised by (its) association with both (those) times and both (those) places. Although that quality, which is made out at the time of hearing a single word such as 'blue' or any other, is not, on account of contradiction, denoted (by that word) at the time when it is grammatically equated (with any other word or words); nevertheless, as it denotes a main part of the thing which is intended to be denoted (by the grammatical equation), there is no figurative significance (in relation to it). On the other hand there is merely a desire not to mention (any) thing which constitutes a quality (of that one thing which forms the import of the equation). This indeed is the nature of a grammatical equation in all cases. Therefore there is nothing wrong (here).

This aforesaid (argument) is of no value. Indeed in all sentences what is to be understood is merely those particular relations which are found between the things imported by the words (in those sentences), and which have arisen in accordance with the proper process of making out the meanings of words. Even when they are used in a grammatical equation, words like 'blue', &c., denote the thing which is characterised by blueness, &c., as established in accordance with the proper process of making out the meanings of words; and (they denote that thing) in its relation with the (other) things denoted by the other words (therein). For instance, when it is said—

'Bring the blue lily,'—what is brought is a thing which is characterised by blueness, &c. Again, when it is said—"A herd of elephants, which is excited with ruttishness (*madamudita*), exists in the Vindhya forest (or *Vindhyāṭavi*),"—what is pointed out is only that thing which is characterised by the attributes denoted by the two words (*madamudita* and *Vindhyāṭavi*). In the same manner, in *Vedāntic* passages also wherein grammatical equations are mentioned, what is to be understood is that *Brahman* who is undoubtedly characterised by all (those) particular attributes (which are denoted by the various words in those grammatical equations). Moreover, when it is desired to mention an attribute (as qualifying a thing), it is not that a thing, which has a form already characterised by some attributes, is (again) to be characterised by some (other) attributes; but, on the other hand, the essential nature (of that one thing itself) is to be characterised by all the attributes. Accordingly—"A grammatical equation (between words) means that words having a variety of significations are used so as to import only one thing."[372] The function of a grammatical equation is to predicate, (in relation to a thing), either affirmatively or negatively, by means of certain words that that same thing which has already a particular form denoted by some words is also possessed of a certain other form: as, in the instance—"Devadatta is brown, youthful, and red-eyed, without mental weakness, without money, and without fault." And where, by the words of a grammatical equation, any two attributes are mentioned which are not capable of being consistently applied to one and the same thing, even there it has

372. Vide *supra* n. 75.

necessarily to be accepted that (only) one of the two words (signifying those attributes) can not have its main and natural significance, but not both of them; as in the instance,—"The man of the *Vāhika* country is a *go*[373] (or a brute)." In the instance—'The lily is blue'—and in others like it, there is no contradiction of the co-existence of two attributes (in one and the same thing); and hence what is denoted (there) is only one thing as characterised by two attributes.

Again you may hold as follows:—What is pointed out as being correlated to (any) one particular attribute is distinct in nature from what is correlated to some other attribute. Accordingly, even though (the words in a grammatical equation) are found in the same grammatical case, it is not (thereby) possible for them to import oneness (in regard to the thing they denote), as (it is not possible) in the case, for instance, of (the words) *pot* and *cloth*. Therefore (the words in a grammatical equation) are not capable of denoting (only) one thing as characterised by many attributes. On the other hand, it is the essential nature (of a certain thing) that is first explained by means of the attributes (denoted by the words in the grammatical equation); and it is subsequently (to this) that they (viz. those words) become capable of denoting the oneness of that (thing).

It may be so, provided (only) that the mere correlation (of a thing) to two attributes is opposed to the oneness (of that thing). This, however, is not seen to be the case. Indeed, what stands in the way of the oneness (of

373. The original here is *Gaurvāhikaḥ*, and the word *Vāhika* is also interpreted to mean the person who is outside the pale of *Vedic* religion. What is to be noted in this illustration is that the word *go* instead of meaning an ox as usual means a senseless brute.

a thing) is only the association (of that thing) with two such attributes, as are not capable of meeting together in one and the same thing that is to be characterised by (those) attributes. And (such) incapability (of meeting together in one and the same thing) is, in the case of the characteristics of the pot and those of the cloth, established by other means of proof. But, in the instance—'The lily is blue'—and in others like it, no such contradiction is perceived; in the same way in which no contradiction is perceived in the case where the attribute of owning a stick and the attribute of wearing an ear-ring (are both found in association with one and the same person), and also in the case where the attribute of having a form, the attribute of having a taste, the attribute of possessing a smell, &c., (are found in association with one and the same thing). It is not merely that there is no (such) contradiction whatsoever: but the association (of a thing) with two attributes (denoted by two words in a grammatical equation) certainly proves (also) that a grammatical equation has the power of importing a single thing through the difference in the significations (of the words used therein). Otherwise, there would be no reason to use more than one word to indicate merely the oneness of the essential nature (of a thing); and thus there would be no grammatical equation at all. If, irrespective of their own relation (to themselves and to the thing they qualify), the attributes (denoted by the words in a grammatical equation) be taken to denote only the accidental characteristic of the essential nature (of that thing),—then, that thing would be sufficiently well marked out by only one (such accidental attribute); and, in consequence, all other accidental attributes would certainly become meaningless. If another form, characterised by (these) other accidental attributes, be admitted (in rela-

tion to the essential nature of that thing), then, there would be room for saying that it (*i. e.* that essential nature) is a qualified thing. Again in the instance—'This is that Devadatta', there is not even the slightest room for (any) figurative (or secondary) interpretation; because there is no contradiction (to be thereby got over), in as much as that thing, which at a past time was in association with a particular far off place, may, without any contradiction, exist at the present time in association with a near place. Indeed it is by means of this very reason that those who maintain[374] the perdurability of external objects prove through the recognitive cognition—'This is that person', that a thing which has been in association with two different periods (or points) of time is (really) one and the same. Otherwise, there would be a contradiction between the (same) perceptions (belonging to different times), and all things would in consequence acquire the character of being transient in existence. And the contradiction resulting from the association (of one and the same thing) with two different places is, however, invalidated by the difference in time.

For whatever reason the words used in a grammatical equation possess the power of denoting a single thing which is characterised by many attributes,—for that very same reason, the exchange (in return for the *soma*) of the heifer, which is one year old and is characterised by redness, &c., is enjoined as the thing that has to be done under the commandment—"With the red, tawney-eyed heifer, one year old, let him purchase the *soma* plant." [*Taitt. Samh.* VI. 1. 6. 7.]. And it is accordingly stated thus:—

374. As against the *Saugatas* or Buddhists who maintain that all external things are transitory.

"Because the substance (heifer) and the quality (redness) are associated with one and the same action (of buying in the above passage), there is the binding rule that they shall together denote one and the same thing." [*Pūr. Mīm.* III 1. 12.]. The *pūrvapakshin* (or the objector) here is of the following opinion:—No doubt, the word 'red' denotes the quality of redness which is contained in substances, for the reason that quality also, like genus (or *jāti*) possesses the singular character of being a mode of substances. Nevertheless, in relation to the redness (here), there is no rule compelling its invariable association with the one year old heifer; because it is not possible, (in one commandment), to enjoin two things to the effect—"Let him purchase with the one year old heifer, and let that (purchase) be made in exchange for a red one." And for this reason, the sentence is to be broken up where the word *aruṇayā* (*i. e. red*) occurs, so as surely to denote without distinction that redness which is contained in all the things mentioned in the context as necessary (for the sacrifice). The use of the feminine gender in connection with the word 'red' is intended to denote (in a general way all) the things which are mentioned as necessary in the context and which are of all genders. Therefore, in relation to the redness (here), there is no rule compelling its invariable association with the one year old heifer. In reply to this it is stated as follows:—"Because the substance (heifer) and the quality (redness) are associated with one and the same action (of buying), there is the binding rule that they shall together denote one and the same thing." [*Pūr. Mīm.* III. 1. 12.]. By means of the grammatical equation (in the passage above quoted), the words *aruṇayā* and *ekahāyanyā*, which (respectively) denote the thing that is characterised by redness and the

thing that is only one year old, are made out to import one and the same thing; and this being the case, the thing heifer which is one year old and the quality of redness are (both) declared by that very word *aruṇayâ* to be related to each other in the form of the qualified and the qualifier; and there is nothing opposed to reason in their being (thus) associated together in relation to one and the same action of buying; consequently, it is unavoidably necessary for redness to be associated with the one year old heifer which forms the means for the purchase (of the *soma* plant). If, like the association of the act of buying with the one year old heifer, the association of redness also (with it) is to be definitely made out by means of the (mandatory) sentence itself, then the (one) sentence will have to be construed as having two meanings. But this is not found to be the case. By means of the word 'red' (*aruṇayâ*) itself, the thing which is characterised by redness is expressed; what is made out by its being grammatically equated with the word *ekahâyanyâ* (*i. e.* the one year old heifer) is merely the fact that that thing is the one year old heifer; and its association with this quality is not (what is so made out). Indeed, a grammatical equation imports nothing other than the oneness of that thing which is characterised by (many) attributes. The definition of a grammatical equation is surely as follows —"A grammatical equation[375] (between words) means that words having a variety of significations are used so as to import only one thing." It is certainly thus that the statement—'The cloth is red'—and other such statements constitute (each) a single sentence owing to (the words in them) importing only one thing. Indeed

375. Vide *supra* n. 75.

(here) the function of this sentence consists in (denoting) the association of the cloth with the predication expressed by the verb 'to be'. But its association with the red colour is expressed merely by the word *red*. What is definitely made out by the grammatical equation is only this much,—that the cloth is that substance which is associated with the red colour. Thus it is nothing wrong to say —that, (in any particular sentence forming a grammatical equation), a thing which is characterised by one attribute, or two attributes, or many attributes is denoted by certain particular words used in agreement either with the *kāraka* case-affixes[376] or with the nominative case-affix; and that it is made out by means of the grammatical equation that the thing so characterised by all the attributes is only one; and that this one thing is associated with the action denoted by the verb (forming the predicate of the sentence). (To illustrate this) there are the following instances:—"Devadatta is brown, youthful, red-eyed, possesses a stick, and wears an ear-ring"—"Let him make the curtain by means of the white cloth"—"Bring

376. The word *Kāraka* expresses the relation of a noun to the verb in a sentence. There are six such relations according to Pāṇini, viz. (1). *Karman*, the object or the idea expressed by the accusative case; (2). *Karaṇa*, the instrument or the idea expressed by the instrumental case; (3). *Kartṛi*, the agent expressed by the instrumental case; if not expressed by the instrumental case, it is not considered a *Kāraka* when expressed by the nominative case; the agent and the instrument are both capable of being expressed by the instrumental case; (4) *Sampradāna*, the recipient of the object of a gift; this is the idea expressed by the dative case; (5) *Apādāna*, ablation *i.e.* the departure or removal of a thing from a fixed point; this is the idea expressed by the ablative case; and (6) *Adhikaraṇa*, location or the place of action,; this is the idea expressed by the locative case. The genitive or possessive case is not considered a *Kāraka*, because it expresses the relation between two nouns but not the relation between a noun and a verb.

the lily which is blue"—"Bring the blue lily"—"Bring the cow which is white and which possesses beautiful eyes"—"Let him offer the sacrificial cake of rice (*puroḍāśa*) in eight clay cups to Agni who shows the way." [*Taitt. Samh.* II. 2. 2. 1.].[377] And the same is the case with the scriptural passage—"With the red, tawney-eyed heifer, one year old, let him purchase the *soma* plant." [*Taitt. Samh.* VI. 1. 6. 7.] What is said is this:—Just as, when it is said—"Let him cook the rice in a vessel by means of fire-sticks,"—one single action denoted by the verb is made out to be simultaneously associated with different words which are in more than one *kāraka* case,—so also, at the very time when any particular *kāraka* relation is made out (in a grammatical equation), every such *kāraka* relation as is mentioned in the group of words forming the grammatical equation is perceived to be characterised by many attributes at once: and thus it is that each (such relation) agrees with the verb. In this there is nothing opposed to reason, and there are the following and other similar instances (to show it):—"Let the clever cook cook the food prepared with milk, in a proper-sized vessel, by means of dry fire-sticks got out of the *khadira* tree (*Acacia Catechu*).

What has been (by implication) stated to the effect that a word, which denotes a quality and is used in a sentence in which a substance has been already mentioned, denotes merely a quality, and that therefore the word 'red' (*aruṇayā*) in the sentence (given above) denotes nothing other than a mere quality,—that is not appropriate; because it is not anywhere seen, either in popular usage or in the *Vedas*, that a word, which denotes a quality and is

377. Vide also *Ait. Br.* VII. 8.

grammatically equated with (another) word denoting a substance, imports merely a quality. It is even wrong to say that a word, which denotes a quality and exists in a sentence in which a substance has been already mentioned, denotes merely a quality; because, in the instance—"The cloth is white"—and in others like it, although a substance is made mention of, what is denoted (by the sentence) is nothing other than a substance which is characterised by a quality. In the following instance, namely, "The white..... belonging to the cloth",[378] the non-apprehension of the cloth which is characterised by whiteness is due to the mention of the words in dissimilar grammatical cases; but is not at all due to a substance having been already mentioned (in the sentence). Adopting that same instance, we may speak of—'The white part belonging to the cloth', —or some such thing. In this case, the words (*śukla i. e. white* and *bhāga i. e. part*) are (both) used in the same grammatical case, and what is therefore apprehended is a substance which is characterised by whiteness.

What has been further stated to the effect that, since the purchase (of the *soma* plant) is completely concluded with the exchange of the one year old heifer, (its) redness has no necessary relation whatsoever to this transaction of purchase,—that also is inappropriate; because a word,—which denotes a quality (such as redness) and is found in a grammatical equation along with any other word denoting a substance that is not characterised by any quality opposed (to the quality already referred to),—expresses that

378. The Sanskrit equivalent of this as given in the original is as follows:—*Paṭasya śuklaḥ. Paṭasya* is the genitive of *paṭa* and so is in the genitive case, and *śuklaḥ* is in the nominative case. Thus there are two dissimilar grammatical cases here.

quality as abiding in that (substance); and hence there is nothing wrong in such a quality being associated with the action denoted by the verb (in the sentence). Moreover, it having been established by means of the foregoing argument that the quality of redness has, according to grammar, a certain relation to the substance (*i.e.* to the one year old heifer), the conclusion (of the *pûrvapakshin*) was accordingly given to the effect that, since substance and quality are not (separately) capable of serving as the means for purchasing (the *soma* plant), it is proved by implication that they are both mutually related to one another: that also is inappropriate. Therefore the meaning of this (*Pûrva-Mîmâmsâ* aphorism) is nothing other than what has been given above (by us).

Accordingly, in the grammatical equation—'That thou art' and in others like it, the teaching of oneness has to be brought out without giving up, even in the least, the qualifications denoted by both the words ('That' and 'thou'). But this is not possible for him who does not admit the Highest Self (or the *Brahman*) to be hostile to all that is evil, to form the only abode of all the innumerable auspicious qualities, and to be a separate Being from the intelligent individual soul, which is capable of existing both in the pure and in the impure condition and is subject to endless miseries superimposed by the beginningless ignorance (or *avidyâ*). Since it has to be accepted that the words used in a grammatical equation are intended to denote the oneness of that thing which is characterised by such attributes as are given (therein), it may be said that, even when one admits (the Highest Self as described above), the association with all those evils that belong to what is denoted by the word 'thou' will tend to affect the Highest Self. But it is replied that it is not (right to

say) so; because, by means of the word 'thou' also, it is the Highest Self alone that is denoted as forming the internal ruler of the individual selves.

What is said is this:—The Highest *Brahman*—who is denoted by the word *Sat* (or *Existence*), who is devoid of even the smallest taint of all that is evil, who possesses, together with the quality of willing the truth, the whole collection of innumerable auspicious qualities unsurpassed in excellence, and who forms the cause of all things,—willed to the effect—'May I become many'; then He created in order the whole world consisting of (the elements of) fire, water, earth, and of such other things; then, in that world existing in the form of the wonderful material configurations known as gods, &c., He caused the whole series of intelligent individual souls to enter into such material embodiments as were suited to their own respective *karmas* so that they might (severally) constitute the self (of those embodiments); then He Himself, wholly of His own accord, entered into the individual selves so as to form their internal Self; and then He introduced the differentiation of names and forms among the material embodiments which are known as gods, &c., and which, being of this nature, are composite and include Him also within themselves. The meaning is that He caused the composite mass, which is altogether of this nature, to assume the character of a thing and also to become capable of being denoted by words. In the passage—[379] "(Entering along) with this individual self which is (also) the same as Myself", the expression —'with this individual self which is also the same as Myself',—shows that the individual self has the *Brahman* for his Self. And it is made out that the individual self has

379. Vide *Chhānd. Up.* VI. 3. 2.

the *Brahman* for his Self for the reason that the *Brahman* has entered into this individual self so as to constitute his Self; because in the context in which the passage[380]—"He created all this, whatever there is. Having created it, He entered into that same thing. Having entered into it, He became the *sat* and the *tyat*."[381]—occurs, the two things, namely, the intelligent thing and the non-intelligent thing, which are denoted by the expression 'all this', are separately pointed out by means of the words *sat* and *tyat*, as also by means of the words *vijñâna* and *avijñâna*; and then the *Brahman* is spoken of as entering even into the intelligent thing (viz. the individual self). Therefore it has to be understood that, owing to the differentiation of names and forms having taken place in this manner, all significant words denote the Highest Self as associated with the non-intelligent thing (matter) and with the (intelligent) individual self.

Moreover, by means of the passage—"All this has That for its Self."—[*Chhând. Up.* VI. 8. 7.], the world which is associated with the intelligent things (or the individual selves) is (first) pointed out as 'all this', and then it is declared that He, (the Lord), is the Self thereof. And since the *Brahman* forms in this manner the Self of all the intelligent things and the non-intelligent things, the whole world together with all the intelligent individual selves forms His body. And to this effect there are these other scriptural passages:—"He, who has entered within, is the ruler of all things that are born, and (He) is

380. Vide *Taitt. Up.* II. 6. 1 The continuation of this passage is as follows:—"He became the *Nirukta* or the defined and the *Anirukta* or the undefined, the *Nilayana* or what has a home and the *Anilayana* or the home-less, the *Vijñâna* or the intelligent thing and the *Avijñâna* or the non-intelligent thing, &c."

381. Vide *supra* n. 185.

the Self of all."—[*Taitt. Ār.* III. 24.]; "He who, dwelling in the earth, is within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body is the earth, and who internally rules the earth,—He is thy internal ruler and immortal Self...... He who, dwelling in the self, is within the self, whom the self does not know, whose body is the self, and who internally rules the self,—He is thy internal ruler and immortal Self."—[*Mādh. Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 3 to 22.]; "He who is moving within the earth, whose body is the earth,......He who is moving within the waters, whose body is the waters..................He who is moving within the *akshara*, whose body is the *akshara*,[382] whom the *akshara* does not know.........He is the internal Self of all beings, He is devoid of all sins, He is the Divine Lord, He is the one Nārāyaṇa." [*Sub. Up.* VII. 1.]. These and other passages first point out that the whole world together with the intelligent individual selves constitutes His body, and then they teach that the Highest Self forms the Self of that (world). Therefore those words also, which denote the intelligent things (or the individual selves), denote the Highest Self alone who forms the Self also of the intelligent things and has these intelligent things for His body; in the same manner in which those words which denote the non-intelligent configurated material masses known as gods, &c., denote only those individual selves who have those particular masses of matter for their bodies. (To illustrate this) there are the following and other (examples)—"The four who perform the sacrifice known as the *pañchadaśarātra* acquire god-hood."[383] The meaning is that they become gods.

In the case of words which denote material embodi-

382. Vide *supra.* n. 185. 383. Vide Āp. Śr. XI. 2. 9.

ments, it is right (to say) that they also include in their import that which is the embodied; because a material embodiment possesses, in relation to the embodied, the character of being a mode (thereof); and because also those words which denote modes include in their import the things which are the possessors of those modes. Indeed what is meant by a mode is that aspect, which is made out to be of a particular nature, and which is in relation to the thing that is denoted, when it is said—"This thing is of this nature." That (mode) is necessarily dependent upon that thing; hence, the knowledge of that (mode) is necessarily dependent upon that (thing); consequently, it is proper (for that mode) to include (within its significance) that very thing. Accordingly, even the word which denotes that (mode) includes that (thing) in its import. It is for this very reason that *ox*, *horse*, *man*, and other such words, as are denotative of particular genera and are the modes of particular masses of matter, include in their import the masses of matter which are (respectively) characterised by (those) modes. And any such mass of matter, constituting the body of an intelligent individual soul, forms his mode. Similarly, even those intelligent individual souls, who have particular masses of matter for their bodies, form modes of the Highest Self. Therefore they (*i. e.* those words) finally include in their import the Highest Self Himself. Thus the Highest Self Himself is denoted by all words. And consequently the grammatical equation (of the word 'That'), with the word ('thou'), which (so) denotes the Highest Self, has certainly a primary and natural significance.

It may, however, be said (here) thus:—It is only such words as denote genera and qualities that are seen to be grammatically equated with words denoting substances;

as, in the instances,—'The ox is broken-horned',—'The candied sugar is white'. And in the case of such substances as form the modes of other substances, the affix having the force of *matup*[384] is seen to be applied to them (when they are used in grammatical equations); as in the instances of *daṇḍin* (or one who is the possessor of a stick) and *kuṇḍalin* (or one who is the wearer of an ear-ring). But it is not right to say so. Neither the genus, nor the quality, nor the substance, nor any single one of these can make a grammatical equation (fully) significant; because each of them may stray into the other. In the case of a thing which can exist as the mode of another thing, the existence, persistence, and realisation (of that thing) are invariably associated with this (other) thing. Hence the words which denote that (mode) possess the power of denoting the substance which is characterised by what is denoted by themselves. Consequently, it is certainly proper for them to be grammatically equated with the word which denotes that substance as characterised by an attribute different (from what they themselves denote). Where, on the other hand, it is desired that a substance, which is capable of being realised separately and exists in itself, should form, somewhere and at some time the mode of another substance,—there, the affix having the force of *matup* becomes applicable. Thus it (*i. e.* the position here maintained) is faultless.

Therefore the words 'I', 'thou', and others, which in themselves specially denote the individual self, signify the Highest Self Himself, owing to the individual selves also, who are associated with the non-intelligent thing (matter),

384. This affix has the sense of possession. The affix *ini* also has the same signification. This is the affix used in *Daṇḍin* and *Kuṇḍalin*.

forming a mode of that (Highest Self); the reason for this is that they thus constitute the body of the Highest Self. And this (view) is summed up in the grammatical equation —'That thou art'. Such being the case, in consequence of the individual self (thus) standing in the relation of the body to the Highest Self, those peculiar attributes which belong to the individual self do not affect the Highest Self; in the same way in which childhood, youth, and other such conditions, which are associated with one's own body, do not affect the individual self. Therefore, in the grammatical equation—'That thou art', the word 'That' denotes the Highest Self who is the cause of the world, who wills the truth, who is the abode of all auspicious qualities, who is devoid of even the smallest taint of all that is evil; and (the word) 'thou' also denotes that same (Supreme Self) as possessing for His body that embodied individual self. Accordingly, the grammatical equation ('That thou art') has a primary and natural significance; there is no contradiction of the context (wherein it occurs); there is no contradiction of any one of all the scriptural passages; and even the slightest taint of ignorance (or *avidyâ*) and of other evils does not become possible in relation to the *Brahman* who is free from impurity and forms the only abode of auspicious qualities. Since the fact of (the *Brahman*) being grammatically equated with the individual self also imports in this manner that He is different from the individual self who forms His attribute,—therefore the *Ânandamaya* (or He who consists of Bliss), who is the Highest Self, is different from the individual self who consists of knowledge (or understanding).

What has been stated above[385] to the effect that, in

385. Vide the objection-statement, *supra* pp. 347 & 348.

the statement—"This itself is the embodied Self of that (which consists of knowledge or understanding)"—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 5. 1.], the *ānandamaya* (or he who consists of bliss) is declared to be associated with a body, and that it is not thus possible for him to be other than the individual self;—that is not right: because, in this context, by means of the statement—"The embodied Self of this is the same as that of the former." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 3. 1. II. 4. 1. & II. 5. 1.], it is declared in each case that the Highest Self Himself is the embodied Self (of all). How? Because the Highest *Brahman* who is other than the individual self, and who, in accordance with the scriptural statement—"From that same Self, indeed, the spatial ether came into existence."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.], is known to be the supreme cause of the whole series of created objects such as the spatial ether and other things, is (Himself) taught to be the Self;—it is (therefore) made out that the spatial ether and other things including the *annamaya* (or what is made up of food), which are all different from Him, constitute His body. And by means of the following passage belonging to the *Subālopanishad*—"(He) whose body is the earth....whose body is the waters,....whose body is the fire....whose body is the air.....whose body is the spatial ether.... whose body is the *akshara*....whose body is *mṛityu* (*i.e. prakṛiti* or nature),....He is the internal Self of all beings, He is devoid of all sins, He is the Divine Lord, He is the One Nārāyaṇa." [*Sub. Up.* VII. 1.],—it is clearly stated that all the constituent principles of the universe form the body of the Highest Self. Therefore, in this very passage, namely,—"From that same Self, indeed, (the spatial ether came into existence)'—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.], what is made out is that the Highest Self Himself forms the embodied Self of the

annamaya (or what is made up of food). The context speaks of the *prāṇamaya* (or what consists of *prāṇa*) in the passage—"He who is (the embodied Self) of the former—He Himself is the embodied Self of this." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 3. 1.]. The meaning is that He who is the embodied Self of the *annamaya* mentioned before, and who forms the supreme cause (of the universe), as established by means of other scriptural passages, is Himself the Highest Self; it is He alone who is the embodied Self also of the *prāṇamaya* (or what is made up of *prāṇa*). In this manner it (viz. the context) has to be understood in the case of the *manomaya* (or what consists of mind) and the *vijñānamaya* (or what consists of knowledge). But in regard to the *Ānandamaya* (or that which consists of bliss), the indicative expression[386]—"He Himself"—[*Taitt. Up.* II.6.1.]—is given to show that He has none other for His Self. How is that? In the foregoing manner, it has been made out that the Highest Self Himself is the embodied Self of the *vijñānamaya* (or what consists of knowledge) also. This being the case, if it be said that He who is the embodied Self of the *vijñānamaya* (or what consists of knowledge) is Himself the embodied Self of the *Ānandamaya* (or what consists of bliss) also: then, the *Ānandamaya* who is made out by the repetition (of the word 'bliss'), to be the Supreme Self will Himself have to be understood as forming the Self of the Supreme Self. Accordingly the whole collection of intelligent and non-intelligent things which are different from Himself constitute His body. He alone is in consequence the unconditioned embodied Self. It is for this very

386. This expression is contained in the passage—"The embodied Self of this (which consists of bliss) is *He Himself* who is (the embodied Self) of the former (which consists of understanding)."

reason that this *śāstra* which is promulgated in relation to the Highest *Brahman* is called by worthy persons as the Science of the Embodied. Consequently the *Ānandamaya* who is the Highest Self is undoubtedly distinct from the individual self who consists of knowledge.

He (a *pūrvapakshin*) might say (here) as follows:—This *Ānandamaya* is not different from the individual self, because the affix *mayaṭ* which signifies modification is found to be used (here). The affix *mayaṭ* is taught to possess the significance of modification in the (grammatical) aphorism which (for the first time) introduces (its modificatory significance) by saying—"The affix *mayaṭ* also is used in these two (significations)"—[*Pāṇini.* IV. 3. 143.]; and (it is) also (taught) in the aphorism which is to the effect—"It (viz. the affix *mayaṭ*) is always used (in the sense of modification) after the words known as the *vṛiddhas* [387] and after the group of words beginning with *śara*." [*Pāṇini.* IV. 3. 144.]. And this word *Ānandamaya* is a *vṛiddha*. It may (again) be said (here) that the affix *mayaṭ* has also the power of signifying abundance, because it is taught (to have that signification) in the aphorism—"The affix *mayaṭ* is (to be employed) wherever the abundance of a thing has to be expressed." [*Pāṇini.* V. 4. 21.]; for example, where it is said—"The sacrifice is abundantly full of food (*annamaya*)"—that (affix *mayaṭ*) has this (signification) alone. It is, (however), not right

387. The definition of this word is given in *Pāṇini* I. 1. 73. That word the first vowel of which is subjected to the process known as *Vṛiddhi* (*i. e.* lengthening) is a *Vṛiddha*, as in the word *Ānanda* where the first vowel is a lengthened *a*.

to say so. It (viz. the affix *mayaṭ*) in *annamaya* is seen in the very beginning (of this context) to possess the significance of modification. Therefore, according to the propriety of interpretation suited to the context, it is right for this (affix *mayaṭ* in the word *Ānandamaya*) also to have nothing other than the signification of modification. Moreover, even if it (viz. the affix *mayaṭ*) have the signification of abundance (in *Ānandamaya*), the character of being other than the individual self cannot result to that (*Ānandamaya*). Thus, when it is said that one is abundantly full of bliss, it is indeed unavoidable (for that one) to be mixed up with misery; for an abundance of bliss implies the possession of a small modicum of misery. Indeed to be an individual self is nothing other than to be associated with misery. Therefore it is right (for the affix *mayaṭ*) to have only that significance of modification which is arrived at in accordance with that propriety of interpretation which is suited to the context. Furthermore, in popular usage as in the instances *mṛiṇmaya* (or what is made up of clay), *hiraṇmaya* (or what is made up of gold), *dārumaya* (or what is made up of wood), and in other such instances—and in the *Vedas* as in the instances of the semicircular vessel which is made of leaves (*parṇamayî*), and of the ladles which are made of the wood called *śamî* (*śamîmayyaḥ*), and of the girdle which is made of grass (*darbhamayî*) and in other such instances,—the affix *mayaṭ* is very frequently used in the sense of modification; and consequently that (sense) alone comes to the mind at the very outset. And the individual self does certainly possess the character of being a modification of bliss. To that (individual self) who is in himself of the nature of bliss, the condition of being found in the state of *samsāra* is nothing other than becoming

a modification of that (bliss). In as much as the affix *mayaṭ* which denotes modification is found to be used (in the case of the word *ānandamaya*), the *ānandamaya* (or what consists of bliss) is accordingly nothing other than the individual self. After stating this (objection) thus, he (the *Sūtrakāra*) invalidates it (as follows):—

Sūtra 14. Vikāraśabdānneti chenna prāchuryāt.

It may be said that owing to there being the affix (*mayaṭ*) significant of modification, (the *Ānandamaya* is not (the *Brahman*); but it is not (right to say) so; because that (affix *mayaṭ*) signifies abundance.

This (above-stated position of the *Pūrvapakshin*) is not right. Why? Because of there being the significance of **abundance.** That is, because there is an abundance of bliss in the Highest *Brahman*, and because also it is possible for the affix *mayaṭ* to signify abundance. What is said is this:—This Bliss is resident in the *Brahman*, because it is not possible for the individual self to be the abode of that *Ānanda* (or bliss) which is continuously repeated in an order in which each succeeding bliss is a hundredfold of the bliss (preceding it). It being so determined, the *Ānandamaya* (or That which consists of Bliss) must be the Highest *Brahman*, because there can be no modification in relation to that *Brahman*, and because also it is possible for the rule regulating the use of the affix *mayaṭ* to operate so as to signify abundance also. Even on account of the propriety of interpretation suited to the context, and on account of the frequency of its use (in the sense of modification), the affix *mayaṭ* cannot (here) have the significance of modification; because, (if it did), there would be the contradiction of the context. Moreover (this) propriety of interpretation suited to the context has been given

up even in relation to the word *prāṇamaya* itself; because, in the case of that word, it is not possible (for the affix *mayaṭ*) to import modification. Thus, in this case, the *vāyu* (or vital air), which usually has a five-fold[388] activity, becomes capable of being denoted merely by the word *prāṇamaya*, for the reason that it is in possession of the activity of the *prāṇa*, or for the reason that, among the five activities known as the *prāṇa* (or the vital activity), the *apāna* (or the excretory activity), &c., the activity of the *prāṇa* is here in abundance. Again, it cannot be said that the affix *mayaṭ* is not largely used in the sense of abundance; because it is so seen in the following and other instances—"The sacrifice is abundantly full of food (*annamaya*)"—"The journey is abundantly full of carts (*śakaṭamayī*).

What has been stated above to the effect that an abundance of bliss necessarily implies the existence of a small amount of misery,—that is not right. Indeed the abundance of a thing is the same as having an exceedingly large amount of it, and this does not necessarily imply the existence of another thing. On the other hand, it implies the negation of the smallness of that thing itself. The existence and non-existence of that other thing have to be made out by other means of proof. And in the present case, the absence of such other things is made out by this other means of proof found in the scriptural passage—"He who is devoid of sin."—[*Chhând. Up.* VIII. 7. 1.]—and in others like it. Under these circumstances, only this much can be said, that the exceedingly large amount of the bliss belonging to the *Brahman* necessarily implies

388. The five activities are of the *Prāṇa* or the principal vital activity, the *Apāna* or excretory activity, the *Samāna* or digestive activity, the *Vyāna* or circulatory activity and the *Udāna* or respiratory activity.

the smallness of the bliss belonging to others. And in the passage beginning with—"That is one unit of human bliss." —[*Taitt. Up.* II. 8. 1.],—this (fact) is declared to the effect that, in comparison with the bliss belonging to the individual self, the Bliss belonging to the *Brahman* is in an unsurpassable condition and is exceedingly large.

What has been further stated to the effect that it is possible for the individual self to become a modification of bliss,—that also is not appropriate. That, in the way in which clay becomes modified into the form of pots, &c., the individual self, whose essential nature consists of knowledge and bliss, becomes modified into some form or other is against all scripture, tradition and logic. And it will be established hereafter[389] that, in the condition of *samsâra*, his knowledge and bliss are (merely) in a contracted condition under the influence of *karma*. Therefore also, the *Ânandamaya* (or That which consists of Bliss) is different from the individual self and is the Supreme *Brahman*.

The *Ânandamaya* (or That which consists of Bliss) is different from the individual self for the following reason also :—

Sūtra 15. Taddhetuvyapadeśāchcha.

Because also He (the *Ānandamaya*) is declared (in the context) to be the cause of that (which forms the bliss of the individual souls).

"If this *Âkâśa* (*i. e.* the *Brahman*) be not Bliss, who indeed is there that can live, and who that can enjoy ?

389. Vide *Sri-Bhâshya* under *Ved. Sût.* III. 2. 5.

For He Himself causes bliss." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 7. 1.]. In this passage, by means of the statement—'He Himself causes bliss'—it is declared that He is the cause of bliss to the individual selves. Therefore it is to be understood that this bliss-giver who is the *Ānandamaya* is that Highest Self who is different from the individual self that is to be blessed. And it will be stated presently that the *Ānandamaya* Himself is here[390] denoted by the word *Ānanda* (or Bliss.)

The *Ānandamaya* is different from the individual self for the following reason also :—

Sūtra 16. Māntravarṇikameva ca gīyate

(Because) also that same Being, who is denoted by the words of the *mantra*[391] (in the context), is declared (there to be the *Ānandamaya*).

That same *Brahman* who is denoted by the words of the *mantra*, which begins with—"The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1], is spoken of as the *Ānandamaya*. And that (*Ānandamaya*) is the Highest *Brahman* who is different from what constitutes the essential nature of the individual self. And accordingly, by means of the passage—"He who knows the *Brahman* attains the Highest."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.], it is pointed out that the *Brahman* is the object that is to be

390. Vide *Śrī-Bhāshya* under *Ved. Sūt.* I. 1. 20. *infra.*

391. This *mantra* is to the following effect : "The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity ; He is hidden in the cave of the heart, in the highest ether ; and he who knows (Him thus) attains along with the Omniscient *Brahman* all the auspicious qualities." *Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1. The word *Mantra* means a metrical composition.

attained by the individual self. In (the sentence)—"This is stated in relation to That."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.], (the word) 'That' means the *Brahman*. Having that (*Brahman*) in view, that is, accepting Him as the thing to be taught, this *ṛik* (or verse) is repeated by those who study the *Vedas*. The meaning is that the subject mentioned in the *brāhmaṇa*[392] is clearly explained by means of this *mantra*. The object to be attained by the individual self who is the worshipper is certainly the *Brahman* who is entirely distinct from him. And immediately afterwards (in the context), by means of the succeeding *brāhmaṇas* as well as the *mantras*, beginning with the passage—"From that same Self, indeed, the spatial ether came into existence."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.], this same (thing) is clearly expounded. Therefore the *Ānandamaya* is different from the individual self.

Here he (a *pūrvapakshin*) might say thus:—No doubt, He who has to be attained (by the individual self) must be different from the individual self who is the worshipper. Nevertheless, the *Brahman* denoted by the words of the *mantra* (above) is not a different thing from the individual self; but, on the other hand, He is that pure essential nature of the aforesaid worshipper himself, which is devoid of even the smallest taint of all evils, which is devoid of attributes, and which is pure undifferentiated intelligence. That same (essential nature of the individual self) is clearly brought out by means of the *mantra* beginning with—"The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infini-

392. A *Brāhmaṇa* is a prose commentary on a *Mantra* or a metrical composition. The *Taittirīyopanishad* consists also of a miscellaneous collection of *Mantras* and *Brāhmaṇas* like the *Taittirīya-Samhitā* itself.

ty." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.]. That same (essential nature of the individual self) again is known to be devoid of attributes owing to its being beyond the province of speech and mind, in accordance with the passage—"Without being able to attain Him, speech returns with the mind." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 9. 1.]. Hence, it is that same (essential nature of the individual self) which is denoted by the words of the *mantra* (under reference). Consequently the *Ānandamaya* is not other than that (essential nature of the individual self).

To this he (the *Sūtrakāra*) gives the following reply:—

Sūtra 17. Netaronupapatteḥ.

He who is other (than the *Brahman*) is not (that Being who is denoted by the words of the *mantra*), because (in such a case) there would be inappropriateness.

He who is different from the Highest Self and is denoted by the word *jīva* (which means the individual self), is not, even in the state of final release, that Being who is denoted by the words of the *mantra*. Why? Because there is **inappropriateness**; that is,—it is not possible for such an individual self to have unconditioned omniscience (*vipaśc͟hittva*). This very same unconditioned omniscience is indeed meant to be explained by the reference to the quality of willing the truth in the passage—"He desired—'May I become many and be born'." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 6. 1.]. Omniscience (*vipaśc͟hittva*) is indeed the possession of such an intelligence as 'sees' in many ways. After eliding the syllable *yat* forming a part of the word *paśyat*, the word *vipaśc͟hit* is derived from it; because it (viz. the word *vipaśc͟hit*) belongs to the group of words

beginning with *pṛishodara*.[393] Omniscience is certainly possible to a released individual self. Nevertheless, as that same individual self has no omniscience in the state of *saṁsāra*, it is not possible for him to possess unconditioned omniscience. The released individual self, who has attained the state of pure undifferentiated intelligence, cannot at all possess this omniscience; because he does not 'see' in a variety of ways. Such is (the **inappropriateness**).

It has been already[394] pointed out that the thing which is devoid of attributes cannot be made out by any accepted criteria of truth whatsoever. If the passage—"(Without being able to attain) Him, speech returns (with the mind)."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 9. 1.]—declare the return of speech and mind from the *Brahman* (without attaining Him), it (surely) can not thereby become capable of giving rise to the knowledge of the attributelessness of (that) Being. But, on the other hand, it will merely tell us that speech and mind form no means of proving that (Being). And accordingly, He will acquire the character of a mere nothing. Beginning with the statement[395]—"He who knows the *Brahman* attains (the Highest)", it is mentioned (in the scripture) that the *Brahman* is omniscient, that He is the cause of the world, that He is the only abode of knowledge and bliss, that He is the bestower of bliss on all others, that He is, of His own free will, the creator of the whole world made up of the intelligent things and the non-intelligent things, that He forms the Self of the whole series of created things by entering into them, that He is the cause of fear and of fearlessness, that He is the ruler of the wind, the sun, &c., that He possesses that bliss which is unsurpassed in the or-

393. Vide *Pāṇini* VI. 3. 109.
394. Vide *supra* pp. 54 to 60.
395. *Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.

der in which each succeeding bliss is a hundredfold of the bliss immediately preceding it, and that He is many other such things. And it is the idle talk of a deluded person to say that the *Brahman* is, after all (these are mentioned), declared to be incapable of any proof, in as much as speech and mind cannot operate (so as to give rise to any knowledge) in relation to the *Brahman*. By means of the word *Ânanda* (or *Bliss*) in the expression—"He who knows the Bliss of the *Brahman*"—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 9. 1.], this passage refers to the Bliss pointed out by the word *yat* in the expression—"(Without being able to attain) that (Bliss) speech returns (with the mind)"—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 9. 1.]; it then says that that Bliss is related to the *Brahman* by distinctly mentioning that it belongs to the *Brahman*; and if, by saying 'he who knows', it then speaks of the knowledge of that same Bliss which is beyond the province of speech and mind,—it will be, like the bellowing noise of an old bull and other such things, (altogether) meaningless, and will not at all fall within the class of what are called sentences. Accordingly, it (viz. this passage) proceeds to give the definite measurement of the excellence of the Bliss of the *Brahman* in that order in which each succeeding bliss is a hundredfold of the bliss (immediately preceding it); and then speech and mind return from Him (without attaining Him) on account of that (Bliss) being incapable of (such) definite measurement. And it is this that is stated in the expression—'(Without being able to attain) that (Bliss) speech returns (with the mind)'. It is said that he who knows that Bliss of the *Brahman*, which is in this manner incapable of definite measurement, need not have any fear from anywhere. Moreover it is undoubtedly very clear that this omniscient Being—who is denoted by the words of the *mantra* (under reference), and who is

subsequently declared in the passage beginning with—"He desired, &c."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 6.1.], to have of His own free will thought it fit to create and preserve the world, to be the internal Self of the world, &c.,—has in consequence characteristics other than those which constitute the essential nature of the released individual self.

For the following reason also, the *Ānandamaya* (or that which consists of bliss) is different from the individual self, who is capable of existing in both the states (of bondage and of final release).

Sūtra 18. Bhedavyapadeśāchcha.

Because also there is (in the context) the declaration of difference (between the individual self and the *Brahman*).

The scriptural context, which, beginning with the statement—"From that same Self, indeed, the spatial ether (came into existence)."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.], explains the *Brahman* denoted by the words of the *mantra* (above quoted), teaches, by means of the passage—"Different from this which consists of understanding (or knowledge) is the (still) inner Self, the *Ānandamaya*."—[*Taitt. Up.* II.5.1.], that He is different from the individual self also; in the same way in which (He is different) from *anna* (food), *prāṇa* (principal vital air), and *manas* (mind). Therefore it is made out that, owing to the declaration of (this) difference (between the *Ānandamaya* and the individual self), this Being, who is denoted by the words of the *mantra* (under reference) and is the *Ānandamaya*, is certainly

different from the individual self.

For the following reason also, (the *Ānandamaya*) is different from the individual self.

Sūtra 19. Kāmāchcha nānumānāpekshā.

Because also His will (is in itself the cause of creation), the *pradhāna*[396] is not needed (by Him in the act of creation just as it is needed by the individual self).

In connection with the act of creating the world, it is impossible for the individual self, who is subject to the influence of *avidyā* (or ignorance), to avoid the necessity of being associated with that non-intelligent thing (viz. matter) which is denoted by the words *ānumānika*, *pradhāna*, &c. Indeed, it is only in this manner that the four-faced Brahmā and others form the cause of the world. In the present instance, however, the creation of wonderful intelligent and non-intelligent things is, in the statement—"He created all this, whatever there is."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 6. 1.], declared to take place solely from that will, which belongs to Him who is devoid of any association with the non-intelligent thing (*pradhāna*), and which is referred to in the statement—"He desired (*i. e.* willed),—'May I become manifold and be born.'" [*Taitt. Up.* II. 6. 1.]. It is accordingly made out that the *Ānandamaya* does not, while creating the world, stand in need of any association with the non-intelligent thing *pradhāna*.

396. The word *Ānumāna* means literally that which is capable of being made out by inference to be the cause of the world. Like the word *Ānumānika*, it denotes the *Pradhāna* of the *Sāṅkhyas*.

The *Ānandamaya* is different from the individual self for the following reason also:—

Sūtra 20. Asminnasya cha tadyogam śāsti.

(Because) also it (viz. the scripture) declares (that) his (*i. e.* the individual self's) acquisition of that (bliss takes place when he is) in (association with) this (*Ānandamaya*).

'**In this**' means—in the *Ānandamaya*. '**His**' means—of the individual self. '**The acquisition of that**' means—the acquisition of bliss. '**It declares**', that is, the scripture declares.

It is said—"Bliss indeed is He. Having obtained that very same Bliss, he (the individual self) becomes blissful." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 7. 1.]. The meaning is this:—When it is declared that, by attaining the *Ānandamaya* who is denoted by the word *Bliss*, that being, who is apt to be denoted by the word *jīva* (which means the individual self), becomes blissful,—then, who but a mad man will say that, by attaining whichever (Being) whoever becomes blissful, he is himself that same (Being)? It has been thus determined that the *Ānandamaya* is the Highest *Brahman*, and hence it is that that same *Ānandamaya* is denoted by the word *Ānanda* (or *Bliss*) in the following and other scriptural passages:—"If this *Ākāśa* be not Bliss"—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 7. 1.]; "The *Brahman* is Knowledge, Bliss."—[*Bṛih. Up.* III. 9. 28.]; in the same way in which the *vijñānamaya* (or what consists of knowledge) is (denoted) by the word *vijñāna* (or knowledge.) It is for this very reason (of our having to interpret *Ānanda* as *Ānandamaya*) that there is given a distinct indication (to that effect)

in the passage—"He who knows the Bliss of the *Brahman* (need not have any fear from anywhere)." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 9. 1.]. And it is for this same reason again that the result (of such knowledge of the Bliss of the *Brahman*) is pointed out in the statement—"He reaches that Self who is the *Ānandamaya*."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 8. 1.]. Moreover the *annamaya* (or what is made up of food) and the other things, which have been mentioned in the earlier[397] *anuvāka* are recapitulated in the later[398] *anuvāka* to the following effect:—"Let him know the *anna* (or food) as the *Brahman*." [*Taitt. Up.* III. 2. 1.]; "Let him know the *prāṇa* (or the principal vital air) as the *Brahman*." [*Taitt. Up.* III. 3. 1.]; "Let him know the *manas* (or mind) as the *Brahman*." [*Taitt. Up.* III. 4. 1.]; "Let him know the *vijñāna* (or knowledge) as the *Brahman*." [*Taitt. Up.* III. 5. 1.]. Hence it is made out that, in this statement also, namely, "(Let him know) the *Ānanda* (or Bliss) as the *Brahman*."—[*Taitt. Up.* III. 6. 1.], it is the *Ānandamaya* Himself that is taught (by means of the word *Ānanda*). And for that same reason, even that (*i. e.* the later *anuvāka*) is concluded by the statement—"He (*i.e.* the released self) having reached that Self which consists of Bliss (*Ānandamaya*)...(sits down singing this *sāman*—*Hā, Vūhā, Vūhā, Vū*)." [*Taitt. Up.* III. 10 5.].

Therefore, it is a demonstrated conclusion that that Highest *Brahman*, who is a different entity from what is apt to be denoted by the word *pradhāna*, is also a different entity from that (other) entity, which is capable of being signified by the word *jīva* (which means the individual self).

397. The earlier *Anuvāka* is the *Ānandavallī*—Chapter II of the *Taitt. Up.*

398. The later *Anuvāka* is the *Bhṛiguvallī*—Chapter III of the same *Taitt. Up.*

ADHIKARAṆA. VII.

Antaradhikaraṇa.

It is certainly not possible for the individual selves—who possess very little merit—to create the world out of their own free will, to be associated with unsurpassable bliss, to form the cause of fear and of fearlessness, &c. Nevertheless, such a thing may surely be possible in the case of the Sun, Indra, Prajāpati, and other such (individual selves) who possess peculiarly valuable merit.

He (the *Sūtrakāra*) disproves this aforesaid supposition thus:—

Sūtra 21. Antastaddharmopadeśāt.

He (*i. e.* the Person) who is within (the Sun and the eye is the *Brahman*), because His attributes are declared (in the context). [399]

It is revealed in the *Chhāndogya* thus:—"This Person who is seen within the Sun,—He is brilliant like gold, has a golden beard, and has golden hairs, and is altogether golden even to the very tips of His nails. His two eyes are like the lotus just opened by the sun. His name is High. This same above-mentioned Person is risen above all sins. He who knows (Him) thus rises indeed above all sins. The *Ṛik* and the *Sāman* are the two psalms in praise of Him.........This is what relates to Him as He is in the gods. Now this is what relates to Him as He is in

399. The context referred to here is *Chhāndogya-Upanishad*. I. 6 & 7.

our selves............Again, that Person who is seen within the eye, He is that same *Ṛik* and that same *Sâman*, He is that *Uktha*,[400] that *Yajus* and that *Brahman*. The form of this above-mentioned Person (in the eye) is the same as the form of that (other Person in the Sun). The psalms in praise of that other (Person) are (the same as) the psalms in praise of this (Person). The name of that (other Person) is the name of this (Person) also." [*Chând. Up.* I. 6. 6 to 8. & I. 7. 1 to 5.].

Here the doubt arises whether this Person who exists within the eye and the bright orb of the Sun is that same individual self who possesses such sovereignties as result from an accumulation of the merit of works, and who is capable of being denoted by *Sun* and other such words; or whether He is the Supreme Self who is other than that (Sun). It is perhaps thought right to hold that He is that same individual self who has accumulated the merits of his works. Why? Because it is declared that that (Person) is associated with a body. Indeed it is possible only for the individual selves to be associated with a body. As a matter of fact, it is for the purpose of experiencing pleasure and pain in accordance with the results of works that there is the association (of the self) with a body. It is surely for this very reason that final release, which is free from association with *karmas*, is declared in the following passage to be capable of attainment in the bodiless condition:—"To him who is and has a body, there is no destruction of the pleasing and the unpleasing; the pleasing and the unpleasing touch not him who is and has no body." [*Chând. Up.* VIII. 12. 1.]. Moreover it is

400. An *Uktha* is a verse belonging to the subdivision known as the *Sastras* which are recited either audibly or inaudibly as opposed to the *Stomas* which are sung.

possible for an increase of knowledge as well as an increase of strength to take place from the greatness of the merit of works. For this same reason the lordship of worlds and desires is appropriate only to such (an individual self as has so made his own merit great). And for the same reason again (it becomes appropriate for him) to be the object of worship, to be the giver of the fruits of works, and also to be useful in causing the attainment of final release by producing the annihilation of sins. Even among men, those who have accumulated merit are seen to be very great in consequence of (their) knowledge, power, &c. The *Siddhas* and the *Gandharvas* are greater than they. Even greater than these are the gods. Still greater are Indra and others. Accordingly, some one among Brahmā and the others from him downwards attains in each *kalpa*[401] the above-mentioned sovereignty as a consequence of (his own) special merit; and thus performs even the work of the creation, &c., of the world. Therefore, the scriptural passage, which deals with what forms the cause of the world and with what forms the internal self of the world, &c., relates only to this being who has specially increased his merit and is (thereby) omniscient and omnipotent. Hence there is nothing that is called the Supreme Self as distinct from the individual self. This being the case, the scriptural passage—"That which is neither gross, nor atomic, nor short, &c."—[*Bṛih. Up.* III. 8. 8.] and others like it are intended to import the essential nature of the individual self. And those scriptures which deal with final release are intended to teach the essential nature of that (individual self) and also (to teach) the means of attaining that (pure essential nature).

401. Vide *supra* p. 226. n. 246.

If it be so held, it is stated in reply—" He (*i. e.* the person) who is within (the Sun and the eye is the *Brahman*), because His attributes are declared (in the context)." [*Ved. Sût.* I. 1. 21.]. That Person who is perceived within the Sun and within the eye—He is the Supreme Self, and is other than the individual self. Why? **Because His attributes are declared (in the context).** That attribute which it is impossible for the individual self to possess, which belongs only to Him who is other than the individual self and is the Highest Self, and which imports the quality of being devoid of sin, &c.,—that is taught in the statement beginning with—"This same above-mentioned Person is risen above all sins." [*Chhând. Up.* I. 6. 7.]. Indeed to be devoid of sin is to be free from *karma*. The meaning is that it is to be free from even the smallest amount of subjection to the influence of *karma*. As a matter of fact, individual selves are subject to the influence of *karmas*, in as much as they have to experience pleasures and pains in obedience to their *karmas*. Therefore, the quality of being free from all sin forms the attribute of the Supreme Self Himself, who is other than the individual self. Based upon this (quality) and conditioned by His own essential nature are—the quality which relates to the lordship of worlds and desires, the quality of willing the truth, &c., the quality of being the internal Self of all beings, which are all His own attributes. Says the scripture to the same effect—"This Self is devoid of sin, is free from old age, free from death, free from sorrow, free from hunger, free from thirst, and desires the truth and wills the truth." [*Chhând. Up.* VIII. 1. 5. & VIII. 7. 1 & 3.]. And similarly there is the passage—"He is the internal Self of all beings, He is devoid of all sins, He is the Divine Lord, He

is the one Nārāyaṇa." [*Sub. Up.* VII. 1.]. To be capable of creating all the intelligent and non-intelligent things, in conformity with the quality of willing the truth as stated in the passage—"He desired,—May I become manifold and be born." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 6. 1.], to form the absolute cause of fear and of fearlessness, to possess that unsurpassable bliss which is devoid of the limitations due to apprehension by speech and mind,—these and such other attributes, which are natural and are not capable of being acquired by means of *karmas*, are impossible for the individual self to possess.

What has been stated to the effect that, owing to there being the mention of the association with a body, the Person (referred to in the scriptural text quoted above) is not other than the individual self,—that is not right. Indeed, association with a body does not establish (any) subjection to the influence of *karmas*; because it is possible for Him who wills the truth to have the association with a body merely through His own will. It may again be said thus :—The body is known to be that aggregate of the elements which are modifications of the *prakṛiti* (or matter) made up of the three[402] qualities. And association with it cannot, in accordance with His will, result to that Person who is devoid of sin and who wills the truth ; because such (an association) cannot be an aim of (His) life. And he who is subject to the influence of *karmas*, and who is totally ignorant of his own essential nature, cannot possibly avoid that association (with the body), in consequence of his having to enjoy the results corresponding to his works, even though he does not like it. It would be so, provided (we grant) that His

402. Vide *supra* n. 344.

body is made up of the three qualities and is a modification of the *prakṛiti* (or matter). But that (body) is in accordance with His own desire, and is suited to His own nature, and is altogether non-material; and thus the whole (of our argument) is appropriate. What is said is this:—There are myriads of innumerable auspicious qualities which are natural in themselves, and are unsurpassed in excellence, and belong to that Highest *Brahman* Himself who is entirely distinct from all other things (than Himself), by reason of His possessing that nature which is wholly made up of infinite knowledge and bliss, and which is hostile to all that is evil. In the very same manner, there is (to Him) a natural and divine form also, which is in accordance with His own desire and is suited to Himself, which is uniform, unthinkable, immaterial, wonderful, eternal and faultless, and which is the home of endless collections of unsurpassable qualities such as splendour, beauty, fragrance, tenderness, elegance, youthfulness and the like. With the object of favouring His worshippers, He (*i. e.* Nārāyaṇa) causes this same form of His to assume such a configuration as is suited to the understanding of each of those (worshippers)—Nārāyaṇa who is the ocean of boundless mercy, sweet disposition, affection and generosity, who is free from even the smallest taint of all that is evil, who is free from all sin, who is the Highest Self, the Highest *Brahman*, and the Highest Person. By means of these passages, namely,—"Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning"—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 1.], "The Self, indeed, this one only was in the beginning."—[*Ait. Up.* I. 1.], "Indeed, Nārāyaṇa alone then was, and not the (four-faced) Brahmā nor Īśāna",—[*Mah. Up.* I.]—and by means of others, (the *Brahman*) is made out to be the only cause of all the worlds; and the essential nature

of that Highest *Brahman* is understood to be of this (above-mentioned) character with the help of such passages as—"The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.], "The *Brahman* is knowledge and bliss." [*Bṛih. Up.* III. 9. 28.]. In the following and other scriptural passages, namely, "(That which is) without attributes, without taint."—[*Adh. Up.* 68.], "(This Self) is devoid of sin, is free from old age, free from death, free from sorrow, free from hunger, free from thirst, and desires the truth and wills the truth."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 1. 5. VIII. 7. 1 & 3.], "He has neither body nor senses, and there is seen neither His equal nor His superior; His supreme power is revealed indeed as varied and natural and as consisting of knowledge, strength, and action." —[*Śvet. Up.* VI. 8.], "(May we know) that highest and greatest Lord of lords, who is the highest Deity of deities." —[*Śvet. Up.* VI. 7.], "He is the cause, the Lord of what is the lord of the senses (*i. e.* of the *jīva* or the individual soul); He has no progenitor, and no superior."—[*Śvet. Up.* VI. 9.], "The omniscient Lord who creates all beings, gives them names, and, calling them (by those names), ever continues to be."—[*Taitt. Ār.* III. 12. 7.], "I know this great Person of sun-like lustre who is altogether beyond darkness."—[*Taitt. Ār.* III. 12. 7.], "All the *nimeshas* were born out of the Person who has the lustre of lightning." [*M. Nār.* I. 8.]; (in these and other passages), they (*i. e.* the scriptures) deny—that the Highest *Brahman* possesses such qualities as belong to *prakṛiti* (or nature) and as deserve to be discarded; (they deny) that He is associated with a body made up of *prakṛiti* and (thus) worthy of rejection, and that He has any association with the condition of being subject to the influence of *karma*, which has that (association with the body) at its root;

and then they declare that He possesses auspicious qualities and has a beautiful form. To bless His worshippers, the Divine Lord who is all-merciful makes this same aforesaid natural form of His assume, in accordance with His own desire, the configurations of gods, men, &c., so that it may have that appearance which is suited to the understandings of those (worshippers). The scripture speaks of this same fact thus:—"Although He is unborn, He is born in various ways." [*Taitt. Ār.* III. 12. 7.]. And the *Smṛiti* also (says the same thing) thus :—"Although I am unborn, and inexhaustible in My own nature, and although I am the Lord of all beings, taking up My own *prakṛiti*, I am then born again and again, by means of My own *māyā*.........for the protection of the good and for the destruction of evil-doers." [*B. G.* IV. 6 & 8.]. Indeed *the good* (here) are the worshippers. The principal object of accomplishment is nothing other than their protection. But the destruction of evil-doers is an object of secondary importance, because that is possible (to Him) even by merely willing it. The expression 'My own *prakṛiti*' means His own peculiar nature. The meaning is—"Taking up His own peculiar nature, but not (taking up) the nature of those who are in *samsāra*, (He is born again and again)." The meaning of the expression 'by means of My own *māyā*' is *by means of that mental power which is of the nature of His own will*. Lexicographers read the word *māyā* as synonymous also with knowledge (or *jñāna*) as when they say *māyā vayunam jñānam*. [Vide *Nir.* III. 9.]. Moreover the venerable Parāśara speaks (of this form of the Lord) thus :—"Wherever, O king, all these powers are established, that is another great form of the Lord, which is different from His Universal Form. He, out of His own playfulness, makes that (form of His), which is

possessed of all powers, actively manifest under the names of gods, animals and men. That (activity) is (intended) for the good of the worlds and is not produced by means of *karma* (*i. e.* by means of the effect of works operating upon Him)." [*V. P.* VI. 7. 70 to 72.]. And in the *Mahābhārata* it is thus stated that even the incarnated form (of the Lord) is not made up of *prakṛiti* (or matter):—"The body of this Highest Self is not a configuration of the collection of material elements." Hence the Highest *Brahman* Himself is the possessor of that form which is of this description, and so this (form) also is His own attribute. Consequently, He who abides within the brilliant orb of the Sun and within the eye is the Highest Self Himself who is other than the Sun and other individual selves.

Sūtra 22. Bhedavyapadeśāchchānyaḥ.

And he is different (from the Sun and other individual selves) because also there is the declaration of difference (between the *Brahman* on the one hand and the Sun and other individual selves on the other).

The difference of this Highest Self from the sun-god and other individual selves is declared (in the scriptures). The following scriptural passages also, namely,—"He who, dwelling within the Sun, is within the Sun, whom the Sun does not know, whose body is the Sun, who internally rules the Sun—(He is thy internal ruler and immortal Self)..................................He who, dwelling within the self, is within the self, whom the self does not know, whose body is the self, who internally rules the self—(He

is thy internal ruler and immortal Self)."[*Mādh. Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 9 to 22.]; "(He) whose body is the *akshara*....whom the *akshara* does not know,...who is moving within the *mṛityu* (or *prakṛiti*), whose body is *mṛityu*, whom *mṛityu* does not know,—He is the internal Self of all beings, He is free from all sins, He is the Divine Lord, He is the one Nārāyaṇa." [*Sub. Up.* VII. 1.]—(these) first point out that the individual selves form the body of this Highest Self who is free from sin, and then declare that He forms the internal Self of them all. Therefore it is an established conclusion that the Supreme Self is altogether different from all the individual selves from the four-faced Brahmā downwards.

ADHIKARAṆA. VIII.

Ākāśādhikaraṇa.

In the passage—"From whom all these beings are born"—[*Taitt. Up.* III. 1. 1.], it is made out that the *Brahman* is the cause of the world. With the object of satisfying the desire to know what that cause of the world is, that cause of the world has been pointed out in general terms (such as *Sat*, *Ātman*, &c.,) in the following passages:—"Existence (or *Sat*) alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning."—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 1.]; "It created *tejas*"—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 3.]; "The Self (or *Ātman*), indeed, this one only was in the beginning.........He created these worlds."—[*Ait. Up.* I. 1 & 2.]; "Indeed from that same Self (or *Ātman*) the spatial ether came into existence." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.]; and it has the nature of such a

special entity as is characterised by the peculiarities indicated by the attribute of 'seeing' and the attribute of bliss: consequently that (cause) has been declared to be the *Brahman* who is different from the *pradhāna* (or matter), and from the individual self, and from other such things. Now, in the aphorism—"That which is denoted by the word *Ākāśa* (is the *Brahman*), because His peculiar characteristics (are mentioned in the context in relation to what is denoted by that word)."—[*Ved. Sūt.* I. 1. 23.]—and in other aphorisms (following it), which make up the remaining portion of this quarter (of the first chapter), it (viz. that cause of the world) is denoted by means of (certain) particular terms such as *Ākāśa*, &c.; and then—even in discussions bearing upon what constitutes the cause of the world, and upon what possesses the sovereignty of the world, and upon such other things,—it is the *Brahman* Himself who is declared to be the entity that is different from those intelligent and non-intelligent things, which are well known to be denoted by *ākāśa* and other words, and (it is He Himself) who is (also declared to be) possessed of the characteristics mentioned already.

Sūtra 23. Ākāśastalliṅgāt.

That which is denoted by the word *Ākāśa* (is the *Brahman*), because His peculiar characteristics (are mentioned in the context[403] in relation to what is denoted by that word).

It is revealed in the *Chhāndogya* to this effect:—"What is the goal of this world? And he (Pravahaṇa) says in

403. The context referred to here is *Chhānd. Up.* I. 9.

reply—It is the *Ākāśa*; all these beings are, indeed, born out of the *Ākāśa*; they go unto the *Ākāśa* at the end; as the *Ākāśa* is greater than all these beings, the *Ākāśa* is the best refuge." [*Chhând. Up.* I. 9. 1.]. Here the doubt arises whether it is the well known element of *ākāśa* (or ether) itself that is denoted by the word *Ākāśa*, or whether it is the *Brahman* Himself as having the above-mentioned characteristics. It is perhaps held that it is the well known element of *ākāśa*. Why? In the case of any thing that has to be made out altogether by means of a word, that same meaning (of it), which is established in accordance with the proper process of deriving the meanings of words and which is expressed by that word,—that alone has to be accepted. Hence, the well known element of *ākāśa* (or ether) is itself the cause of the whole world which is made up of the totality of (all the) movable and immovable beings. Therefore the *Brahman* can not be other than that (*ākāśa*). However, it has been already pointed out that the *Brahman* is distinct from the non-intelligent thing (matter) as well as from the (intelligent) individual self, for the reason that He performs such acts of creation, &c., as are invariably caused by (His) 'seeing' (*i. e.* willing). True, it was (so) pointed out; but that (statement) is not right. Accordingly, when it is declared that—"He from whom all these beings are born—That is the *Brahman*."—[*Taitt. Up.* III. 1. 1.], then, it may be specially desired to know what that particular entity is which is the cause of the birth, &c.,[404] of all those beings that are born; in such a case, that special entity is made known by means of the passage beginning with—"All these beings are indeed born out of the *ākāśa*"—[*Chhând. Up.* I. 9. 1.];

404. *Birth, &c.*, means birth, sustentation and destruction.

thus, the cause of the origin, &c., of the world is definitely determined to be nothing other than the *ākāśa*. It being so, *Sat* and other words which possess a general significance, and which are mentioned in the following passage among other passages also, namely,—"Existence (or *Sat*) alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning"—[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 1.],—denote that same special entity *ākāśa*. In the passage—"The Self (or the *Ātman*),indeed, this one only was in the beginning."—[*Ait. Up.* I. 1.]—and in others, the word *Ātman* is also used to signify that same thing (*ākāśa*). Indeed that word *Ātman* also is not restricted to mean only intelligent beings. For example, there is the instance—"The pot is *mṛidātmaka* (or made up of clay)." Since the word *Ātman* may be derived[405] from the root *āp* to pervade, the word *Ātman* also signifies the *ākāśa* (or the ether) quite absolutely. Hence, when it is thus determined that the *ākāśa* itself is the *Brahman* that forms the cause of the world, then the activity of 'seeing', &c., have to be understood in their figurative sense so as to suit that (element of *ākāśa*). If the cause of the world had been, as a matter of fact, denoted only by *Sat* and other such general terms, then, in accordance with the import of 'seeing', &c., (predicated in relation to it), that cause would have been specially made out to be nothing other than a particular intelligent being. But by the word *ākāśa* itself a characteristic entity is definitely pointed out; and thus there is nothing else that has to be particularly understood (to be its import) as arising from the naturalness of its meaning (in the context). Indeed, it may be said (here) that, in the passage—"From the Self the *ākāśa* came into existence."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.], the *ākāśa*

405. See *Śāṇḍilya-Upanishad*. III.

itself is made out to be a produced effect. True; in fact, *vāyu* (air) and all other such things exist in two conditions, namely, the subtle condition and the gross condition. Of these the subtle condition of the element of *ākāśa* constitutes the cause; and its gross condition, the effect. The meaning of the passage—"From the Self the *ākāśa* came into existence."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.]—is, that from its subtle form, it became changed into its own gross form. By means of the passage beginning with—"All these beings are, indeed, born out of the *ākāśa*."—[*Chhānd. Up.* I. 9. 1.], it is declared that the whole world derives its existence from, and has its dissolution in, the *ākāśa* itself; hence it is determined that that same *ākāśa* is indeed the *Brahman* that forms the cause of the world. For whatever reason the *Brahman* is not other than the well known element of *ākāśa*, for that same reason the (following scriptural) statements—"If this *ākāśa* be not bliss, &c."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 7. 1.], "The *akāśa* is, indeed, the evolver of name and form." [*Chhānd. Up.* VIII. 14.1.]—and other such (statements) are also (seen to be) very appropriate. Therefore the *Brahman* is not other than the well known element of *ākāśa*.

If it be so held, we reply (thus):—"That which is denoted by the word *Ākāśa* (is the *Brahman*), because His peculiar characteristics (are mentioned in the context in relation to what is denoted by that word)." [*Ved. Sût.* I. 1. 23.]. That which is denoted by the word *Ākāśa* is that Highest Self Himself who has the characteristics already mentioned, and who is a different entity from the non-intelligent and well known element of *ākāśa* (or ether). Why? **Because His peculiar characteristics (are mentioned in the context in relation to what is denoted by that word).** To be the only cause of all the

worlds, to be greater than all others, to be the best refuge, &c.,—which are all the characteristics of the Highest Self,—are found mentioned (in the context under reference). Indeed, it is not possible for that non-intelligent thing, which is usually denoted by the well known word *ākāśa*, to be the cause of the world; because it is not possible for an intelligent thing to be the produced effect of that (non-intelligent thing). And to be the best refuge is to be that highest object which is worthy of being attained by intelligent beings; and to be this,—it is not possible for that non-intelligent thing which deserves to be discarded and which is opposed to all the desirable aims of life. And to be greater than all is to be unconditioned; it is to be so great by means of all the auspicious qualities as to remain unsurpassed by all. To be this also,—it is not possible for the non-intelligent thing.

What has been stated to the effect that a specially characteristic thing is mentioned by means of the word *Ākāśa*, in response to the query to know what that particular object is which forms the cause of the world, and that, in consequence, every thing else (in the context) has to be explained so as to exactly agree with that (*ākāśa*) itself,—that is improper; because, in the passage.—"All these beings are, indeed, born out of the *Ākāśa*."—[*Chhānd. Up.* I. 9. 1.], that (*Ākāśa*) is pointed out as if it were (a thing) already well known. Indeed, to mention a thing as if it were well known implies that there is some other means of knowing it. And the other means of knowledge (here) are, indeed, the following passage and other similar ones:—"Existence alone, my dear child, this was in the beginning." [*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 1.]. And they declare the *Brahman* to be altogether the same as has been already mentioned. Accordingly, the *Brahman* established

by those (passages) is pointed out by the word *Âkâśa* as if it were a well known thing. And it is also possible for the Highest *Brahman* to be denoted by the word *Âkâśa*,[406] in as much as He possesses the power of illuminating things, that is, in as much as He is luminous to Himself and also causes other things to shine. Further, this word *Âkâśa*, even when it is capable of importing a particular (well known) entity, denotes that particular non-intelligent thing which it is not possible to think of as forming the cause of the intelligent thing. Such excerpts from scriptural passages as the following among others, namely,—"It thought"—[*Chhând. Up.* VI. 2. 3.]—"He desired—May I become manifold"—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 6. 1.], enable us to know that peculiar Being who is characterised by the attribute of omniscience and the attribute of willing the truth, &c.; and now to cause, by means of that (*âkâśa*), the import of those scriptural passages, which are capable of proving that (Being), to be other than what that (import) really is,—this is not (certainly) within the province of correct reasoning. Similarly, it is not also possible to make the common import of those numerous passages, which are capable of denoting that peculiar Being thus characterised by peculiar and endless attributes, become something other than what that (import) really is, through the influence of a single passage which is merely a restatement (of something that has been already taught).

It has been stated that the word *Âtman* is not absolutely restricted to mean intelligent beings, because it is seen (to be used otherwise) in the instance—"The pot is *mṛid-*

406. The word *Âkâśa* is derived from the root *Kâś* to shine and is interpreted to mean that which is luminous to itself and also that which causes other things to shine.

ātmaka (or made up of clay)." In reply to this it is said thus:—No doubt, the word *Ātman* is, in some cases, used even so as to denote things other than what is intelligent. Nevertheless, the word *Ātman* is very largely used so as to denote that (intelligent entity) which forms the correlative of the body. Consequently, that intelligent entity itself which is correlated to the body is made out to be mentioned in the following and other passages, namely,—"The Self (or *Ātman*), indeed, this one only was in the beginning."—[*Ait. Up.* I. 1.]; "From the Self, the *ākāśa* (or the spatial ether) came into existence." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 1. 1.]. For example, although the word *go* (*i.e.* ox) may express many things, that thing alone which has the dewlap and other such (characteristics) is naturally and of itself apprehended thereby, on account of its being largely used (to signify that thing): and to apprehend its other meanings, it is necessary to have a special mention made of each (of those meanings) in particular. Similarly, each of the following and other particular scriptural passages, namely, "He thought—May I create the worlds."—[*Ait. Up.* I. 1.], "He desired,—May I become manifold and be born."—[*Taitt. Up.* II. 6. 1.]—themselves confirm that it (viz. the word *Ātman*) signifies nothing other than that intelligent entity, which is of itself arrived at (from the common use of that word) and forms (also) the correlative of the body.

Thus the *Brahman*—who forms the only cause of all the worlds, and who is characterised by many such wonderful attributes, as are peculiar to none other than Himself, and as are made out by means of excerpts from scriptural passages,—is Himself established by means of the passage beginning with—"Existence alone, my dear child, &c." —[*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 2. 1.]. And it is thus a settled conclusion that (that *Brahman*) Himself is pointed out by

means of the word *Ākāśa*, in the passage beginning with—"All these beings are indeed (born out of the *Ākāśa*)"—[*Chhānd. Up.* I. 9. 1.], as if He were already well known.

ADHIKARAṆA. IX.

Prāṇādhikaraṇa.

Sūtra 24. Ata eva prāṇaḥ.

For that same reason (which has been given in the case of *Ākāśa*), He who is denoted by the word *Prāṇa* (also in the context[407] is the *Brahman*).

After commencing the context by means of the statement—"O thou *prastotṛi*, that deity which invariably attends the *prastāva*, &c.",—[408] it is revealed in the *Chhāndogya* to this effect:—"Which is that deity? He said—'Indeed it is the *Prāṇa*. All these beings certainly enter into the *Prāṇa* (to be absorbed into it); they are evolved out of the *Prāṇa*. This is that deity which invariably attends the *prastāva*. And if, without knowing that deity, you had sung (your) psalms of praise, your head would have fallen off'."—[*Chhānd. Up.* I. 10. 9. & I. 11. 4 & 5.]. Here the word *Prāṇa* also denotes, like the word *Ākāśa*, the Highest Self Himself who is other than the ordinarily well known *prāṇa* (or vital air); because this (*prāṇa*) is described

407. The context here referred to is *Chhānd. Up.* I. 10 & 11.

408. *Prastāva* is the prelude or the introductory words of a *Sāman* sung by the *Prastotṛi* who is the assistant of the *Udgātṛi* or the chanter of the *Sāmaveda*.

(in the context), as if it were a well known thing, by means of the characteristics of the whole world entering into it and coming out of it, &c., which are not (at all) common to it.

However, there may also be an additional objection (here) to the effect that, since the whole of the totality of beings is seen to have its existence and activity dependent upon the *prāṇa*, the ordinarily well known *prāṇa* (or vital air) itself deserves to be pointed out as the cause of the world. And the invalidation (of this objection) is to the effect that the statement—"All these beings certainly enter into the *Prāṇa* (to be absorbed into it), they are evolved out of the *Prāṇa*."—[*Chhând. Up.* I. 11. 5.]—can not be appropriate in relation to stones and sticks, as also in relation to the essential nature of the intelligent thing (viz. the individual self); because it (viz. that *prāṇa*) does not exist (in them). Therefore the word *Prāṇa* (here) denotes the Highest *Brahman* Himself for the reason that it is to be understood as that which gives life to all beings.

Consequently, it is a demonstrated conclusion that the Highest *Brahman* Himself—who is altogether different from the ordinarily well known *ākāśa* (or ether), *prāṇa* (or vital air), and other such things, who is the only cause of all the worlds, who possesses infinite myriads of auspicious qualities, such as the quality of being free from sin, the quality of omniscience, the quality of willing the truth, &c.,—is denoted (here) by such words as *Ākāśa*, *Prāṇa*, &c.

ADHIKARAṆA. X.

Jyotiradhikaraṇa.

Hereafter, by means of the aphorism—"That which is denoted by the word *Jyotis* (is the *Brahman*), because there is the mention of (His) feet (in a connected context)"—[*Ved. Sût.* I. 1. 25.] and by means of the other aphorisms (following it), it is declared that that *Jyotis* (or Light), which is characterised by at least a certain unsurpassable quality invariably associated with what constitutes the cause of the world, and which is also denoted by *Indra* and other words that are ordinarily well known to refer to other things, is the Highest *Brahman* Himself.

Sûtra 25. Jyotiśśharaṇâbhidhânât.

That which is denoted by the word *Jyotis* (is the *Brahman*), because there is the mention of (His) feet (in a connected context).

It is revealed in the *Chhândogya* to this effect:—"Now that Light which shines beyond this Highest Heaven, beyond all the things in the universe, beyond the whole universe, in the highest worlds than which there are no higher worlds, that is that same Light indeed which is within this person." [*Chhând. Up.* III. 13. 7.]. Here there arises the doubt whether that thing which is denoted by the word *Jyotis* (or Light), which is associated with unsurpassable brilliance and forms that same well known light which belongs to the sun-god and others,—(whether that) is the *Brahman* that forms the cause of the world; or whether that (thing) is the Highest Person, who is altogether

distinct from the aggregate of intelligent and non-intelligent things, who is the highest cause, who has unlimited splendour, who is omniscient and wills the truth. It is perhaps thought right to hold that it is the ordinarily well known light itself (which is denoted by the word *Jyotis*). Why? Because, although it (viz. *Jyotis*) is described as if it were an already well known thing, there are not found mentioned in the passage in which it occurs any such characteristics as are invariably associated with the Highest Self, in the same way in which (they are seen to be so associated) with (what is denoted by) *Ākāśa*, *Prāṇa*, and other such words; and it is not, in consequence, possible to derive (from that context) any knowledge which leads to the recognition of the Highest Person (therein): and because also that (*Jyotis* itself) is taught to be the same as the digestive heat in the stomach. The ordinarily well known light itself has (thus) to be the *Brahman* that forms the cause of the world; for, there is associated with it (also) that unsurpassable splendour which is invariably concomitant with what constitutes the cause (of the world).

If it be so held, we state in reply—"That which is denoted by the word *Jyotis* (is the *Brahman*), because there is the mention of (His) feet (in a connected context)." [*Ved. Sūt.* I. 1. 25.]. That 'Light', which is described as being related to the Highest Heaven and is associated with unsurpassable splendour, is the Highest Person Himself. Why? Because, in the passage—"All beings make up His one foot; His three immortal feet are in the Highest Heaven."—[*Chhānd. Up.* III. 12. 6.], all beings are declared to form the foot of this same entity who is in relation with the Highest Heaven. What is said is this:—In the passage—"That Light which is beyond the Highest

Heaven, &c."—[*Chhānd. Up.* III. 13. 7.], the peculiar characteristics of the Highest Person are certainly not mentioned; nevertheless, it is recognised that, since the Highest Person is mentioned in a former passage (in the same context) as being related to the Highest Heaven, this Light also which is related to that Highest Heaven is that Person Himself. And in the teaching that that (*Jyotis*) is one with the digestive heat of the stomach, there is nothing wrong; because it (viz. that teaching) is a commandment enjoining the continued meditation of that (Highest Person) in the form of that (digestive heat) for the purpose of attaining the fruition of a desired result. And that the digestive heat of the stomach has the character of that (Highest Person) is declared by the Lord Himself in the passage—"Becoming the *vaiśvānara*,[409] I dwell in the bodies of all living beings." [*B. G.* XV. 14.].

Sūtra 26. Chhandobhidhānānneti chenna tathā che-torpaṇanigamāt tathāhidarśanam.

If it be said that, on account of the metre (known as the *gāyatrī*) being mentioned (in the context, the Light or *Jyotis* described above is) not (the *Brahman*), it is not (right to say) so; because the teaching (here) relates to the concentration of the mind (on the *Brahman*) conceived as that same (*gāyatrī*): indeed the scripture declares it accordingly.

In a former passage (in the same context), the metre

409. This is an epithet of *Agni* or Fire. Here, this word denotes the digestive heat of the stomach in accordance with the scriptural passage—"This Fire which is within man and by which food is digested—that is the *Vaiśvānara*." *Bṛih. Up.* V. 9. 1.

known as the *gāyatri* is mentioned in the statement—"The *Gāyatri* indeed is all this."—[*Chhānd. Up.* III. 12. 1.]; and this *Rik* verse also, which is then quoted after the statement—"Therefore this same (*Gāyatri* known as the *Brahman*) is also declared in a *Rik*[410] verse."—[*Chhānd. Up.* III. 12. 5.] to the effect—"Such is His greatness."—[*Chhānd. Up.* III. 12. 6.],—relates to (that) metre: hence, here (*i. e.* in the passage under discussion) there is no mention of the Highest Person. If it be so held, (it is replied that) it cannot be (right to maintain) so,—**"Because the teaching (here) relates to the concentration of the mind (on the *Brahman*) conceived as that same (*gāyatrī*)."** Here it is not merely the metre (*gāyatri*) that is denoted by the word *Gāyatri*; because it is impossible for what is merely a metre to form the Self of all. But on the other hand, it is taught here that the mind as concentrated on the *gāyatri* is to be applied to the *Brahman* Himself. The meaning is—that, for the purpose of attaining the fruition of the desired result, it is taught in relation to the *Brahman* that He is to be continuously conceived and meditated upon as being similar to the *gāyatri*. And from the passage—"All beings make up His one foot; His three immortal feet are in the Highest Heaven"—[*Chhānd. Up.* III. 12. 6.], there arises a similarity between the *Brahman* who (thus) has four feet and the *gāyatri* which also has four feet. And the *gāyatri* (metre) with four feet is met with occasionally, as in the following instance:—

Indraśśachīpatiḥ |
Valenapīḍitaḥ ||
Duśchyavano vṛishā |

410. Vide *R. V.* X. 90. 3.

Samitsu sāsahiḥ ‖[411]

"Indeed (the scripture declares it) accordingly"—that is —elsewhere also a word which ordinarily denotes a metre is used to denote other things, in consequence of its similarity with them; for example, in connection with the *vidyā* (or the form of worship) in which the vital air is enjoined to be meditated upon and worshipped as having the quality of absorbing all things at once into itself, it is declared, in the passage beginning with— "Now these five and the other five make ten."—[412] [*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 3. 8.], that "this same (ten-syllabled metre) *virāj* (which consists of ten constituent parts) is that which eats the food (consisting of ten parts)." [*Chhānd. Up.* IV. 3. 8.].

For the following reason also, what is denoted by the word *Gāyatrī* is the *Brahman* Himself:

Sūtra 27. Bhūtādipādavyapadeśopapatteśchaivam.

Because also it is appropriate only thus to declare that (intelligent) beings and other objects form the feet (of the *Gāyatrī*).

411. Halāyudhabhaṭṭa quotes these lines almost as they are given above in his commentary under the following aphorism of Pingala in his work on Sanskrit prosody: *Ādyam chatushpāt ṛitubhiḥ*. Here the metre known as *Gāyatrī* is said to consist of four parts of six syllables each. And in illustration of this the following example is given:—

Indraśśachīpatiḥ |
Valena vīlitaḥ ‖
Duśchyavano vṛishā |
Lamatsu sāsahiḥ ‖

412. The first five are—*Vāyu*, air, *Agni*, fire, *Āditya*, sun. *Chandra*, moon, and *Ap*, water; the second five are—*Prāṇa*, breath, *Vāk*, speech, *Chakshus*, sight, *Śrotra*, hearing, and *Manas*, mind.

After pointing out the (intelligent) beings, the earth, the body, and the heart (to form the feet of the *Gāyatrī*), there is this teaching which is given to the effect—" This above-mentioned (*Gāyatrī*) has four feet."—[*Chhānd. Up.* III. 12. 5.]; and such (a teaching) can be highly appropriate only in relation to the *Brahman* Himself, who is (here) denoted by the word *Gāyatrī*.

Sūtra 28. Upadeśabhedānnetichennobhayasminnapy-avirodhāt.

If it be said that, on account of there being a difference between the (two) teachings (given in the context, what is denoted by the word *Jyotis* or Light) is not (the *Brahman*), it cannot be (right to say) so; because even in both those (teachings) there is nothing that is contradictory (of each other).

In a former passage (in the same context), namely,—" His three immortal feet are in the Highest Heaven (*divi*)."—[*Chhānd. Up.* III. 12. 6.], the Highest Heaven (*dyu*) is pointed out as the position of location; and here (*i. e.* in the passage under reference), viz.—" Beyond the Highest Heaven, (*divaḥ*)"—[*Chhānd. Up.* III. 13. 7.], it (viz. that Highest Heaven) is indicated to be a boundary; and thus the teaching has different forms. Consequently that *Brahman* who is declared in the previous passage cannot be recognised in the subsequent one. If it be so held, (it is replied that) it cannot be so; because **even in** (regard to) **both those** teachings there is a similarity in the nature of their import, and there is thus nothing to hinder such a recognition. For an (analogous) example, there is this instance—" The hawk

is on the top of the tree," and—"The hawk is above the top of the tree." Therefore, the Highest Person Himself, who is possessed of unsurpassable splendour, is declared to be that *Jyotis* (or Light) which is resplendent beyond the Highest Heaven. And the Highest Person is declared to have four feet in this passage,—"Such is His greatness. Greater than that is the *Purusha*. All beings make up His one foot. His three immortal feet are in the Highest Heaven." [*R. V.* X. 90. 3. & *Chhānd. Up.* III. 12. 6.]: and He is also declared to have an immaterial form in the passage—"I know this great Person of sunlike lustre who is beyond darkness."—[*Taitt. Ār.* III. 12. 7.]; and the splendour belonging to such (a Person) is also non-material. Consequently, it is faultless to say that, owing to His possessing that (splendour), He Himself is denoted by the word *Jyotis* (or Light here).

ADHIKARAṆA. XI.

Indraprāṇādhikaraṇa.

It has been stated that that which is associated with unsurpassable splendour, which is denoted by the word *Jyotis* (or Light), and which is pointed out as if it were a well-known thing, is the Highest Person Himself. Now, he (the *Sūtrakāra*) says: that what are denoted also by *Indra*, *Prāṇa* and other such words, and are declared in the scriptures to constitute objects of worship, owing to their forming the means of attaining that immortality which is invariably associated with what constitutes the cause of the world,—(they) are (all the same as) the Highest Person Himself.

Sūtra 29. Prāṇastathānugamāt.

That which is denoted by *Prāṇa* (*Indra* and other such words is the *Brahman*), because it is so understood in the sequel.

In the *Kaushītakī-Brāhmaṇa*, the context[413] dealing with the *vidyā* (or form of worship) taught to Pratardana is begun with the passage—"Now Pratardana, the son of Divodāsa, went to the favourite abode of Indra by means of battle and valour"; and therein it is remarked by Pratardana to Indra, who had asked him to choose a boon,—"You yourself choose for me that boon which you think is most beneficial to man"; and thereafter, it is declared thus (in the same context):—"He said—'Indeed, I am the *Prāṇa* and the omniscient Self. Worship and meditate on me as life, as immortality'." [*Kaush. Up.* III. 1.].

Here the doubt arises whether this Being, who is denoted by the words *Indra* and *Prāṇa* to be the object of such worship as is most beneficial (to man), is the individual self himself; or whether He is the Supreme Self who is other than the individual self. It is perhaps thought right to hold that that (Being) is the individual self himself. Why? Because the word *Indra* is ordinarily well known to denote only a particular individual self, and the word *Prāṇa* also which is grammatically equated with that (word *Indra*) signifies that same (individual self). When this individual self having the name of Indra was told by Pratardana to the effect—"You yourself choose for me that boon which you think is most benefi-

413. The context referred to here is the third chapter of the *Kaushītakī-Brāhmaṇa-Upanishad.*

cial to man."—[*Kaush. Up.* III. 1.], he (*i. e.* Indra) taught the worship of himself as being the most beneficial by saying—"Worship me." [*Kaush. Up.* III. 1.]. And what is most beneficial (here) is nothing other than what forms the means for the attainment of immortality. That the worship of that (Being), which is the cause of the world, forms the means for the attainment of immortality, is made out from this passage—"So long as he is not freed (from the body), so long there is delay; then he will be blessed." [*Chhānd. Up.* VI. 14. 2.]. Therefore the well known Indra himself who has the nature of an individual self is that *Brahman* who forms the cause of the world.

To this supposition there is this reply—"That which is denoted by *Prāṇa* (*Indra* and other such words is the *Brahman*); because it is so understood in the sequel." [*Ved. Sūt.* I. 1. 29.] This Being who is denoted by the words *Indra* and *Prāṇa* is not merely the individual self; but, on the other hand, He is the Highest *Brahman* who is a different entity from the individual self; because it is only on such a supposition that that meaning in the sequel becomes appropriate which is derived from the grammatical equation of what is in the very commencement denoted by the words *Indra* and *Prāṇa* with the words *ānanda* (blissful), *ajara* (undecaying), and *amṛita* (immortal), as mentioned in the scriptural passage—"That same *Prāṇa* is the omniscient Self who is blissful, undecaying and immortal." [*Kaush. Up.* III. 9.].

Sūtra 30. Navakturātmopadeśāditichedadhyātma-sambandhabhūmāhyasmin.

If it be said that, on account of the speaker (Indra) declaring himself (to be the object of worship, what is

denoted by the words *Indra* and *Prāṇa* is) not (the *Brahman*, it is replied that it cannot be right to say so); because there is here (in this context) the mention of a multitude of attributes belonging to the Inner Self.

What has been stated to the effect that He who is denoted by the words *Indra* and *Prāṇa* is the Supreme *Brahman*, in as much as He is that same entity that is imported by the passage—"He is blissful, undecaying, and immortal."—[*Kaush. Up.* III. 9.],—that is not appropriate; because *Indra*, who is the speaker in the passages—"Know me alone."—[*Kaush. Up.* III. 1.] and—"I am the *Prāṇa* and the omniscient self. Meditate on me as life, as immortality."—[*Kaush. Up.* III. 1.],—teaches Pratardana that he himself, who is made out to be of the nature of an individual self on account of his having killed Tvāshṭra and of having done other (such acts) as are stated in the following passage among others—namely—"I killed the three-headed Tvāshṭra",—[*Kaush. Up.* III. 1.], is undoubtedly the object of worship (sought after). Hence, it having been understood in the beginning (of the context) that he (Indra) is a particular individual self, the conclusion (of that context) with—"He is blissful, undecaying and immortal, &c."—[*Kaush. Up.* III. 9.]—has (necessarily) to be interpreted in conformity with that (commencement).

When it is so held, he (the *Sūtrakāra*) disproves (such a supposition) by saying—"**Because there is here (in this context) the mention of a multitude of attributes belonging to the Inner Self.**" That related quality which exists *in* the Self is the **attribute** of **the Inner Self.** Its 'multitudinousness' is its abundance. The meaning is that it is manifold. This manifoldness of the related quality results from the manifoldness of the things which are

related to the Self so as to be contained in Him. And this (manifoldness of attributes) is indeed possible only in relation to the Highest Self taken to be the speaker here. Thus, in the passage—"Just as, in a chariot, the circumference (of a wheel) is fixed to the spokes and the spokes are fixed to the nave, so also these subtle material elements (*bhûtamâtras*) are made to depend on the subtle intelligences (*prajñâmâtras*), and the subtle intelligences are made to depend upon the *Prâṇa*. This same *Prâṇa* Himself is the omniscient Self, who is blissful, undecaying, and immortal." [*Kaush. Up.* III. 9.],—the whole collection of non-intelligent things is denoted by the word *bhûtamâtra*; then by means of the word *prajñâmâtra* the whole series of intelligent individual selves is denoted as forming the support of those (non-intelligent things); then it is pointed out that the subject of the context denoted by the words *Indra* and *Prâṇa* forms the support of those (intelligent individual selves) also; and (finally), it (viz. that context) teaches that that same Being is "blissful, undecaying, and immortal." The meaning is, that this quality of being the support of all the things, which consist of the intelligent and the non-intelligent entities, is appropriate only in relation to that Highest Self who is a different entity from the individual self.

Or, in the expression—"**Because there is here** (**in this context**) **the mention of a multitude of attributes belonging to the Inner Self,**"—'the **attributes** of **the Inner Self**' are those attributes which are the peculiar characteristics of the Highest Self. Their 'multitudinousness', that is, their manifoldness is indeed found '**here**', that is, in the present context. Accordingly, at the outset it is made out in the passages—"You yourself choose for me that boon which you think is most beneficial to man,"—[*Kaush.*

Up. III.1.] and—"Worship me."—[*Kaush. Up.* III.1.], that the Indra, who is denoted by the word *Prāṇa*, is the object of that peculiar worship of the Highest Self, which forms the means for the attainment of final release. Similarly, to be the Impeller of all activities, in accordance with the passage—"He of Himself induces him, whom He wishes to lead beyond these worlds, to do work which is good; He of Himself induces him, whom He wishes to lead downwards, to do work which is not good."—[*Kaush. Up.* III. 9.], is also an attribute of the Supreme Self. So also to be the support of all, in accordance with the passage—"Just as, in a chariot, the circumference (of a wheel) is fixed to the spokes, and the spokes are fixed to the nave, so also these subtle material elements are made to depend upon the subtle intelligences, and the subtle intelligences are made to depend upon the *Prāṇa*,"—[*Kaush. Up.* III. 9.]—is an attribute of Himself. Similarly again those attributes, which are found mentioned in the passage—"This same *Prāṇa* Himself is the omniscient Self who is blissful, undecaying and immortal."—[*Kaush. Up.* III. 9.], belong to that Supreme Self Himself. And these (attributes) also, namely, that "He is the Lord of all the worlds" and that "He is the Lord of all"—[*Kaush. Up.* III. 9.],—are possible only in relation to the Supreme Self. Consequently, in as much as the attributes of the Supreme Self are here abundantly mentioned, it is the Supreme Self Himself who is denoted by the words *Indra* and *Prāṇa* here.

To point out how under such a circumstance it becomes appropriate for Indra, who is well known to be of the nature of an individual self, to teach that he himself is the object of worship,—he (the *Sūtrakāra*) says :—

Sûtra 31. Śâstradṛishṭyâtûpadeśo Vâmadevavat.

And the teaching (in the context) is, as in the case of Vâmadeva, in accordance with the view found in the scripture.

This teaching, which, in the statements—" Know me alone"—[*Kaush. Up.* III.1.] and—"Worship me"-[*Kaush. Up.* III. 1.], is given to the effect that his own self is the *Brahman* who has to be worshipped,is not derived from that self-knowledge which is obtained from other means of proof (than the scripture); but, on the other hand, it is the result of the self-knowledge which is derived from the scripture itself. What is said is this:—In accordance with the following and other similar passages, namely,—" Entering in along with this individual self, which is (also) the same as Myself, I evolve the differentiations of name and form "—[*Chhând. Up.* VI. 3. 2.], " All this has That for its Self."—[*Chhând. Up.* VI.8.7.], " He who has entered within is the ruler of all things that are born, and is the Self of all."—[*Taitt. Âr.* III. 21.], "He who, dwelling in the self, is within the self, whom the self does not know, whose body is the self, and who internally rules the self, &c."—[*Mâdh. Bṛih. Up.* III. 7. 22.], " He is the internal Self of all beings, He is devoid of sin, He is the Divine Lord, He is the One Nârâyaṇa."—[*Sub. Up.* VII.1.], he (*i. e.* Indra) had in mind that the Supreme Self owns the individual selves as His body, and knew also that the words *I, thou,* and others, which denote individual selves, include the Supreme Self Himself within their import ; and thereafter, by means of the scriptural statements—" Know me alone"—[*Kaush. Up.* III. 1.] and—" Worship me "—[*Kaush. Up.* III. 1.] he taught that none other than the Supreme Self who has (Indra) himself for His body forms the object of worship.

"As in the case of Vāmadeva." That is, Vāmadeva realised that the Highest *Brahman* forms the internal Self of all things and that all things form His body, and that those words which denote material embodiments include the embodied in their import; and then he indicated the Highest *Brahman* who has himself (*i. e.* Vāmadeva) for His body by the word 'I'; and (lastly) he taught, with the help of a grammatical equation with that ('I'), that he (himself) was Manu, the sun, &c., in the following and other passages:—"After seeing this (*Brahman*), the sage Vāmadeva experienced—I have become Manu and the sun also."—[*Bṛih. Up.* I. 4. 10.], "I am the sage and seer Kakshīvat." [*R. V.* IV. 26. 1.]. And Prahlāda also says the same thing thus:—"Since the Infinite One exists in all things, I am also none other than He; all things proceed from me, I am all things and all things exist in me who am eternal." [*V. P.* I. 19. 85.].

After previously stating an objection (that may be raised against his position), he (the *Sūtrakāra*) gives below the reason why, in this context, the words that denote the individual self and denote also certain non-intelligent things (such as the *prāṇa* or the principal vital air) are used to denote the Highest *Brahman* who forms the object of worship.

Sūtra 32. Jīvamukhyaprāṇaliṅgānnetichennopāsātraividhyādāśritatvādihatadyogāt.

If it be said that, on account of the characteristics of the individual self and of the principal vital air (being mentioned in the context), there is no (reference to the

***Brahman* here at all, it is replied that) it cannot be (right to say) so; because the worship (of the *Brahman*) has a threefold nature; because (elsewhere) this (threefold nature of His worship) is taken for granted; and because here (*i. e.* in the present context also) that (same kind of worship) may be appropriately referred to.**

The characteristics of the individual self are mentioned in the following and other passages :—"Let no man specially desire to know what speech is, let him understand who the speaker is."—[*Kaush. Up.* III. 8.]; "I killed the three-headed Tvāshṭra; I handed over the devotees, (named) Aruṁmukhas to the wolves."—[*Kaush. Up.* III. 1.]. The characteristics of the principal vital air are given in the following passages :—"So long as the *prāṇa* dwells in this body, so long surely there is life."—[*Kaush. Up.* III. 1.]; "Now indeed the sentient *prāṇa*, firmly taking hold of this body, makes it rise up."—[*Kaush. Up.* III. 2.]. If it be said that, in consequence, there is here (*i. e.* in this context) no mention (really) of a multitude of attributes belonging to the Inner Self, (it is replied that) it cannot be so for this reason, namely, that **the worship (of the *Brahman*) has a threefold nature.** The denotation (of the *Brahman*) by means of certain particular words (in this context) is meant to teach the threefold nature of (His) worship. The meaning is that it is meant to serve the object of teaching the three kinds of continued meditation (in relation to the *Brahman*), namely, the continued meditation of the *Brahman* as forming the only cause of all the worlds in accordance with His own essential nature; the continued meditation (of the *Brahman*) as having the whole series of enjoyers (or the individual selves) for His body; and the continued medi-

tation (of the *Brahman*) as having the enjoyable (material) things and the auxiliary (material) helps to enjoyment for His body. This same threefold continued meditation of the *Brahman* is **taken for granted** in other (scriptural) contexts also. In the following and other passages, namely,—"The *Brahman* is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity."—[*Taitt. Up.* II.1.1.]—and "The *Brahman* is bliss."—[*Taitt. Up.* III. 6. 1.], the continued meditation (of the *Brahman*) as He is in His own essential nature (is taken for granted). In the following and other passages, namely,—"Having created it, He entered into it; having entered into it, He became the *sat* and the *tyat*, the defined and the undefined, the possessor of a home and the homeless one, the intelligent thing and the non-intelligent thing. While being the unchangeable individual self (*satya*) and the changeable matter, He has (nevertheless) remained true to His own nature." [*Taitt. Up.* II. 6. 1.],—the continued meditation (of the *Brahman*) as having the enjoyers (or the individual selves) for His body and also as having the enjoyable (material) things and the (material) auxiliaries of enjoyment for His body, (is taken for granted). The meaning is that **here,** that is, in the (present) context also, this threefold meditation of the *Brahman* is appropriate. What is said is this:—Wherever particular individual selves from the four-faced Brahmā downwards and particular non-intelligent things from the *prakṛiti* downwards are found mentioned in association with the peculiarly characteristic attributes of the Supreme Self,—or wherever the words denoting them (*i. e.* those intelligent individual selves and those non-intelligent things) are seen to be grammatically equated with the words denoting the Supreme Self;— in all such cases, what is intended to be taught is the continued meditation of the *Brahman* as form-

ing the Inner Self of those particular intelligent and non-intelligent entities. Consequently, it is an established conclusion that he who is denoted by the words *Indra* and *Prāṇa* here (*i.e.* in the context under reference) is the Supreme Self Himself, who is a different entity from the individual selves.

END OF VOLUME I.

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ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS VOLUME.

A. M. Nār.=Atharva-Mahānārāyaṇa-Upanishad.
Adh. Up.=Adhyātma-Upanishad.
Adhik.=Adhikaraṇa.
Ait. Ār.=Aitareya-Āraṇyaka.
Ait. Br.=Aitareya-Brāhmaṇa.
Ait. Up.=Aitareya-Upanishad.
Ath. Up.=Atharvaśira-Upanishad.
Ā. S.=Ātmasiddhi of Yāmunāchārya.
Āp. Dh.=Āpastamba-Dharma-Sūtras.
Āp. Śr.=Āpastamba-Śrauta-Sūtras.
Āś. Śr.=Āśvalāyana-Śrauta-Sūtras.
B. G.=Bhagavad-Gītā.
Bṛih. Up.=Bṛihadāraṇyaka-Upanishad.
Brah. Up.=Brahma-Upanishad.
C̲hhānd. Up.=C̲hhāndogya-Upanishad.
Īś. Up.=Īśāvāsya-Upanishad.
Kaṭh. Up.=Kaṭha-Upanishad.
Kāṇ. Bṛih. Up.=Bṛihadāraṇyaka-Upanishad, Kāṇva recension.
Ken. Up.=Kena-Upanishad.
Kaush. Up.=Kaushītakī-Brāhmaṇa-Upanishad.
M. Bh.=Mahābhārata.
M. Nār.=Taittirīya-Mahānārāyaṇa-Upanishad.
Mah. Up.=Mahā-Upanishad.
Manu.=Manusmṛiti.
Mādh. Bṛih. Up.—Bṛihadāraṇyaka-Upanishad, Mādhyandina recension.
Māṇḍ. Up.=Māṇḍūkya-Upanishad.
Muṇḍ. Up.=Muṇḍaka-Upanishad.

n. = foot-note.
nn. = foot-notes.
Nir. = Nirukta of Yāska.
Pāṇini. = Ashṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini.
Pūr. Mīm. = Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā aphorisms of Jaimini.
Pr. Up. = Praśna-Upanishad.
R. V. = Ṛigveda-Saṃhitā.
Śat. Br. = Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa.
Śvet. Up. = Śvetāśvatara-Upanishad.
Sub. Up. = Subāla-Upanishad.
Sūt. = Sūtra.
Taitt. Ār. = Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka.
Taitt. Br. = Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa.
Taitt. Saṃh. = Taittirīya-Saṃhitā.
Taitt. Up. = Taittirīya-Upanishad.
V. Dh. = Vishṇu-Dharma.
V. P. = Vishṇu-Purāṇa.
Vāj. Saṃh. = Vājasaneyi-Saṃhitā.
Ved. Sūt. = Vedānta-Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇa.

THE FOLLOWING IS THE SYSTEM OF TRANSLITERATION ADOPTED IN THIS WORK.

Vowels.	*Equivalents and Pronunciation.*		
अ	a	in	mica.
आ	ā	"	father (fāther).
इ	i	"	give.
ई	ī	"	police (polīce).
उ	u	"	put.
ऊ	ū	"	rule (rūle).
ऋ	ṛi	"	gridiron or critique.
ॠ	ṛī	"	the above prolonged.
ऌ	lṛi	"	revelry (revelṛi).
ॡ	lṛī	"	the above prolonged.
ए	e	"	prey.
ऐ	ai	"	aisle.
ओ	o	"	note.
औ	au like ou	"	loud.

Consonants.	*Equivalents and Pronunciation.*		
क्	k	in	kind.
ख्	kh	"	ink-horn (inkhorn).
ग्	g	"	gun.
घ्	gh	"	log-hut (loghut).
ङ्	ṅ	"	king (kiṅg).
च्	ch	"	such.
छ्	chh	"	church-hill (churchhill).
ज्	j	"	jump.

Consonants.	*Equivalents and Pronunciation.*		
झ्	jh	„	hedge-hog (hejhog).
ञ्	ñ	„	singe (siñj).
ट्	ṭ	„	cat (caṭ).
ठ्	ṭh	„	ant-hill (anṭhill).
ड्	ḍ	„	dance (ḍance).
ढ्	ḍh	„	red-haired (reḍhaired).
ण्	ṇ	„	bind (biṇd).
त्	t like th	„	kith.
थ्	th	„	nuthook (more dental).
द्	d like th	„	this.
ध्	dh	„	adhere (more dental).
न्	n	„	not.
प्	p	„	pot.
फ्	ph	„	uphill.
ब्	b	„	bear.
भ्	bh	„	abhor.
म्	m	„	map.
य्	y	„	royal.
र्	r	„	rod.
ल्	l	„	like.
व्	v & w	„	waver.
श	ś	„	sure (śure).
ष्	sh	„	rush.
स्	s	„	sir.
ह्	h	„	hear.

ः ḥ (aspirate) Symbol for the sibilant called *visarga*, or substitute for final *s*.

ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA.

Page	Line	For	Read
i	14th from below	his	His
viii	13th ,,	fourfold means	fourfold moral means
16	5th ,,	darkness'	'darkness'
48	1st ,,	realisation	realisation
86	11th ,,	mentoning	mentioning
95	6th ,,	time of	time (of
124	22nd from above	worid.	world,
132	15th ,,	Saunka	Saunaka
146	27th ,,	III,24.	III.21.
152	2nd ,,	experession	expression
184	7th from below (right-hand column)	or	or-
201	7th ,,	denoted by	denoted simply by
205	25th from above	is	is always to be
209	10th from below	by	by means of
215	22nd from above	III.24	III.21.
228	20th ,,	III.24.	III.21.
247	4th ,,	childern	children
256	7th from below	the general	a general
317	18th from above	there is contradiction	there is no contradiction
343	7th from below	III.24.	III.21.
347	9th from above	of various grades (of	(of various grades of
352	9th ,,	Bliss	bliss
380	1st ,,	III,24.	III.21.
388	9th ,,	(the Ānandamaya	(the Ānandamaya)
407	,, ,,	12.7	13.1.